tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post5376040887950095464..comments2024-03-28T09:37:08.486-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Oerter on motion and the First MoverEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger70125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6776582084000864892015-07-21T13:24:26.618-07:002015-07-21T13:24:26.618-07:00How do we know that the terms 'substantial for...How do we know that the terms 'substantial form' and 'pure matter' aren't simply projections of the mind upon the material world? In other words, why are 'substantial form' and 'pure matter' both necessary when describing the material world, and how do we trust that the terms themselves are actual representations of matter itself? Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07125064035395387932noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-13156603342495627672013-10-16T12:38:43.787-07:002013-10-16T12:38:43.787-07:00Excellent and I agree, any serious student of Thom...Excellent and I agree, any serious student of Thomas needs to read Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages by Weisheipl. It sure opened my eyes. P.S. Plan on reading it at a library, it is very $$$$.<br /><br />LinusAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-91414598543323446622012-10-17T22:57:45.865-07:002012-10-17T22:57:45.865-07:00Alan Aversa: I am a bit surprised that the poster ...Alan Aversa: I am a bit surprised that the poster you quote suggests that Parmenides or Heraclitus supplies a better understanding of change than Aristotle. They are usually seen as presenting either impossible end of a spectrum where Aristotelianism is middle course that actually works. He goes for a static eternalism that denies "potentiality as such"; and while you can get away with that for doing physics (because the mathematical nature of physics in fact describes the world precisely insofar as it can be mapped onto a 4-D structure), it denies our direct experience of change. So even if that description of the physical world were true, we would still need Aristotle to account for our incontrovertible experience of change.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77748267971508596132012-10-09T19:37:47.569-07:002012-10-09T19:37:47.569-07:00יאיר רזק's comment on Oerter's September 2...<a href="http://somewhatabnormal.blogspot.com/2012/09/act-and-potency-in-physics.html?showComment=1349833915129#c8883141149391006438" rel="nofollow">יאיר רזק's comment</a> on Oerter's September 23, 2012, "<a href="http://somewhatabnormal.blogspot.com/2012/09/act-and-potency-in-physics.html" rel="nofollow">Act and Potency in Physics</a>" posting is interesting. On the relationship between physics and metaphysics, he summarizes what he believes is your view on the relationship between modern physics and A-T metaphysics:<br /><br /><i>1. Physics presupposes change;<br />2. change can only be explained in the Thomistic-Aristotelian framework;<br />3. ∴, physics presupposes the TA-metaphysics.</i><br /><br />He continues:<br /><i>I think that is fallacious, for two reasons:<br />(a) Aristotelian metaphysics never really succeeded in understanding change, and<br />(b) there are other metaphysical frameworks out there that are at least as good, if not better, at understanding change.</i><br /><br />How would you answer this, Dr. Feser? I would distinguish the major, conceding the minor.<br /><br />ThanksGeremiahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11812810552682098086noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26465641455584211992012-06-22T19:05:47.579-07:002012-06-22T19:05:47.579-07:00Yes it is rather funny, the lecture was an 'ev...Yes it is rather funny, the lecture was an 'evangelical atheist' as he put it, so i decided to try and get inside his head and see what makes him tick. it is quite amazing though after reading Dr Feser's books how perfectly he fit the description given by Dr Feser of the contemporary philosopher. No final causes for a start makes things very interesting in a debate. He also had issues with hylemorphism. However as i am still young and new to this game im going to be scavenging around this blog for a bit to see what i can pick upTom Masseynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69399371987299214442012-06-21T09:22:51.123-07:002012-06-21T09:22:51.123-07:00@Tom Massey, Arthur:
See God, obligation, and the...@Tom Massey, Arthur:<br /><br />See <a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.pt/2010/10/god-obligation-and-euthyphro-dilemma.html" rel="nofollow">God, obligation, and the Euthyphro dilemma</a>.grodrigueshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12366931909873380710noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-85549660590875685112012-06-21T04:45:55.029-07:002012-06-21T04:45:55.029-07:00The Euthyphro objection essentially runs like this...The Euthyphro objection essentially runs like this. If goodness is whatever God commands, (as in Divine Command Theory), does He command it because it is good, or is it good because he commands it?<br /><br />The problem would then seem to be that either:<br /><br />i) God only commands the things He does in light of some further, higher standard, which makes God inessential for goodness. He might be passing on accurate moral information, but isn't the <i>reason</i> it's accurate in the first place.<br /><br />or:<br /><br />ii) What's good is good <i>purely because</i> God commands it. God <i>could</i> have decided that say, murder and rape were good instead. This seems to make morality uncomfortably contingent and whimsical.<br /><br />Those are the two horns of the Euthyphro dilemma, and the point is that neither of them are attractive to a proponent of Divine Commnand Theory.<br /><br />I'm less clear on the nuances of Aquinas' response, but here goes. One way to think of it is this: Horn 1 implies that God is subservient to morality, beneath it, and Horn 2 implies that God is above morality, and independant of it. Put like that, I think the third option becomes more obvious. Why couldn't God be <i>equal</i> to morality? Perhaps God <i>is</i> morality.<br /><br />That probably wasn't especially convincing, but from I can tell Aquinas' point is that God and morality are too tightly related to be seperable in the way that the Euthyphro Dilemma requires. (Thomists, feel free to correct me!)<br /><br />If nothing else, I credit the Euthyphro Dilemma with helping me "get" meta-ethics in the first place. It definitely kick-started my thinking. It's a good place to start thinking about such things, but a bad place to finish, I suspect.<br /><br />Was your philosophy teacher an atheist? It sounds to me like he was using a bottom-up, materialist metaphysics that implies that God would have to be complex. Just look up "Divine Simplicity" if you want to see the counterpoint to that. It seems to me that Divine Complexity (to give it a name) implies atheism. Richard Dawkins understands that much.Arthurnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-87844452070741051252012-06-20T04:56:51.981-07:002012-06-20T04:56:51.981-07:00Im a beginner in the field of philosophy however i...Im a beginner in the field of philosophy however i absolutely love all three books Aquinas, Philosophy of Mind and the Last Superstition, and have found them extremely captivating. I have gathered a rough understanding but Is there anybody who could explain to me the euthyphro objection, and why it is a false dilemma? I also had a discussion recently with my philosophy lecturer who stated that things become more complex the higher up the order they get ie. God is incredibly complex. However, is it not that something is complex in the amount of potential it has therefore the capacity it has to change, and God being pure actuality must be purely simple?Tom Masseynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28104468099397320452012-06-18T13:36:12.482-07:002012-06-18T13:36:12.482-07:00@Eduardo: This is precisely why physics must maint...@<a href="#c3186962216658424304" rel="nofollow">Eduardo</a>: This is precisely why physics must maintain a realist philosophy.Geremiahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11812810552682098086noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-31869622166584243042012-06-16T17:42:39.680-07:002012-06-16T17:42:39.680-07:00I sort of feel bad for physicists XD during the ar...I sort of feel bad for physicists XD during the article.<br /><br />But I suppose physicists have no desire to have their beliefs attacked at the philosophical level even if all they are doing is philosophy <br /><br />I mean imagine having thought about many fundamental questions around the things you have just done in a lab, plowing through mistakes and thinking about the nature of nature, the nature of things... THEN ALL of sudden comes a snob metaphysician and says that you have just arrived two thousand years too late to be the one to answer those questions AND ... you happen to be one nice specimen of a train wreck thinker, while he shows all have got wrong while citing some long forgotten guy that just had too much time in his hand.