tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post6039476820867420437..comments2024-03-18T21:06:42.546-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: The limits of eliminativismEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger453125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33443377331679998642013-02-25T15:47:57.924-08:002013-02-25T15:47:57.924-08:00Good we're all in agreement!
Sorry Scott and ...Good we're all in agreement!<br /><br />Sorry Scott and Steve about the name dyslexia. If you guys would agree not to post in the same thread anymore, I'd be a lot better with your names - I swear!<br /><br />Sorry guys!Liberteurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17878796551917615050noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-64495201549387645912013-02-25T08:25:37.311-08:002013-02-25T08:25:37.311-08:00@Daniel Smith:
"No, I'm referring to why...@Daniel Smith:<br /><br />"No, I'm referring to <i>why</i> the thing has a nature that tends to an end. I'm referring to the <i>determining factor</i> behind that end."<br /><br />In that case I understand and agree—both with the statement itself and with your belief that Aquinas accepted it. I don't think falling rocks make up their minds to fall, and I don't think Aquinas thought so either.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-42351208923544955052013-02-24T17:21:01.350-08:002013-02-24T17:21:01.350-08:00mercy! you folks make a fly on the wall dizzy.mercy! you folks make a fly on the wall dizzy.Aunty Bellehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13868780211706866610noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-12357552915943736172013-02-24T15:53:54.019-08:002013-02-24T15:53:54.019-08:00Daniel, I think we're pretty much in agreement...Daniel, I think we're pretty much in agreement with everything except my name :)Stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10478365664202149335noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-22335984566523328522013-02-24T15:40:52.206-08:002013-02-24T15:40:52.206-08:00Scott: Perhaps I don't understand what you mea...Scott: <i>Perhaps I don't understand what you mean by "determine their own ends." Did you mean that the thing is making a conscious choice to act a certain way?</i><br /><br />No, I'm saying that it's <i>impossible</i> for that to happen - since the thing lacks intelligence - hence the need for another intelligence.<br /><br /><i>By "determine their own ends" I thought you were referring to a thing acting in accordance with its own nature. Like fire burning someone's hand because it is inherent to the fire to give off heat (secondary cause).</i><br /><br />No, I'm referring to <i>why</i> the thing has a nature that tends to an end. I'm referring to the <i>determining factor</i> behind that end. <br /><br /><i>I suppose you could also have been referring to a thing deciding for itself why it exists at all, as though it's its own final cause.</i><br /><br />No, I'm using Aquinas' argument that non-intelligent things can't 'decide' anything.<br /><br /><i>Have I given the impression that I don't believe that God is behind all of this?</i><br /><br />Not at all. This is just a distinction many Thomists fail to make. I think it has to do with an inordinate focus on the first three of the five ways.<br /><br /><i>Just out of curiosity; do you believe that there is an intelligent design theory out there that is in harmony with St. Thomas' Fifth Way?</i><br /><br />Not that I know of. I used to frequent an ID website and would often use the Fifth Way as a jumping off point. But I seemed to get as much opposition from the ID crowd as I did the atheists so...Liberteurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17878796551917615050noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-79379575838478126842013-02-24T13:21:45.237-08:002013-02-24T13:21:45.237-08:00@Mr. Green:
"[F]or one thing, 'teleology...@Mr. Green:<br /><br />"[F]or one thing, 'teleology' by the form of the word refers to the <i>study</i> of ends, which is not in objects at all!"<br /><br />True, but I don't think it's any different from referring to (say) the "biology" of dogs. (Or for that matter to the "chemistry" of life or the "physics" of mechanical systems.) It's fairly common to use the name of a field of study to refer to the phenomena it studies.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11683852393070262682013-02-24T13:15:03.652-08:002013-02-24T13:15:03.652-08:00I didn't see anything in the references you ci...<i>I didn't see anything in the references you cited that gave me the impression that Aquinas believed that mindless material things can determine their own ends through secondary causes.</i><br /><br />Perhaps I don't understand what you mean by "determine their own ends." Did you mean that the thing is making a conscious choice to act a certain way? That's not the way I was interpreting it, and have never seen such an argument. By "determine their own ends" I thought you were referring to a thing acting in accordance with its own nature. Like fire burning someone's hand because it is inherent to the fire to give off heat (secondary cause). I suppose you could also have been referring to a thing deciding for itself why it exists at all, as though it's its own final cause. Of course, that would be absurd because the thing would have to be responsible for its own existence which would make it ontologically prior to itself. Again, God is the reason behind why anything exists at all.<br /><br /><i>The end, the goal, the direction must come from an external intelligence.</i><br /><br />Have I given the impression that I don't believe that God is behind all of this?<br /><br />Just out of curiosity; do you believe that there is an intelligent design theory out there that is in harmony with St. Thomas' Fifth Way? If so, can you explicate the theory for me? I'm not up to speed on ID theories these days...thanks.Stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10478365664202149335noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-56677090481127367852013-02-24T10:34:18.690-08:002013-02-24T10:34:18.690-08:00[cont.]
