tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post6077253715972722868..comments2024-03-28T13:39:03.094-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Agere sequitur esse and the First WayEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger116125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83460608222064712222022-12-09T18:47:01.095-08:002022-12-09T18:47:01.095-08:00Pls can anyone help me with this. The existential ...Pls can anyone help me with this. The existential metaphysics of human symbolism: agere sequitur esse<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-36201611825600931542020-03-13T12:32:59.164-07:002020-03-13T12:32:59.164-07:00Please, somebody shoots this idiot in the head.
H...Please, somebody shoots this idiot in the head.<br /><br />He won't be polluting with his nonsense.<br /><br />Feel free to share your address, StarStupidityPsyche, I'd ready the gun and the bullet.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83648082951692206942020-03-11T21:11:28.406-07:002020-03-11T21:11:28.406-07:00Atno,
"The PSR...you fail to see its truth &q...Atno,<br />"The PSR...you fail to see its truth "<br />To me the PSR seems, well, reasonable.<br /><br />What would it even mean for events to occur without a reason? Just poof? Any old thing can just pop off any old which way for no reason at all? How does that make sense of any kind?<br /><br />I agree wholeheartedly, things happen for reasons, the word "sufficient" being superfluous, for what sort of reason would be insufficient? How could things happen for an insufficient reason? <br /><br />So, under the principle that things happen, all things always happen, for a reason, by some causal mechanism, then there cannot be in the universe any element of true randomness.<br /><br />If the PSR holds then any apparent randomness in the universe is false, merely too complicated for humans to analyze precisely.<br /><br />So, on the PSR the universe is strictly deterministic, correct?StardustyPsychehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12493629973262220492noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67562741784976096312020-03-11T14:56:34.891-07:002020-03-11T14:56:34.891-07:00Your claim is about psychology, not the PSR. The P...Your claim is about psychology, not the PSR. The PSR as Leibniz understood it was metaphysical. The fact that you fail to see its truth (and the consequences of not accepting its objective truth) just shows that your intellect is mistaken and/or confused.Atnohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13138424784532839636noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28463700140761339132020-03-11T14:54:45.549-07:002020-03-11T14:54:45.549-07:00Transubstantiation is a contingent event. If God h...Transubstantiation is a contingent event. If God has always been the world, He is still not limited to the world, as such an identity would be contingent. God's necessary essence would still transcend the world.<br /><br />Moreover, you're getting things backwards, in any event. Transubstantiation is not God becoming bread, but bread becoming God. It is God who miraculously transforms the bread into the Body of Christ.<br /><br />In any case, most likely time had a beginning, so God could not have always been the world.Atnohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13138424784532839636noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-47455441066570972112020-03-11T12:48:33.645-07:002020-03-11T12:48:33.645-07:00If God can become bread thru a human body (jesus),...If God can become bread thru a human body (jesus), how do we know the world hasn't always been God?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44347352939036248352020-03-08T13:30:52.976-07:002020-03-08T13:30:52.976-07:00I also do not see how the following works in Feser...I also do not see how the following works in Feser's ACPQ article, which he links above. Of the Fourth Way, Feser says:<br /><br />"... Aquinas is concerned only with what the<br />Scholastics called the transcendentals—being, one, good, true, and the like—which, unlike smelliness, sweetness, heat, cold, red, green, etc., are predicable of everything without exception."<br /><br />This may be true of modern revisions of the Fourth, but it is not identical to what's in the text of the saint. Aquinas says that "in things/reality something is found more or less good, and true, and noble; and so about other things of this sort."<br /><br />The transcendentals in Thomism are: being, one, good, true, thing, something. It is not clear that "noble" cuts across all the categories so as to be predicable of every being; this needs to be argued. So it is not established that the Fourth is talking only about the so-called transcendental attributes. If Feser has proved that "noble" should be added to the standard list of transcendentals, I would appreciate the reference.<br /><br />Secondly, the Fourth says that what most completely bears the defining property in any genus is the cause of all that are in that genus, and Aquinas gives the example of fire as maximally hot, which is the cause of all hot things. But the transcendentals are not in any genus, since they cut across all the categories. So again, it is not clear that the attributes in view in the Fourth are restricted to the transcendentals.<br /><br />Third - and I step away from A-T - Aquinas in the Fourth appeals to Aristotle for the dictum that the maximal thing that bears each attribute has the most being, or exists maximally ("maxime ens"), for what are maximally true/real are maximally existing ("maxime entia"). This is to make existence a predicate or perfection and thereby to destroy modern logic. That's too high a price for me to pay for signing on to the Fourth.ficino4mlhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00805116221735364590noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-48922730928743845372020-03-08T11:23:23.988-07:002020-03-08T11:23:23.988-07:00ficino,
