tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post4429222020400149425..comments2024-03-28T21:43:44.433-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Oerter and the indeterminacy of the physicalEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger68125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29431321202607692212013-11-03T14:44:52.243-08:002013-11-03T14:44:52.243-08:00I see comment moderation has been enabled on this ...I see comment moderation has been enabled on this thread, so I won't reply further here in order not to make extra work for Ed.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67373706957103435742013-11-03T14:17:16.991-08:002013-11-03T14:17:16.991-08:00@Yair:
"Incidentally, I've just been exp...@Yair:<br /><br />"Incidentally, I've just been exposed to the most impressive such attempt that I've seen yet - the work of Giulio Tononi."<br /><br />Same here; someone else recently posted a link to one of his papers in a thread on this site. I've only had time to glance over it but it does look pretty interesting.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75971826651653772532013-11-02T22:32:51.165-07:002013-11-02T22:32:51.165-07:00@Scott:
I think we're mostly in agreement, ac...@Scott:<br /><br />I think we're mostly in agreement, actually - we both agree that the "function must be determined at least in part by something non-physical", and the only real argument that I can see between us is whether this is in contrast to the physicalist position or an integral part of it. I still maintain the physicalist can deny (2) precisely by invoking psycho-physical correspondence rules as his "non-physical something". <br /><br />Incidentally, I've just been exposed to the most impressive such attempt that I've seen yet - the work of Giulio Tononi. He suggests that consciousness is to be understood as integrated information. I note that this implies panpsychism, which he readily admits. <br /><br />I would very much appreciate any commentary on Tononi's position from an Aristotelian-Thomist perspective - how does his theory relate to the hylomoprhic theory of the soul AT advocates ?<br /><br />http://vimeo.com/53787308<br /><br />Cheers,<br /><br />Yairיאיר רזקhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15798134654972572485noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-66061951823997344702013-10-23T08:25:21.710-07:002013-10-23T08:25:21.710-07:00"Second, and more importantly, finding the fu...<i>"Second, and more importantly, finding the function of a specific object, say a heart, isn't a matter of metaphysics at all. I hardly think you're likely to deny that our understanding of the heart's function (pumping blood) isn't well-grounded empirically."</i><br /><br />I'm tempted to agree. But Feser states "no collection of physical facts ... entails any particular meaning rather than another." This seems to contradict your sentences. I think the theory is that the physicalist is a <i>de facto</i> dualist. He is so because the mere fact that he can detect final cause commits him to hylemorphism whether he admits it or not. But I don't see how this claim can be accepted unless it's shown how hylemorphism gives one that ability. That's why I asked for a proof and why one is necessary before continuing. Until then, your position is indistinguishable from radical relativism.<br />donjindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09204496435655660609noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-89867846048650443012013-10-22T06:18:26.142-07:002013-10-22T06:18:26.142-07:00@Yair:
"How do you move from that to 'th...@Yair:<br /><br />"How do you move from that to 'there are no functions that <i>metaphysically determine</i> the data'?"<br /><br />You don't.<br /><br />You've got the wrong end of the stick here. As Anon implies, the argument is that the <i>data</i> don't determine the <i>function</i>, not the other way around.<br /><br />And that's the metaphysical argument. Since all the physical data together still don't suffice to determine a specific function (like addition), and yet we know a specific function is being implemented (we know we're adding rather than "quadding" or anything else), that function must be determined at least in part by something non-physical.<br /><br />That's why it's wrong-headed to reply <i>But the non-physical data might supervene on the physical data</i>. In admitting that more than one function is compatible with the physical data, you've already acknowledged that this isn't the case—the physical data aren't sufficient to determine the non-physical. <i>That's the whole point of the blinkin' argument</i>.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-65785290389522485332013-10-21T21:51:31.118-07:002013-10-21T21:51:31.118-07:00Do any of those multiple functions come just from ...Do any of those multiple functions come just from the physical facts?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-79309612328582136122013-10-21T18:15:00.323-07:002013-10-21T18:15:00.323-07:00"It's not an argument that there are &quo..."It's not an argument that there are "more data,""<br /><br />Yes it is. Feser is saying that given more data - about the future and counterfactuals - we are faced with the <i>same</i> problem; the problem of undertermination Oerter already acknowledged we face on less data (the past alone).