However, a property like "falling-do...[cont.]<br /><br /><i>However, a property like "falling-down-ness" is inherent to the arrow — or, rather to the individual substances making up the arrow.</i><br /><br />Yes but that just moves intentionality one step back. One must then ask if "falling-down-ness" is a determination made by the substances that make up the arrow or if <i>they</i> depend upon an external intelligence for that end.<br /><br /><i>You could call these innate properties "derived" in the sense that they are "derived" from God (thus making something that also had properties derived from an external artificer/archer "doubly derived")</i><br /><br />Well, according to Aquinas all teleology requires intelligence so...<br /><br /><i>but we normally don't talk that way any more than we say that something intrinsically round has its shape "derived" from God</i><br /><br />Yes, well "roundness" only applies if something is in act or in potential toward "roundness". IOW, teleology is all about actions and work.<br /><br /><i>After all, the whole point of being intrinsic is that you cannot remove the mass (or roundness, etc.) from the substance because then it wouldn't be that substance any more.</i><br /><br />Agreed. But remember, we're talking about "roundness" as an end that the mass works to maintain. That end, (the goal of "roundness") comes not from the mass but from a mind.<br /><br /><i>God doesn't create, say, an massless electron and then "add" some mass to it from outside, because if it didn't have mass it wouldn't have been an electron in the first place. An artificer, on the other hand (whether that be a man or whether that be God "assembling" something rather than "creating" it), takes some substance(s) which already exists, and adds something extra to it ("extra" being pretty much the same word as "external", after all).</i><br /><br />Yes but it's not "mass" that we're saying is added, it's the "aboutness" of that mass (the potential of the electron to act toward an end).<br /><br /><i>As for why the Fifth Way is not as prominent as the first three, I think that's because the materialist reductionist view is so pervasive at the present time. We are so used to assuming that physical entities "just work" this way or that way, that it seems strange even to ask what's behind that.</i><br /><br />Yes but that's why it's so powerful. When you ask the question, materialists are dumbfounded. And when they try to reduce teleology to matter, you just point out that the lower levels of matter are more alike - so that doesn't explain the differentiations in material objects at all. It leads to the necessity of formal and final causes to explain teleology in nature.<br /><br /><i>We can easily study Hamlet, and quite productively, without knowing about Shakespeare, or even consciously being aware that an author existed. But if you bring it to somebody's attention, he will immediately agree that there must have been some author behind the work. Not so to someone who is accustomed to thinking in terms of "laws" and not natures or substances or causes, let alone someone who does not understand what forms, final causes, or intentionality is.</i><br /><br />Yeah but they really like to talk about origins though (mostly because they're used to dealing with the creationist/ID crowd), and when you talk about origins (whether it's <i>Hamlet</i> or the universe), the door is wide open for the Fifth Way!Liberteurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17878796551917615050noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26122484839285896362013-02-24T10:32:27.424-08:002013-02-24T10:32:27.424-08:00Mr Green: Perhaps consider an example such as a co...Mr Green: <i>Perhaps consider an example such as a computer...</i><br /><br />That example always comes to mind when I think of this.<br /><br /><i>Or consider the arrow once you have shot it towards the target. The arrow is definitely flying in a certain direction, and that direction is "in" the arrow itself; indeed, there's no such thing as an arrow that isn't pointing in some direction. So even though that directionality is "derived" from you as the archer, the directionality is (or becomes) something internal to the arrow, insofar as it possesses it.