tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post4484743395472271008..comments2024-03-28T03:20:15.940-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Some questions on the soul, Part IEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger123125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55500397330527279482013-10-01T08:17:55.951-07:002013-10-01T08:17:55.951-07:00BTW JesseM you have been a great discussion partne...BTW JesseM you have been a great discussion partner.Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18621746232708389932013-09-30T19:26:57.964-07:002013-09-30T19:26:57.964-07:00>2. A world just like ours...etc (including acc...>2. A world just like ours...etc (including accepting Jesus' sacrifice and God's will, sincerely repenting their sins, etc.), were nevertheless sent to hell.<br /><br />Another logical contradiction, This is like saying in one world 1 is added to 2 and we get 3 but in a world just like ours 1 is added to 2 and we get "Not 3". That is not coherent.<br /><br />>3. A world just like ours>3...but where God miraculously caused everyone who ever knew of Jesus or his teachings to forget him completely, so no one could know of and accept his sacrifice, and every single person subsequently went to hell.<br /><br />I already told you Catholics believe God can save the invincibly ignorant so this is not coherent, If it is just like our world except God didn't allow knowledge of the sacrifice of Jesus that sacrifice would still objectively provide sufficient grace for all men to be saved.<br /><br />>4 4. A world where God gets people to heaven by taking away their freedom of will, compelling them to love Him.<br /><br />Many of your examples are equivocations. God does save Baptised Infants even thought their will isn't sufficiently developed to make an act of faith & of course they can't will to mortally sin either. So under certain logical conditions God doesn't need your act of will to save you & God need not create beings who freely will to love him. He could create other beings who can't help but love him but of course by definition they wouldn't be either Humans or Angels. <br /><br />>5. A world where even completely unrepentant sinners and rejectors of God are accepted into heaven.<br /><br />Heaven is the soul seeing God in the Beatific Vision. It's not some Cosmic resort for good little boys and girls. It's incoherent to try to conceive of God forcing the beatific vision on souls who have rejected grace and without grace nobody can have the beatific vision by their mere natural powers.<br /><br />>If you do say that some worlds can be deemed logically impossible on the grounds of inconsistency with God's love/goodness/justice, then it seems to me that for humans there must always be an element of moral intuition in judging which worlds are "too bad" to be compatible with God's nature,<br /><br />This is where you are misunderstanding the concept of "logically possible worlds". & what is inconsistent with God's Nature.<br /><br />Most of your example are of you trying to say God can create A and at the same time and in the same sense not create A & there is a lot of argument by equivocation, There is no such thing as Grace Filled Damnation otherwise the terms Grace and Damnation have no objective content anymore there there is such a thing as 2+2=Absolutely Not 4.<br /><br />There is a lot of meat in your posts to answer but I don't have the patience. <br /><br />>It seems to me that Aquinas just asserts this rather than arguing it though; even if one accepts that for any individual created thing God could make a better thing, why couldn't the universe contain an infinite ascending chain of better and better things? Or couldn't a universe be a bit like a work of art, in that part of its beauty is in how it achieves its desired effects in a relatively austere way, without adding more than is necessary? <br /><br />I think He could create a Universe with an Infinite ascending chain of better and better things but by definition no act of creation is necessary & no logically possible world is so good He must create it or so bad he must refrain as long as it partakes of His Goodness.<br /><br />Anyway I may stop and give you JesseM the last word because well to be blunt I have a short attention span & I've reached 50th Level Jedi Knight in the Star Wars:The Old Republic MMORPG. I have to Kill the Dark Emperor & I want to make 51st level before I make the attempt.<br /><br />Maybe Scott or others will take up the slack?<br /><br />Any final questions or points JesseM before I punk out on you?Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67936219975736377182013-09-30T19:26:29.883-07:002013-09-30T19:26:29.883-07:00@JesseM
First let me say even thought I modestly ...@JesseM<br /><br />First let me say even thought I modestly brought to everyone's attention you misreading the essay in parts(& you where pretty cool about owning up to it) I want to apologize if I in turn misread you or failed to acknowledge statements or assumptions you have made & clearly stated here in this thread<br /><br />For example:<br /><br />>You think that because I don't assume the logical rigor of the A-T notion that God is"truth" and therefore unable to lie (nor did I assert it is definitely logically incoherent, I just expressed some doubt), that somehow shows that my argument about hell shows that I am assuming a "theistic personalist deity"?<br /><br />I will acknowledge you are not intending to assume a "theistic personalist deity".<br /><br />I will amend my objection to the following "Whatever the deity you are criticizing your objection cannot in principle apply coherently to a Classic View of the Deity not without equivocating in a major way. <br /><br />Also let me deal with some of the easy stuff. God cannot create a logically impossible world which means he cannot make real anything that clearly violates the Principle of Contradiction. God cannot make "A" and at the same time and in the same sense make "Not A". With that in mind let us look at your argument.<br /><br />>I did no such thing, my question was just whether a world where Noah hears this voice (not caused by any finite being), and its prophecy fails to come true, was logically possible, and/or whether God has the power to create such a world. I never said that the answer must be "yes", I just asked for your answer one way or another.<br /><br />The question is not coherent if it is missing necessary content & thus cannot be determined to be logically possible or not. For one thing we need a metaphysical account for Bullshit Voice. If we merely negatively say it's not of natural origin, preternatural origin, uncreated origin & say it can't be of supernatural origin since God being Truth Itself cannot lie then we aren't saying anything when we ask can God logically create a world containing Bullshit Voice which is neither natural, preternatural, supernatural or uncaused.<br /><br />It's like asking is it logically possible for A to equal B if we know what A is but don't know what B is only what it is not? Well maybe? But we need to know what A is….<br /><br />>Doesn't the A-T philosophy deny that contingent events can ever be truly uncaused? <br /><br />Of course but your example of "Bullshit Voice" has no positive formal content just some negative content(it's not the Devil, has no physical cause & Noah is not nuts etc) so how can I answer the question if it is a logically possible world or not? So I filled in the blanks. No world where Bullshit Voice is Uncaused or Supernatural is logically possible to be made to exist by Classic Theist God.<br /><br />The issue here is the Principle of Contradiction & with that, not our moral intuitions, we analyze your examples.<br /><br />>If you do indeed say it's logically impossible for God to create such a world, then would you say there are any similar examples of worlds that are logically impossible for God to create, not because they contradict "God is Truth", but because they contradict "God is justice" or "God is goodness" or "God is love"? <br /><br />Given the Divine Simplicity all these things are the same & the Principle of Contradiction still applies.<br /><br />>1. A world where Adam and Eve never sinned, but God caused them to die and suffer eternal damnation anyway.<br /><br />Violates the POC. God created Adam & Eve with Original Justice & as such they had Divine Grace. So you are in effect saying they had Grace and yet didn't have Grace at the same time and in the same sense. They didn't loose grace"they never sinned" yet they lost Grace "suffer eternal damnation". This is as meaningful a statement as 2+2=5.<br /><br />Violates the POC ergo it's logically impossible.Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75439623445692190772013-09-30T15:17:35.581-07:002013-09-30T15:17:35.581-07:00reply to BenYachov continued:
Since Classic God is...reply to BenYachov continued:<br /><i>Since Classic God is Truth Itself then logically there is no possible world that could be created that wouldn't be created by Truth Itself & as thus True Itself cannot lie to Noah & coherently still be truth.<br />The voice that claims to be "god" that is bullshiting Noah here which I will call "Bullshit Voice" can either be caused by Supernatural origin(i.e. God). Preternatural origin(some spiritual creature made by God) or natural origin or it might even be Uncaused and Uncreated itself.</i><br /><br />Doesn't the A-T philosophy deny that contingent events can ever be truly uncaused? Otherwise the cosmological argument couldn't work, it seems. And I specified as part of the premise that it isn't caused by any creature made by God. So are you therefore saying that, given these premises, this is not a "logically possible world"? <br /><br />If you do indeed say it's logically impossible for God to create such a world, then would you say there are any similar examples of worlds that are logically impossible for God to create, not because they contradict "God is Truth", but because they contradict "God is justice" or "God is goodness" or "God is love"? Here are some examples, I'm not really asking you to address them individually, just to tell me whether you think any of them are logically impossible for God to create:<br /><br />1. A world where Adam and Eve never sinned, but God caused them to die and suffer eternal damnation anyway.<br /><br />2. A world just like ours up through Jesus' death and resurrection, but where some who went to heaven in our world, and whose thoughts and feelings and lives in this world are exactly identical to the thoughts/feelings/lives of their counterparts in our world (including accepting Jesus' sacrifice and God's will, sincerely repenting their sins, etc.), were nevertheless sent to hell.<br /><br />3. A world just like ours up through Jesus' death and resurrection, but where God miraculously caused everyone who ever knew of Jesus or his teachings to forget him completely, so no one could know of and accept his sacrifice, and every single person subsequently went to hell.<br /><br />4. A world where God gets people to heaven by taking away their freedom of will, compelling them to love Him.<br /><br />5. A world where even completely unrepentant sinners and rejectors of God are accepted into heaven.<br /><br />If you do say that some worlds can be deemed logically impossible on the grounds of inconsistency with God's love/goodness/justice, then it seems to me that for humans there must always be an element of moral intuition in judging which worlds are "too bad" to be compatible with God's nature, unless anyone can propose some clearly-defined rules that would give an unambiguous answer about any such world. It's these sorts of moral intuitions I'm appealing to when I say it seems incompatible with God's nature to suggest he might let people be eternally damned even if He didn't know whether they might have been save-able if they were allowed to exist in a changeable state for a longer time. So it's not a proof, just an argument that if you think any worlds like the ones described above can be deemed logically impossible, there's an analogous case against the traditional Christian idea of how damnation works.JesseMhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09993568347649474812noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-66186999770898732332013-09-30T15:14:50.927-07:002013-09-30T15:14:50.927-07:00@BenYachov:
Briefly I am merely taking everything ...@BenYachov:<br /><i>Briefly I am merely taking everything I know & learned about Classic Theism & Catholic Natural Theology and judging your criticism and claims by it. The fact you understand "truth" to be a mere property tells me that you are not assuming an Aristotelian/Thomistic metaphysics when you think of "god".</i><br /><br />I didn't say that the A-T philosophy couldn't redefine "truth" to mean something different than a mere property--words often are given different definitions from their common ones in specific intellectual fields, including philosophy. So Im fine with adopting a different definition than the more common one for the sake of discussion, as long as the definition is sufficiently clear. My point was just that "truth" has always been understood as a property of statements and beliefs by pretty much everyone who is not a believer in divine simplicity (which I think would include Aristotle himself), so if the A-T philosopher wants to use a different definition and use it to prove that God cannot lie, they need to <i>make explicit what the new definition actually is</i>, such that we can make sense of both statements like "God is truth" <i>and</i> ones like "the statement 'the sky is blue' is true". Ideally the definition should be clear enough that one could use it to construct a logical syllogism showing that, given the premises of the definition, God can never be the cause of verbal statements (like the voice in my example) that are not true. Now, if you don't know of any place where Aquinas or another A-T philosopher has provided such a detailed definition, it would be asking too much for you to come up with one yourself for the sake of a casual discussion on a comments thread, I'm not doing that. I'm just noting that the argument seems questionable to me as stated.<br /><br /><i>Thus my original charge your critique best fits a Theistic Personalist deity rather than a Classic view obtains. </i><br /><br />This is a total non-sequitur. You think that because I don't assume the logical rigor of the A-T notion that God is"truth" and therefore unable to lie (nor did I assert it is definitely logically incoherent, I just expressed some doubt), that somehow shows that my argument about hell shows that I am assuming a "theistic personalist deity"? How is the second part supposed to follow from the first, exactly? My argument about hell had nothing to do with the question of whether God being "truth" makes logical sense, I was just noting as a side-point that this would need some careful definitions if it is to be a rigorous argument. And obviously I don't have to be a personal believer in the A-T philosophy to note that some of its own premises about God don't seem to fit very well with its premises about hell.