tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post6477977595909797471..comments2024-03-27T23:49:45.668-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Sheer Hart attackEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger136125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-56200631348882600482013-06-03T20:06:39.196-07:002013-06-03T20:06:39.196-07:00@daniel smith
QUOTE from your blog"I am also...@daniel smith<br /><br />QUOTE from your blog"I am also a non-Darwinist ID opponent; a Protestant Thomist and a heavy metal lover (Black Sabbath rules!)."<br /><br />So are you like Norman Geisler sans the love of Metal and opposition to ID?<br /><br /><br />PS. Iron Maiden can't be fought! Iron Maiden can't be sought!Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28812600732001181282013-06-03T20:03:08.629-07:002013-06-03T20:03:08.629-07:00My anger at this point at this point is crossing t...My anger at this point at this point is crossing the line from "sin not" to rather dark territory.<br /><br />But unfortunately like Bruce Banner from the Avengers I am always angry. So what can I do? Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-82931729742459553942013-05-03T00:08:23.819-07:002013-05-03T00:08:23.819-07:00Rank,
Perhaps the weak link is the theory of evol...Rank,<br /><br />Perhaps the weak link is the theory of evolution, then. I'm have far from the real expertise needed to comment, but one need not accept creationism to reject evolution. It does seem to me that evolution is not as obviously beyond doubt as its proponents, and most culture, seems to believe. <br /><br />Another alternative to evolution and I.D is a Platonic explanation of the origins of species: that they descend down the hierarchy of being until they emerge in our corporeal realm. <br /><br />It is certainly the case that allegations that God has faked geological evidence should be held in contempt. But there are arguments, ironically closely connected to those being made in the discussion about Hart, that our ability to perceive some forms of evidence, especially that more connected to psychic or subtle realms of being (those directly above our corporeal realm) is due to how attuned our consciousnesses are, individually and collectively, to extra-corporeal reality. This is one reason why, despite the fact the corporeal realm can never be completely closed off from the rest of reality (even now miracles and paranormal events abound)our normal experience of the world, again individually and collectively, has a smaller place for the miraculous and the paranormal than in ages past.<br /><br />A homely illustration of this last point could come from an article I once read by the irreplaceable John Michell. Michell recalled how he had once went to the Isle of Mann and while there how he conversed with an old Manx farmer. This farm told him how he had not seen the "Fairie Folk" (no sure if this was the exact term he used) for many years, not since the Manx language had died out on the island. Such talk will be scoffed at, of course, by naturalists, but I find it an interesting illustration of the point, which is essentially Blake's that the wise man and the fool see not the same tree.<br /><br />Whatever the case, I think the issues surrounding the origin and development of life and species is far less settled and obvious as some would have us believe. Though really, it is a topic that takes great expertise, philosophically and scientifically, to navigate.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26653925656139434292013-05-02T05:50:46.473-07:002013-05-02T05:50:46.473-07:00Rank, the problem you're describing used to bo...Rank, the problem you're describing used to bother me too, until I remembered that the Fall of Man was not the first Fall. I believe traditional Christian teaching is that Satan and the other rebel angels fell very soon after the initial creation. Presumably they were not doing nothing in the billions of years between the Big Bang and the appearance of man. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-2939030916947955952013-05-01T23:03:32.230-07:002013-05-01T23:03:32.230-07:00Mr. Green,
Anyway, so special evolution involves ...Mr. Green,<br /><br /><i>Anyway, so special evolution involves lots of death... so what? Aquinas believed in death before the Fall (for animals). I'm sympathetic to arguments against any death before the Fall, but I don't see how it's impossible.</i><br /><br />I'm not saying that it's impossible, from a logical standpoint. I just don't believe that death before the Fall can be reconciled with the Christian message. I made an argument about this a couple of months ago in an old combox, so I'll just copy and paste what I said then:<br /><br /><i>The core distinction, here, is pre-fall and post-fall. Gen 1:29-30 make it fairly clear that animals were not meant to be eaten by man or by one another pre-fall, even though Aquinas denies this with a bald assertion and an argument from authority in ST Ia q96 a1. God later lifted this ban in Gen 9:3 following the introduction of death--permission contrary to his intentions for creation. That humans are allowed to eat animals without sin says nothing about God's will, because the natural evil of death was not supposed to exist in the first place. Isaiah 11:6-9 and Romans 8:18-23 plainly state that decay, violence and hostility, even in the case of creation generally, are contrary to God's plans. The issue of consuming plants pre-fall is a bit tricky, but less so when it is realized that eating from a plant does not necessarily result in its death, particularly in a pre-fall state. Seeing as plants had, at least at that time, the final cause of "being food" (again, see Gen 1:29-30), I don't see how this constitutes a natural evil. Plants would not be dying and would be fulfilling their teleological end (as it was then)--so where is the natural evil?