</i><br /><br />I don't know if I agree with the direction being "in" the arrow. The direction is "controlling" the arrow, but I don't know if it's really "part of" the arrow. But I also understand that this is just an analogy and in actual natural objects - yes, the direction (more correctly the tendency toward a certain direction) is part of the object.<br /><br /><i>Now what is not in the arrow is the goal: the state of "being-stuck-in-the-target"-ness is clearly not in the arrow, since the only way for a form to be in matter is for the arrow to actually be sticking in the target.</i><br /><br />I don't think the "goal" depends on the "end" actually being achieved. It is the "aiming" that determines the "direction". The "goal" is what's "aimed at".<br /><br /><i>Since the form does not exist materially (yet!), the only other way for it to exist is intentionally, in some mind (and the arrow has no mind, only the archer).</i><br /><br />OK, I agree with that.<br /><br /><i>Hence the directionality is "in" an object, while the goal itself is external. So strictly speaking, yes, it is not quite right to say that things possess "teleology" — for one thing, "teleology" by the form of the word refers to the study of ends, which is not in objects at all!</i><br /><br />Yes!<br /><br /><i>We really should refer to "teleological properties" or "aspects" or something like that: the internal directedness and the external goal.</i><br /><br />Agreed.<br /><br /><i>I have also been sloppy above about the distinction between substance and artifact: we can say that the direction is in the arrow while it's flying to the target, but clearly that directionality is "external" in the sense that is was externally imposed by you, the archer; the arrow could have been shot in some other direction at some other target (a different goal), or in some random direction (no goal at all). So "target-striking-directionality" is not something inherent to being an arrow.</i><br /><br />Yes, this is much better I think.<br /><br />[continued]Liberteurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17878796551917615050noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25093187097721045252013-02-24T09:49:58.455-08:002013-02-24T09:49:58.455-08:00Steve,
Thanks for the references. I'm not su...Steve,<br /><br />Thanks for the references. I'm not sure that they say what you think they say though.<br /><br />I said: "material things can't determine their own direction".<br /><br />And you answered: "Aquinas believes they can [determine their own direction] through secondary causes".<br /><br />I didn't see anything in the references you cited that gave me the impression that Aquinas believed that mindless material things can <i>determine</i> their own ends through secondary causes.<br /><br />Remember, the determining factor for <i>all teleology</i>, according to the Fifth Way, is <i>intelligence</i>. Something that lacks intelligence <i>cannot</i> 'set its own goals', 'determine its own way', 'design its own purpose', etc. That is the heart and soul of the Fifth Way.<br /><br />So, even though all of these things <i>act</i> on their own power, and <i>move</i> toward those goals on their own, they do not do so because they have made that <i>determination</i> within themselves. The end, the goal, the direction <i>must come</i> from an external intelligence.<br /><br />This doesn't mean that God must make that determination anew every time something acts toward an end. It just means that the determination is not and never was 'of the thing itself'. All of the references you cited are in agreement with that I think.Liberteurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17878796551917615050noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71583577204604428362013-02-23T17:30:46.391-08:002013-02-23T17:30:46.391-08:00(cont'd.)