The difficulty in attempting to make sense...ficino,<br />The difficulty in attempting to make sense of Thomistic reasoning is that Aquinas was heavily influenced by Aristotle and they both made some fundamental errors in reasoning. Therefore, a modern person who attempts to reconcile Thomism with modern science and logic will inevitably uncover incoherencies in Thomism.<br /><br />1.The concept of a hierarchical linear regress analysis is not representative of how the universe really works, nor is such a regress particularly insightful in its reasoning, rather, such reasoning is fundamentally limited in its conceptual scope, being simplistic and unrealistic. <br /><br />Scotus, who argued similarly to Aquinas, recognized that he had to make as an explicit premise that causality cannot be circular. This premise is implicit in Thomistic use of a hierarchical linear regress. Scotus was wrong, as was Aquinas.<br /><br />In truth, the universe exists and changes at base in mutual process of simultaneous inseparable co-dependence. As much as the Thomist may wish to separate and isolate form, essence, and existence imagining them to be somehow pure and of certain sorts in their isolated condition, that just is not physically possible in the real structure of the universe.<br /><br />Form, essence, and existence, or simply properties and existence, are inseparable and mutually co-dependent. An existent thing must have properties, and properties are always of an existent thing. Pure existence is an incoherent term. Pure essence is an incoherent term. Pure form is an incoherent term.<br /><br />2.Aristotle was wrong, and therefore the Thomists who adopt his views are all wrong in thinking all sublunary motion is in an impeding medium such that motion will slow and stop and be lost absent a mover.<br /><br />In truth, all motion is in space, and space does not impede motion at all, therefore there is no call for a first mover to account for observed motion. Motion is never lost, only transferred and transformed in net lossless mutual interactions. In modern science motion, change, and causality are formulated as mutual net lossless interactions with no identifiable objects that can meaningfully be assigned the titles of The Cause and The Effect, rather, there is only the net lossless mutual interaction in a universe in perpetual motion.<br /><br />Thus, the First Way fails because it contains false premises, invalid logic, and is based on unrealistic analytical errors.<br /><br />For the Thomist causality occurs in a linear chain:<br />Z caused by Y<br />Y caused by X<br />X caused by W<br />… caused by U (ad hoc assigned the title of God in the first way)<br />In nature such a causal chain does not exist, all causality being mutually interactive with no identifiable objects with titles of Cause and Effect. But, supposing we allow for a bit of human perceptual illusion at first, then we can see that mutuality terminates at base any apparent linear regress of causality:<br />Z caused by Y<br />Y caused by X<br />X caused by W<br />W caused by X<br />(Terminus)<br /><br />Similar to the incomplete conceptual scope Thomists employ in considering motion and causality, Thomists also lack conceptual scope in considering structural realism. Again, Thomists are linear thinkers in a universe of mutuality and co-dependence.<br /><br />Thomists, being linear thinkers, reason their way back to notions of purity, somehow thinking it just could not not be that eventually everything existentialy must regress to simple purity. This leads the Thomist to make incoherent assertions, typically comprised of multiword terms that combine disjoint words into incoherent terms.<br /><br />The universe, however, need not conform to such thinking, rather, form, essence, and existence are mutually co-dependant in structural reality and cannot not be found always together. <br />StardustyPsychehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12493629973262220492noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-48151285786763451132020-03-08T07:30:54.699-07:002020-03-08T07:30:54.699-07:00In his article on DDC and denial of EI, Professor ...In his article on DDC and denial of EI, Professor Feser says, "an essence is of itself purely potential." This is not new; Gavin Kerr says the same, and I assume that it is standard Thomistic doctrine, at least today.<br /><br />I have some difficulties with it:<br />1. essence or "the what it was to be" of a thing is frequently made convertible with the thing's nature, but Aquinas sometimes also puts essence on a level with form. And on the standard account, form of F configures matter so as to actualize a being that is F. For example, In VI Meta l. 1 C1148: “each and every thing has existence through its quiddity." Quiddity is essence.<br />2. One often finds the dictum in Aquinas that potency is the medium between essence and operation. So how is essence the same as potency? Aquinas says that virtue or potency always follows essence. But if essence is not the same as potency, why say essence is wholly potential?