tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post6681442442842875848..comments2024-03-19T02:00:34.750-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Some varieties of atheismEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger741125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-43831097321280298822011-10-30T07:16:20.579-07:002011-10-30T07:16:20.579-07:00All we are saying; is give peace a chance!
Religi...All we are saying; is give peace a chance!<br /><br />Religion is unnecessary, our collective data supports this across the board. As in secular communities which are a heck of a lot more successful than religious communities.<br /><br />Anything outside of a religious belief can be generated by an atheist. We are human. All of us. Thus we hold humankind attributes.<br /><br />New Atheism? Hardly. Simply the ability to speak out without the need to fear a hanging.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-43920176185192839142011-10-09T18:39:59.700-07:002011-10-09T18:39:59.700-07:00Verbose Stoic,
"So you're talking about ...Verbose Stoic,<br /><br /><i>"So you're talking about 'essential' here without talking about 'essential property'.</i><br /><br />Since you seem to admit stopping eating eventually makes us dead, I think you admit eating is essential to our life. Yes, I would say that what it means for us, in part, to be alive is to eat. It's seems obvious that something that is essential to our life is an essential property of our life. If it's not, then what exactly is your standard for identifying an essential property? How do you decide which properties are essential and which are not?<br /><br />Furthermore, you have ignored the most important question. What property of a living thing distinguishes it from a rock?<br /><br /><i>"Note that, conceptually, undead is a great counter-example to your claim. Vampires and zombies eat and are not alive in the sense we normally mean alive, and yet we have no trouble with the concept and don't think this raises a problem for our definition of 'living'. </i><br /><br />You know that your opponent is in the Twilight Zone when he uses literary monsters as examples relevant to matters of fact. If 'essence' to life is whatever can be imagined in a horror story then 'essence' becomes laughable nonsense. Figuring that out should be really, really easy.<br /><br /><i>"And here it's important because the previous poster may well advance an argument of "What makes me me is, in fact, my personal identity, and my personal identity does not change, and so change is not essential to what it means for a person to be a person". Yes, people can change, but the argument here is that while the person can change, the identity never does; no matter how much I change and objectively note that change, there is something that still allows me to say that I am, indeed, still me."</i><br /><br />What is the difference between 'personal identity' and 'identity'? Scratch the chair -- that's a change. But it's still the same chair, identity-wise. So your distinction does not exist.Don Jindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05550378223563435764noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9147717884327192472011-10-09T12:05:42.068-07:002011-10-09T12:05:42.068-07:00Note that, conceptually, undead is a great counter...<i>Note that, conceptually, undead is a great counter-example to your claim. Vampires and zombies eat and are not alive in the sense we normally mean alive, and yet we have no trouble with the concept and don't think this raises a problem for our definition of "living".</i><br /><br />The problem there is that Vampires and zombies (depending on how you define them) do not meet the other qualifiers for being alive... like growth or reproduction.StoneTopnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-17654998816163254042011-10-08T10:42:27.029-07:002011-10-08T10:42:27.029-07:00StoneTop,
"It is if that change is further d...StoneTop,<br /><br /><i>"It is if that change is further defined as either a metabolic process or as 'change in response to environmental stimuli'"</i><br /><br />Exactly. The change in living things is fundamentally different than in non-living things. Those changes, more than anything else, separate the living from non-living. For example, if a billiard ball hits a living animal we are faced with the fact that we cannot predict its exact path of reaction. And then there is reproduction and metabolism on top of reactive changes. A 'form' that presumes to capture the 'essence' of living things has to deal with these fundamental differences. I don't see how any non-changing 'form' can hope to do such a thing.<br /><br />And this also makes me wonder about the 'form' for a billiard ball. Isn't that form more about how it is used than what it is? The billiard ball 'form' has to take into account the human intention to use that ball in a certain way. Otherwise it's just a ball, not a billiard ball. Therefore the 'form' has to be somehow mixed with the form for humanness. 'Form' can change with our intent. That alone takes it out of the realm of the permanent.Don Jindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05550378223563435764noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-7647477840607320452011-10-08T03:17:01.820-07:002011-10-08T03:17:01.820-07:00djindra,