<br /><br />You have no idea how hard that is, especially to a scientist who loves his field. Being outwitted is really something terrible in certain sciences ... if not all I suppose.<br /><br />I mean ... How many times I have not spent days, weeks or even months thinking about ccertain things and trying to come up with sort of a solution to find out that not only the solution is wrong, but the I was hardly the first one to come to it.<br /><br />That brings a person down XD really hard, unless the person is A-Okay to revise his ideas; which in this case I am not so much.Eduardonoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-50397339667262272482012-06-16T14:04:37.016-07:002012-06-16T14:04:37.016-07:00You would also be interested in Fr. Stanley L. Jak...You would also be interested in <a href="http://www.sljaki.com/" rel="nofollow">Fr. Stanley L. Jaki</a>'s <i>New Scholasticism</i> article "<a href="http://www.u.arizona.edu/~aversa/scholastic/The%20Physicist%20and%20the%20Metaphysician%20(Jaki).pdf" rel="nofollow">The Physicist and the Metaphysician</a>," which is about the correspondences between the early 20th century French physicist <a href="http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Pierre_Maurice_Marie_Duhem.aspx#1" rel="nofollow">Pierre Duhem</a> and <a href="http://www.christendom-awake.org/pages/thomas-crean/saint-in-heaven.htm" rel="nofollow">Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.</a> regarding the law of inertia and St. Thomas's proofs of God's existence.Geremiahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11812810552682098086noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80923325468289796962012-06-16T13:03:09.591-07:002012-06-16T13:03:09.591-07:00This link to the article seems to work, but it req...<a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&sqi=2&ved=0CFEQxQEwAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fdocs.google.com%2Fviewer%3Fa%3Dv%26q%3Dcache%3A5ZZSy7OXz-4J%3Awww.pdcnet.org%2Fcollection-anonymous%2Fpdf2image%253Fpdfname%253Dacpq_2011_0085_0002_0237_0267.pdf%2526file_type%253Dpdf%2B%26hl%3Den%26gl%3Dus%26pid%3Dbl%26srcid%3DADGEESjKW8O0SJeXmB5EHpiRxG22BVcGBsmRbcDTos0kSsLxTudYfS6xKpKgpdtJBO3Cbw0ucqzr0q-jhuQNUZ4wSwgF970ZEmsjCEW9eo5gsyMm3ZSvtwU6inrNE0EfXpq1X7opkSze%26sig%3DAHIEtbRN_dOIX3CpBaDme1JCxMa0adkm3g&ei=leTcT4zGL4qa2AXdmfC2DQ&usg=AFQjCNHq8f6nCnpeSynkLeYsWh7YE_s1kA&sig2=69mPmp0FKD8nguhEDcZD0w&cad=rja" rel="nofollow">This link</a> to the article seems to work, but it requires you have a Google account and log-in to it.Geremiahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11812810552682098086noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-15996530902268016532012-06-15T11:50:04.671-07:002012-06-15T11:50:04.671-07:00which of the two segments would you be most likely...<i>which of the two segments would you be most likely to give attention to: that smooth segment having more to do with the extrinsicality of final causes (segment Y-Z), or that (for those MPs as 'defined' above) pot-hole filled segment having more to do with the intrinsicality of final causes (segment X-Y)?</i><br /><br />Yeah, that’s fine, reighley. The only problem is that most of these guys here are coming away with the impression that finality is only intrinsic and not at all extrinsic to natural things -- whereas the reality is that not only is finality extrinsic, it is PRIMARILY and in the TRUEST SENSE extrinsic, and only secondarily intrinsic. Nor is it ever explained how or in what way finality is in things, I.e., not qua finality but rather qua formality. <br /><br />I think some clarification on these points would be helpful to everyone here.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55097158649111139712012-06-15T10:33:47.690-07:002012-06-15T10:33:47.690-07:00Assuming this question is rightly recognized as be...Assuming this question is rightly recognized as being rhetorical--and assuming the point it intends to make is reasonably accurate--it follows that (with regard to Dr. Feser's, as Daniel Smith put it, <i>emphasis on secondary "final" causes</i>):<br /><br />1. It is neither the case that intrinsic final causes are being promoted (in the sense of their being elevated above their station) nor the case that extrinsic final causes are being demoted; and,<br /><br />2. The primacy of the extrinsicality of final causes over the secondary intrinsicality of final causes is in no way usurped by all the attention given to, or emphasis heaped upon, <i>secondary "final" causes</i>. Indeed, the primacy of the extrinsicality of final causes is as safe, sound and secure as it has ever been.