tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post5384553191943218015..comments2024-03-19T02:00:34.750-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Braving the webEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger183125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-82032120916971592762015-03-09T12:14:49.335-07:002015-03-09T12:14:49.335-07:00I also recognize that my last comment does not rea...I also recognize that my last comment does not really address the issue of my apparent theism; since I had assumed, based on what I thought was a consistent intellectual tack, that it would not be apparent.<br /><br />Somewhat clearer to me now, why in other venues thoroughgoing and militant atheists when frustrated or angered have spat out some retort to me along the lines of "You [this or that] Christians!", based on some simple natural law entailment I had posited.<br /><br />I guess realism of any kind is the big bugbear among progressive anti-theists. <br />DNWnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-49590596741152315892015-03-09T12:01:13.226-07:002015-03-09T12:01:13.226-07:00John West said...
'DNW subsequently state...John West said...<br /><br /><i> 'DNW subsequently stated that his tone was meant to be one of 'amiable comic relief'. Maybe it didn't come off well in some eyes at the time. Oh well. But he did later clarify, and that should be that.'<br /><br /> Right. And you'll notice my strident comments were all before that clarification.<br /><br /> 'As for whether he is or is not a theist, what difference does it make? The truth of what a person says is not a function of that person's status as a theist or non-theist.'<br /><br /> Well, yeah -- of course*. And frankly, I sometimes think we need more atheists around here to keep the dialogue fresh; but I would totally get naturalists running weirdness objections against Platonic objects is all.<br /><br />... *you'll recall that I never actually asked, just noted I didn't know.<br /> March 6, 2015 at 2:18 PM "</i><br /><br />Guys, I visit this site on my own volition. If I had tender feelings or thought some criticism was unreasonable, I'd say so.<br /><br />Puzzling a bit over whether I am a theist or not hardly compares to what het up leftists pretended to have store for me if they got a street address. I've been there. And this is nothing but polite.<br /><br />On theism: Though not intellectually persuaded in the way I am persuaded 2 plus 2 equals four, you would certainly see me crowding the pews if a comet were to hit earth. I'd throw metaphysics to the wind, and burrow into the historical.<br /><br />However, when merely considering the more global intellectual positions typically taken by non-theists or anti-theists, I have found it more useful personally to grant for the sake of argument, and in brackets, their own metaphysical principles when analyzing the "logic" of their sociopolitical stances.<br /><br />The sense of this first occurred to me back during my classroom study of the "early Marx"; when I eventually realized that his sneering attack on - ruling out of court - metaphysical speculation, and natural freedom, constituted a default metaphysics of its own.<br /><br />Although, Feser has explicitly noted and quoted science historians and philosophers pointing this out decades prior to my arrival on the college scene, at the time it struck me, I thought it was some clever insight all my own.<br /><br />Anyway, enough people make that move, and highlight the implications, or lack thereof, and what one sees as a result of the atheist-progressive being confronted with the implications of their own doctrines, are such comical developments as " Atheism + ":<br /><br />' Yeah sure we know atheism doesn't imply "humanism", we're Brights after all. But we should all be "nice" and self-sacrificing anyway because ... something ... and might ... and if you too were ... although you are not ... and just imagine ... and flourishing too, in general that is, and not you specifically ..."<br /><br />So, that is where I'm coming from on the general approach issue.<br /><br />I think we all agree that realism need not necessarily be theistic; and certainly not religious in the usual sense. I also obviously think that it need not even be "Platonic".<br /><br />Feser of course, links the argument for the immateriality of the intellect to the grasping of the immateriality of the formal cause - if I understand him right.<br /><br />If so, that might be a logical entailment derived from the existence of any recognizable universals. But I also think it is obvious to all that that is a step further than one need to go just to establish the functional, extra-mental reality, or existence, of natural kinds.<br /><br />However, I admit that that kind of wan realism, though recognizing natural kinds, may not go quite far enough to satisfy all when considering anthropological questions, and meeting all the psychosocial commitments which are entailed by Catholicism.<br /><br />There, you [speaking generally] carry an extra burden, both rhetorically and conceptually: i.e., the unity of mankind; and not just the real existence of anthropological kinds.