No, you are equivocating like mad ... wh...djindra,<br /><br />No, you are equivocating like mad ... whether that's intentional or not remains to be seen.<br /><br />Let's look at your comment on essential again:<br /><br />"If anything is essential to life, certainly change is. The mere act of eating and metabolizing is change."<br /><br />So, in order to stay alive, it is essential that I eat. Certainly true for a specific sense of the word "essential". If I don't eat and metabolize, I die, and since those are change therefore it is essential that I eat in order to live. Fair enough. The problem is that if we tried to apply this to the actual debate you'd be saying that what it means, in part, to be alive is to eat. That's what the term "living" means, since you would have to assert that eating is an ESSENTIAL PROPERTY of living things. Even the link to "living involves eating which involves change, therefore change is an essential property" fails because while for us without eating we would be dead, the reason that not eating makes us not living is NOT because stopping that activity is stopping part of what it MEANS to be alive, but because stopping that activity eventually makes us dead.<br /><br />So you're talking about "essential" here without talking about "essential property". When we say "essential property", we aren't talking -- at least solely -- about the actions that are required to maintain that state, but about what it MEANS to be living as opposed to dead, not living, or undead.<br /><br />Note that, conceptually, undead is a great counter-example to your claim. Vampires and zombies eat and are not alive in the sense we normally mean alive, and yet we have no trouble with the concept and don't think this raises a problem for our definition of "living". That suggests that eating and and metabolizing -- which are essential for them as well -- are not critical for determining what it means to be alive; it is something else that determines that distinction in those cases.<br /><br />(But do note that figuring this stuff out is, in fact, really, really hard.)<br /><br />You also equivocate on identity:<br /><br />"But it's worth noting that identity has nothing to do with it. Even a non-living chair has an identity."<br /><br />But not a personal identity, which is what the previous poster was clearly referring to. So you're using a different definition of identity than the previous post is, and expecting that that will show that the argument is wrong, which doesn't work logically. And here it's important because the previous poster may well advance an argument of "What makes me me is, in fact, my personal identity, and my personal identity does not change, and so change is not essential to what it means for a person to be a person". Yes, people can change, but the argument here is that while the person can change, the identity never does; no matter how much I change and objectively note that change, there is something that still allows me to say that I am, indeed, still me.Verbose Stoichttp://verbosestoic.wordpress.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51007594519365945612011-10-07T11:03:28.377-07:002011-10-07T11:03:28.377-07:00Depending on how one defines change, all living th...<i>Depending on how one defines change, all living things might well have to change, but recall that in that case that was derived from a claim that all things change and so cannot be used as something particular to living things.</i><br /><br />It is if that change is further defined as either a metabolic process or as "change in response to environmental stimuli"<br /><br /><i>And you change definitions to make these points here, ironically in different ways.</i><br /><br />No change in definition is needed... living "things" are organized bodies of cells (with the simplest living thing being a single cell, metabolic processes are part of the way a body changes in response to its environment.<br /><br /><i>There are other ways to be organized unless you define "cells" as "any building blocks that provide organization", which is tautological but doesn't link up to the original argument properly (since I do think they meant "biological cells").</i><br /><br />Hardly tautological... at leas no more so then any definition. If they were talking about biological cells and biological life then the point still stands.<br /><br />The list of properties that make a thing "living" is a list of all the conditions that must be met for something to be alive. Most things that exist meet one or more of those points (crystals are composed of smaller organized units, but are not alive because they do not meet all the requirements).StoneTopnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-37638341353524278052011-10-06T07:05:24.797-07:002011-10-06T07:05:24.797-07:00@Steersman:
"By which token, I’m arguing tha...@Steersman:<br /><br />"By which token, I’m arguing that, as the position of an object will change even though there is no force causing it to do so, once set in motion from potentiality to actuality an object will continue to change from potentiality to actuality continuously, again with no further force required. Or, if you prefer, once actualized – into motion, into existence – it will stay that way until another force is applied."<br /><br />Your argument is incorrect; you ignore other elements of Thomistic metaphysics. Here it suffices to say that your last sentence provides the response as far as the TCA is concerned.<br /><br />"<i>Unless your opinion has changed since then, this means you refuse logic when it comes to God and similar matters and I have no reason to suppose that you will not refuse logic on any other subject whatsoever.</i><br /><br />That is a completely bogus argument – a straw-man of the first water. That I question the premises and rules of inference for A-T metaphysics does not at all mean that I necessarily question those associated with, for example, Euclidean geometry."<br /><br />My original question was (from the copies of my posts):<br /><br />"Fine, then no argument which has the sort of mathematical certainty can convince you, at least when it comes to the particular subject of God, souls, etc. So the question is, if not even an argument satisfying the standards of rigor in mathematics suffices, what sort of argument would in principle convince you?"<br /><br />Your response was:<br /><br />"Largely, none, at least in the sense of an argument of logic."<br /><br />So no, it was not a "completely bogus argument". I am not a mind reader; if you meant "the premises for A-T metaphysics" then you should have said so. I note however, that besides premises, you have added rules of inference. The rules of inference used in metaphysics, or in basically any intellectual discipline, are the usual rules of logical inference. If you reject those, you reject logic, thus giving a second confirmation in spite of your little outburst.<br /><br />"For one thing, I’m able to actually take out my protractor and ruler and measure the resulting constructions and see some correspondence with the theorems – something that is notably lacking in A-T metaphysics."