</i><br /><br />I'm a firm believer that death before the Fall contradicts Christianity to the core. Remember that God "did not make death, nor does he rejoice in the destruction of the living" (Wis 1:13-15). I think that any conception of God that makes him complicit in death and suffering falls victim to Ivan's argument in The Brothers Karamazov, during the chapter "Rebellion". Why should anyone accept a harmony built on the back of incalculable suffering and death? Even if God exists, there's no reason to desire that harmony.<br /><br /><i>Well, first we could notice that we do not at all know for a fact that humans "evolved" (which in context presumably means "developed biologically from a long line of non-human predecessors"). [...] So if you could establish with certainty (or at least with greater certainty than the historical extrapolations) that, say, special evolution could not have occurred before the Fall, then you would have a good argument that there must be some other explanation for the evidence, even if we don't yet know what that is.</i><br /><br />I simply meant that evolution is the standard belief now, and we have very little reason to doubt it. I agree that we have no reason to accept evolution before the Fall simply because of the historical record, though. Consistency with Christianity comes first.<br /><br /><i>Alexander Pruss has just posted an amusing (though unabashedly far-fetched) variation on that theme which accommodates a literal reading of Genesis 1 with long-term evolution. I guess since you don't believe that Christianity and special evolution are compatible, then you presumably go for some option along those lines... although perhaps you remain strictly agnostic about the whole thing.</i><br /><br />Strictly agnostic would probably be the best label for my position. I have no solution. I believe in Christianity and I believe that evolution occurred, but, like the physicists studying that pesky gap between relativity and quantum mechanics, I make no claim as to how they intersect. I've heard arguments about the supernatural unreliability of the historical record before--and I find them entertaining. But there's just got to be a more cohesive position than outright skepticism out there somewhere. Who knows, though?rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-85368429355354614992013-05-01T22:13:54.160-07:002013-05-01T22:13:54.160-07:00Rank Sophist: Making evolution God's will enta...Rank Sophist: <i>Making evolution God's will entails that God must rely on death and the rest. This is a problem even if we reject "tinker" versions like Intelligent Design and just stick with the idea that God made evolution and intended it to play out in the way that it did</i><br /><br />I don't think we can say Intelligent Design entails "tinkering" if that means God has to continually intervene with miracles to keep things on track. I'm not even sure that would be a predominant view among ID folks. (Nor, <i>contra</i> Anon., do I see the problem with tinkering; I quite enjoy it myself.) Anyway, so special evolution involves lots of death... so what? Aquinas believed in death before the Fall (for animals). I'm sympathetic to arguments against any death before the Fall, but I don't see how it's <i>impossible</i>.<br /><br /><i>I personally don't believe that Christianity and evolution can be reconciled unless evolution is, in some way, made a result of the Fall. [...] We know for a fact that humans evolved, so how could the Fall be prior to the evolution of humans?</i><br /><br />Well, first we could notice that we do not at all know for a fact that humans "evolved" (which in context presumably means "developed biologically from a long line of non-human predecessors"). What we have is a load of circumstantial evidence that can be plausibly interpreted by positing a long line of pre-human creatures. And we don't have a plausible alternative (scientific) explanation for that evidence. There's nothing wrong with that; that is the correct and reasonable way to apply scientific knowledge to historical events... but such conclusions can be probable at best, never certain. So if you could establish with certainty (or at least with greater certainty than the historical extrapolations) that, say, special evolution could not have occurred before the Fall, then you would have a good argument that there must be some other explanation for the evidence, even if we don't yet know what that is.<br /><br />Of course, there is a very simple — though irksomely vague — possibility: that some sort of miracle(s) occurred that throw a monkey wrench in the evidential chain. Alexander Pruss has just posted an amusing (though unabashedly far-fetched) variation on that <a href="http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.com/2013/04/a-just-so-story-for-genesis-1-3.html" rel="nofollow">theme which accommodates a literal reading of Genesis 1 with long-term evolution</a>. I guess since you don't believe that Christianity and special evolution are compatible, then you presumably go for some option along those lines... although perhaps you remain strictly agnostic about the whole thing.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-38496958123309988312013-05-01T19:24:27.158-07:002013-05-01T19:24:27.158-07:00Well actually... evolution relies heavily of genet...Well actually... evolution relies heavily of genetic changes in the local genetic pool, the rest is outcomes of a creatures life, it is the genetic information that builds the creature and hence it is the heaviest factor in evolutionary History, the rest is just the dynamics of the environment and simply dictates those creatures that prosper in that same environment.<br /><br />Eduardonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55992186927230426482013-05-01T13:15:40.588-07:002013-05-01T13:15:40.588-07:00Anon at April 30, 10:45 AM,