<br /><br /><i>I'm sorry but your revised example still suffers from the same problem. You have some sort of mysterious voice bullshiting Noah & you are just labeling it "Classic Theist God". Logically and coherently it cannot be. </i><br /><br />I did no such thing, my question was just whether a world where Noah hears this voice (not caused by any finite being), and its prophecy fails to come true, was logically possible, and/or whether God has the power to create such a world. I never said that the answer must be "yes", I just asked for your answer one way or another.JesseMhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09993568347649474812noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-91430482802392357122013-09-30T13:43:16.633-07:002013-09-30T13:43:16.633-07:00Thanks for the quotes, Ben and Scott. Addressing B...Thanks for the quotes, Ben and Scott. Addressing Ben's first:<br /><i>>>Accept the essay says by definition all potential creation is "imperfect".<br />>What statement in the essay are you referring to? <br />QUOTE" "...That God does not will necessarily some of the things that he wills does not result from defect in the divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed... and such defect accompanies all created good."( Summa Theologiae Ia, 19, 3 ad 4)</i><br />This does say all potential creation is imperfect, but it seems to me that this alone doesn't necessarily imply that there cannot be a best of all possible worlds, though, if "best" just means "better than (or at least as good as) any of the alternative possible worlds" rather than "perfect". The remainder of the quote Ben posted in that same comment seems to be saying that God's divine freedom means he must be able to create any logically possible world, no matter how imperfect it is, which also need not be inconsistent with the idea that there could be a "best of all possible worlds".<br />The quote posted by Scott is more unambiguous, though. In <a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1025.htm#article6" rel="nofollow">the linked section</a> Aquinas says that God "can always make something else better than each individual thing" and also that "God could make other things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would be another and a better universe." It seems to me that Aquinas just asserts this rather than arguing it though; even if one accepts that for any individual created thing God could make a better thing, why couldn't the universe contain an infinite ascending chain of better and better things? Or couldn't a universe be a bit like a work of art, in that part of its beauty is in how it achieves its desired effects in a relatively austere way, without adding more than is necessary? Even if the writer of the essay that Ben linked to was aware of this passage where Aquinas asserts there is no best of all possible world, it may be that he wanted to supply his own argument for it since Aquinas' reasons for making this assertion aren't sufficiently obvious. As I said to Ben, I think it is clear that the author is trying to make an original argument rather than simply recount Aquinas' views, since he says "I want to attempt a defence of the conclusion that this is not the best of all possible worlds on the basis of divine omnipotence, or the limits thereof. In doing so, I will have to make a claim similar to one that Aquinas made about the nature of the divine will, namely that its freedom in creation is grounded in the imperfection of creation." And then he goes on to describe the logical structure of his argument (its use of modus tollens) and says "I hope to show that, while this argument is not Aquinas', it is thomistic in being drawn from thomistic principles." <br /><br />Finally, I want to emphasize again that my own argument about hell wasn't saying that God must create the best of all possible worlds, we just got into this discussion after Ben linked to the author's argument as a way of trying to refute my argument (I originally assumed Ben was linking to it because of the argument how God's divine freedom necessitates that he be free to create any logically possible world, so that's the aspect to the essay I mostly focused on in my replies, but given some later replies I'm not actually sure how the essay was intended to relate to my argument).JesseMhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09993568347649474812noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-48264917371960106492013-09-30T08:20:41.627-07:002013-09-30T08:20:41.627-07:00In such discussions I think one stumbling block to...In such discussions I think one stumbling block to understanding the doctrine of Hell might be that it is hard to envision "what it is like" to be and make decisions as someone else.<br /><br />To put it more concretely through a cliched example, let's say that Hitler will perpetually choose damnation through all Eternity.<br /><br />Now if I try to put my head inside his head, I would say, why would he do that? At some point, after suffering for a bajillion years, obviously Hitler would repent and come to God. Hitler would obviously be racked with remorse and reflect on the suffering he caused, and would turn and repent.<br /><br />But that's not what Hitler would necessarily do - that's what *I* would do if my mind were somehow simultaneously inside Hitler. We are simply incapable of knowing for sure what another person would choose given that we're not them. It's more like we can sort of just project ourselves onto everyone else and assume they'd made decisions like us.<br /><br />But as a graduate student in psychology I've found over countless experiments that sometimes the decisions made by others are a complete mystery. That's just *not* what I'd do given that situation.<br /><br />So while I'm sympathetic to universalism I have to remain agnostic about what other people may or may not do/want given a set of circumstances. I'm just not them. The doctrine of Hell seems to indicate (if true) that indeed there are some people out there who would permanently reject God. How do I know there aren't people out there who wouldn't? I have no idea.<br /><br />Now maybe this would be too much of a Cartesian "I think therefore I am" sort of agnosticism about other minds for the Thomists here. But I'm not quite a Thomist (yet, anyway).Syphaxhttp://saintsandsaints.wordpress.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-13126864313798481782013-09-28T15:16:57.107-07:002013-09-28T15:16:57.107-07:00>The classical God can still communicate messag...>The classical God can still communicate messages to people, no? Let me rephrase the scenario so it deals only with events in the contingent universe, like the message itself, saying nothing about the nature of the God that created a universe where that message is heard. <br /><br />I'm sorry but your revised example still suffers from the same problem. You have some sort of mysterious voice bullshiting Noah & you are just labeling it "Classic Theist God". Logically and coherently it cannot be. <br /><br />>Do you think it there is a logically possible world where both of the following happen?<br /><br />Since Classic God is Truth Itself then logically there is no possible world that could be created that wouldn't be created by Truth Itself & as thus True Itself cannot lie to Noah & coherently still be truth.<br /><br />The voice that claims to be "god" that is bullshiting Noah here which I will call "Bullshit Voice" can either be caused by Supernatural origin(i.e. God). Preternatural origin(some spiritual creature made by God) or natural origin or it might even be Uncaused and Uncreated itself.<br /><br />Well we can eliminate God since he is Truth itself. You claim it's not insanity or any preternatural cause like the Devil. That either leaves some other natural cause such as this particular universe has some weird feature where it's fabric might randomly record spoken words and play some of them back and it's by mere consequence that they arranged themselves in a patter that told Noah there was a flood. OTOH if they are Uncaused and Uncreated well logically Classic God cannot create something that is uncreated since that would be a contradiction and also only God can be uncreated as is argued by Aquinas.<br /><br />So when mapped out it seems to me mostly logically impossible or at best an unknown natural phenomena but logically no possible world created by the God of Abraham & Aquinas could be created by anything other then Truth Itself which can't directly lie because that would be failing to will His own good.<br /><br />>I thought the essay was using Aquinas' assumptions about the nature of God's omnipotence (that His nature can't prevent him from realizing any logically possible world) ….<br /><br />But it's pretty much using all of Aquinas assumptions across the board you are using one that you are qualifying in a peculiar way that I don't recognize. <br /><br />Cheers anyway. I give you an A for effort but that is only because I just came from confession and don't want to muck it up being my usual jerk self.<br /><br />Cheers.Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-84192214271441094262013-09-28T15:16:38.464-07:002013-09-28T15:16:38.464-07:00@JesseM