<br /><br />It's just that, to borrow from my prior oversimplified, 'blitzkrieg' comment,<br /><br /><i>[I]f one...is seeking to engage (in some way and for some purpose) adherents of the [playfully, even if inaccurately, named] Doctrine Of Fidelity To The Mere Observation And Non-Functional Description Of Goings-On Amongst Nature--for whom it is an article of faith that there is no teleology in nature--then [the] emphasis [on "secondary" final causes] itself becomes a kind of (or contributes to the) starting point for the intended engagement.</i><br /><br />(Of course, it may well be the case that there is some other, more accurate reason which better accounts for the emphasis on secondary "final" causes by Dr. Feser.)Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-84384833033787851542012-06-15T10:31:55.776-07:002012-06-15T10:31:55.776-07:00reighley,
The Doctrine Of Fidelity To The Mere Ob...reighley,<br /><br />The Doctrine Of Fidelity To The Mere Observation And Non-Functional Description Of Goings-On Amongst Nature was a playful naming of an attitude which might be held, wholly or in part, by: a) a scientist; b) a non-scientist; c) a philosopher; d) a non-philosopher; e) one with philosophical training (but not really a philosopher); or even, f) one with no philosophical training at all. And it was employed in a juxtapositional capacity--not to make a weak argument look strong or a strong argument look weak, but, rather, for the purpose of suggesting a reason for there having been, as Daniel Smith put it, an <i>emphasis on secondary "final" causes</i> by Dr. Feser.<br /><br />I'll do away with the metaphorical angle employed in my prior oversimplified, 'blitzkrieg' comment, and revisit instead <a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/09/teleology-revisited.html" rel="nofollow">Teleology Revisited</a> to pluck out / abstract a new starting point for suggesting the same, basic reason behind the questioned emphasis. <br /><br />The following five points--which are paraphrasings of the original points, and appear here in a different order (with some notations added)--are said by Dr. Feser, in the 10th paragraph therein, to have been made by Christopher Martin in his important book <i>Thomas Aquinas: God and Explanations</i>:<br /><br />1. On the one hand, it is easy for Aquinas (A) to show that teleology (Y) exists in the natural order (X).<br /><br />2. What takes work, according to A, is showing that the existence of teleology (Y) entails the existence of God (Z).<br /><br />3. OTOH, Modern philosophers (MP) tend to have a reverse conception of the matter.<br /><br />4. What MPs tend to think is easy, is getting from the existence of teleology (Y) to the existence of God (Z).<br /><br />5. But MPs also tend to think that showing that teleology (Y) exists in the natural order (X) is difficult, if not impossible.<br /><br />To summarize the last two points: MPs tend to think/say (in effect), "Sure, getting from Y to Z is a piece of cake; no doubt about it. Or, rather, it <i>would</i> be a piece of cake <i>if</i> you could start out at Y. But there is a slight problem here. And this slight problem has to do with being able to start out from Y. The reason why this, ahem, <i>slight</i> problem exists is because it so happens that <i>X</i> is the starting point, and you really / probably / most likely can't get from X to Y."<br /><br />Now, if you are, say, Dr. Feser, and you seek to engage certain arguments of the MPs, or certain arguments of those MPs as 'defined' above, and you bear in mind that these MPs may think that the trip from Y-Z would be a smooth one (if only Y could be legitimately taken as a starting point), which of the two segments would you be most likely to give attention to: that smooth segment having more to do with the <i>extrinsicality</i> of final causes (segment Y-Z), or that (for those MPs as 'defined' above) pot-hole filled segment having more to do with the <i>intrinsicality</i> of final causes (segment X-Y)?<br /><br />(cont)Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-78387341803654483942012-06-14T06:29:37.065-07:002012-06-14T06:29:37.065-07:00However, other translations render this