<br /><br />Anyway, that roughs it out.DNWnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14542863705481612412015-03-06T14:18:49.346-08:002015-03-06T14:18:49.346-08:00DNW subsequently stated that his tone was meant to...<i>DNW subsequently stated that his tone was meant to be one of 'amiable comic relief'. Maybe it didn't come off well in some eyes at the time. Oh well. But he did later clarify, and that should be that.</i><br /><br /><br />Right. And you'll notice my strident comments were all before that clarification.<br /><br /><i>As for whether he is or is not a theist, what difference does it make? The truth of what a person says is not a function of that person's status as a theist or non-theist.</i><br /><br />Well, yeah -- of course*. And frankly, I sometimes think we need more atheists around here to keep the dialogue fresh; but I would totally get naturalists running weirdness objections against Platonic objects is all. <br /><br /><br />*you'll recall that I never actually asked, just noted I didn't know.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26951559514036712932015-03-06T14:09:29.283-08:002015-03-06T14:09:29.283-08:00DNW subsequently stated that his tone was meant to...DNW subsequently stated that his tone was meant to be one of 'amiable comic relief'. Maybe it didn't come off well in some eyes at the time. Oh well. But he did later clarify, and that should be that.<br /><br />As for whether he is or is not a theist, what difference does it make? The truth of what a person says is not a function of that person's status as a theist or non-theist.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71656293710571703652015-03-06T14:01:02.320-08:002015-03-06T14:01:02.320-08:00But what made me think of it was the March 3, 2015...But what made me think of it was the March 3, 2015 post: <i>Really? It's up to the naturalist [...]</i> type stuff, and <i>where are they?</i> etc.<br /><br />Incidentally, for the record, I run into this type of objection <i>all</i> the time, especially with theists of the rather numerous, personalistic, nominalistic, "Craigian" variety. Everything he disagrees with is <i>wooeffffullly misguided</i> (stress hyperbole) with that guy.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54532344650065461722015-03-06T13:46:52.385-08:002015-03-06T13:46:52.385-08:00Glenn,
Where here has anyone tried to assault you...Glenn,<br /><br /><i>Where here has anyone tried to assault you with "strident 'weirdness objections' against Platonic entities"? </i><br /><br />Well, like I said, I wasn't even sure DNW was a theist. In fact, I'm still not.<br /><br /><i>And if someone is acclimated and/or habituated to viewing non-spatiotemporal forms inhering and residing in spatiotemporal things rather than separately from those spatiotemporal things, mightn't it at least be possible that a claim of "weirdness" might stem less from some inconsistency on the part of the one making that claim, and more from what, for that person, is unusual relative to what s/he is acclimated and/or habituated to?</i><br /><br />Absolutely.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-65779006110234056302015-03-06T13:42:46.849-08:002015-03-06T13:42:46.849-08:00John West,
Frank believes in that which is non-sp...John West,<br /><br /><i>Frank believes in that which is non-spatiotemporal (angels, demons, God). Objects in Plato's world are non-spatiotemporal. Hence, Frank shouldn't consider -- in fact, not only consider, but reject for being weird -- objects in Plato's world weird on the basis of those objects' non-spatiotemporality.</i><br /><br />I can, at least on general principle, agree with that.<br /><br />Still, <br /><br />Where here has anyone tried to assault you with "strident 'weirdness objections' against Platonic entities"? <br /><br />And if someone is acclimated and/or habituated to viewing non-spatiotemporal forms inhering and residing in spatiotemporal things rather than separately from those spatiotemporal things, mightn't it at least be possible that a claim of "weirdness" might stem less from some inconsistency on the part of the one making that claim, and more from what, for that person, is unusual relative to what s/he is acclimated and/or habituated to?Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-13847344689087088802015-03-06T13:36:10.805-08:002015-03-06T13:36:10.805-08:00If Frank wants to consider them weird because they...If Frank wants to consider them weird because they're <i>abstracta</i> rather than <i>concreta</i>, or due to some other fine point, that's fine or at least another issue. But doing so on the basis of their non-spatiotemporality while not being bothered by non-spatiotemporality in all these other cases, was why I complained.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35451030635158668112015-03-06T13:23:13.829-08:002015-03-06T13:23:13.829-08:00Of course, initially I called it hypocritical. Tha...Of course, initially I called it <i>hypocritical</i>. That was too greedy. I shouldn't have said it.<br /><br /> Rather, I think it is <i>odd</i> to reject that which is non-spatiotemporal for being non-spatiotemporal, when one already has other non-spatiotemporal ontological commitments.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58595828469665659252015-03-06T13:20:43.701-08:002015-03-06T13:20:43.701-08:00Scott,
Thanks for the helpful clarifications.