I have also been sloppy above about...(cont'd.)<br /><br />I have also been sloppy above about the distinction between substance and artifact: we can say that the direction is in the arrow while it's flying to the target, but clearly that directionality is "external" in the sense that is was externally imposed by you, the archer; the arrow <i>could</i> have been shot in some other direction at some other target (a different goal), or in some random direction (no goal at all). So "target-striking-directionality" is not something inherent to being an arrow. However, a property like "falling-down-ness" <i>is</i> inherent to the arrow — or, rather to the individual substances making up the arrow. You cannot re-direct matter to fall up, no matter what you do to it externally. (You can of course throw some matter up in the air, but it continues to be subject to the force of gravity — and even if you put it out in the middle of empty space, a substance with mass is always <i>directed towards</i> gravitational attraction.)<br /><br />You could call these innate properties "derived" in the sense that they are "derived" from God (thus making something that also had properties derived from an external artificer/archer "doubly derived"), but we normally don't talk that way any more than we say that something intrinsically round has its shape "derived" from God — we just say God created a round thing. After all, the whole point of being intrinsic is that you cannot remove the mass (or roundness, etc.) from the substance because then it wouldn't be that substance any more. God doesn't create, say, an massless electron and then "add" some mass to it from outside, because if it didn't have mass it wouldn't have been an electron in the first place. An artificer, on the other hand (whether that be a man or whether that be God "assembling" something rather than "creating" it), takes some substance(s) which already exists, and adds something extra to it ("extra" being pretty much the same word as "external", after all). <br /><br />As for why the Fifth Way is not as prominent as the first three, I think that's because the materialist reductionist view is so pervasive at the present time. We are so used to assuming that physical entities "just work" this way or that way, that it seems strange even to ask what's behind that. We can easily study <i>Hamlet</i>, and quite productively, without knowing about Shakespeare, or even consciously being aware that an author existed. But if you bring it to somebody's attention, he will immediately agree that there must have been some author behind the work. Not so to someone who is accustomed to thinking in terms of "laws" and not natures or substances or causes, let alone someone who does not understand what forms, final causes, or intentionality is.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-50738268827088989082013-02-23T17:27:23.830-08:002013-02-23T17:27:23.830-08:00Daniel Smith: >"Aquinas believes they can ...Daniel Smith: ><i>"Aquinas believes they can through secondary causes."<br />Not sure how that would work.</i><br /><br />Perhaps consider an example such as a computer that has been programmed to do certain things. The programmer does not have to remain to manipulate the computer; once programmed, it will act accordingly, even if the programmer is dead and gone, or annihilated completely. But the programming still completely depended on the programmer; the computer in no sense "programmed itself" or in any way came to be running the given code without some programmer in the first place. <br /><br />Or consider the arrow once you have shot it towards the target. The arrow is definitely flying in a certain direction, and that direction is "in" the arrow itself; indeed, there's no such thing as an arrow that isn't pointing in <i>some</i> direction. So even though that directionality is "derived" from you as the archer, the directionality is (or becomes) something internal to the arrow, insofar as it possesses it. Now what is not in the arrow is the <i>goal</i>: the state of "being-stuck-in-the-target"-ness is clearly not in the arrow, since the only way for a form to be in matter is for the arrow to actually be sticking in the target. Since the form does not exist materially (yet!), the only other way for it to exist is intentionally, in some mind (and the arrow has no mind, only the archer).<br /><br />Hence the directionality is "in" an object, while the goal itself is external. So strictly speaking, yes, it is not quite right to say that things possess "teleology" — for one thing, "teleology" by the form of the word refers to the <i>study</i> of ends, which is not in objects at all! We really should refer to "teleological properties" or "aspects" or something like that: the internal directedness and the external goal.<br /><br />(continued...)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-57149473708118676412013-02-23T11:47:52.152-08:002013-02-23T11:47:52.152-08:00Shifting to secondary causation we see St. Thomas ...Shifting to secondary causation we see St. Thomas admit of secondary powers that inhere in created things, but that remain dependent on God:<br /><br /><i>I answer that we must admit without any qualification that God operates in the operations of nature and will. Some, however, through failing to understand this aright fell into error, and ascribed to God every operation of nature in the sense that nature does nothing at all by its own power. They were led to hold this opinion by various arguments. Thus according to Rabbi Moses some of the sages in the Moorish books of law asserted that all these natural forms are accidents, and since an accident cannot pass from one subject to another, they