>Is this meant to be a rigorous argume...@JesseM<br /><br />>Is this meant to be a rigorous argument or is there meant to be some element of poetry or mystery to it? If it's meant to be rigorous I think you would have to specify more clearly how you are defining "truth" since you don't seem to be using that word in the same way that anyone who doesn't subscribe to divine simplicity would use it. Ordinarily "truth" is understood as a property of certain statements, and a property can't be said to be the cause of any events in the world (like a person receiving a divinely-inspired message) any more than it would make sense to say that "loudness" is the cause of my hearing a particular loud sound.<br /><br /><br />Briefly I am merely taking everything I know & learned about Classic Theism & Catholic Natural Theology and judging your criticism and claims by it. The fact you understand "truth" to be a mere property tells me that you are not assuming an Aristotelian/Thomistic metaphysics when you think of "god". Thus my original charge your critique best fits a Theistic Personalist deity rather than a Classic view obtains. Truth is more than a property it is what is real vs what is not real. Lies are statements told as truth but known to the teller to be unreal. God is Truth Itself thus God cannot tell us directly something that is not true. He has no moral obligation to prevent others from telling us untruth. Nor does his Nature compel him to do so since it does not pertain to his own Good which he must Will by Necessity. Nor does he have an obligation in either case by Nature or Morality to prevent human minds from making mistakes. That is just the way it is.<br /><br />Let me just say as a disclaimer I don't doubt your sincerity & that you are trying to the best of your ability to adapt your general theistic critiques to Classic Theism. But to be blunt I don't think you are succeeding. Your efforts thus far to use the following analogy are like something trying to cast doubt on a Pantheistic concept of God by refuting Cosmological arguments. The thing is Cosmological arguments presuppose some sort of creator deity. A Pantheistic Deity is identical to creation & not a creator deity thus refuting CO are not relevant. God in the Classic Sense is not a being alongside other beings & is completely unlike us.<br /><br />Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67641581116860554282013-09-28T15:06:11.891-07:002013-09-28T15:06:11.891-07:00I also just happened across a related passage in B...I also just happened across a related passage in <a href="http://archive.org/stream/naturaltheology00boeduoft#page/n139/mode/2up" rel="nofollow">Bernard Boedder's <i>Natural Theology</i></a>. The important bit is in section 87 at the bottom of p. 124 (to which I've linked), but the preceding pages set it up.<br /><br />By the way, for anyone who may be interested: quite a few of these old neo-Scholastic manuals (listed by Ed some time ago in his "Scholastic's bookshelf" posts, which you can find by searching this site for that phrase) are now available in inexpensive print versions from a few of the publication houses that specialize in public-domain material. Over the last year or so I've managed to purchase (and read) a fair number of them. They're quite good. (I certainly hope they're not what Pope Francis meant when he said he had "[u]nfortunately . . . studied philosophy from textbooks that came from decadent or largely bankrupt Thomism"!)Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-15635894101379104962013-09-27T11:49:20.174-07:002013-09-27T11:49:20.174-07:00I'll answer some of JesseM's particulars l...I'll answer some of JesseM's particulars later. Anyway thank you Scott.<br /><br /><br />>>Accept the essay says by definition all potential creation is "imperfect".<br /><br />>What statement in the essay are you referring to? <br /><br /><br />QUOTE" "...That God does not will necessarily some of the things that he wills does not result from defect in the divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed... and such defect accompanies all created good."( Summa Theologiae Ia, 19, 3 ad 4)<br /><br />Aquinas, in dealing with the issue God's freedom in the Summa, grounds his assertion that this is not the best of all possible worlds in divine freedom, and indeed he explains divine freedom with a reference to this principle. "Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as was shown above, He has free choice with respect to what he does not necessarily will." ((S.T. Ia, 19, 10) The only thing that God must will is his own nature. However, no possible world is so good that God must choose it.<br /><br /> For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness, necessarily.... Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things since no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. (S.T. Ia 19, 4) <br /><br />This claim constitutes a defence of divine freedom that in no way implies God's imperfection, but rather places the imperfection on the side of the object, i.e. the world."END QUOTESon of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58174260839236029032013-09-27T11:39:10.301-07:002013-09-27T11:39:10.301-07:00@JesseM:
"If you say that Aquinas himself cl...@JesseM:<br /><br />"If you say that Aquinas himself clearly stated that there could be no such thing as a 'best of all possible worlds' (as opposed to just saying that God is not constrained to create a best world), can you point to a specific passage where he says this?"<br /><br />For whatever it's worth, he comes pretty close <a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1025.htm#article6" rel="nofollow">here</a> when he states that, for anything God has made, there's always something better He could have made instead.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72707758055518425392013-09-27T08:19:39.308-07:002013-09-27T08:19:39.308-07:00reply to BenYachov, part 3:
Well the essay links t...reply to BenYachov, part 3:<br /><i>Well the essay links to the various arguments made by Aquinas for his views in the Summa & maybe you should read them as well? Still in a essay on a Thomist website that makes Thomistic Assumptions. Reject those assumption if you wish but the brute fact a Thomist doesn't believe there is such a thing as "the best of all possible worlds" is possible remains. </i><br /><br />I thought the essay was using Aquinas' assumptions about the nature of God's omnipotence (that His nature can't prevent him from realizing any logically possible world) to come to a novel conclusion about their implications, namely that there can be no "best of all possible worlds". If not, why would he explain the logical structure of his argument as "I hope to show the antecedent of the conditional is false by showing on thomistic grounds that its consequent is false and invoking the logical rule of modus tollens"? He seems to be saying that "thomistic grounds" lead to the conclusion that the consequent is false, and <i>his</i> modus tollens argument shows that therefore the antecedent of the conditional must be false too. And he had earlier said "In what remains of this paper, I want to attempt a defence of the conclusion that this is not the best of all possible worlds"…"I want to attempt a defense" again sounds like he is making a somewhat original argument, not merely recounting Aquinas' view, although he does make use of Aquinas' views as one component of the argument.<br /><br />If you say that Aquinas himself clearly stated that there could be no such thing as a "best of all possible worlds" (as opposed to just saying that God is not constrained to create a best world), can you point to a specific passage where he says this?JesseMhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09993568347649474812noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69741395515567673052013-09-27T08:18:52.654-07:002013-09-27T08:18:52.654-07:00reply to BenYachov continued:
Do you agree that t...reply to BenYachov continued:<br /><br />Do you agree that the author is saying in the quote above that the only type of world God cannot create is one that involves a logical contradiction? I suppose one could argue that certain exhaustive collections of facts about a contingent universe might not contradict one another in any way, but it might still be logically contradictory to assume that the classical theist God had created a universe where all those facts hold true. Such a world could be said to be "internally possible" (in that there is no internal contradiction between any of the facts about this putative world) but not "actually possible" (in that there is a contradiction between God's nature and the notion that God would cause such a world to exist). If this fits with your conception of why it's impossible God would create a world like the one I described above where people receive false messages, please clarify. But if you use this type of argument to explain why God can't create an internally possible world like the one I described above, then I could equally well turn it around and say God should not be able to create a world where people go to hell who might have been saved if God prevented their death, since my argument is that this contradicts the idea that God is perfectly loving and powerful.<br /><br /><i>Accept the essay says by definition all potential creation is "imperfect".</i><br /><br />What statement in the essay are you referring to? If you're referring to the last short paragraph where the author writes "there is no best, even though some are better than others", my point was that this was a non sequitur given the argument earlier in the essay. It would be equally consistent with the previous argument if he had said "there might be a best of all possible worlds, but even if so God is not constrained to actualize that one, because omnipotence requires that God be free to actualize any logically possible world." If you think there is anything in the arguments of the essay prior to the last two sentences that would contradict that alternate conclusion, please quote the part that you think contradicts it.<br /><br /><i>As Tony pointed out talking about a "best of all possible worlds" is like talking about the largest finite integer. It's not possible since even the number googolplex which is psychotically huge can be made larger by a mere addition of +1. Creation is imperfect thus there cannot be the "best" thought there can always be better.</i><br /><br />That's a good argument, but it isn't the one made in the essay. Even this argument isn't perfect, because it might be "best" for the span of time between creation and doomsday to be less than some finite amount, and best for the number of created entities (material or spiritual) to be below some finite amount too, in which case there might only be a finite number of possible worlds satisfying these requirements.<br /><br />I admit that speculation doesn't sound very plausible, but keep in mind that my argument about Hell was never about God choosing the "best of all possible worlds" in the first place. What I was doing was more like dividing the collection of all possible worlds into two categories, one category consisting of worlds where God allows people to die unsaved and be transformed into an unchangeable state where their choice is frozen for eternity, another category consisting of worlds where God either prevents people from dying if they are in danger of doing so in an unsaved state, or anyone who dies unsaved gets resurrected in a still-changeable state (as I think Christians would say was likely true of Lazarus after Jesus resurrected him). My argument is that any world in the second category is better than any world in the first category, even though there may be no single "best" world in the second category.JesseMhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09993568347649474812noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-10582007804856851162013-09-27T08:17:16.949-07:002013-09-27T08:17:16.949-07:00@BenYachov:
The doctrine of the Divine Simplicity....@BenYachov:<br /><i>The doctrine of the Divine Simplicity. God is identical with His attributes. God isn't a being with the separate attribute of being truthful but God is Truth Itself thus God's Word is Truth. Truth by definition can't be both true and a lie otherwise it wouldn't be truth. Thus to speak of God as lying is more incoherent thus logically not possible much like 2+2=5 is logically impossible.</i><br /><br />Is this meant to be a rigorous argument or is there meant to be some element of poetry or mystery to it? If it's meant to be rigorous I think you would have to specify more clearly how you are defining "truth" since you don't seem to be using that word in the same way that anyone who doesn't subscribe to divine simplicity would use it. Ordinarily "truth" is understood as a property of certain statements, and a property can't be said to be the cause of any events in the world (like a person receiving a divinely-inspired message) any more than it would make sense to say that "loudness" is the cause of my hearing a particular loud sound.<br /><br />There is also the issue that even most people who believe every precisely-defined meaningful statement must be unambiguously "true" or "false" would still probably admit there is some ambiguity in whether a particular communication is "truthful" or not, since for example people can make statements that are technically true but are intentionally misleading, with the wording being subject to multiple interpretations and the statement being false under the most obvious or "natural" interpretation.<br /><br /><i>You seem to be channeling your inner Hume. You are trying to imagine some preternatural disembodied entity lying to Noah but if you do so then the entity you are imagining cannot coherently be God in the Classic Sense but some other "god" concept that is not Classical.</i><br /><br />The classical God can still communicate messages to people, no? Let me rephrase the scenario so it deals only with events in the contingent universe, like the message itself, saying nothing about the nature of the God that created a universe where that message is heard. Do you think it there is a logically possible world where both of the following happen?<br /><br />1. Noah suddenly hears a voice telling him that it is the voice of God (though I'm not assuming anything about whether that's true at the moment, since I'm only discussing facts about the universe), and that he needs to build an ark because a great flood is coming. Assume the voice is not a hallucination, that it comes from real physical sound waves, but the sound waves suddenly appeared with no physical cause. Also assume that no finite intelligent being such as a devil caused this to occur.