Is your reading of ev...Anon at April 30, 10:45 AM,<br /><br /><i>Is your reading of evolution and theism something you developed on your own, or is it one that I can read about somewhere else? I'm still having difficultly reconciling the two in a way that doesn't make God look like some ridiculous "tinkerer."</i><br /><br />I was referring to versions of theistic evolution that understand it as a directed process by which God's will is fulfilled. Evolution is a process of death, disease, famine, chance, mass predation and all sorts of stuff like that. Making evolution God's will entails that God must rely on death and the rest. This is a problem even if we reject "tinker" versions like Intelligent Design and just stick with the idea that God made evolution and intended it to play out in the way that it did--see BioLogos.<br /><br />I personally don't believe that Christianity and evolution can be reconciled unless evolution is, in some way, made a result of the Fall. How could that be done? I've dedicated quite a bit of time to thinking about it, without much success. We know for a fact that humans evolved, so how could the Fall be prior to the evolution of humans? I'm sure there's a way, but I haven't found it yet.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-60623751078404394822013-05-01T10:58:11.880-07:002013-05-01T10:58:11.880-07:00Anonymous wrote: "and no one is suggesting th...Anonymous wrote: "and no one is suggesting that natural lawyers should stop talking; rather, Hart is critiquing their assumptions and tactics."<br /><br />WHOSE assumptions and tactics??<br /><br />Listen up, Anonymous: if you have read Feser's frickin' critique of Hart's position, then you should know that central to Feser's critique is the claim that Hart is critiquing nameless (i.e., *anonymous*) opponents, using lousy arguments, which appear not to hit any REAL targets. You ignore that. So, you see, you're just begging the question and producing more of the same worthless hollow rhetoric. Maybe Hart and his defenders are right, but if they can't comprehend criticisms well enough to actually respond to them, I must continue to think it far more likely that Feser is the one who knows what he's talking about.DavidMnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16768705848397016532013-05-01T10:41:58.404-07:002013-05-01T10:41:58.404-07:00@Glenn: I, for one, appreciate your intensity - pe...@Glenn: I, for one, appreciate your intensity - perhaps because I also feel intensely about RS's 'methods' of argumentation, which, in my view, you have aptly characterized.<br /><br />Brandon wrote: "This is where your artificial distinction between Absolute Right and Wrong and merely hypothetical right and wrong comes from: it comes from Kant, who is the only major moral philosopher who has ever thought that hypothetical imperatives are not genuinely moral." <br /><br />To which RS replied: "Are you telling me that Aquinas did not think that certain actions were absolutely right or wrong? That would be a bit strange. Hypothetical imperatives only became a problem when the fact-value distinction inserted itself into modern moral reasoning. A categorical imperative is required to get a moral theory that cannot simply be rejected." <br /><br />And this was after Brandon had just written: "Even Kant, however, recognizes that it's impossible to have hypothetical imperatives without a categorical imperative: all hypothetical imperatives presuppose the categorical imperative to have any imperative force at all."<br /><br />So what gives? What is RS talking about in his reply to Brandon? (Maybe part of the problem is that he has never read Kant, only Hart-attacks on Kant?)<br /><br />[RS: "I honestly don't care what anyone thinks about what I'm saying. It's what I believe from my reading." Might we add: "...my *not-so-careful* reading, and subsequent rush to judgment"?]DavidMnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86638038067448913862013-04-30T10:35:46.828-07:002013-04-30T10:35:46.828-07:00rank,
"This problem also stands in the way o...rank,<br /><br />"This problem also stands in the way of theistic evolution. It's an ends-justify-the-means kind of mass-teleology, which only the morally disturbed would be willing to accept. (Not that I think evolution is incompatible with theism, by the way--I just don't believe that most theistic accounts of evolution are acceptable.)"<br /><br />Is your reading of evolution and theism something you developed on your own, or is it one that I can read about somewhere else? I'm still having difficultly reconciling the two in a way that doesn't make God look like some ridiculous "tinkerer."Another Anonnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28087899545969231852013-04-29T19:41:02.778-07:002013-04-29T19:41:02.778-07:00@Anonymous