<br /><br />"it's not an attempt to show merely that we can't deduce what program is being run from the physical facts alone"<br /><br />Yet that is what it achieves.<br /><br />"it's an argument that the physical facts alone are not sufficient to determine what program is being run."<br /><br />How does it show this ? All that it shows is that there are multiple functions consistent with the data. How do you move from that to "there are no functions that <i>metaphysically determine</i> the data"? It's like arguing that because there are infinitely many ways to reach the digit series 3.14, I didn't actually determine which numbers to just write by the first digits of pi. These are two distinct levels, the epistemic and the actual. The argument never moves above the epistemic.<br /><br />"The whole point of the argument itself is that this isn't the case—that physical facts don't determine non-physical facts in this way. "<br /><br />The argument just doesn't reach that far. It isn't really discussing what is "determinate" metaphysically, only the epistemic boundaries on that.<br /><br />"You don't show that an argument is bad by saying that it hasn't taken into account the possibility that its conclusion is false."<br /><br />You certainly do show that an argument is bad by saying that it hasn't taken the conclusion's negation seriously. In this case - you can't attack physicalism using an argument whose premises fail if common physicalist theses (emergence) are true. You can certainly attack these thesis; but that's a different matter. <br /><br />Note that this is just a "proof of principle", showing that physicalism, specifically, has the resources to deny (2). Oerter's main point, that this argument is epistemic rather than metaphysical, is more general.<br /><br />Yairיאיר רזקhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15798134654972572485noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-63860387995717211052013-10-21T16:03:10.546-07:002013-10-21T16:03:10.546-07:00@Yair:
Take the complete list of physical behavio...@Yair:<br /><br /><i>Take the complete list of physical behaviors a given machine does exhibit or could exhibit -- a calculator's outputs, the words and images on a computer screen, the noises a robot makes, or even a machine sputtering, melting, or emitting smoke and sparks. There are always going to be alternative incompatible programs (even if eccentric ones like a program for computing Kripke's "quus" function) that the machine's behavior is consistent with. You could take such-and-such behavior as a malfunction in a machine that was running program A, but it could also -- for all any collection of physical facts could in principle entail -- be a machine that is functioning properly as it runs program B.</i><br /><br />That's a (short but, I think, sufficient summary of a) metaphysical argument, not an epistemological one. It's not an argument that there are "more data," it's not an appeal to authority, and it's not an attempt to show merely that <i>we can't deduce</i> what program is being run from the physical facts alone; it's an argument that the physical facts alone <i>are not sufficient to determine</i> what program is being run.<br /><br />Now, you may think that argument doesn't <i>succeed</i>. But you won't <i>show</i> that merely by saying that there might be supervening non-physical facts that, together with the physical ones, <i>do</i> suffice to determine what program being run. The whole point of the argument itself is that this isn't the case—that physical facts don't determine non-physical facts in this way. You don't show that an argument is bad by saying that it hasn't taken into account the possibility that its conclusion is false.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83405132240482862992013-10-21T15:42:50.304-07:002013-10-21T15:42:50.304-07:00"No, that isn't all they show; the argume..."No, that isn't all they show; the argument isn't about epistemology at all, as you can learn easily enough by rereading the passage headed Metaphysical not epistemological."<br /><br />Out of respect for you, I reread the section. All I can see is the "there is more data" argument, and an argument from authority. I hope I don't have to waste words on why more data doesn't move us away from epistemology, and why an argument from authority isn't. An argument.<br /><br />Maybe in the vast literature Feser refers to in his argument from authority there are actual arguments for why the issue is more than epistemological. Maybe there are such arguments in his own paper, too. All I'm saying is that in the arguments presented so far - I don't see any.<br /><br />Yairיאיר רזקhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15798134654972572485noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54080562734741931352013-10-21T11:28:22.112-07:002013-10-21T11:28:22.112-07:00@Yair:
"All they show is that we cannot dedu...@Yair:<br /><br />"All they show is that we cannot deduce which is the determinate function from the physical alone."<br /><br />No, that isn't all they show; the argument isn't about epistemology at all, as you can learn easily enough by rereading the passage headed <i>Metaphysical not epistemological</i>.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86220555517155912102013-10-21T09:11:11.662-07:002013-10-21T09:11:11.662-07:00"That argument is about the strictly physical..."That argument is about the strictly physical, and its burden is precisely that the "non-physical data" are not simply supervenient on the physical."<br /><br />Sorry, but I don't see their argument as succeeding to meet this burden. All they show is that we cannot deduce which is the determinate function from the physical alone. This is not the same as showing that the non-physical data - the psychophysical rules - are not of the supervenience kind.יאיר רזקhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15798134654972572485noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33223284308737584342013-10-21T09:07:25.955-07:002013-10-21T09:07:25.955-07:00@Crude: "It's not 'physicalism' a...@Crude: "It's not 'physicalism' and 'theism' which is relevant here, but 'physicalism' and non-naturalism/non-materialism. And physicalism is entirely compatible with various forms of theism, which the Frank Tipler example oddly enough shows"<br /><br />Alright, accepted.<br /><br />We have some minor disagreements, but mostly - <br /><br />"You say physicalists regard final causes as 'rare and not fundamental'. First, if they're not 'fundamental', I'm not sure you're talking about final causes at all anymore. And rare? If brain states are intrinsically directed towards X - and, unless I misunderstand you, this is a view you are defending physicalists on behalf of - then final causes are extraordinarily common and fundamental after all. But if that 'direction' is not fundamental - if it's just derived, an interpretation - then it looks like the physicalist view is going to collapse into the materialist view, which you don't question the relevance of Feser's criticism regarding."<br /><br />Even if all human actions are "Intentional", intentionality is still extremely rare in the large picture.<br /><br />The physicalist need not commit to fundamental intentionality or meaning (the two are not the same). He can maintain a weak emergence thesis where one description is still determinate, while not being fundamental. He can maintain a strong emergence thesis where one "description" is indeed correct metaphysically. Or he can maintain panpsychist position where "meaning" of brain states is borne out of composition rules rather than being fundamental or endemic. (I personally consider the first two appraoches a failure and the third close to my own, but this is besides the point.)<br /><br />In all these cases, the physicalist can affirm (1) while denying (2).<br /><br />And I must emphasize again that the physicalist is free to deny determination altogether. Certainly in the strong and unique metaphysical sense Feser seems committed to. Remember many physicalists even deny the <i>self</i> in this sense - their own self isn't a unique things that exists at the metaphyiscal level, but rather a rough and vague collection of particles and void. <br /><br />"Sure, someone can just keep redefining 'physical' if they like. "<br /><br />Physicalism maintains that everything is physical or supervenient on the physical. We seem to agree that this thesis is broad enough to avoid Feser's objections. I think we should leave it at that.יאיר רזקhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15798134654972572485noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-65093622520066156822013-10-19T13:09:42.440-07:002013-10-19T13:09:42.440-07:00Er, "likely to deny that it is."Er, "likely to deny that it <i>is</i>."Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-66623426621473415792013-10-19T13:08:41.719-07:002013-10-19T13:08:41.719-07:00@donjindra:
"[T]he metaphysical claim that a...@donjindra:<br /><br />"[T]he metaphysical claim that an object has one true function is not the same as proving you've found it."<br /><br />Well, I think we've found part of the problem.<br /><br />First of all, and less importantly, there's no metaphysical claim here that any object has just "one true function." At bottom, there's just the fairly uncontroversial observation that causes have effects and the unaccountably controversial conclusion that they must therefore have them by nature—be in some way "directed" to them. There's no reason an object can't have more than one function or be "directed' to more than one effect.<br /><br />Second, and more importantly, finding the function of a specific object, say a heart, isn't a matter of <i>metaphysics</i> at all. I hardly think you're likely to deny that our understanding of the heart's function (pumping blood) isn't well-grounded empirically.<br /><br />(That's why your question—"How do we know whether or not we're applying the Aristotelian doctrine correctly?"—is off-base. Finding the function of an object doesn't involve "applying" a "doctrine" any more than recognizing that a red object isn't also blue involves "applying" the Principle of Non-Contradiction. We're exercising our natural reason in accordance with a principle, not drawing conclusions from that principle or trying to make something conform to it.)<br /><br />So your statement is technically true, but its relevance to whatever point you're trying to make is far from clear.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-62009249528090565342013-10-19T12:50:12.970-07:002013-10-19T12:50:12.970-07:00@donjindra:
"Feser must show that the four c...@donjindra:<br /><br />"Feser must show that the four causes were more than sheer <i>stipulation</i> on Aristotle's part."<br /><br />I'm pretty sure Aristotle himself already did that in <i>e.g.</i> <a href="http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.2.ii.html" rel="nofollow">Book II of his <i>Physics</i></a>. (See especially Part 8, where he defends final causes; they're the most controversial item on his list, and they were so in his own day as well.)Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-59608505612763572592013-10-19T12:14:11.801-07:002013-10-19T12:14:11.801-07:00@donjindra:
"If we arrive there, we had to s...@donjindra:<br /><br />"If we arrive there, we had to start from somewhere else. But that 'somewhere else' is going to be something like materialism[.]"<br /><br />Why?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-211433961456459552013-10-19T09:57:22.406-07:002013-10-19T09:57:22.406-07:00it's argued that the modern materialist view i...<i>it's argued that the modern materialist view is ultimately incoherent, and that attempts by to save it in a physicalist way tend either to collapse into incoherency, or collapse into a broadly A-T view anyway.</i><br /><br />The materialist view cannot collapse into the dualist A-T view -- not according to what Feser writes above. That's partly what I've been saying.<br /><br />Either we start with the A-T dualist view, or we arrive there. Those are the only two possibilities.<br /><br />If we start there, all proofs of that A-T dualism are question-begging. That's all Ross's paper does.<br /><br />If we arrive there, we had to start from somewhere else. But that "somewhere else" is going to be something like materialism and therefore -- according to Feser -- it will be impossible to advance beyond that stage because we will not be able to make sense out of the only stuff we count as real -- matter.<br /><br />This is the dilemma.<br /> <br />donjindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09204496435655660609noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-7202276721353521392013-10-17T19:55:13.859-07:002013-10-17T19:55:13.859-07:00@donjindra:
"Yet while formal cause is groun...@donjindra:<br /><br />"Yet while formal cause is grounded in the senses, and everyone can grasp that, where is final cause grounded?"<br /><br />In the fact that final causes are necessary if causation is to make sense at all. If causes have effects, as they must if they're to be regarded as "causes" at all, then there must be final causes.<br /><br />"What 'sense' gives us the ability to 'discover' the final cause, purpose or function of an object?"<br /><br />The intellect—which is a faculty rather than a sense, but it doesn't have anything to work on without input from sensory perception.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67011469806067995022013-10-17T15:08:07.293-07:002013-10-17T15:08:07.293-07:00Quoting from The Last Superstition:
I'll quot...<i>Quoting from The Last Superstition:</i><br /><br />I'll quote as well.<br /><br />Page 112: "On this 'mechanical' picture of the universe as a kind of clockwork, everything that exists in the physical world is made up of (or "is reducible to") purely material parts which by themselves have no goal, purpose, or meaning, and these parts interact with other bits of material stuff according to a stripped-down version of Aristotle's "efficient cause"."<br /><br />So, like I said - they operate with a different metaphysical view, a different view of what counts as 'physical' to begin with. What's "physical" for the Aristotilean is not necessarily so for the materialist or physicalist. On the flipside, "physicalist" is so loose and broad at this point that it's hardly of much use to refer to anyway.<br /><br /><i>Yet while formal cause is grounded in the senses, and everyone can grasp that, where is final cause grounded? What "sense" gives us the ability to "discover" the final cause, purpose or function of an object? </i><br /><br />In part, the same "sense" that gives us the ability to "discover" the final cause: observation coupled with reflection, logical argument, etc. Doesn't seem all that controversial.<br /><br /><i>The word, "doctrine," is appropriate because no proof of the four causes is offered. There's a complaint that the modern "rejection of the four causes was a sheer stipulation, an act of pure intellectual willfulness." (page 72) Fine. But since no proof was offered in the first place, no disproof was required.</i><br /><br />Actually, the complaint goes far beyond that: it's argued that the modern materialist view is ultimately incoherent, and that attempts by to save it in a physicalist way tend either to collapse into incoherency, or collapse into a broadly A-T view anyway.<br /><br />And what do you mean by 'required'? As in 'you're allowed to do so, and no one will show up at your house and have you committed'? Sure - but who cares about that? Embrace whatever metaphysical view you want. Just don't ask as if the one you've rejected is disproven unless it actually was - and you're conceding that it wasn't.<br /><br /><i>In short, the metaphysical claim that an object has one true function is not the same as proving you've found it.