<br /><br />2. Despite the voice, no great flood actually occurs.<br /><br />This does not seem <i>logically</i> impossible to me, so I would say there is a logically possible world where both of these happen. Do you agree or disagree? Obviously, if you agree it's logically possible, then my follow-up question will be about whether God can cause this possible world to exist, but the first question does not presuppose anything about God, it's just about the contingent universe. The argument at the <a href="http://www.aquinasonline.com/Topics/boapw.html" rel="nofollow">link</a> you pointed me to seemed to say that God's nature cannot forbid him from creating <i>any</i> logically possible universe:<br /><br />"For Aquinas, the only restriction on God's omnipotence is what cannot be because it involves a contradiction … so long as all its elements are compossible, i.e. do not entail a contradiction, the possible world is a possible participation in divine goodness from the mere fact that it is conceived by the divine intellect. So the only possible world that is so bad that it cannot be willed by the divine will is one that cannot be conceived by the divine intellect. Thus, it is false that any possible world could be so bad that God could not choose it."JesseMhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09993568347649474812noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-76431132512362087492013-09-26T19:58:33.496-07:002013-09-26T19:58:33.496-07:00Of course for purposes of argument when I am takin...Of course for purposes of argument when I am taking about God's Word I am talking neither of Scripture nor the Second Person of the Trinity but of God speaking.<br /><br />Since God's essence is identical with His essence then God is His attributes. If God has the attribute of Truth then God is Truth. So God being Truth can't lie because then He wouldn't be Truth.Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6729471071387733922013-09-26T18:27:00.997-07:002013-09-26T18:27:00.997-07:00Ingx24--
I have the same difficulties you do, but...Ingx24--<br /><br />I have the same difficulties you do, but in my case I don't know what the answer is. The thing to remember is that God is far more compassionate than we are. If there's a Hell, there's some reason why it's the best God could do for the those who end there. (I doubt eternal torture is part of it.) And another thing to remember is that no matter how vile a position may be, you can always find an intellectual of some sort somewhere who will defend it. You see this in secular politics and it's also something to be observed in religion. All one has to say is "God wills it" or "the Party wills it" or "National security demands it" and there will be a flock of intellectuals falling over themselves justifying "it", no matter what "it" is. <br /><br />On a related note, I think the torture chamber view of hell is probably behind the notion that Christians long had that heresy should be punished. It makes sense in its own way--what crime could be worse than teaching people ideas that could drag them down to Hell? Of course this isn't exactly an original observation on my part. Donaldnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28829429340670214752013-09-26T17:47:59.933-07:002013-09-26T17:47:59.933-07:00>Even if he shows "the antecedent of the c...>Even if he shows "the antecedent of the conditional" is false, that antecedent actually contains multiple assumptions--both the assumption that "this is the best of all possible worlds" and the separate assumption that "that God always acts for the best, <br /><br />Well the essay links to the various arguments made by Aquinas for his views in the Summa & maybe you should read them as well? Still in a essay on a Thomist website that makes Thomistic Assumptions. Reject those assumption if you wish but the brute fact a Thomist doesn't believe there is such a thing as "the best of all possible worlds" is possible remains. <br /><br />>God could not make another, i.e. a worse, world than this one, for then he would make something worse than the best."<br /><br />This flows from the principle that God wills his own good and must do His own Good by necessity(which is another reason why God can't lie. Since lying is against His good. If I lie His Good is undiminished). If this is the best of all possible worlds then God cannot create any world other then this and also he must create it & cannot freely choose not to create it. The principle that God's act of creation is a free act is then undermined.<br /><br />The act of creation on the part of God becomes necessity. <br /><br />> So even if he argues that the consequent is false (according to Thomist philosophy) and therefore by modus tollens the antecedent of the conditional is false, why couldn't the false part that "God always produces the best possible"?<br /><br />Because creation is by definition is imperfect. All created thing by definition have a distinct existence and essence & can never be perfect like God having His essence and existence identical and only notionally distinct. <br /><br /><br /><br />>That would actually seem to be more in line with the later argument about divine freedom involving the capability to do absolutely anything that isn't logically impossible.<br /><br />Except a "perfect creation" that is perfect like God is perfect is not logically possible thus it can't be the best just as there is no highest finite number since no matter how high you get you can still add one.. God cannot create another classic theistic God & He cannot create the best of all possible worlds. He can only create a better world then the one he made & yes he could have created worst one but as long as it participates in being it is good. <br /><br /><br /><br />>Indeed it seems to me that according to this argument, there is nothing to rule out the possibility that there is a worst of all possible worlds, and that this would be exactly the world God would choose to create!<br /><br />Except you need to read the essay more closely. God must will & do His own Good by necessity but creating isn't something that causes God's good by necessity. Thought the act of creating is good never the less it isn't necessary for God. God would still be God even if he never created. OTOH in a sense you can have a "worst" of all possible worlds. To use the number analogy if our world is a 5,000 on the sliding scale of goodness from 1 to potential infinity then God could alway make a world that is rated "1", What would such world be like? Oh I don't know maybe an empty black void & nothing else. OTOH maybe there isn't a "worst" of all possible worlds either since you can't actually get to zero by dividing by half. You can get to one over one googolplex but you can also get one over one googolplex +1. <br /><br />Cheers.Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-22318519868525889822013-09-26T17:47:40.696-07:002013-09-26T17:47:40.696-07:00@JesseM
