tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post4457605110363673944..comments2024-03-19T02:00:34.750-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Averroism and cloud computingEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger72125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-85483741485740122092013-12-08T21:24:59.599-08:002013-12-08T21:24:59.599-08:00-Porphyry
It seems that under Aristotle matter is ...-Porphyry<br />It seems that under Aristotle matter is defined as capable of differentiating between species, because that which we sense is differentiated between species. To try and work out why things other than matter can be differentiated seems like a fancy way of begging the question, as to whether matter really is the only thing that has that property. Of course one could go to the rules of three at the beginning of The Physics, but it's hard to see how that would definitively assign the property of differentiating between species to matter.<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-60034531169195300682013-12-06T05:45:33.094-08:002013-12-06T05:45:33.094-08:00Still trying to think this through.
"For the...Still trying to think this through.<br /><br />"For the Averroist, each human being [i.e., each composition of the <i>material intellect</i> with an individual <i>passive intellect (imagination)</i>] is somewhat like a Kindle Fire tablet whose content [i.e., that which constitutes the <i>speculative/habitual intellect</i>] is stored [i.e., subsists?] entirely [exclusively? or eternally?] in the Amazon Cloud [primarily, the <i>active intellect</i>, and secondarily/immediately, the <i>material intellect</i>]. [Doesn't it <i>also</i> come to be stored locally? Isn't that what is meant by the <i>speculative/habitual intellect</i> of individual human beings?] When you think, and when I think, we are each, as it were, “streaming” different content [actualizing different <i>speculative intellect(ions)</i>?] from the same universal intellect [i.e., <i>immediately</i> from the <i>material</i> intellect, and <i>ultimately</i> from the <i>active</i> intellect]."David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16824521514795552722013-12-05T10:49:25.921-08:002013-12-05T10:49:25.921-08:00Still trying to understand all this...
From H. Ch...Still trying to understand all this...<br /><br />From H. Chad Hillier's, IEP article on Ibn Rushd (Averroes): "the human mind is a composite of the *material* [potential] intellect and the *passive* intellect [a.k.a. imagination]. ... When the material intellect is actualized by information received, it is described as the *speculative* (habitual) intellect." ...which becomes the *acquired* intellect insofar as its object becomes the *active* [agent] intellect.<br /><br />So applying this to Feser's analogy: "For the Averroist, each human being [i.e., each composite of material intellect and passive intellect (imagination)] is somewhat like a Kindle Fire tablet [active intellect?] whose content is stored entirely [or eternally?] in the Amazon Cloud. [Doesn't it also come to be stored in the speculative/ habitual intellect of individual human beings?] When you think, and when I think, we are each, as it were, “streaming” different content [actualizing different speculative intellect(ions)?] from the same universal [active?] intellect." <br /><br />It sounds like it's not enough for the individual human being to stream content *from* the (one) active intellect *in* the (one) material intellect - the actual human mind also functions by its essential dependence on imagination/ phantasms. And the material intellect, as such, is necessarily one, because it is something like Hegel's Begriff, it is the passive (historically realized) coming-to-be of intellect as such (which must either make everything or become everything) in the world. And the material intellect approaches unity with the active intellect as it approaches, under the influence of the active intellect, a formal identity with the active intellect. <br /><br />"For Aquinas, by contrast, we are more like personal computers with their own processing power [agent intellect], and whose content is all stored locally [phantasms]."<br /><br />So for Averroes, the human mind is individuated (it develops as a particular, distinct speculative/ habitual intellect) just as it is for Descartes: in virtue of the course of its individual, historical interactions with the body (in particular, with phantasms). But as far as this goes, I'm having a hard time seeing the substantive contrast with Aquinas (although I suppose starker differences would arise once we move beyond a purely rational account of the 'phenomenology of spirit' - and I don't mean to imply that either Averroes or Aquinas would adhere to Hegel's rather narrow, doctrinaire construal of the actual history of the 'material intellect' or his assessment of what constitutes the final status achieved by the 'acquired intellect').David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6981183320852306012013-12-02T07:15:42.036-08:002013-12-02T07:15:42.036-08:00"how can different souls of this same one spe..."how can different souls of this same one species be individuated -- as our souls are -- if the Cartesian is correct in claiming that the soul is not related to the body as form to matter?"