<br /><br />If someone can expand on how the essence is wholly potential, I shall be grateful. To say that a thing is a composite of form and matter makes sense to me, but to say it is a composite of an essence and an act of existence, as though act of existence is some third thing added to a substance, doesn't make sense. The act of existence is just some F's reality or actuality as having the essence F or F-ness. ??ficino4mlhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00805116221735364590noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-32839888964093781512020-03-07T19:25:00.797-08:002020-03-07T19:25:00.797-08:00I was thinking, since "action follows being&q...I was thinking, since "action follows being" a thing who don't act at all does not really exist, as Edward says in his post about the socialist state. <br /><br />Won't this be a problem for the modern platonist? Plato saw at least the Form of The Good* as acting, so maybe this would not bother him, but would not a modern platonist, who takes the forms to have no casual powers, have to reject this principle or say that the forms do not really exist?<br /><br />I mean, the best the forms can casually do in the platonist view is be the content of intelects, so i believe we can use this principle to argue that the forms are really just ideas in a intelect who is eternal, omniscient, necessary etc.<br /><br />So, can we argue that platonism collapses into divine conceptualism using this principle? What do you guys think?<br /><br />*Was it just the supreme form to Plato? It seemed to me that it was moreTalmidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04267925670235640337noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69117963790598829012020-03-07T15:30:23.332-08:002020-03-07T15:30:23.332-08:00The PSR is about psychology. The fact that a geniu...The PSR is about psychology. The fact that a genius like Leibniz thought it important just shows he was human. There are people in India for whom life has no meaning unless the monkey god in the cloud exists. How is their argument any weaker than Feser's? Whether there is a Zeno like series of past time with no boundary like Hawking said or if it's like an infinite slide with liquid eternally sliding down, the system would physically be the same whether there was a God creating it or not. The 5 ways are really the same argument: matter is inferior to spirit. Of course you can't prove spirit even exists, but Fewer keeps trying hard to prove the unprovableAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-20752728639398406262020-03-04T13:56:24.419-08:002020-03-04T13:56:24.419-08:00Feser at least needs to watch some videos on Hawki...Feser at least needs to watch some videos on Hawking's no boundary hypothesis. Or read up on Penrose and Carroll, who each have theories on how motion starts without God. Feser is here combining the first two ways and changing them to the third. He's getting further and further from scientific argument. Modern people aren't going to accept his "matter is inferior to the simple" premiseAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44706115791066059432020-03-04T10:13:52.800-08:002020-03-04T10:13:52.800-08:00@David
I don't have access to the links he us...@David<br /><br />I don't have access to the links he uses to justify his "proper accidents" assertion. Pure Act has no accidental properties, so I'm uncertain what he's driving at. If you've read the link, will you please summarize his argument?<br /><br />As to Zeus & Apollo, per what I said <a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2020/02/agere-sequitur-esse-and-first-way.html?showComment=1583040380537#c5474704590408877998" rel="nofollow">above</a>, two "eternal and unchanging" beings are instances of a kind which makes them genus/species, essence/existence composites. Since Pure Act cannot be composite, there cannot be more than one.Billhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08001130202947985336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-43601269391299836002020-03-04T01:00:54.511-08:002020-03-04T01:00:54.511-08:00What about accidents? Do accidents also follow fro...What about accidents? Do accidents also follow from a thing's mode of being? Can you give some examples?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-85492079413017131522020-03-03T22:20:50.289-08:002020-03-03T22:20:50.289-08:00Atno,
"If there are two necessarily-existing ...Atno,<br />"If there are two necessarily-existing gods, they must share the common nature of being necessarily-existing,"<br />No, not any more then two separate identical twins share the common DNA, rather, they each have their own separate set of DNA that is merely of the duplicate organizational structure.<br /><br />Multiple necessary beings do not logically have to share a common necessity, they can logically each have their own necessity.<br /><br />"But then where do these properties come from?"<br />They are necessarily co-dependent in the real universe. A real thing cannot exist without properties. Properties must be of a thing, never independent of a thing.<br /><br />Each necessary being can logically have its own necessity and its own inseparable necessary properties.<br /><br />There is no logical necessity to limit ones self to a linear hierarchical structural regress analysis that must terminate in the incoherent notion of an absolutely simple being.<br /><br />Such limited linear concepts are one of a number of reasons the First Way fails, in this case being logically invalid by employing the fallacy of a false dichotomy, the choice between an infinite linear regress and a first mover. There is a third choice, mutuality.<br /><br />Mutuality is the observed reality of how our universe works. Mutuality is observed in gravitational interactions of macro objects where there is no identifiable cause and effect separable as such, the choice between causal being and affected being only arbitrary and meaningless.<br /><br />Mutuality is how the interactions of physics are formulated. Like charges mutually repel each other, while opposite charges mutually attract each other. Similar formulations of mutual interaction are the case throughout modern physics.