>>God saying something is the same ...@JesseM<br /><br />>>God saying something is the same as willing it.<br /><br />>Why should that be so?<br /><br />The doctrine of the Divine Simplicity. God is identical with His attributes. God isn't a being with the separate attribute of being truthful but God is Truth Itself thus God's Word is Truth. Truth by definition can't be both true and a lie otherwise it wouldn't be truth. Thus to speak of God as lying is more incoherent thus logically not possible much like 2+2=5 is logically impossible.<br /><br />> In the above example, the event of Noah hearing the booming voice seems to be a different event than a later flood, would you in fact say it's logically impossible to have a world where the event of Noah hearing the voice occurs but the flood does not? Or would you say such a world is logically possible but God's nature forbids Him from creating such a world?<br /><br />You seem to be channeling your inner Hume. You are trying to imagine some preternatural disembodied entity lying to Noah but if you do so then the entity you are imagining cannot coherently be God in the Classic Sense but some other "god" concept that is not Classical.<br /><br />God cannot lie but God can create a being with free will that can choose to lie & as long as that being participates in being it is good and thus not so evil as for God to not create it.<br /><br />>OK, I admit I must not have read carefully enough, I did read through it quickly the first time. <br /><br />It is laudable you own your mistakes. But as I read your response I think you need to do some more reading & try a little harder not to equivocate between the Classic view of God vs the Theistic Personalist view. <br /><br />>But even after reading it again more carefully, I don't see how the conclusion in the last paragraph that there is no "best of all possible worlds" follows from any of the argument in earlier paragraphs, which seem to just be arguing that there is no restriction on God's power such that His nature forbids him to create certain logically possible worlds because they are "too bad" ("it is false that any other world is insufficiently good to be created by God ... the only possible world that is so bad that it cannot be willed by the divine will is one that cannot be conceived by the divine intellect. Thus, it is false that any possible world could be so bad that God could not choose it.")<br /><br />Accept the essay says by definition all potential creation is "imperfect". As Tony pointed out talking about a "best of all possible worlds" is like talking about the largest finite integer. It's not possible since even the number googolplex which is psychotically huge can be made larger by a mere addition of +1. Creation is imperfect thus there cannot be the "best" thought there can always be better.<br /><br /><br />Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26710690570791311792013-09-25T16:36:55.897-07:002013-09-25T16:36:55.897-07:00I missed Anonymous's question, but it's pa...I missed Anonymous's question, but it's partly covered by my response to JesseM. In a nutshell: we don't really know in any detail what it will be like for the damned. Aquinas thinks there is good reason to think that the damned, both out of body and in body, will be punished by being bound to real, physical fire; the fire will penalize both soul and body in the way appropriate to each; they have some kind of <i>poena sensus</i>, an awareness of positively being penalized, and this penalty will certainly not be pleasant, but while the bodies of the damned, unlike the bodies of the blessed, can be forced to endure things, the bodies of the damned are, like the bodies of the blessed, incorruptible and inalterable; this penalty is <i>not</i> the worst penalty of hell. So how much will it really be pain in our sense? We don't really know. Possibly one could squeeze more out of Aquinas than this, but it would require very close exegesis of the texts in question, which are often more vague in the Latin than the English translations sometimes make them sound.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69312247757004233332013-09-25T16:13:42.496-07:002013-09-25T16:13:42.496-07:00(1) You are quite right about Ed; but ingx24 was s...(1) You are quite right about Ed; but ingx24 was specifically referring to Aquinas as Ed presented him in this post.<br /><br />(2) You say, "What could "bodies are tormented" refer to except physical pain?" To which the answer is that it could mean what the actual Latin means, and the Latin is broader. The Latin <i>can</i> mean torment or torture; it can also mean 'made subject to grief', or can even sometimes just mean 'forced to bear a severe trial against one's will'. It's the same word for being crucified, and that's almost certainly deliberate: those who would not willingly bear their cross while alive, like the blessed, will in some sense bear it while they are dead.<br /><br />Further, we should keep in mind that Aquinas is using the word because it's in his authorities. And this is particularly significant given that we're talking about a question in the Supplement -- questions in the Supplement were not written by Aquinas for the Summa, they are abridgements by others of questions from the Commentary on the Sentences, one major point of which is to show facility in the handling of authorities.<br /><br />(3) It's still the case that on Aquinas's account the damned are not perpetually burned alive: burning is a corruption and their bodies are incorruptible. They are immune to burning. And even when Aquinas explains the fire (in article 1), he says that it makes sense for it to be fire because fire is most <i>afflictivus</i>, which means 'buffeting' or 'vexing' or 'oppressive' or even 'humiliating'. The fire is a punishment for Aquinas not by burning but by being a burden, a vexation.<br /><br />And we also have to keep in mind that when Aquinas thinks 'fire' he thinks not primarily what we usually think of fire, which for Aquinas would only be a very impure kind of fire, but rather 'Aristotelian element of fire', which in its pure form does not necessarily work in the same way we think of fire as working. And it's notable that the primary characteristics of fire as an element are (1) that it can be considered the noblest of the elements and (2) that it is the element that is least likely to deviate from its end regardless of the obstacles. It's an interesting irony, actually: those who refused to achieve their ends as rational creatures are bound to the nonrational creature that rarely deviates from achieving its ends; they who refused to do their job rationally are subjected to what always does its job even without reason.<br /><br />(4) We get a similar issue with your SCG reference; 'capable of suffering' here is <i>passibilia</i> which means being of a sort that has to undergo things, 'suffering' in the old sense of 'having to endure something', not necessarily suffering in our sense. This is a problem that we have elsewhere for other reasons; <i>poena</i> is usually translated pain, because 'pain' used to be that broad, but it's a broader term than 'pain' usually is today -- anything that punishes in any way is a <i>poena</i>. So when Aquinas says that the damned and the souls in purgatory have <i>poena sensus</i>, usually translated by 'pain of sense', there's no way to determine just from that whether it's even pain in our sense of the word -- it just means something that positively penalizes in some way.<br /><br />Now, there are passages you can find in Aquinas that can be read as arguing that the damned experience pain in our sense -- there's a passage in which he describes it as being like always dying but never dead, but they are always quite vague, and usually are at base just allusions to the original images (weeping, darkness, fire, death) in which the doctrine of hell is formulated. And I think that's not surprising: when there is a new heaven and a new earth, things will work differently.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27467663641194053892013-09-25T15:41:16.054-07:002013-09-25T15:41:16.054-07:00reply to George LeSauvage, continued:
That people...reply to George LeSauvage, continued:<br /><br /><i>That people deserve damnation is pretty obvious, unless you have a grossly inflated view of mankind. The really tough point -- the hard part -- is the teaching that some are saved.</i><br /><br />Again, the issue that it seems logical that a perfectly loving God would <i>desire</i> that no one suffer the fate of eternal damnation, if they can be saved from it in a way that's compatible with other aspects of God like his perfect justice. For a non-Molinist there seems to be something He could do which might save more people (as a result of their free choices, so the need for justice isn't violated), namely give people who die unsaved (or are in immediate danger of dying) more life in a changeable state. For a Molinist, there is the issue above that He could actualize a possible world where the only people who exist are the ones whose choices result in them being saved in some possible worlds, including that one.JesseMhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09993568347649474812noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-2004755410688243822013-09-25T15:40:22.027-07:002013-09-25T15:40:22.027-07:00@George LeSauvage:
1. I don't see it as you de...@George LeSauvage:<br /><i>1. I don't see it as you describe, "that this timeless vision is seen even by those who God returns to ordinary life, like Lazarus?" I don't see what Lazarus (a one-off miracle) really has to do with it.</i><br /><br />Because my argument is about the contrast between what God actually does (according to traditional Christian doctrine) and what He <i>could</i> do. Even though according to traditional Christian beliefs it's true that Lazarus was a one-off miracle, if you believe that after his resurrection Lazarus remained in a changeable state (he hadn't been given any timeless vision that froze his choice for eternity), then God <i>could</i> resurrect everyone who dies unsaved in the same way. And keep in mind that this argument is really directed at non-Molinists, who don't believe God knows for certain that a person who dies unsaved could never have become saved if he were allowed to live a bit longer. I have some separate objections to the Molinist scenario which I'll discuss further below, but I'd also be curious if you agree that this issue of God having the power to give people further chances to avoid damnation but not doing it is at least somewhat problematic for non-Molinists, and would thus be a good argument for the plausibility of Molinism.<br /><br /><i>2. The real point, though, is that I don't see what the number of chances has to do with it. It may take some longer than others, to reach their fixed position, that's all. I don't see a problem here.</i><br /><br />As I said, the problem is for non-Molinists. If it takes some longer, and the non-Molinist says God doesn't know one way or another whether a person who dies unsaved might have reached a different "fixed position" had they lived a bit longer, then why wouldn't God give these people further chances to change their position, if He is really infinitely loving and wants what is best for us all?<br /><br /><i>3. "Why should it be true that humanity would divide up neatly into two radically different classes..." <br /><br />Because some say to God, "Thy will be done", while to others He has to accept saying "Thy will be done." I don't see this as hard.</i><br /><br />But people can change what they "say to God" over the course of their life, no? Why should it be that there are plenty of people who go from rejecting God's will to accepting it at age 50 or 60 or 70, but not one person who would only switch their decision in possible worlds where they lived to a greater age like 200 or 5000?<br /><br />Another issue with Molinism: all possible souls should fall into one of two categories, the first consisting of those would reject God in all possible worlds, the second consisting of those who would accept Him in at least some possible world. Your Molinist position is that God ensures that the actual world is one where every soul he creates in the second category actually <i>does</i> accept Him before death, right? So wouldn't it be more loving for God to ensure that the actual world is one containing <i>only</i> souls of the second kind, rather than one in which He creates souls in both categories? Why create souls that He knows are unsaveable and thus will be damned to suffer eternal torment, if it would be in His power to create a world populated solely by souls that can be saved?JesseMhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09993568347649474812noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29705303990156974612013-09-25T15:21:21.059-07:002013-09-25T15:21:21.059-07:00To be honest, I'd be hard-pressed to find a pr...To be honest, I'd be hard-pressed to find a pre-20th century theologian, East or West, who didn't propose in some way a physical element, whether we're talking about the actual energies of God unveiled (East) or a creation of God's (West).<br /><br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80139765193353867842013-09-25T14:30:58.626-07:002013-09-25T14:30:58.626-07:00@Brandon:
Actually, no; Aquinas takes hell to invo...@Brandon:<br /><i>Actually, no; Aquinas takes hell to involve being bound to fire. It's impossible for the damned to burn -- they are as immune to burning as the blessed -- and the punishment of being bound to fire in Aquinas's view is not the punishment of being burned but (as Ed notes above) the punishment of not being able to do as you please, of having your will subordinated to something that doesn't even reason.</i><br /><br />But Dr. Feser said he was specifically talking about their punishment <i>before</i> the resurrection ("as to the experiences of the soul after death and <i>prior to its reunion with the body at the resurrection</i>, consider the suffering of the damned from hellfire"). After the resurrection, even if it's true according to the standard doctrine that their bodies can't be "burned" in the sense of being damaged, they could still feel the same physical pain that we feel when we touch a hot stove, a sensation rooted in signals that our sensory nerves start sending to our brain even before our flesh has had time to be significantly damaged. And doing some googling on Aquinas' writings it seems he thought a new form of <i>bodily</i> suffering (which I would assume was meant to be physical pain) would begin after the resurrection. In his <a href="http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles.htm" rel="nofollow">Summa Contra Gentiles</a> I found the following in <a href="http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles4.htm#96" rel="nofollow">Book 4, Chapter 96</a>:<br /><br />"From the foregoing it is clear, then, that there is a twofold retribution for what a man does in life: one for the soul—and this he receives as soon as the soul has been separated from the body, but there will be another retribution when the bodies are assumed again—and some will receive bodies which are incapable of suffering and glorious; but others, bodies capable of suffering and ignoble."<br /><br />Likewise, in <a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/5097.htm#article5" rel="nofollow">the Supplement section of Summa Theologica, Question 97, Article 5</a> he writes "whatever we may say of the fire that torments the separated souls, we must admit that the fire which will torment the bodies of the damned after the resurrection is corporeal, since one cannot fittingly apply a punishment to a body unless that punishment itself be bodily" and "Augustine, as quoted in the text of Sentent. iv, D, 44, clearly admits (De Civ. Dei xxi, 10) that the fire by which the bodies are tormented is corporeal." What could "bodies are tormented" refer to except physical pain?<br /><br />Of course a Catholic need not assume Aquinas was right about everything, he was a philosopher who arrived at his conclusions through reasoning rather than divine revelation, but I think Aquinas' views on hell did indeed become the traditional ones for Catholics.JesseMhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09993568347649474812noreply@blogger.com