deemed it impossible for a natural agent by its form to produce in any way a similar form in another subject, and consequently they said that fire does not heat but God creates heat in that which is made hot. And if it were objected to them, that a thing becomes hot whenever it is placed near the fire, unless some obstacle be in the way, which shows that fire is the per se cause of heat; they replied that God established the order to be observed according to which he would never cause heat except at the presence of fire: and that the fire itself would have no part in the action of heating. This opinion, is manifestly opposed to the nature of sensation: for since the senses do not perceive unless they are acted upon by the sensible object—which is clearly true in regard to touch and the other senses except sight, since some maintain that this is effected by the visual organ projecting itself on to the object—it would follow that a man does not feel the fire’s heat, if the action of the fire does not produce in the sensorial organ a likeness of the heat that is in the fire. In fact if this heat-species be produced in the organ by another agent, although the touch would sense the heat, it would not sense the heat of the fire, nor would it perceive that the fire is hot, and yet the sense judges this to be the case, and the senses do not err about their proper object.</i><br /><br /><i>It is also opposed to reason which convinces us that nothing in nature is void of purpose. Now unless natural things had an action of their own the forms and forces with which they are endowed would be to no purpose; thus if a knife does not cut, its sharpness is useless. It would also be useless to set fire to the coal, if God ignites the coal without fire. De pot.3.7</i><br /><br /><i>Some have understood God to work in every agent in such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that God alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, and so forth. But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect would be taken away from created things: and this would imply lack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the cause, that it bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be bestowed on things to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way, to be purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the purpose of everything is its operation. For the less perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the matter is for the sake of the form, so the form which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and thus operation is the end of the creature. We must therefore understand that God works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation. ST Ia.105.5</i><br />Stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10478365664202149335noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-17585859258071218422013-02-23T11:43:06.565-08:002013-02-23T11:43:06.565-08:00Daniel,
With respect to primary causation (per se)...Daniel,<br />With respect to primary causation (per se) and relevant to the 5th way:<br /><br /><i>Material and efficient causes, as such, cause only the existence of their effects. They are not sufficient to produce goodness in them so that they be aptly disposed in themselves, so that they could continue to exist, and toward others so that they could help them. Heat, for example, of its very nature and of itself can break down other things, but this breaking down is good and helpful only if it happens up to a certain point and in a certain way. Consequently, if we do not admit that there exist in nature causes other than heat and similar agents, we cannot give any reason why things happen in a good and orderly way. De ver. 5.2 resp.</i><br /><br /><i>For, as Augustine says, for creatures to subsist God must constantly work in them. This action of God, however, must not be compared to the action of a craftsman building a house, for, when his action ceases, the house still remains; it should rather be compared to the sun’s lighting up the air. Consequently, when God no longer gives existence to a creature, whose very existence depends on His will, then this creature is reduced to nothingness. De ver. 5.2 ans.6</i><br /><br /><i>Indeed, everything whereby things attain their end pertains to the governance of these things. For things are said to be ruled or governed by virtue of their being ordered to their end. Now, things are ordered to the ultimate end which God intends, that is, divine goodness, not only by the fact that they perform their operations, but also by the fact that they exist, since, to the extent that they exist, they bear the likeness of divine goodness which is the end for things, as we showed above. Therefore, it pertains to divine providence that things are preserved in being. ScG.3.65.2</i><br />Stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10478365664202149335noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3136020072536220672013-02-22T16:53:48.425-08:002013-02-22T16:53:48.425-08:00Steve,