After reading as much as I could on bo...@Anonymous<br /><br />After reading as much as I could on both sides of this debate, I find your points refreshing and very much needed in this discussion. You have really helped me understand Hart better. Though I feel like you've explained him much more clearly than he explained himself - but perhaps I am just having problems with his writing style. I do think (maybe hope) that there is more common ground between Hart and Feser than has been acknowledged to this point.Syphaxhttp://saintsandsaints.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54229802571299423072013-04-29T18:49:30.393-07:002013-04-29T18:49:30.393-07:00Hart's position, as anonymous states it owes a...Hart's position, as anonymous states it owes a lot to a Platonising impulse, yet I cannot help but think it owes just as much to modern continental philosophy. This seems to be proved if one compares Hart's position, as anonymous relates it, to other modern Platonist writers of Tradition and Metaphysics, such as William Blake, Coleridge, Henry Corbin, and the Perennialists. <br /><br />For example, the Platonist considers all human language and concepts to be grasping at a truth that is formless. Even those traditions or forms closest to the Truth have their limitations as they are in themselves. The modern grammars of thinking described, being more or less an obstacle to finding Truth and God, are so because they are much further away from the Truth than more beneficial and divine modes of thought. To this degree they are empty and lack coherence and meaning. To the Platonist, therefore, there is not an equivalence between modern and the great traditions of the past - the modern ways of thinking prove themselves hollow and muddled.<br /><br />Also, for the Platonist, it is true, the spiritual openness and preparation of a man for Truth determines his ability to grasp Truth; or, to put it another way, the Platonist links knowledge of Truth to Being. The Platonist sees man's intelligence as, in a sense, graded - it is Nous that is a light of all his knowledge, as it is Nous that is connected to the pinnacle of man's Being, and to properly and consistently partake in Nous takes spiritual effort and enlightenment. However, it may be asked whether, even in this day and age, the normal man is so degraded that he is beyond the grasp of discursive reason - whether in principle, if not in practice, he, his Being, has slipped below the reach of discursive reason (ratio) and argument and therefore totally cut off from the sort of arguments given by Natural Law thinkers. I don't think the Platonist would grant that this is so; he has a great respect for dialectic, as long as it is kept in its place, and it is far more the tendency of modern continental philosophy to suggest radical limitations, even in principle, to dialectic or discursive reason.<br /><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61921990271650306392013-04-28T22:19:59.330-07:002013-04-28T22:19:59.330-07:00Tony,
I don't think that Hart would disagree ...Tony,<br /><br />I don't think that Hart would disagree with you; I certainly wouldn't. But his critique is that the appeal to natural law, which has been one of the RC Church's primary means to appeal to secular governments and people in the public sphere, is being leveraged incorrectly. He thinks that because (1) Moderns inhabit a different tradition and speak a different grammar, (2) sin blinds people to natural reason, especially in an age of outright nihilism, and (3) most people will not respond to arguments of pure reason in the public square, current efforts are wasted and misguided. Worse, they compromise the Christian message by acceding to the secular demand that all legitimate public discourse be shorn of "Religious Rhetoric," which involves the internalization of an account of reason that splits the natural and the supernatural. (But recall that I was uncertain about this critique in my long post.)<br /><br />This critique is roughly similar to what one finds in MacIntyre, Cavanaugh, and others: modern secular reason operates by subordinating the "religious" to the private sphere. Efforts by Christians to engage the public on these terms legitimates secular reason and the autonomy of the nation state and the market. This can only end in a bad way for Christians as they accept a process and structures that by their very design act to displace Christianity. <br /><br />Rather than resist modernity by focusing exclusively on political activity that accepts such things as legitimate, Christians are better served by what they did in the Roman Empire: build communities in alternate social spaces and accept martyrdom. For Hart, the rhetoric of Christians are not to be found in the ballot box or by persuading politicians (for to pursue such can only be a Nietzschean Will to Power in a society that has no shared vision of the common good), but a rhetoric of martyrdom and of love.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-62540870657722421702013-04-28T20:27:12.866-07:002013-04-28T20:27:12.866-07:00as MacIntyre, Gadamer, and Hart have all acknowled...<i>as MacIntyre, Gadamer, and Hart have all acknowledged at one point – it is not practically feasible" as a tactic to rely on this.</i> <br /><br />Nor is it practically feasible to rely on ANY method - all methods are doomed to failure without grace, and with grace ANY method based on truth can work. Anyway, all of nature and the world will fail in the long run, it will all be swallowed up in the great doom of the END. Nothing we can do will enable humankind to avoid that, so it is pointless to try. <br /><br />Or not. Plato's efforts against sophistry were a tea cup against the ocean. Christ died with 1 man and 3 or 4 women still with him - an obvious failure. I just don't grant the seriousness of Hart's complaint about what is "practically feasible". We are in it for the long haul here, not just this one specific issue. If a natural lawyer were to position himself as saying that we should make <i>only</i> NL arguments, and that we <i>shouldn't</i> also be relying on prayer, sacrifice, good works, evangelization, and an upright life to work their way, well sure that would be foolish. But how many NL proponents say that? I haven't come across that. And I think Hart is exaggerating it if he is suggesting that's what's happening. OK, so maybe his calling is a different part of the overall effort. Fine - some are called to be monks or hermits, some are called to be businessmen, and some are called to be natural lawyers. All are members of the one Body. Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-79612311572910842992013-04-28T20:01:56.589-07:002013-04-28T20:01:56.589-07:00Tony,