<br /><br />The specific uniformity of diverse human souls follows from their common spiritual essence. But that spiritual essence is specifically such that it is (initially) a kind of blank slate which is filled up (which is given content, which comes to fruition) on the basis of experience gained in the course of interaction with the body (with matter). So the Cartesian soul is, in fact, individuated 'by matter,' at least in the sense that its particular spiritual/intellectual destiny is accomplished only in concert with the particular material/corporeal destiny of the body to which it is joined.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54749084982487102442013-11-27T19:35:08.262-08:002013-11-27T19:35:08.262-08:00Brandon (siris) has done a few posts on the first ...Brandon (siris) has done a few posts on the first way, I think he has the original argument split into premises.<br /><br />Mike Flynn also had a good article on the fourth way.<br /><br />The blog links are in the side bar.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39021160214404253442013-11-27T09:26:22.933-08:002013-11-27T09:26:22.933-08:00Off topic: Anyone know where I can get each of the...Off topic: Anyone know where I can get each of the five ways presented in valid syllogistic form?<br /><br />Thankszmikecuberhttp://www.debate.org/zmikecuber/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-37630921013176375992013-11-27T04:08:41.850-08:002013-11-27T04:08:41.850-08:00@Sami,
Well, since a dog's soul is completely...@Sami,<br /><br />Well, since a dog's soul is completely embodied in Matter and cannot be separated from it one couldn't alter it too much before it loses its Substantial Form. In the case of humans this is initially more difficult since their Forms can exist apart from Matter. The Basque philosopher Xavier Zubiri, an opponent of Aristotle's Genus/Species definition of Essence, once famously remarked 'Giving Man's Essential Characteristic as a Rational Animal is insufficient as it does not explain why said Rational Animal always possesses two legs'.<br /><br />As much as I admire Zubiri I think part of this stems from a problem I mentioned in my last post, i.e. the failure to distinguish between the Logical Essence or Quiddity and the Substantial Form out there in the world: the Substantial Form of Man makes him more than a Rational Animal; it makes him a Man. We might illustrate this by appealing to Krippe's notion of Natural Kinds and Rigid Designators. To save time I'll quote from the extremely convenient short section on it in Professor Feser's Philosophy of Mind: 'A Rigid Designator is an expression that denotes the same thing in every possible world, in every possible way that things might have been.' So, in order to be a man in any possible world an entity must possess all the inseparable Accidents it naturally possesses in the actual world e.g. having two legs. So whilst it would seem we can easily conceive of a dog possessing Rationality we are in fact conceiving of a different being and not a dog at all.<br />Danielhttp://hieroglyphicpress.co.uk/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23774317359200538622013-11-27T02:26:21.946-08:002013-11-27T02:26:21.946-08:00To what extent can you change a thing before it is...To what extent can you change a thing before it is no longer the same thing? Like, if god took a horse and gave it dog feet is it still a dog? how about dog organs? dog skin? a dog brain? does it matter how this transformation took place? where would aquinas draw the line between a form being imperfectly realized (eg, human without an arm) and a form being lost?Saminoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88553527005558552702013-11-26T14:47:10.274-08:002013-11-26T14:47:10.274-08:00I will just mention a number of points:
1. The i...I will just mention a number of points: <br /><br />1. The individulisation of Angels works in a slightly different fashion since, for Thomas at least, each Angel exhausts the possibility of its species. Thus one could say Michael differs from Gabriel specifically in the same fashion as an ox differs from a goat.<br /><br />2. A somewhat obvious point but in terms of Hylemorphic Dualism the Soul is not just considered qua Mind, as some Cartesians would have it, but qua Substantial Form. Furthermore, I think it would help to distinguish between the Quiddity or Logical Essence, i.e. the Universal considered as such, and the Substantial Form out there in the world from which the former is derived). This is important since Conceptualists like Ockham and Jean Buridan still upheld a Hylemorphic philosophy of Nature and Persons whilst rejecting the former. The form of Socrates is not the form of Plato – it is only on reflection that this entity apprehended by abstraction, which at this stage is considered neither as Universal or Particular, that the Intellect by an act of Second Intention recognises it as exemplifiable as one in many: to whit, as Universal. The Universal is a purely Logical being, an ens rationis, but one with a foundation in Reality.<br /><br />If the form of Plato were coupled with Prime Matter it would always lead to embodied Plato. Not even God could ‘put’ Plato’s soul into Socrates’ body, though He/It could make Plato’s ‘new’ body look like that of Socrates’. A Form/soul is always a Form /soul of this or that man. Though we speak of Men as having Nutritive, Sensitive and Rational souls it is only in view of a Virtual Distinction we can think of these separately, i.e. Man has only one Substantial Form and thus only one soul. Now, only the Rational powers of the soul are not fully dependent on a bodily organ and thus can continue operating post mortem – however, as there is only one soul it does not lose its capacity for the lower functions which it could fulfil again were it incarnated in Matter. <br /><br />(I’m not a Christian but Hylemorphic Dualism is the only philosophical standpoint which makes the Resurrection of the Body seem feasible and not a dogmatic dead end). <br />Danielnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-64674437789901637552013-11-26T14:08:28.361-08:002013-11-26T14:08:28.361-08:00@dguller:
"[I]f we different intellects rece...@dguller:<br /><br />"[I]f we different intellects received the same forms while they were embodied, then wouldn’t they become the exact same disembodied intellect after death?"<br /><br />I think this is disanalogous to the case under discussion. What you probably want to suggest instead is that one disembodied intellect might have two different sets of received forms.<br /><br />Apart from the disanalogy, though, your question is a good one and suggests that my own example isn't the right answer to the question ultimately at issue here. I still don't think "temporality" has much to do with it, though.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-66513334079675265612013-11-26T13:58:32.109-08:002013-11-26T13:58:32.109-08:00(In fact I suspect the A-T answer will turn out to...(In fact I suspect the A-T answer will turn out to lie in the fact that a human substantial form "has" bodily operations in some essential way. But if that's right, then someone more expert than I am will have to spell it out.)Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14478846438577863022013-11-26T13:54:39.579-08:002013-11-26T13:54:39.579-08:00@dguller:
"Why wouldn’t the same objection h...@dguller:<br /><br />"Why wouldn’t the same objection hold in this context, as well?"<br /><br />It might; as I said, I'm not offering the example as A-T's answer to the question at issue. But if it doesn't hold, it will be because the two intellects in question have been differentiated by matter and bear the traces of that differentiation in the forms they've received.<br /><br />That may not be right for other reasons, but I don't think it's wrong <i>merely</i> because there's no "temporality" involved. And that was my (only) point.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14523111365583622062013-11-26T13:48:34.416-08:002013-11-26T13:48:34.416-08:00@ dguller
One example of how something might have...@ dguller<br /><br />One example of how something might have cross-temporal identity is the following.<br /><br />Suppose that an old man owns a house, and his kids would often visit him in it. Now suppose the man dies. When the kids are looking over the will and dividing his property, the children might still refer to the house as “their father’s house”, even though he isn’t alive, because he once owned the house. And indeed, the house would have the partial identity of once being that old man’s house, even if he was dead.<br /><br />Now it’s true that, in the abstract, if we were strangers who walked up to the old man’s house after he died, we would probably not recognize the house's identity of once being the old man's house. But, as I’ve made clear previously in this thread, identity conditions do not rely on whether or not WE can recognize them, but if they can even exist at all.<br /><br />Admittedly, this example is imperfect, and skirts around much of the issue, but it still does illustrate the concept, even if it doesn’t provide a real example.Timotheoshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09848027239405239382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-37758157450577262982013-11-26T13:33:33.857-08:002013-11-26T13:33:33.857-08:00Scott:
Well, that's the question, isn't ...Scott:<br /><br /><i> Well, that's the question, isn't it? And I don't offhand see why the "trace in question . . must include temporality." </i><br /><br />The deeper question, I think, is how a disembodied immaterial intellect can refer to the past at all. <br /><br /><i> I'm not suggesting that the following is the A-T answer to the question, but why couldn't two immaterial intellects with differing histories be distinguished by (for example) the forms they received while embodied?</i><br /><br />You wrote earlier that differentiating Cartesian thinking substances on the basis of having different thoughts would not work, because “there's no reason in principle why one intellect can't have two different thoughts at the same time”. Why wouldn’t the same objection hold in this context, as well? After all, one intellect can have several received forms within it, and so if we different intellects received the same forms while they were embodied, then wouldn’t they become the exact same disembodied intellect after death?<br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-57666162077981517102013-11-26T13:30:29.893-08:002013-11-26T13:30:29.893-08:00@Natural Mind:
"[W]e have different material...@Natural Mind:<br /><br />"[W]e have different material bodies, and thus instantiate different souls."<br /><br />Yes, but be careful: that doesn't mean we have different substantial forms. According to A-T, the substantial forms of two human beings are formally identical; they're numerically different because they're individuated by matter. So the way in which two human beings have different souls (substantial forms) is different from the way in which two angels have different forms; the two angels' forms are <i>not</i> formally identical.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74478461191516855912013-11-26T13:25:01.047-08:002013-11-26T13:25:01.047-08:00@Natural Mind:
"How is it angels get to be d...@Natural Mind:<br /><br />"How is it angels get to be different from each other without bodies, while we humans require different bodies?"<br /><br />Timotheos has already more or less addressed this, but the point is that in A-T, <i>matter</i> is the principle of individuation and is therefore what accounts for their being two substances of the same form. Since angels are immaterial, there can't be two angels of the same form because there would be nothing to individuate/differentiate them. But since humans are (at least partly) material, two of us can have the same substantial form without being the same substance; we're each of us individuated by our matter in a way that angels can't be.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-20276333625648190392013-11-26T13:23:14.793-08:002013-11-26T13:23:14.793-08:00@Timotheus:
Thanks for your comments; I'm in ...@Timotheus:<br /><br />Thanks for your comments; I'm in a late time zone and ready for bed; will respond tomorrow!Erich Groathttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01792208231231133579noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9445580347927456492013-11-26T13:19:30.108-08:002013-11-26T13:19:30.108-08:00@Scott:
so the difference is "formal."
...@Scott:<br /><br />so the difference is "formal."<br /><br />How is that "formal" any different from a "corporal," "material" difference? <br /><br />Difference is difference. "The soul is the form of the body:" we have different material bodies, and thus instantiate different souls. But angels are formally different too, without having different "bodies," and instantiate different forms.<br /><br />How is it angels get to be different from each other without bodies, while we humans require different bodies? <br /><br />It's a serious question for me. How is any sort of "angelic" difference" any different from what makes us crawling creatures?Erich Groathttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01792208231231133579noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-45534747534680282172013-11-26T13:10:57.959-08:002013-11-26T13:10:57.959-08:00@ Natural Mind
For Aquinas, angels are pure essen...@ Natural Mind<br /><br />For Aquinas, angels are pure essences compounded with an act of existence. Since an act of existence adds no identity conditions, all the identity must come from the essence.<br /><br />From an individuation standpoint, this isn’t a problem, since a form alone can be sufficient to provide identity conditions for a substance. Averroes’ argument relies heavily on the supposition that all humans are members of the same species. <br /><br />In Aristotelian philosophy, every substance has one, and only one, substantial form, which is the form of its species. Since two members of the same species must have the same substantial form, if identity conditions are not provided distinctly from the essence, then the “two” members of the species would really have the same identity, and thus would really be the same substance.