In the ma...<i>However, other translations render this</i><br /><br />In the manuscripts, there's a divergence on this premise of the Third Way; thus the second translation is also rendering the Latin strictly, just using the minority reading in the manuscripts.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-65221998731840619612012-06-13T21:31:06.021-07:002012-06-13T21:31:06.021-07:00Vincent Torley: if material substances are genuine...Vincent Torley: <i>if material substances are genuinely capable of ceasing to exist, they must eventually do so. Fair enough; but Aquinas didn't think that all material substances were capable of ceasing to exist. He believed that the heavenly bodies were incorruptible.</i><br /><br />Yes, and so as (temporally) "necessary" substances, they get him what he needs to run the main argument of the Third Way. Since it's not immediately obvious that there are beings like angels, or perhaps heavenly bodies, that are incorruptible, he starts by showing that reality cannot consist only of temporally finite beings. If his opponent is willing to grant the existence of incorruptible things, all the better. As far as the Third Way goes, I think the usual translation is misleading. The translation goes: "But it is impossible for these [finite things] always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not." This a plausible translation looking at the Latin word for word: <i>"Impossibile est autem omnia quae sunt, talia esse, quia quod possibile est non esse, quandoque non est." </i><br /><br />However, other translations render this: "It is impossible, however, that everything that exists should be such, for what can possibly not exist does not do so at some time." The former seems to be saying that all finite things must come to a (single) end, which has an easy counter-example: just take an endless supply of finite entities and string them out one after the other. They would "always exist", just not all at the same time. The latter translation, however, says that not everything could be finite; and the "endless series" is not a counter-example then, because the series itself is something that exists at every point in time, and thus there is at least one thing that does not come to an end. The second translation makes perfect sense of Aquinas's subsequent statements, and avoids the problematic interpretation of whether things that are corrupt-ible are guaranteed to get corrupt-ed.<br /><br /><br /><i>I wouldn't say that the type [of a variable] and its value are a composite. If you think this is a poor analogy, I'd be interested to hear why.</i><br /><br />The type and value surely are a composite. There are two separate pieces of data, the type of the variable (whether it's a character, an integer, etc.) and the value of the variable. And there is further information tying those pieces of data together (e.g. how this complex data structure is laid out in memory, etc.). Even if you were considering the variable as an abstract mathematical entity (as opposed to one instantiated in a physical computer), the different properties (type vs. value) are distinct, so how could it not be composite?Mr. Greennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25215094153643466002012-06-13T18:25:26.936-07:002012-06-13T18:25:26.936-07:00@Glenn,
"Now, it just so happens that accord...@Glenn,<br /><br />"Now, it just so happens that according to the doctrine of this starting point, i.e., according to the Doctrine Of Fidelity To The Mere Observation And Non-Functional Description Of Goings-On Amongst Nature, there is no cause for the movement of the right-most ball--it simply moves, and, therefore, is a causeless event."<br /><br />The experiment with Newton's cradle you described would have a distinctly different energy once the balls started to move. The energy could be identified with the cause of the motion. The law of conservation of energy would lead us to ask the source of that energy, and so on down the chain. Even if we never identified the source of the original energy the conservation law is so strongly believed that most scientists would immediately begin looking for some invisible hitherto unknown mechanism. <br /><br />This Doctrine Of Fidelity To The Mere Observation And Non-Functional Description Of Goings-On Amongst Nature is too conspicuously a straw man. The problems which physics raises for causality are somewhat more interesting than that.<br /><br />I read Oerter's point in this particular instance to be based on Galilean relativity. How can we posit a cause without first positing the effect? We see an object moving in a uniform motion, we do not know whether it is moving or whether it is stationary and we are moving! Identifying the cause of the motion would require identifying the motion. Is it acceptable to ask what caused the motion of an object which is standing still?<br /><br />To me a large part of the question comes down to our ontology. Is it even legitimate to regard a straight line motion as a "change". Any notion of position is very much dependent on the observer.<br /><br />This doesn't really sink Aquinas at all. As Feser points out, there are other kinds of motion. It does offer a warning that we cannot simply say "everything which is changed is changed by something" in a naive way. We must be careful about what we mean by "thing" and what we mean by "change".reighleynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54449638471824095202012-06-13T09:22:35.496-07:002012-06-13T09:22:35.496-07:00Daniel Smith,