Aquinas believes they can through secondar...Steve,<br /><br /><i>Aquinas believes they can through secondary causes.</i><br /><br />Not sure how that would work.<br /><br />BTW, I should have said "<i>mindless</i> material things can't determine their own direction".<br /><br /><i>I need to go for now, but if you like, I can try to pull together some more references for you later. Just let me know...</i><br /><br />Please. I'd appreciate it - when you get time.Liberteurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17878796551917615050noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77379848341786529842013-02-21T18:17:04.366-08:002013-02-21T18:17:04.366-08:00Yes, but the end to which the nature is directed d...<i>Yes, but the end to which the nature is directed does not come from the nature itself.</i><br /><br />Correct. God determines what kind of thing a thing is as the primary causal principle of everything outside Himself. So its proper end is predetermined in that sense.<br /><br /><i>This has nothing to do with God sustaining a thing in existence BTW.</i><br /><br />It does is we want to maintain a distinction between God as primary cause and what Aquinas refers to as secondary causes. These are effects of causes distinct from Himself, but not independent from His primary causal activity.<br /><br /><i>It has everything to do with the fact that material things can't determine their own direction.</i><br /><br />Aquinas believes they can through secondary causes.<br /><br />I need to go for now, but if you like, I can try to pull together some more references for you later. Just let me know...<br /><br />Stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10478365664202149335noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27734929616990241892013-02-21T16:53:18.109-08:002013-02-21T16:53:18.109-08:00DavidM: no, intelligence may imply only contemplat...DavidM: <i>no, intelligence may imply only contemplation. Only practical intelligence implies decision-making. Divine intelligence (including providence) is not deliberative (unless in an analogous sense, since God's act of creation is free, i.e., not subject to any extrinsic necessity).</i><br /><br />OK that makes sense. I must confess that I didn't fully understand Aquinas' statements in the link <i>Steve</i> provided. He seemed, at various times, to be attributing God's providence to his knowledge, his will or his power.<br /><br /><i>You're ignoring the intrinsic connection between the nature of a thing and its operation. Operation follows from nature. God doesn't create a thing, then decide how it will operate.</i><br /><br />When I used the term "decision" I meant it in the sense of one who makes a determination. God <i>determines</i> what a thing's nature will be. He sets the boundaries. I humanized it a bit and said that he "makes the decision". Not the best choice of words.<br /><br /><i>So when you say "natural bodies could act differently" this just means that God could have created natural bodies other than those that he did in fact create.</i> <br /><br />Yes, and that's what I meant by that. It's not up to the natural thing to determine how it will operate, that is determined by God's will (or knowledge or power). <br /><br /><i>To amplify Aquinas' answer:<br /><br />"5. That determination [i.e., the thing's created nature] by which a natural thing is restricted to one course of action belongs to it, not because of itself, but because of something else [why? - because it was created by something else, and for the sake of something else]. Consequently, the very determination for bringing about a suitable/harmonious effect is, as has been said, a proof of divine providence."</i><br /><br />Well said.Liberteurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17878796551917615050noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81955996553262077722013-02-21T16:32:32.905-08:002013-02-21T16:32:32.905-08:00Steve: then can't we say that the thing's ...Steve: <i>then can't we say that the thing's nature was fully its own even though it's God's creative act that sustains it?</i><br /><br />Yes, but the end to which the nature is directed does not come from the nature itself. This has nothing to do with God sustaining a thing in existence BTW. It has <i>everything</i> to do with the fact that material things <i>can't</i> determine their own direction.Liberteurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17878796551917615050noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-76290421845396116872013-02-21T16:22:10.771-08:002013-02-21T16:22:10.771-08:00Scott: For the record, 'twas not I but another...Scott: <i>For the record, 'twas not I but another who provided that link.</i><br /><br />My bad!<br /><br /><i>If I give you ten dollars, it's your money, but you still got it from me and wouldn't have had it without me.</i><br /><br />Yes, I agree. My problem is when people say that material things have intrinsic teleology - full stop. To use your $10 analogy, it's like a kid who gets a $10 allowance for doing nothing, then claims he earned it! The material thing <i>does nothing</i> to <i>determine</i> its own direction. That direction comes <i>entirely</i> from another. <br /><br />I guess it's a nit-pick, because Thomists know the whole story, but it gives those unfamiliar with A-T thought the idea that we believe in something akin to "magic matter" - i.e. that teleology comes from matter itself.<br /><br />One other nit-pick: When dealing with materialism here on this website, I've yet to see a Thomist break out the Fifth Way as an argument. I don't understand why that is. It's such a powerful argument!Liberteurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17878796551917615050noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67929347654361855612013-02-21T10:23:20.302-08:002013-02-21T10:23:20.302-08:00Scott and Steve have already explained what is goi...Scott and Steve have already explained what is going on, but I'll add my bit too.<br /><br />"Well intelligence implies decision making..." - no, intelligence may imply only contemplation. Only practical intelligence implies decision-making. Divine intelligence (including providence) is not deliberative (unless in an analogous sense, since God's act of creation is free, i.e., not subject to any extrinsic necessity).