- ...Scott,<br /><br />Thanks for the helpful clarifications.<br /><br />- - - - -<br /><br />(One of these days I'm going to get to Blanshard.)Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-65020390693198970352015-03-06T13:19:47.567-08:002015-03-06T13:19:47.567-08:00Frank believes in that which is non-spatiotemporal...Frank believes in that which is non-spatiotemporal (angels, demons, God). Objects in Plato's world are non-spatiotemporal. Hence, Frank shouldn't consider -- in fact, not only consider, but reject for being weird -- objects in Plato's world <i>weird</i> on the basis of those objects' non-spatiotemporality.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19234810723551085552015-03-06T13:19:13.038-08:002015-03-06T13:19:13.038-08:00(s/b "...could be extended and generalized, s...(s/b "...could be extended and generalized, so that it might said that the point is not that there ought to be...")Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58760785923481935832015-03-06T13:17:50.950-08:002015-03-06T13:17:50.950-08:00Daniel,
I agree with Scott that one needn't g...Daniel,<br /><br />I agree with Scott that one needn't get carried away. <br /><br />Indeed, St. Thomas himself sometimes referred to God as "a being", both implicitly (e.g., <a href="http://dhspriory.org/thomas/Compendium.htm#109" rel="nofollow">here</a>, <a href="http://dhspriory.org/thomas/Compendium.htm#117" rel="nofollow">here</a> and <a href="http://dhspriory.org/thomas/english/ContraGentiles1.htm#95" rel="nofollow">here</a>) and explicity (e.g., <a href="http://dhspriory.org/thomas/english/ContraGentiles1.htm#38" rel="nofollow">here</a>).<br /><br />But the point, specifically, was as Scott has stated above. <br /><br />(Although the point could be extended and generalize, so that it might said that the point is not that ought to be a prohibition against speaking of God in certain ways, but that care should be taken not to lose sight of or muddle the distinction between that which is its own being and that which has its being from something else.)Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-10494126914329667982015-03-06T13:13:46.177-08:002015-03-06T13:13:46.177-08:00Not on the basis of their non-spatiotemporality^Not on the basis of their non-spatiotemporality^Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26821660109514931432015-03-06T13:12:42.096-08:002015-03-06T13:12:42.096-08:00Glenn,
Ergo, Denise should also believe in object...Glenn,<br /><br /><i>Ergo, Denise should also believe in objects in Plato's world.</i><br /><br />I've never made a claim like this. I would Denise shouldn't consider the objects <i>weird</i>.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40704270856700108952015-03-06T13:10:58.173-08:002015-03-06T13:10:58.173-08:00John West,