<br /><br />You simply do not know what you are talking about and you keep making the same category mistakes. In the A-T account, all knowledge, including metaphysical one, *starts* with sense experience -- and thus, depending on how one defines "validated", A-T metaphysics *is* validated by reality. If as you say, such aspect is "notably lacking in A-T metaphysics" then either you can set up an experiment that invalidates A-T metaphysics, or A-T metaphysics is not an empirical discipline and thus empirical methods are useless. Mathematics is not an empirical discipline; your supposed experiment says absolutely nothing about Euclidean geometry. Part of your confusion is that the objects you mention are so close to our sense experience, but if you had just a little bit more knowledge of mathematics you would know how bogus your assertion is.<br /><br />"I very much agree with him – my amens – on the very great many problematic aspects derived from a literal interpretation of the stories therein – and of religious dogma in general."<br /><br />Ah yes, "literal interpretation". The simpleton's exegesis favored by fundie Gnu atheists and rejected by the Catholic, Orthodox and many Protestant Churches.<br /><br />Finally, as regards your performance at Jerry Coyne's blog, you owe me nothing, so why exactly did you felt the need to justify yourself?grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72102065333817763972011-10-05T22:34:27.123-07:002011-10-05T22:34:27.123-07:00You suggest that inertia invalidates the metaphysi...<i>You suggest that inertia invalidates the metaphysics. Since motion is change and there is no inertia principle for change, your objection is null and void.</i><br /><br />Ipse dixit.<br /><br /><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inertia#Classical_inertia" rel="nofollow">Inertia</a> wasn’t a concept that Aristotle used or was familiar with, hence Galileo’s and Newton’s development of it – aided, I might add, by several notable scholastics unhappy with Aristotle’s views:<br /><br /><i>The law of inertia states that it is the tendency of an object to resist a change in motion. According to Newton's words, an object will stay at rest or stay in motion unless acted on by a net external force, whether it results from gravity, friction, contact, or some other source [e.g. “The Unmoved Mover”]</i> [my example]<br /><br />By which token, I’m arguing that, as the position of an object will change even though there is no force causing it to do so, once set in motion from potentiality to actuality an object will continue to change from potentiality to actuality continuously, again with no further force required. Or, if you prefer, once actualized – into motion, into existence – it will stay that way until another force is applied.<br /><br /><i>The word "cant" does not mean "rigorous metaphysical proof", which is what you surely meant in the quoted phrase …</i><br /><br />No, I certainly didn’t mean that – more along the line of the other definitions you provided. <br /> <br /><i>Unless your opinion has changed since then, this means you refuse logic when it comes to God and similar matters and I have no reason to suppose that you will not refuse logic on any other subject whatsoever.</i><br /><br />That is a completely bogus argument – a straw-man of the first water. That I question the premises and rules of inference for A-T metaphysics does not at all mean that I necessarily question those associated with, for example, Euclidean geometry. For one thing, I’m able to actually take out my protractor and ruler and measure the resulting constructions and see some correspondence with the theorems – something that is notably lacking in A-T metaphysics.<br /><br /><i>I was just reading … the thread [on Jerry <a href="http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2011/09/16/catholics-claim-that-lies-are-truer-than-truth/" rel="nofollow">Coyne’s site</a>] that finally evicted Ye Olde Statistician, and I have to say your performance was stellar (*), complete with a Goebbels quote and amens to that paragon of rationality called Ben Goren.</i><br /><br />First, I don’t really think YOS was evicted – only that he was asked to post under his own name, hardly unreasonable – not that he was making strenuous efforts to hide any connections – which I pointed out to him.<br /><br />Second, the Goebbels quote is something that Feser himself has referred as well: “Since any lie repeated long and loudly enough will come to seem the plain truth ….” [TLS; pg 222] Seems the problem and the modus operandi is no stranger in either camp.<br /><br />Thirdly, while I disagree with Mr. Goren on his apparent, more or less categorical, rejection of any metaphorical value in the Bible, I very much agree with him – my amens – on the very great many problematic aspects derived from a literal interpretation of the stories therein – and of religious dogma in general. It doesn’t take much effort to find examples of those aspects, but for some horrific details of the consequences of faith healing, largely Christian, on children you might want to check out this <a href="http://childrenshealthcare.org/" rel="nofollow">site</a> – some portion of the blame for which might reasonably be laid at the doorstep of the Catholic Church for its own dogmatic literalism. It’s all fine and dandy to be concerned about and interested in the arcana of theory, but to lose sight of the practical consequences of those theories doesn’t say much that’s positive about those pursuing those avenues.<br /><br />And fourth, yes, that is me posting under the Steersman handle on Coyne’s site as well.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11039002533270157792011-10-05T19:55:12.126-07:002011-10-05T19:55:12.126-07:00Try The Reconstruction of the Christian Revelation...Try The Reconstruction of the Christian Revelation Claim by Stuart Hackett. Probably the best -philosophical- defense of Christianity, and without agenda.machinephilosophyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07715878687266064548noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3372342295935374642011-10-05T17:31:19.642-07:002011-10-05T17:31:19.642-07:00Verbose Stoic said...