<br /><br />As the First Way is logically invalid in employing that false dichotomy with respect to motion, by similarity as is the subject of this thread, the inference of a linear existential regress also fails by false dichotomy, neglecting what is clearly observable in our real universe, that real existent beings always have properties that are inseparable from that being, with the notions of pure existence and pure essence both being incoherent.<br /><br />Essence and existence are always found together, mutually co-dependent and inseparable in the real structure of our universe by necessity.<br /><br />It cannot not be that real existent beings have properties, or essences, or aspects, simultaneously it cannot not be that essences are inseparable from the beings they are essences of.StardustyPsychehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12493629973262220492noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-90967701218968099442020-03-03T20:22:41.219-08:002020-03-03T20:22:41.219-08:00So basically you’re saying you would need to deny ...So basically you’re saying you would need to deny the PSR to say that things are beyond our understanding as humans? Isn’t it sufficient reason to say the reason is it’s behind human experience?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-520358080794084682020-03-03T20:13:01.861-08:002020-03-03T20:13:01.861-08:00I don't see how it's possible to avoid the...I don't see how it's possible to avoid the argument from the principle of identity of indiscernibles. If there are two necessarily-existing gods, they must share the common nature of being necessarily-existing, but they must also have distinguishing properties which allow for one to be one and the other to be another. But then where do these properties come from? Not from the essence, since it's common for both of them. But if not from the essence, where does the differentiating property come from? Nowhere. Brute fact. <br /><br />Besides, Occam's razor favors monotheism. It is much simpler to postulate only one God, one supernatural entity, to explain the existence of nature, than to posit many gods. <br />And then there's a host of other issues which favor monotheism: the apparent unity of the order of the world seems to suggest a single cause which is easier and simpler than positing many cooperating things; omnipotence could only be had by a single being; it seems polytheism would invite arbitrariness and questions (such as "why is this god this god and not some other god?"); and so on.<br /><br />Finally, as an extra inductive reason from authority, it is interesting to note that the majority of the great traditions and philosophers have identified the Absolute ground of reality, or necessary being, with a single or unique entity. Atnohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13138424784532839636noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-118177239277752222020-03-03T19:46:09.412-08:002020-03-03T19:46:09.412-08:00Hi thanks for your reply, what i wanted to know is...Hi thanks for your reply, what i wanted to know is about this point:<br />"15 makes an appeal to the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) <br />16, firstly ignores Proper-Accidents see 1&2, a proper accident is not unactualised potential since it follows from essence. And secondly, if two such beings (say Zeus & Apollo) are both eternal and unchanging then the relationship between them would not be the result of some potential."<br /><br />Would a polytheisitc conception really ignore things like potential and be strictly based off of essence?<br />Davidnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-56035444169045254642020-03-03T19:14:41.869-08:002020-03-03T19:14:41.869-08:00I like Bill’s response here. I think that one coul...I like Bill’s response here. I think that one could look at the way Pruss and Rasmussen (2018) address the notion of arbitrary boundaries of explanation with relation to brute facts in their book Necessary Existence. <br /><br />The idea would be that in order to oppose any PSR variant, you would need to posit some kind of arbitrary boundary between explainable facts and explained facts. Obviously, the fact that when I click “publish,” this post appears is explainable. There are countless things that we cannot rationally deny are explainable in our daily lives. I’m thirsty all day, because I haven’t taken any water. Anyone who argues that nothing can be explained by at least a “principle of good enough explanation” is operating in an irrational fantasy world. There are many who would accept those explanations, but then as you wrote, say there are certain things that cannot be explained because they are beyond human level of understanding and too far removed from human experience. <br /><br />But if you did operate under such an approach, which Kant did argue for but is today defended by Carroll, and to a lesser extent Oppy, you would need to absolutely posit an arbitrary “ok, no more explanations needed or no more are possible.” But who gets to set that arbitrary boundary? Who gets to say when we stop at a brute fact that has no explanation? Who is the arbiter of what is possibly to be explained and what isn’t?<br /><br />Pruss and Rasmussen:<br />“Suppose Suzy and Albert are both material objects. Then they presumably both occupy some positions in space and time: they both have a spacetime profile, we might say. But how can a difference with respect to a spacetime profile account for a difference with respect to having an explanation? It is hard to see how. It seems that differences in location or in shape or in temporal duration are differences in mere degree—degree of size, degree of complexity, degree of age, etc. None of these differences in degree, however, seems to make a categorial difference with respect to requiring an explanation. It may seem, therefore, that if Albert should have an explanation, then any other spatial‐temporal object should, too. More generally, it may seem that if a contingent state of existence E has an explanation, then any other contingent state of existence does as well. The reason, in summary, is that no mere difference with respect to spatial‐temporal properties, or any other non‐modal properties, would seem to adequately account for a difference with respect to explicability.”