Your response is set against a straw man. I...Tony,<br /><br />Your response is set against a straw man. If you read the rest of what I had posted, including that quotation by Hart, it will become clear that the position you ascribe to me and him is not what either of us are arguing.<br /> <br />My point wasn't that there is barrier that cannot be crossed between traditions and grammars -- in fact, I state quite plainly, "So while it is not impossible to cross the divide between traditions – as MacIntyre, Gadamer, and Hart have all acknowledged at one point – it is not <i>practically</i> feasible" as a tactic to rely on this.<br /><br />No, my point -- and Hart's, if I'm reading him correctly -- is that such a barrier is difficult to cross and that the way many try to cross it today ignores the full lived experience of the human person, to "the full range of their capacities and senses, physical and spiritual," as Hart puts it. <br /><br />Yes, we have God's law on our Heart -- and Hart makes this very point in his last article -- but we do not have unmitigated access to universal reason a la the Enlightenment. We are creatures that are either moving toward Being or back to Non-Being, toward God or toward sin, oriented toward the Truth or mired in a verisimilitude.<br /><br />And no one is denying that arguments are useless -- for they covert some who are adept in reason and have an open heart -- and no one is suggesting that natural lawyers should stop talking; rather, Hart is critiquing their assumptions and tactics. Hart, if you read his remark that I posted, even goes so far to claim there are scriptural warrants for natural law.<br /><br />As a side note, I'm not entirely clear why everyone here finds this point so objectionable. Both the RC and EO Church historically have made the claim that sin can blind us, and that this can make conversion difficult.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-8242004593442272872013-04-28T18:50:24.329-07:002013-04-28T18:50:24.329-07:00my answer is that what worries me is not the diffi...<i>my answer is that what worries me is not the difficulty of convincing such a person, but the fact that any demonstration will rest on premises which are (at least partly) drawn from the social sciences, and which therefore cannot be considered incontrovertible, however common-sensical they may appear to us. Unlike arguments for the existence of God, the premises themselves are open to rational doubt. Doubting that things change (the premise of Aquinas' First Way) is absurd, in a way that doubting that children thrive best in traditional family arrangements is not. </i> <br /><br />No, no, Vincent, you have put later, much later conclusions as if they were early premises. They aren't. Practical reason, and natural law, is indeed based on truths that are just as true and <i>just as evident</i> as the premise "things change." Indeed, before you even start the practical reasoning, you first have the sheer observation "actors desire goods". You don't even need to formulate it as a universal for it to be the ground of the discussion, but is absolutely evident and universally understood and accepted. Doubting such desire is equally absurd as doubting that things change. Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88292544277672644772013-04-28T18:43:49.164-07:002013-04-28T18:43:49.164-07:00As MacIntyre, Gadamer, and others have argued, Tra...<i>As MacIntyre, Gadamer, and others have argued, Traditions set the possibilities for our discourse. Our age is one in which most people lack the conceptual grammar to discuss metaphysics and theology intelligently. Further, moderns have developed grammars and concepts that allow them eschew such a conversation. </i> <br /><br />And as many others have argued, this "most people lack" complaint is pointless, or worse than pointless. <br /><br />For one thing, most people in St. Thomas's day, or Plato's day, or St. John Damascene's day, also lacked the conceptual grammar to discuss these things, and that didn't stop great thinkers from thinking well and writing well and to some extent, <i>molding the future</i> of discourse by their crafting thoughts well. <br /><br />For another, the written word well studied is capable of transforming the mind so that it DOES have the conceptual grammar to discuss these things. If you take a college student, and allow them to delve into Plato and Aristotle and Augustine, slowly but deeply, you can effect a change in their grammar. This so called "modern" mind is just as potentially capable of being taught to expand the field of his thoughts as Plato's students were drawn forward from being semi-literate youths to deep thinkers. I have seen it happen, repeatedly. Human nature hasn't changed. <br /><br /><i>To put it plainly, the very words we use are subject to historical development. They are amongst the things, to use Plato's distinction, which are always in flux in the sensible world. They can better express our experience of Being and the world of beings, as say scholastic Latin – or not, like the barbarism of modern English – but they are always, in a sense, provisional and delimited.</i> <br /><br />And yet, the Divine Author, the one who used men to srite Scripture, saw fit to write it in specific languages of specific times. Indeed, the Word himself saw fit to become a specific male human being at a specific time in history, and to give us a very specific prayer as "The Lord's Prayer". The specificity of concrete human expressions somehow seem adequate to God's purpose in leading us to heaven. Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11974512574158196732013-04-27T18:26:55.636-07:002013-04-27T18:26:55.636-07:00Incredible post, Anon. Hopefully that will settle ...Incredible post, Anon. Hopefully that will settle things.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-90914171680662369242013-04-27T16:41:46.780-07:002013-04-27T16:41:46.780-07:00(5 of 4 -- I know, Mea Culpa)