Thus, a living thing that do...Verbose Stoic said...<br /><i>Thus, a living thing that does not change is not a living thing mainly because it stops being a thing, not because it stops being alive.</i><br /><br />Staying above the level of vibrating molecules for now, living things constantly experience change at a rate in proportion to their size. They are constantly breathing, burning fuel, etc., or they are dead things.<br /><br />Admittedly, I'm not sure where frozen thigs fit in this scale. Dead but revivable? Truly living? Some third category? I lean to the last choice, but have not given it deep thought.<br /><br /><i>I had to look up the term to see what your criticism was, and it seems backwards. Nominalism seems to imply that there are no abstract things, only physical things. </i><br /><br />My understanding is that one consequence of this is that categorizations like "red" or "living" represent exactly what the mind of the thinker says they represent, hence my comparison.<br /><br /><i>My argument, in my opinion, risks doing the exact opposite and arguing that there are only truly abstract things like Platonic forms, and no physical things at all. </i><br /><br />I think even Platonism does not go quite that far. Saying universals exist independently of matter is different from saying the matter itself does not exist.<br /><br /><i>I can't see how you can get to me denying the existence of abstract things from focusing on defining the concept independently of empirical observations of instances ...</i><br /><br />I meant that you seem to be saying the properties of the essence of a thing can be chosen on an arbitrary basis, much like a nominalist might say that any given sense experience is in the sqame category as any other given sense experience, based on their say-so.<br /><br /><i>It wouldn't be, say, organic. Can we conceive of inorganic life? Well, Star Trek has been doing it for decades, so it seems possible [grin].</i><br /><br />I think many of the regulars here who tend to agree with Feser would not recognize Data as being alive. I could be wrong.<br /><br /><i>These may not be clear cases, but they are enough to put the burden of proof on the person who wants to claim that cells are an essential property of life to explain why it is that those things ought not be considered to be alive just because they lack cells ... </i><br /><br />I suppose we could distinguish different universal for biological living things and a more generic version.<br /><br />On the other hand, we shouldn't use "life" and "sentience" synonymously. Data may be sentient yet not alive. No one in science fiction worries about machines without sentience, like phasers. However, we consider biological entities without sentience alive.<br /><br />October 5, 2011 8:25 AMOne Browhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11938816242512563561noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-47760001303494345002011-10-05T17:25:06.486-07:002011-10-05T17:25:06.486-07:00@Steersman:
"Which, I might suggest, raises ...@Steersman:<br /><br />"Which, I might suggest, raises the question of which came first, the perception of physical motion or the metaphysical notion of change from potentiality to actuality – which, according to the cant, requires a First Cause."<br /><br />That Aristotle arrived at the notions of potentiality, actuality, etc. from physical observation, is probably true, but it is also irrelevant. You suggest that inertia invalidates the metaphysics. Since motion is change and there is no inertia principle for change, your objection is null and void.<br /><br />You have many suggestions, so allow me to suggest that you check the dictionary. The word "cant" does not mean "rigorous metaphysical proof", which is what you surely meant in the quoted phrase, but rather pious platitudes, the peculiar vocabulary of a sect or covenant. For example, New Atheists have a cant all of their own. Dr. Johnson's wise admonition was "clear your mind of cant".<br /><br />"One might still argue that it has applicability in the metaphysical sphere, but without something to justify it – as Aristotle’s physical observations did originally – that premise can hardly be characterized and dignified as even a hypothesis – “idle speculation” or “fanciful conjecture” at best, methinks."<br /><br />If the argumentation shows that it holds in the metaphysical sphere it holds in the metaphysical sphere, period. There is plenty of justification for the principle that does not go through the outmoded Aristotelian physics.<br /><br />"And while my own argument hardly conclusively disproves the metaphysical one, I would say that it raises, or should raise, some significant doubt about it. And it seems there is already plenty of such doubt – maybe related to the foregoing – on that score given the rejection of that argument by a number of philosophers knowledgeable of both Aristotle and Aquinas – Kenny & Vallicella for examples."<br /><br />That you have doubts, that much is clear, but then it is also clear that you are woefully ignorant of these matters. The objections of Sir Anthony Kenny and Bill Vallicella have nothing to do with the incorrectness of Aristotle's physics.<br /><br />"Not in my view; not if a fundamental premise undergirding the First Cause argument is inductively derived from Aristotle’s misunderstanding of the material world physics."<br /><br />If Aristotle's metaphysics is indeed based on a misunderstanding of the material world, then it is possible to trace out the misunderstanding and show exactly where the metaphysics goes wrong. Thomists that have been thinking about this for 700 years and who, as we all know, the only physics they understand is the Aristotelian one, will surely like to hear your proof.