1. Adam likes Betty.
2. Betty has lim...John West,<br /><br />1. Adam likes Betty. <br />2. Betty has lime green hair. <br />3. Cathy, it is said, also has lime green hair. <br />4. Ergo, Adam should also like Cathy.<br /><br />5. Denise believes in God.<br />6. God is non-spatiotemporal.<br />7. Objects in Plato's world, it is said, also are non-spatiotemporal.<br />8. Ergo, Denise should also believe in objects in Plato's world.<br /><br />9. Elmer believes in objects in Plato's world.<br />10. Objects in Plato's world are non-spatiotemporal.<br />11. God, it is said, also is non-spatiotemporal.<br />12. Ergo, Elmer should believe in God.<br /><br />13. Felicia finds grilled cheese sandwiches to be palatable.<br />14. Grilled cheese sandwiches have cheese.<br />15. Cheese cake, it is said, also has cheese.<br />16. Ergo, Felicia should also find cheese cake to be palatable.<br /><br />However,<br /><br />17. Adam doesn't like Cathy;<br />18. Denise doesn't believe in objects in Plato's world; <br />19. Elmer goesn't believe in God; and,<br />20. Felicia doesn't find cheese cake to be palatable.<br /><br />Ergo,<br /><br />21. Each one of Adam, Denise, Elmer and Felicia is:<br />21a. either weird or illogical;<br />21b. both weird and illogical;<br />21c. weirdly illogical; or,<br />21d. illogically weird.<br /><br />But,<br /><br />22. Why is "lime green hair" necessarily transitive?<br />23. Why is "non-spatialtemporality" necessarily transitive? and,<br />24. Why is "has cheese" necessarily transitive?Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77731546127662266082015-03-06T12:55:12.561-08:002015-03-06T12:55:12.561-08:00Bad 'weirdness' type arguments professiona...Bad 'weirdness' type arguments professional philosophers of Religion have given:<br /><br />1. Richard Swinburne once objected to Divine Necessity on the groups that he knew of no other purported necessary concrete being.<br /><br />2. J.H. Sobel argued that if God is necessary i.e. exists in all possible worlds then God must be an abstract object because the only beings we know of that are necessary i.e. exist in all possible worlds are abstract objects.<br /><br />@Random question: does anyone here know if Frege was an 'explicit' naturalist or just a Kantian type agnostic? I remember Dallas Willard mentioning somewhere that he (Frege) was a dualist about mind too.<br />Danielnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-1581952120002046912015-03-06T12:54:32.845-08:002015-03-06T12:54:32.845-08:00Not just classical theists, I think, for that matt...Not just classical theists, I think, for that matter.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-47519295528898785832015-03-06T12:52:55.186-08:002015-03-06T12:52:55.186-08:00Daniel,
A Classical Theist might argue that ther...Daniel,<br /><br /><i> A Classical Theist might argue that there is a strong intuition that God should be ontologically 'ultimate'</i><br /><br />But I confess that, while I know a lot of classical theists have this intuition, I never have. I've never shared this intuition.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61909398051374609092015-03-06T12:50:54.104-08:002015-03-06T12:50:54.104-08:00Daniel,
Yes (aside from the obvious immaterial so...Daniel,<br /><br /><i>Yes (aside from the obvious immaterial souls). Needless to say both of these are concreta though.</i><br /><br />Fascinating. You know, Michael Resnik (I think it was him) attacks the concrete/abstract distinction, calling it merely epistemological.<br /><br /><i>For what it's worth I think weirdness objections have very little going for them beyond rhetorical appeal.</i><br /><br />Well (speaking in general now), if weirdness objections do have force, then I think we would be able to raise them against quite a lot of the entities posited by theoretical physics. Personally, I've never found them very convincing.<br />Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9750392878459910192015-03-06T12:39:57.944-08:002015-03-06T12:39:57.944-08:00Yes (aside from the obvious immaterial souls). Nee...Yes (aside from the obvious immaterial souls). Needless to say both of these are concreta though.<br /><br />For what it's worth I think weirdness objections have very little going for them beyond rhetorical appeal. A Classical Theist might argue that there is a strong intuition that God should be ontologically 'ultimate', this is a motivation for me at least, but on its own that serves as no actual objection to abstracta in and of itself. Danielnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39166651081365500082015-03-06T11:50:20.677-08:002015-03-06T11:50:20.677-08:00So Christians do hold to the existence of non-spat...So Christians do hold to the existence of non-spatial beings in the form of angels then?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-2266696140281148732015-03-06T11:27:36.179-08:002015-03-06T11:27:36.179-08:00@John,
No, angels are just the stock Thomist exam...@John,<br /><br />No, angels are just the stock Thomist example for immaterial intellectual being. Danielnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81051120895603861272015-03-06T11:14:22.477-08:002015-03-06T11:14:22.477-08:00That was just a general question, not directed to ...That was just a general question, not directed to the post directly above me, or anything like that.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16664197394361680882015-03-06T08:30:35.657-08:002015-03-06T08:30:35.657-08:00Are angels spatial?Are angels spatial?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04470664030455998305noreply@blogger.com