Thus, I must dista...(5 of 4 -- I know, Mea Culpa)<br /><br /><i> Thus, I must distance myself also from Smith’s rejection of “demonstration” and “persuasion.” As to the former, a survey of my text will show that it is a word I nowhere use opprobriously; wherever I speak of demonstration—the very last sentence of the book, for instance—I do so positively. And as to the latter: While I heartily concur that the attempt to use the modern rhetoric of “universal rationality” to coerce assent to anything, especially to a particular political or social agenda, is in some sense “violent,” I do not believe that this applies to many very honorable traditions of theological apologetics. The actual argument I make in my book on this issue, in fact, is not that universal claims are inherently violent; rather it is that such claims are not necessarily violent, for the simple reason that a rhetoric of truth is not necessarily violent. I am not rejecting universal claims; I am rejecting an ontology that would condemn all universal claims, simply on the grounds that they dare to be universal or dare to employ a rhetoric of persuasion. More importantly, I reject the Enlightenment understanding of universality in part because it dissembles its own rhetorical basis, and feigns disinterest, and even pretends that “enlightened” rationality is the very opposite of rhetorical persuasion; it is in this way that it lays the ideological groundwork for a certain very modern sort of coercion. <br /><br />Even then, I do not condemn the Enlightenment ideology for seeking to win an argument, but only for trying to end the argument by a false account of how reason functions and of what therefore may legitimately be said. When Smith writes, then, that “Martyrs aren’t out to win arguments,” I simply must disagree. They do most definitely wish to win: by “demonstrating” the power of Christ to inform their lives, but also by marshalling every resource of reason and argument that they can employ with a clear conscience. St Justin may have earned the honorific “Martyr” by dying for the faith, but his entire theological career—metaphysical debate, moral persuasion, even the philosopher’s mantle—was in the most proper sense a martyr’s labor.</i><br /><br />David Bentley Hart. “Response to James K. A. Smith, Lois Malcolm and Gerard Loughlin.” New Blackfriars 88, no. 1017 (2007): 611–2.<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-57560865543231030872013-04-27T16:40:48.152-07:002013-04-27T16:40:48.152-07:00(4 of 4)
Similarly, in my haste to dismiss the En...(4 of 4)<br /><br /><i>Similarly, in my haste to dismiss the Enlightenment myth of a “pure reason,” neutrally available to every reflective mind, undetermined by the particularities of language or culture, I seem not to have made it sufficiently clear that I was by no means calling into question the power of natural reason to discern many truths, to clarify its understanding of those truths, and to inform and receive nourishment from reasoned debate and reflection. It is one thing to say that reasoning is always carried out within a tradition of discourse, according to certain prior intentions and prejudices; it is another thing altogether to suggest that reason is impotent to find truths—even ultimate truths—that are objectively real. The former view I hold; the latter I reject.<br /><br />So, to make my views clear: I believe theology must indeed think and speak out of its own tradition, starting from an ever more perspicuous inner articulation of what that tradition is—but not because theology describes a distinct world of scripture, set over against other worlds, and not because it has no outer frame of reference by which to judge its “saga” or “narrative.” Theology should never surrender worldly reality to philosophies that deny the theocentric frame of the universe, or retreat from the work of metaphysical logic, rational argument, historical interpretation, and so on, into a world where the kerygma simply ceaselessly thunders overhead. I believe one must start from Christian tradition, but do so with the understanding that it is an interpretation of all of reality, directly engaged with a real world of human discourse and experience. Moreover, as one proceeds one should find that one’s articulations of one’s tradition require modification, and that one should be hospitable to the insights and experiences of those outside the tradition, and that the word of God does not disrupt the world of natural reason, but illuminates and redeems it. This, for instance, is why I think it perfectly legitimate (for example) to consider Heidegger’s ontology in terms of its logical coherence, or to argue for the philosophical necessity of elevating the actual over the potential, and so on.<br /><br /> Thus I would never—as Smith clearly would have me do—reject talk of natural law, or even of natural religion. To be perfectly honest, I have not got a “dialectical” bone in my body. I admit that I am skeptical as to how far natural law reasoning can actually go, especially when it is pursued under modern conditions, in which one cannot presume any sort of religio naturalis or habitual pietas of the sort one could presume in reverent pagans. And, certainly, much of the natural law writing done today, by earnest young Thomists especially, is often worse than naive, and ridiculously ambitious in its claims. Still, I believe that God as Creator reveals himself—to use a word to which I am inordinately attached—prodigally. He reveals himself in nature, in human reason, in human culture, in human religions: always now through a veil of sin and death, perhaps, but never unavailingly. When he reveals himself fully in Christ, then, he comes as the light that lighteneth all men, and comes to gather up into himself all the scattered lights—all the primordial intuitions of reason, all of the innate longing for truth, all of the joys and sorrows and true pieties, all of the beauty and grandeur of the world—that the fallen order still comprises. And I take Romans 1 or Wisdom 13 as an adequate (though certainly not the sole) scriptural warrant for such a view.</i><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-78021443306971805932013-04-27T16:40:03.863-07:002013-04-27T16:40:03.863-07:00(3 of 4)