<br /><br />As a parting comment, I have to say I am not really willing to argue with you and prefer to simply point out the numerous mistakes in your posts. In a previous exchange, you conceded that no logical argument could ever convince you of the existence of God, souls, etc. Unless your opinion has changed since then, this means you refuse logic when it comes to God and similar matters and I have no reason to suppose that you will not refuse logic on any other subject whatsoever. In other words, arguing with you is a waste of both our times. Maybe you are better served by discussing these matters in Jerry Coyne's blog with like-minded people. I was just reading<br /><br />http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2011/09/16/catholics-claim-that-lies-are-truer-than-truth<br /><br />the thread that finally evicted Ye Olde Statistician, and I have to say your performance was stellar (*), complete with a Goebbels quote and amens to that paragon of rationality called Ben Goren.<br /><br />(*) If you are not the same Steersman of that thread, then my apologies for the confusion.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52458941095921978592011-10-05T14:28:38.386-07:002011-10-05T14:28:38.386-07:00Verbose Stoic,
"He clearly said "some l...Verbose Stoic,<br /><br /><i>"He clearly said "some living things" have identity, that those things are persons. Comparing them to oak trees, them, is kinda ridiculous."</i><br /><br />It's kinda ridiculous for him to have brought up personal identity in the first place. The issue was life and change, not personhood and/or identity and change. But it's worth noting that identity has nothing to do with it. Even a non-living chair has an identity. And as for personhood, I would argue that we wouldn't go to schools or churches if we didn't believe persons change -- and must change. We can't remain Peter Pan.Don Jindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05550378223563435764noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4367541793793623282011-10-05T14:16:46.208-07:002011-10-05T14:16:46.208-07:00G. Rodrigues (?) said:
Motion for the scholastics...G. Rodrigues (?) said:<br /><br /><i>Motion for the scholastics is not physical motion but change.</i><br /><br />Yes, I understand that, though I might emphasize or argue instead “motion for the scholastics is not <b>just</b> physical motion but change in general”. Which, I might suggest, raises the question of which came first, the perception of physical motion or the metaphysical notion of change from potentiality to actuality – which, according to the cant, requires a First Cause.<br /><br />More specifically, it seems entirely plausible to me that Aristotle started off from the observation of physical objects – in the “material world” – that apparently needed a constant force to maintain them in constant velocity and concluded that as a law of nature. And from there he inferred, by the rules of induction and arguing from the particular to the general – “as below, so above”, that it also applied to all change in general, specifically the change from potentiality to actuality.<br /><br />As you know, the problem of induction appears to be not exactly a trivial one, although the case of mathematical induction is apparently, I would argue in spite of mathematical “conventional wisdom”, a case where entirely valid conclusions can be reached, but mainly because the universe of particulars is largely constrained. Generally not at all the case outside the realm of mathematics if I’m not mistaken.<br /><br />But if, as is the case, that rule or law is invalid in that material world then it seems highly questionable to be using it anywhere else since that usage elsewhere is fundamentally dependent on its validity in the first case – one needs to keep in mind the sources of derivation of one’s premises. One might still argue that it has applicability in the metaphysical sphere, but without something to justify it – as Aristotle’s physical observations did originally – that premise can hardly be characterized and dignified as even a hypothesis – “idle speculation” or “fanciful conjecture” at best, methinks.<br /><br /><i>"Likewise suspect" or "likewise probable" does not count as a refutation of a metaphysical argument -- and I stress the metaphysical.</i><br /><br />True enough. But that highlights the asymmetry between proof and disproof: for the proof of a theorem one must show it applies in all cases whereas for the disproof all one needs is one case that is inconsistent with that theorem. And while my own argument hardly conclusively disproves the metaphysical one, I would say that it raises, or should raise, some significant doubt about it. And it seems there is already plenty of such doubt – maybe related to the foregoing – on that score given the rejection of that argument by a number of philosophers knowledgeable of both Aristotle and Aquinas – Kenny & Vallicella for examples.<br /><br /><i>Aristotle's physics can be dropped without injury to his metaphysics.</i><br /><br />Not in my view; not if a fundamental premise undergirding the First Cause argument is inductively derived from Aristotle’s misunderstanding of the material world physics.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-91562669478034763912011-10-05T14:08:29.820-07:002011-10-05T14:08:29.820-07:00Verbose Stoic,
"You're still equivocatin...Verbose Stoic,<br /><br /><i>"You're still equivocating on 'essential'. You're splitting it out from the term 'essential property' and then trying to claim that that's just what it means, but you can't make that move without solid argumentation that you lack."</i><br /><br />I'm not 'equivocating' on anything. Change is indeed an essential property of life. It's a bluff for you to claim it's "conceptually possible to have things that lived that did not change" (and it again demonstrates the incoherent meaning A-Ters attach to 'conceivability.') . If you think you can make the argument that change is non-essential to life, let's see it. Tell me how you would know it was life. How would you know that un-changing 'life' was different than a rock? What would be a clue?Don Jindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05550378223563435764noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-45121267266588131802011-10-05T14:02:26.222-07:002011-10-05T14:02:26.222-07:00G. Rodrigues (?) said:
Motion for the scholastics...G. Rodrigues (?) said:<br /><br /><i>Motion for the scholastics is not physical motion but change.</i><br /><br />Yes, I understand that, though I might emphasize or argue instead “motion for the scholastics is not <b>just</b> physical motion but change in general”. Which, I might suggest, raises the question of which came first, the perception of physical motion or the metaphysical notion of change from potentiality to actuality – which, according to the cant, requires a First Cause.<br /><br />More specifically, it seems entirely plausible to me that Aristotle started off from the observation of physical objects – in the “material world” – that apparently needed a constant force to maintain them in constant velocity and concluded that as a law of nature. And from there he inferred, by the rules of induction and arguing from the particular to the general – “as below, so above”, that it also applied to all change in general, specifically the change from potentiality to actuality.<br /><br />As you know, the problem of induction appears to be not exactly a trivial one, although the case of mathematical induction is apparently, I would argue in spite of mathematical “conventional wisdom”, a case where entirely valid conclusions can be reached, but mainly because the universe of particulars is largely constrained. Generally not at all the case outside the realm of mathematics if I’m not mistaken.<br /><br />But if, as is the case, that rule or law is invalid in that material world then it seems highly questionable to be using it anywhere else since that usage elsewhere is fundamentally dependent on its validity in the first case – one needs to keep in mind the sources of derivation of one’s premises. One might still argue that it has applicability in the metaphysical sphere, but without something to justify it – as Aristotle’s physical observations did originally – that premise can hardly be characterized and dignified as even a hypothesis – “idle speculation” or “fanciful conjecture” at best, methinks.<br /><br /><i>"Likewise suspect" or "likewise probable" does not count as a refutation of a metaphysical argument -- and I stress the metaphysical.</i><br /><br />True enough. But that highlights the asymmetry between proof and disproof: for the proof of a theorem one must show it applies in all cases whereas for the disproof all one needs is one case that is inconsistent with that theorem. And while my own argument hardly conclusively disproves the metaphysical one, I would say that it raises, or should raise, some significant doubt about it. And it seems there is already plenty of such doubt – maybe related to the foregoing – on that score given the rejection of that argument by a number of philosophers knowledgeable of both Aristotle and Aquinas – Kenny & Vallicella for examples.<br /><br /><i>Aristotle's physics can be dropped without injury to his metaphysics.</i><br /><br />Not in my view; not if a fundamental premise undergirding the First Cause argument is inductively derived from Aristotle’s misunderstanding of the material world physics.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26657659693077556912011-10-05T08:47:34.883-07:002011-10-05T08:47:34.883-07:00StoneTop,
"Really? You are the one one clai...StoneTop, <br /><br />"Really? You are the one one claiming that there are living things out there that do not change"<br /><br />I claimed no such thing. I claimed that it is conceptually possible to have things that lived that did not change. Or, more precisely, that the argument of "all things change so all living things change" did not make change an interesting essential quality of living things specifically. Depending on how one defines change, all living things might well have to change, but recall that in that case that was derived from a claim that all things change and so cannot be used as something particular to living things.<br /><br />Thus, if you want to insist that it is particular to all living things that they all must change as part of the concept of living things itself and not just inherited from things, you need to argue that. I not only do not need to give you any example until you do so, I don't need to give you an empirical example EVER since we are talking about concepts, not instances.<br /><br />"Actually yes. Though exact definitions vary having cells (organization) and changing (growth, reproduction, metabolism) is a part of that."<br /><br />And you change definitions to make these points here, ironically in different ways.<br /><br />For the first case, you seem to be implying that organization is part of the concept of living things, cells are at least one way of organizing, so all living things having cells is part of the concept of living things. The error? There are other ways to be organized unless you define "cells" as "any building blocks that provide organization", which is tautological but doesn't link up to the original argument properly (since I do think they meant "biological cells"). So you argue that the general is involved and so all must have the specific case that you've observed, which is just plain wrong.<br /><br />For the latter, you go the other way. You try to justify the general "change" based on specific things that involve change. But, again, this does not make change itself an interesting differentiating term; yes, all living things have an implication of change in their concept, but since we do not know if all things contain similar implications with different properties this does not distinguish living things from non-living things (as change itself) and so change, again, is not the relevant property for the argument.Verbose Stoichttp://verbosestoic.wordpress.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33141745664820034112011-10-05T08:25:25.767-07:002011-10-05T08:25:25.767-07:00One Brow,
Sorry about the delay in replying.