<br /><br />"Aquinas must have in mind that natural bodies could act differently but don't (because God determines for them what end they are to aim for)." - You're ignoring the intrinsic connection between the nature of a thing and its operation. Operation follows from nature. God doesn't create a thing, then decide how it will operate. So when you say "natural bodies could act differently" this just means that God could have created natural bodies other than those that he did in fact create. <br /><br />To amplify Aquinas' answer:<br /><br />"5. That determination [i.e., the thing's created nature] by which a natural thing is restricted to one course of action belongs to it, not because of itself, but because of something else [why? - because it was created by something else, and for the sake of something else]. Consequently, the very determination for bringing about a suitable/harmonious effect is, as has been said, a proof of divine providence."DavidMnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81595518275386684012013-02-20T19:39:49.569-08:002013-02-20T19:39:49.569-08:00Daniel,
If we consider that the natural things th...Daniel,<br /><br />If we consider that the natural things that we've been talking about have their own nature from the moment they come into existence until the moment they go out of existence, but that God created and was sustaining the thing all along the way, then can't we say that the thing's nature was fully its own even though it's God's creative act that sustains it?<br /><br /> Even we who have our own nature as rational souls owe every moment of our existence to the God that created us in His image. So as Scott said, it is intrinsic in one sense, and derived in another. Stevehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10478365664202149335noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16242604704108079002013-02-20T17:13:34.558-08:002013-02-20T17:13:34.558-08:00@Daniel_Smith:
"In the link Scott provided ....@Daniel_Smith:<br /><br />"In the link Scott provided . . . "<br /><br />For the record, 'twas not I but another who provided that link.<br /><br />"This is where it gets sticky though."<br /><br />I think the problem may be is an accidental equivocation on the word "intrinsic."<br /><br />What I take Aquinas to be saying is that a natural thing is, by nature, restricted to a single course of action, but isn't and can't be responsible for generating/creating the nature that thus determines it to that action.<br /><br />Aquinas acknowledges, that is, that the determination by which a natural thing is restricted to one course of action does <i>belong</i> to it and is thus "intrinsic" to it in one sense -- but that determination has to be imparted to the thing by something else in the first place, and so in another sense it <i>isn't</i> "intrinsic" to the thing.<br /><br />If I give you ten dollars, it's your money, but you still got it from me and wouldn't have had it without me.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81083188596329038562013-02-20T16:44:05.639-08:002013-02-20T16:44:05.639-08:00DavidM: That doesn't sound quite right. Aquina...DavidM: <i>That doesn't sound quite right. Aquinas doesn't say (or imply) that natural bodies act as if they are 'making decisions'. He says they act always or for the most part in the same way, so as to arrive at some determinate end.</i><br /><br />Well intelligence implies decision making - at least in the sense that something intelligent must <i>decide</i> what end a body will act toward. In the link Scott provided, Aquinas attributes divine providence to divine knowledge <i>and</i> to divine will. Aquinas must have in mind that natural bodies <i>could</i> act differently but don't (because God determines <i>for them</i> what end they are to aim for).<br /><br />All in all, I think we are in agreement here that bodies which lack intelligence cannot have teleology <i>of themselves</i> (i.e. <i>intrinsically</i>).<br /><br />This is where it gets sticky though. A-T thought (at least as put forth by Dr. Feser) stresses that natural bodies, lacking intelligence, <i>do have</i> intrinsic teleology.<br /><br />Here's Aquinas on that subject (from the link Scott provided).<br /><br />First, the objection:<br /><br /><i>5. What is, of itself, determined to one course of action does not need the direction of anything else, because direction is applied to a thing to prevent it from taking a contrary course. Natural things, however, are determined to one course of action by their own natures. Consequently, they do not need the direction of providence.</i><br /><br />Then, Aquinas' answer:<br /><br /><i>5. That determination by which a natural thing is restricted to one course of action belongs to it, not because of itself, but because of something else. Consequently, the very determination for bringing about the suitable effect is, as has been said, a proof of divine providence.</i>Liberteurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17878796551917615050noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-36676830790956907582013-02-20T10:53:42.830-08:002013-02-20T10:53:42.830-08:00It's probably also worth mentioning again that...It's probably also worth mentioning again that what Aquinas meant by "matter" is not what today's physicists mean by it. I hope I've been clear about which kind I have in mind each time I use the word, but I suspect I haven't -- which makes your clarification all the more welcome.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-78581859710591329172013-02-20T10:51:08.193-08:002013-02-20T10:51:08.193-08:00DavidM, thanks for the clarification.DavidM, thanks for the clarification.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.com