So by engaging the modern, captive to a ...(3 of 4)<br /><br />So by engaging the modern, captive to a Tradition and a grammar that allows him recourse to explain the world without reference to God, metaphysics, teleology, etc., with an account of natural law requires overcoming many very barriers. The presuppositions, those "bedrock" beliefs, which the modern holds do not allow him to consider it. In fact, he doesn't even accept the classical account of motion. And, of course, this is where many of the protestations here have come in. "Sure," you might say, "it is difficult to convince them, but that doesn't mean we shouldn't try." Well, yes, you should try, I suppose. There are people who are willing to consider such things and be convinced by them. However, the vast majority of people hold to these assumptions uncritically, having internalized them through a lengthy process of socialization. And then there is sin. Many of you have referenced the first few chapters of Romans as a justification of Natural Law – and Hart has actually done the same (see below) – but you fail to note that Paul describes sin as inhibiting the ability of many to reason, for they "did not think it worthwhile to retain the knowledge of God, so God gave them over to a depraved mind, so that they do what ought not to be done" (Rom 1:28). This means that people who are caught in sin are less susceptible to the light of reason – a position that has a long pedigree in both the RC and EO Churches (I am of the latter, if you haven't figured it out, but I also have great respect for the former).<br /><br />Hart's point is not that natural law is impossible. Sure, he finds much of what is done today in the discipline as overconfident, but he elsewhere (see below) even acknowledges scriptural mandates for it. Rather, his claim is that focusing too heavily on advancing the arguments of natural law in the public realm is a myopic misallocation of resources. It won't convince most people and resources are limited. The Church, both Eastern and Western, while it should never stop proclaiming the truth, needs to do work to foster alternative social spaces against the forces of modernity in order to survive – a priority also for MacIntyre and Political Theologians like William Cavanaugh. To do so otherwise is to give up too much to modernity because it severs the natural from the supernatural in order to render classical metaphysics legitimate in the sphere of "public reason," which must be shorn of religious or metaphysical reasoning.<br /><br />Back to my original point, it is here that Feser and Hart seems to have the most differences, and I was quite disappointed to see Feser largely ignore the main thrust of Hart's critique in this regard – particularly because I'm left wondering whether Feser is actually subject to this critique. From what I've read of his work, it seems too strong and too unequivocal to apply to him. But it also seems to me that Feser responded in the wrong way to Hart's argument. To recount the basics of the natural law position without addressing whether or not he is subject to such a critique is a non-starter. Again, somebody needs to pay the airfare for these two so that they can have a beer together. Anyway, for those interested, see this statement below by Hart on Natural Law. It should enrich the conversation somewhat.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55663589177833476492013-04-27T16:38:06.984-07:002013-04-27T16:38:06.984-07:00(2 of 4)
This is, of course, not to claim that ph...(2 of 4)<br /><br />This is, of course, not to claim that philosophy is equivalent to monasticism; it isn't. Or that philosophy has no need of logic or rigorous analysis -- for it clearly does. Nor does it mean that scholastic approaches are not philosophical. Scholasticism has its origins in the monasteries, after all, and Aquinas himself wrote many lovely hymns. Furthermore, he did in fact achieve a vision of the divine, much like our desert monk above. (But note that he took this vision to be in some sense a revelation that abrogated his prior work.) And finally, this is not an attempt to vindicate Hart's more "Continental" approach over and against an "Analytic" one. But it is to suggest that Analytics, on the average (and please note my continual effort to avoid generalizing about all of them), are notoriously ignorant of the contingency of their ideas, grammars, and conventions. They also tend to fall into the habit of treating arguments without treating the person. <br /><br />As MacIntyre, Gadamer, and others have argued, Traditions set the possibilities for our discourse. Our age is one in which most people lack the conceptual grammar to discuss metaphysics and theology intelligently. Further, moderns have developed grammars and concepts that allow them eschew such a conversation. So while it is not impossible to cross the divide between traditions – as MacIntyre, Gadamer, and Hart have all acknowledged at one point – it is not <i>practically</i> feasible. One cannot start with the obvious, an account of motion, as Aristotle does