<br /><br />Thus, since all identity conditions for angels come from essence, if “angel” was a species, there could only be one angel. This is false, so “angel” must be a genus, not a species.<br /><br />Now theoretically, we could give Cartesian souls the same treatment, but then we run into the problem of saying that humans are not a species but a genus. To this, the Cartesian may just shrug his shoulders and insist that humans are not a species, but a genus. Of course, this has its own problems, but it is one possible escape route for the Cartesian.Timotheoshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09848027239405239382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23679130427629641942013-11-26T13:07:10.836-08:002013-11-26T13:07:10.836-08:00@dguller:
I should be more careful here: I don...@dguller:<br /><br />I should be more careful here: I don't mean to suggest that God belongs to some "other genus" that is <i>not</i> composite. God transcends any genus. My point is that wherever we find difference apart from God, among and between angels and men, it is not so easy to say one kind of difference is different from any other...Erich Groathttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01792208231231133579noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44460723947789513342013-11-26T13:03:45.209-08:002013-11-26T13:03:45.209-08:00@Natural Mind:
"[H]ow do they differ from ea...@Natural Mind:<br /><br />"[H]ow do they differ <i>from each other?</i>"<br /><br />In having different forms.<br /><br />"What kind of difference is that?"<br /><br />Formal.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-12328191323595846672013-11-26T13:01:28.284-08:002013-11-26T13:01:28.284-08:00@dguller:
"[I]f you could examine an individ...@dguller:<br /><br />"[I]f you could examine an individual disembodied soul, there would be nothing about it that pointed towards a previous material existence."<br /><br />Well, that's the question, isn't it? And I don't offhand see why the "trace in question . . must include temporality." I'm not suggesting that the following is the A-T answer to the question, but why couldn't two immaterial intellects with differing histories be distinguished by (for example) the forms they received while embodied?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46494548007577154922013-11-26T12:53:53.400-08:002013-11-26T12:53:53.400-08:00@dguller:
Yes, indeed. "They" - the ang...@dguller:<br /><br />Yes, indeed. "They" - the angels, a set of individuals, differing from each other - have this in common: compositeness. That divides them from God. They, each in their own unique way, belong to the genus of beings that are composite. But how do they differ <i>from each other?</i> What kind of difference is that? <br /><br />The archangels Michael and Gabriel are different beings, I suppose. Is their difference from each other "different" from the difference between you and me?Erich Groathttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01792208231231133579noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-38437843442381771002013-11-26T12:19:39.532-08:002013-11-26T12:19:39.532-08:00Natural Mind:
Something divides them from God an...Natural Mind:<br /><br /><i> Something divides them from God and each other: and that would appear to be pure form.</i><br /><br />What divides them from God is that they are composite and God is simple. <br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77076746485169207552013-11-26T12:12:39.633-08:002013-11-26T12:12:39.633-08:00Tim:
It’s my rather limited understanding that, o...Tim:<br /><br /><i>It’s my rather limited understanding that, on an AT conception, disembodied souls are individuated by their once being associated with matter, and so continue on as an incomplete substance after death.</i><br /><br />It is precisely this “once being associated with matter” that I’m having a problem with. What is the nature of this association? There is nothing about the disembodied soul <i>itself</i> that points towards this previous association with matter, because the disembodied soul is completely independent of matter altogether. In other words, if you could examine an individual disembodied soul, there would be nothing about it that pointed towards a previous material existence. <br /><br />So, the association in question is not intrinsic to the disembodied soul itself, and thus must be <i>extrinsic</i> to the soul. And if individuation is now extrinsic to an individual substance – complete or incomplete – then the Cartesian can simply reply that, yes, the immaterial thinking substances are intrinsically identical, but their individuation comes from outside of themselves. Perhaps the Cartesian can even appeal to God who identifies them as distinct from one another on the basis of some extrinsic factor existing in his intellect? <br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.com