George R.: [I]t must be clearly und...Daniel Smith,<br /><br />George R.: <i>[I]t must be clearly understood...that the final cause is intrinsic to natural things only in a secondary sense, to wit, as a cause is intrinsically present in an effect.</i><br /><br /><a href="http://www.lhup.edu/~dsimanek/scenario/newton.htm" rel="nofollow">Newton's cradle interactive animation"</a>: Left-click and drag an inch or so to the left the left-most ball. Now, release the mouse button. What happens? Why does it happen?<br /><br />Daniel Smith: <i>[But] The Fifth Way proves that teleology in nature comes from the mind of God (full stop). [So] Why the emphasis on secondary "final" causes?</i><br /><br />This is a good question. Let's try approaching an answer from this metaphorical angle: <br /><br />If Newton's cradle is set in motion again, and after releasing the mouse button this time the three left-most balls are covered and removed from consideration, then what is left to see is all that some can see--and this "all that some can see" is the starting point for many. <br /><br />(The adoption of or subscription to this starting point may be due to any of many reasons: inherent blindness; eyes not yet open; eyes opened but sight not yet sufficiently developed; willful blindness; funding seems more likely; acceptance by the (apparently) prevailing 'in-group' seems more likely; etc., etc.)<br /><br />Now, it just so happens that according to the doctrine of this starting point, i.e., according to the Doctrine Of Fidelity To The Mere Observation And Non-Functional Description Of Goings-On Amongst Nature, there is no cause for the movement of the right-most ball--it simply moves, and, therefore, is a causeless event.<br /><br />So, if one sees or accepts that <i>The Fifth Way proves that teleology in nature comes from the mind of God (full stop)</i>, an <i>emphasis on secondary "final" causes</i> may very well seem to be confusing, baffling or even pointless.<br /><br />However, if one instead is seeking to engage (in some way and for some purpose) adherents of the Doctrine Of Fidelity To The Mere Observation And Non-Functional Description Of Goings-On Amongst Nature--for whom it is an article of faith that there is no teleology in nature--then that emphasis itself becomes a kind of (or contributes to the) starting point for the intended engagement.<br /><br />(Or so I humbly posit.)Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67891145776209913322012-06-13T07:24:37.778-07:002012-06-13T07:24:37.778-07:00Like you, I believe that natural objects possess i...<i>Like you, I believe that natural objects possess immanent finality; but I don't believe that this fact alone can get you to the existence of an Intelligent Being guiding them to their ends, for reasons I'll explain in my post.</i><br /><br />Good luck with that explanation, Vincent, because by saying that you would appear to be not only denying Aquinas’s Fifth Way, but also, in effect, the First Way as well. For as Aristotle taught, the First Mover and the Final Cause are one; and it is by virtue of His being the latter that He is also the former. In other words, the principle of all motion is final causation.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-64593138810319153552012-06-13T06:12:21.708-07:002012-06-13T06:12:21.708-07:00Hi Ed,
Sorry for my late comment, but anyway, her...Hi Ed,<br /><br />Sorry for my late comment, but anyway, here goes.<br /><br />1. I agree that you're right that about First Way being quite different from the argument in <i>De Ente et Essentia</i>, since the former focuses on the act-potency distinction, the latter on the essence-existence distinction.<br /><br />2. I have to disagree with you regarding your statement that Aquinas would not agree that a particular material substance might in principle have had no beginning. The reason you gave in your book is that if material substances are genuinely capable of ceasing to exist, they must eventually do so. Fair enough; but Aquinas didn't think that all material substances were capable of ceasing to exist. He believed that the heavenly bodies were incorruptible. <br /><br />3. After watching your video, I have a better understanding of your argument that something composed of parts requires an external cause of its being. You argue that neither form nor matter can impart to substance a tendency to continue to exist. So the question comes down to whether it is legitimate to speak of a material substance as being composed of form and matter.