and work their way to natural law and the unmoved mover, for the ideology behind modern science and its metaphysics and account of nature allow it a different path -- even if that path is ultimately untenable intellectually. Furthermore, as Hart recounts and many here have been too quick to dismiss, natural law has a checkered history. Aristotle, for instance, famously defended the institution of slavery, finding it perfectly amenable to natural law. It therefore seems to me that natural law can only consult immediate ends, but can only vaguely intimate what these ends are ultimately striving toward. When a Christian uses natural law to argue, for instance, that slavery is against the natural order, he does so under the presumption that humans are created in the image of God and are therefore equal in some sense and not subject to ownership. Now, of course, he may have arguments that reference only "nature" as it appears to us, but this is done alongside and in full view of the revelation operating in the background, shaping the very idea of "nature" and the status of the human person in the background. To put it plainly, the very words we use are subject to historical development. They are amongst the things, to use Plato's distinction, which are always in flux in the sensible world. They can better express our experience of Being and the world of beings, as say scholastic Latin – or not, like the barbarism of modern English – but they are always, in a sense, provisional and delimited.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58899707832145350422013-04-27T16:37:17.671-07:002013-04-27T16:37:17.671-07:00(1 of 4)
I'm actually quite puzzled by Feser&...(1 of 4)<br /><br />I'm actually quite puzzled by Feser's approach. He seemed to ignore the thrust of Hart's main criticism -- i.e. that reason cannot be separated from one's Tradition and that reason cannot exist abstracted from the lived experience and condition of the human animal -- and instead opts to recount the basics of Natural Law. It's as if he is attempting to bring Hart down from the lofty perch of a "Continental" approach and bring him down into a line-by-line analysis "Analytic" style. But I don't see either of them compromising in this regard -- at least in writing. (Perhaps if they both sat down and had a beer or two together, it would be all for the best. Then they may reach an informal and ecumenical agreement.)<br /><br />The problem is that Hart and Feser are communicating through different philosophical idioms. Contrary to an anonymous above, Hart is quite capable of doing logic -- he is not "shooting blanks"; rather, he is working in a Tradition that avoids reducing discourse to formal logic in order to take a larger view, one that accounts for the contingency and particularity of language, as well as the "full range of human capacities and senses." This is why his prose often comes off as obscure, imprecise, and the like.<br /><br />Now, many of you reared in the Anglo-American world dominated by Analytic approaches may not like this -- that's fine -- but to suggest that this is "not philosophy" betrays the very ahistorical approach to philosophy that Hart is critiquing. Philosophy, after all, cannot be solely equated to a style of formal argumentation local to English speaking countries in the 20th and 21st centuries; nor can it be reduced simply to a scholastic style of disputation. John the Damascene, for instance, an important Eastern Father whom Aquinas references copiously and someone who, you know, was part of the tradition from which the very word philosophy springs, provides six definitions of philosophy:<br /><br />1) the knowledge of beings as beings;<br />2) the knowledge of things divine and human;<br />3) a preparation of death;<br />4) the assimilation of man to God as far as humanly possibly;<br />5) the art of arts and the science of sciences<br />6) the love of wisdom.<br /><br />Under these definitions, the solitary monk in the Sinai desert in the 3rd century would be more of a philosopher than an analytic -- and indeed, monks at this time were often called philosophers. I would venture so far as to say that going by the above, "philosophers" in the Analytic tradition fail on all accounts: (1) Most tend to dismiss ontology and confine it to the fire, (2) Most of them dismiss the divine, (3) They are more concerned with puzzle-chopping and problem-solving than caring for the soul, (4) They take no heed to the imperative of Theosis, (5) Most of them slavishly attempt to ape the sciences and turn their craft into its handmaiden, and (6) Most of them prize careerism and the accretion of knowledge over understanding. As such, the Monk in his cell (1) who has, through the practice of theoria, grown to see both creation as a ktisis, reflecting and yearning toward God, distinguished from the kosmos of the fallen order, has a better knowledge of beings as beings. (2) Given his vision of God, he has a greater knowledge of things divine and human. (3-4) Given his life of katharsis, he is better prepared for death and has achieved a much greater assimilation of man to God. (5) He also prioritizes the life of prayer and contemplation above other disciplines. (6) And he loves wisdom, not just knowledge. All in all, this monk would be closer to the description of the man given in Plato's cave than an Analytic. For he has "seen" something of the divine, which has given him noetic knowledge – understanding – which is higher than discursive knowledge of the forms (dianoia). Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-53827658017784763472013-04-27T14:39:21.682-07:002013-04-27T14:39:21.682-07:00The problem is not with my statement, Marc, but wi...The problem is not with my statement, Marc, but with the atheists: they're liars.George R.noreply@blogger.com