&qu...One Brow,<br /><br />Sorry about the delay in replying.<br /><br />"I will agree change does not distinguish the living from the non-living, except by its absence (that whcih does not change is not living)."<br /><br />Well, I think that's what you can't say. Not changing does not necessarily imply not living (although certain qualities might imply that, if we worked it out) but it is clear that the reason you can say "If it doesn't change it is not a living thing" is because of the earlier argument that all things change. Thus, a living thing that does not change is not a living thing mainly because it stops being a thing, not because it stops being alive.<br /><br />"I don't include A in my conception of B, so A is not part fo the essence of B? Again, this seems to veer close to nominalism."<br /><br />I had to look up the term to see what your criticism was, and it seems backwards. Nominalism seems to imply that there are no abstract things, only physical things. My argument, in my opinion, risks doing the exact opposite and arguing that there are only truly abstract things like Platonic forms, and no physical things at all. I can't see how you can get to me denying the existence of abstract things from focusing on defining the concept independently of empirical observations of instances ...<br /><br />"Conceptually, what would such a thing resemble if it did not have dividing cells? What is the essence of a living thing?"<br /><br />It wouldn't be, say, organic. Can we conceive of inorganic life? Well, Star Trek has been doing it for decades, so it seems possible [grin].<br /><br />Are Cylon centurions alive? Take any number of examples from sci-fi and we get reasonable concepts of things that are alive but don't have cells, let alone ones that divide. These may not be clear cases, but they are enough to put the burden of proof on the person who wants to claim that cells are an essential property of life to explain why it is that those things ought not be considered to be alive just because they lack cells ...Verbose Stoichttp://verbosestoic.wordpress.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-47346724163017419882011-10-05T08:12:12.911-07:002011-10-05T08:12:12.911-07:00djindra,
"Shown to me? Maybe it's been a...djindra,<br /><br />"Shown to me? Maybe it's been asserted but it has not been shown to me or anyone else. If anything is essential to life, certainly change is. The mere act of eating and metabolizing is change."<br /><br />You're still equivocating on "essential". You're splitting it out from the term "essential property" and then trying to claim that that's just what it means, but you can't make that move without solid argumentation that you lack.<br /><br />" "And no one's denying that living things change; what's being denied is that some living things i.e., persons, change qua identity."<br /><br />That's nonsense. What identity does an oak tree have?"<br /><br />Did oak trees become persons without anyone telling me?<br /><br />He clearly said "some living things" have identity, that those things are persons. Comparing them to oak trees, them, is kinda ridiculous.Verbose Stoichttp://verbosestoic.wordpress.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35670087710613081472011-10-03T19:00:19.289-07:002011-10-03T19:00:19.289-07:00sharq,
"'I' am not my cells; that is...sharq,<br /><br /><i>"'I' am not my cells; that is, my cells aren't essential to me qua my identity as the person I am."</i><br /><br />I have to break some bad news to you. Your identity is not essential to life. It's not even essential to human life or humanness. Your identity is yours and only yours. It's a particular peculiar to you. Therefore it cannot be part of a universal or form. This my-soul-as-form idea is a contradiction -- just one more contradiction in the Thomist scheme of things.Don Jindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05550378223563435764noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-63488270442753722522011-10-03T18:39:49.600-07:002011-10-03T18:39:49.600-07:00sharq,
"No, it isn't an essential proper...sharq,<br /><br />"<i>No, it isn't an essential property. That has already been shown to you."</i><br /><br />Shown to me? Maybe it's been asserted but it has not been shown to me or anyone else. If anything is essential to life, certainly change is. The mere act of eating and metabolizing is change.<br /><br /><i>"And no one's denying that living things change; what's being denied is that some living things i.e., persons, change qua identity.</i><br /><br />That's nonsense. What identity does an oak tree have?Don Jindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05550378223563435764noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71414928027798961532011-10-03T18:11:40.697-07:002011-10-03T18:11:40.697-07:00@Steersman:
"My point has been that since it...@Steersman:<br /><br />"My point has been that since it is known that motion can continue without there being any force, any “impulse”, to cause it, the existence of some First Cause to give existence to matter, its transition from potentiality to actuality, is itself highly dubious – a matter of conjecture, not fact."<br /><br />Motion for the scholastics is not physical motion but change.<br /><br />"And, similarly, since the “facts” of that physical motion are anything but the case, it is likewise probable that the inductive conclusion which presumably follows from them is likewise suspect"<br /><br />"Likewise suspect" or "likewise probable" does not count as a refutation of a metaphysical argument -- and I stress the metaphysical.<br /><br />"Maybe, although it seems that is partly due to the difference between classical and personal theism. But, as I say, I think it is consistent with my rejection of the applicability of Aristotle’s misconception of inertia to his metaphysics."<br /><br />Aristotle's physics can be dropped without injury to his metaphysics.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44972813425365354422011-10-03T15:25:16.863-07:002011-10-03T15:25:16.863-07:00FM said:
In A-T even if the universe was always h...FM said:<br /><br /><i>In A-T even if the universe was always here, the argument Aquinas presents would still be valid (Prof. Feser wrote more than one post on the subject).<br /><br />As a matter of fact Aquinas did not use the idea that the universe had a beginning as a premise to his cosmological arguments.</i><br /><br />Agreed. Though he did base it on an analogy with one of Aristotle’s principles of physics as it pertained to the empirical, tangible, and real world and which has been shown to be invalid – as even Feser acknowledges. Consider this from Richard Tarnas’ <i>The Passion of the Western Mind: Understanding the Ideas That Have Shaped Our World View</i>:<br /><br /><i>Aristotle’s logic could be represented in the following way: (a) <b>All motion</b> is the result of the dynamicism impelling potentiality to formal realization. (b) Since the universe as a whole is involved in motion, and since nothing moves without an impulse toward form, the universe must be moved by a supreme, universal form. (c) Since the highest form must already be perfectly realized – i.e., not in a potential state – and since matter is by definition the state of potentiality, the highest form is both entirely immaterial and without motion: hence the Unmoved Mover, the supreme perfect Being that is pure form, God.</i> [pg 63; my emphasis]<br /><br />My point has been that since it is known that motion can continue without there being any force, any “impulse”, to cause it, the existence of some First Cause to give existence to matter, its transition from potentiality to actuality, is itself highly dubious – a matter of conjecture, not fact. And, similarly, since the “facts” of that physical motion are anything but the case, it is likewise probable that the inductive conclusion which presumably follows from them is likewise suspect: no God required – self powered existence; God, like a good father, or more appropriately, a good mother, gave birth to its creation, its conception, and then let nature take its [accidental] course. <br /><br />Though, again continuing the analogy, that does not preclude some god having given existence to all of creation at some “time” which then, accidentally – so to speak, continues on in its merry way without any necessity for any ongoing involvement by any god. <br /><br /><i>On the other hand I think that the idea of the 'tweaker God' that is often presented in Intelligent Design is often, if not always, [refuted] by Thomists...</i><br /><br />Maybe, although it seems that is partly due to the difference between classical and personal theism. But, as I say, I think it is consistent with my rejection of the applicability of Aristotle’s misconception of inertia to his metaphysics.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-41585367386509371072011-10-03T03:19:18.279-07:002011-10-03T03:19:18.279-07:00I haven’t the foggiest idea – maybe it’s always be...<i>I haven’t the foggiest idea – maybe it’s always been here, cycling between Big Bang and Big Crunch.</i><br /><br />Mr Steersman,<br /><br />in A-T even if the universe was always here, the argument Aquinas presents would still be valid (Prof. Feser wrote more than one post on the subject).<br /><br />As a matter of fact Aquinas did not use the idea that the universe had a beginning as a premise to his cosmological arguments.<br /><br /><br /><i><br />Though, in passing, the argument I provided still leaves open the possibility of a God who “twiddled the universe parameters, pushed the button and stepped back, and hasn’t been seen since”.<br /></i><br /><br />On the other hand I think that the idea of the 'tweaker God' that is often presented in Intelligent Design is often, if not always, refused by Thomists...<br /><br /><br /><i>Brian, <br /><br />I'd recommend Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion. He devotes about 10 paragraphs to Aquinas and the Five Ways, and boy do they deliver!<br /></i><br /><br />Well it sure is more substantial (at least in number of words used :P) that the half paragraphs trained philosophers like Dennet or Harris use ;)<br /><br />We must give Dicky 1 point for trying!FMnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71533048547615555462011-10-01T06:52:40.268-07:002011-10-01T06:52:40.268-07:001) Change fails because it is about the concept &q...<i>1) Change fails because it is about the concept "thing" as opposed to the concept "living thing". Yes, in some sense because "living thing" is a "thing" it does distinguish it, it is not what distinguishes living things from all other things, and so cannot be used here.</i><br /><br />So if change is a property of living things because they are "things" then doesn't that mean that all living things change?<br /><br /><i>2) Cell division fails because it is an empirical presumption that living things have cells and have cells that divide. Conceptually, there is nothing wrong with having a living thing that either does not have cells or whose cells do not divide.</i><br /><br />How so? What would a living thing be composed of if not "cells"?StoneTopnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11822027629653384592011-10-01T04:26:18.374-07:002011-10-01T04:26:18.374-07:00I think that you're demanding something of me ...<i>I think that you're demanding something of me before you've given me a reason to provide that. </i><br /><br />Really? You are the one one claiming that there are living things out there that do not change... so it would fall to you to explain how they are 'living' but at the same time do not change.<br /><br /><i>Is it part of the concept of living things that they change or have cells?</i><br /><br />Actually yes. Though exact definitions vary having cells (organization) and changing (growth, reproduction, metabolism) is a part of that.StoneTopnoreply@blogger.com