<br /><br />4. Here is where I have doubts. From the fact that the substance of a thing includes both potency and act, it does not follow that the thing is a composite of potency plus act. I see the latter as just a mode or realization of the former - rather like a variable in a computer program (say, one of type CHAR) being assigned a value "A." I wouldn't say that the type and its value are a composite. If you think this is a poor analogy, I'd be interested to hear why.<br /><br />5. Re your video: I'll be commenting on your argument against ID shortly, on Uncommon Descent, as it's an interesting one. Suffice to say that I think a watch is a very poor analogy for a living thing, or for any kind of natural object. Like you, I believe that natural objects possess immanent finality; but I don't believe that this fact alone can get you to the existence of an Intelligent Being guiding them to their ends, for reasons I'll explain in my post.Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74256860255719918222012-06-12T16:17:53.825-07:002012-06-12T16:17:53.825-07:00Hi George R,
Thanks for your clarification. I gu...Hi George R,<br /><br />Thanks for your clarification. I guess that's part of my confusion. I get it that Dr. Feser wants to distance Aquinas from Plato (perhaps that has more to do with Paley and ID than Plato though?), but I don't understand exactly why. The Fifth Way proves that teleology in nature comes from the mind of God (full stop). Why the emphasis on secondary "final" causes?Daniel Smithhttp://thefoolishnessofgod.blogspot.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-20935231458341070962012-06-12T06:22:16.021-07:002012-06-12T06:22:16.021-07:00Daniel Smith,
Aquinas clearly taught that, of the ...Daniel Smith,<br />Aquinas clearly taught that, of the Four Causes, the formal cause and material cause are intrinsic to the thing, while the final cause and efficient cause are extrinsic. Therefore, to deny that the final cause is extrinsic is to directly contradict Thomas. However, you should note that Ed never does deny that the final cause is extrinsic, but merely seems to do so, because he is always emphasizing its immanence in natural things. Now this immanence is not illusory. The final cause is, in a certain and real sense, intrinsic to the thing. However, it must be clearly understood, and Ed has not made this clearly understood, that the final cause is intrinsic to natural things only in a secondary sense, to wit, as a cause is intrinsically present in an effect. For example, the final cause of the eyes is not in the eyes themselves, except as a cause is in its effect. For the final cause of the eyes is “the animal seeing,” and this is the cause of the eyes being what they are, i.e., an attribute by which the animal may see.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74345020786049576242012-06-11T16:44:16.129-07:002012-06-11T16:44:16.129-07:00Ed:
Now the Fifth Way says something similar about...Ed:<br /><i>Now the Fifth Way says something similar about final causality. A tendency toward an end is really in natural objects themselves (contra the entirely extrinsic teleology of Plato's Timaeus and of Newton, Paley, and other moderns) but it nevertheless requires a divine sustaining cause (contra Aristotle's view that it is just there naturally with no further explanation needed).</i><br /><br />Thank you Dr. Feser, for your answers. I'm still trying to wrap my head around this and I guess the key (for you anyway) is in the phrase "really in" (as in: "a tendency toward an end is <i>really in</i> natural objects themselves".)<br /><br />I guess that's important, but it doesn't help me (yet) because, in terms of chains of causation, doesn't the final cause <i>still</i> terminate in God? <br /><br />So of what use is it to allow for the intermediate members in the chain to have this power "really in" them if it doesn't <i>actually</i> come from them? (I hope that makes sense!)Daniel Smithhttp://thefoolishnessofgod.blogspot.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-50672497269635629732012-06-11T15:08:46.549-07:002012-06-11T15:08:46.549-07:00Hi Ed,
I watched your video. Very interesting. I&...Hi Ed,<br /><br />I watched your video. Very interesting. I'll be commenting later today.Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.com