<br /><br />Why does one thing get an explanation and then another becomes a brute fact, especially when they are just differences of degree? If there is an answer to why one can be explained and why cannot be, then that answer in itself is indicative of the fact that we at least know SOMETHING about this “brute fact.”<br /><br />Plus, it gets very complicated when we take what Carroll or Oppy argue with regard to these “brute facts” to be true. In my opinion, it is similar to a God of the Gaps argument. What happens if we say something is a brute fact in 2025, but scientists in 2095 discover a “good enough explanation” for it? Then it’s not a brute fact anymore. This is why I hate brute fact, because they are not something we ever use in any field with acceptability. Everything is always an open research question if it is not answered. <br /><br />Sorry for the long reply, but I felt the need to explain that much because I think what you’re essentially saying is an argument that would cut against even the weakest form of the PSR, which comes with it very grave costs, arbitrary boundaries being only one of the many, but the most operative in the case of trying to say fundamental metaphysical question is too far beyond human experience. El Gerentehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02728568294330891998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3104549377456802492020-03-03T18:17:49.077-08:002020-03-03T18:17:49.077-08:00Perhaps you could post some specific points being ...Perhaps you could post some specific points being made there you’re having trouble with and we can respond here. Reddit is too toxic for me, so I will not post there.El Gerentehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02728568294330891998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44157779738179353782020-03-03T18:17:06.033-08:002020-03-03T18:17:06.033-08:00*partial insofar as it’s more rationally conceivab...*partial insofar as it’s more rationally conceivable than there being some infinite or finite number of deities with equal powers or distinct roles and no fundamental powerful oneEl Gerentehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02728568294330891998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51895794842495724982020-03-03T18:16:07.906-08:002020-03-03T18:16:07.906-08:00I mean, no, they aren’t valid. The fellow in the R...I mean, no, they aren’t valid. The fellow in the Reddit thread there who states he’s a polytheist makes interesting and rational points, but these are all things that have been dispensed with for a long time. For me, I think omnipotence is the best explanation for why there can only be one God, since if you prove an omnipotent being, you’ve proven there to be one being only since power cannot be shared by an omnipotent being. <br /><br />I’m a bit more partial to Plotinus’ arguments that hold that there is the One which is the ultimate fundamental, then various demiurges and “lower gods,” but it’s debatable if such a thing is even polytheism or not. El Gerentehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02728568294330891998noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-76035624730078592882020-03-03T18:05:21.211-08:002020-03-03T18:05:21.211-08:00So is it just a brute fact that A is bigger than B...So is it just a brute fact that A is bigger than B? That's absurd. Either A is bigger because it is in the essence of A to be bigger (which cannot be the case, since A and B are supposed to share the same essence), or because of an external factor. But then that external factor will be a part of A which is distinct from its essence. A will be its essence plus some mysterious property which makes it bigger than B, and then A will be a composition of its essence plus this mysterious property.<br /><br />And by spatial part I mean something very simple, like extension, how your arm has different spatial parts (some are closer to your torso others are closer to your hand), that is also parts. Size implies this kind of extension.Atnohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13138424784532839636noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67516445472607448982020-03-03T17:47:37.741-08:002020-03-03T17:47:37.741-08:00can someone take a look at the points that a polyt...can someone take a look at the points that a polytheist as making against classical theism and see if they're valid or not? thanks.<br /><br />https://www.reddit.com/r/classicaltheists/comments/fch86w/is_polytheism_philosphicallymetaphysically/Davidnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-24664965712450870052020-03-03T17:16:02.804-08:002020-03-03T17:16:02.804-08:00@Question on 5 proofs
What do you know about real...@Question on 5 proofs<br /><br />What do you know about reality that precludes our generalizing about it? If you know nothing whatsoever about reality, you have no basis to object that a boundary has been crossed. And if you know where the boundary is, then you know something about the whole of realty that enables you to make a general claim about it---namely, that no general claims can be so made.Billhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08001130202947985336noreply@blogger.com