</i><br /><br />"So what?" is a valid reply here. You're apparently taking the position that a final cause has to be demonstrated with utter certainty on the lines of "2 + 2 = 4", and anything short of that means someone can ignore the view. That seems like a silly standard - we don't demand it in most areas of areas, including science.<br /><br />If you want to see how he's on a better foundation than the physicalist - watch them try to account for (among other things) the mind, and trying to do so without slipping into either incoherency or a broad A-T view anyway. And personally? I think when the defense amounts to the physicalist trying to prove that, if you turn your head and squint your eyes and ignore the physicalist problems, maybe-possibly the two views break even, Ed's made one hell of an advance anyway.Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19483546309302129002013-10-17T11:50:20.174-07:002013-10-17T11:50:20.174-07:00"Not as far as I've read, no - they'r...<i>"Not as far as I've read, no - they're operating with a different metaphysical view, a different view of what counts as 'physical' to begin with, etc."</i><br /><br />Quoting from The Last Superstition:<br /><br />Page 62, "There are objective essences, natures, or forms of things, just as Plato says; but our knowledge of them derives from the senses, and is grounded in ordinary objects of our experience, just as common sense holds."<br /><br />Page 70, "The final cause of a thing is also the central aspect of its formal cause; indeed, it determines its formal cause. For it is only because a thing has a certain end or final cause that it has the form it has -- hence hearts have ventricles, atrias, and the like precisely because they have the function of pumping blood."<br /><br />So we can assume that final cause is crucial and is required in understanding anything, even formal cause. Yet while formal cause is grounded in the senses, and everyone can grasp that, where is final cause grounded? What "sense" gives us the ability to "discover" the final cause, purpose or function of an object? How do we apply this ability? How do we know whether or not we're applying the Aristotelian doctrine correctly?<br /><br />The word, "doctrine," is appropriate because no proof of the four causes is offered. There's a complaint that the modern "rejection of the four causes was a sheer <i>stipulation</i>, an act of pure intellectual willfulness." (page 72) Fine. But since no proof was offered in the first place, no disproof was required. <br /><br />Yet now that he's thrown down the gauntlet, Feser must show that the four causes were more than sheer <i>stipulation</i> on Aristotle's part. He must show that his ability to discover the function(s) of a calculator are more than an act of pure intellectual willfulness. He must show that his metaphysical position gives him that necessary advantage in finding the true final cause(s), or any final cause, of any object. We'll need clear directions on how to build his compass.<br /><br />For proof we'll need more than an act of intuition because a physicalist has no need to deny his own intuition. Feser must do this <i>prior</i> to invoking his final cause. Because if he invokes that, it's circular. And since he's already said nothing can be understood without invoking final cause, he's in a bit of a predicament. Nevertheless, the problem must be solved. Until he does that, I don't see how he can claim he's on a better foundation than the physicalist. <br /><br /><br />In short, the metaphysical claim that an object has one true function is not the same as proving you've found it.<br /><br />donjindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09204496435655660609noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11319091286558545742013-10-17T05:55:32.773-07:002013-10-17T05:55:32.773-07:00(My first paragraph should end "on it" r...(My first paragraph should end "on it" rather than "on them.")Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75454776129065139462013-10-17T05:54:25.756-07:002013-10-17T05:54:25.756-07:00@Yair:
Perhaps more fundamentally, the very sort ...@Yair:<br /><br />Perhaps more fundamentally, the very sort of supervenience at issue here is exactly what Ross and Feser are arguing <i>against</i>. They're saying that the physical alone is indeterminate with regard to some of the very "mental states" that are supposed by some to supervene on them.<br /><br />"But physicalists can take supervenient non-physical data into account" isn't a cogent reply to their argument. That argument is about the strictly physical, and its burden is precisely that the "non-physical data" are <i>not</i> simply supervenient on the physical.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52693884776742915262013-10-15T13:11:00.843-07:002013-10-15T13:11:00.843-07:00Yair,
This shows well it's those extra assump...Yair,<br /><br /><i>This shows well it's those extra assumptions that make the difference between physicalism and theism.</i><br /><br />It's not 'physicalism' and 'theism' which is relevant here, but 'physicalism' and non-naturalism/non-materialism. And physicalism is entirely compatible with various forms of theism, which the Frank Tipler example oddly enough shows: Tipler flat out regards his view as theistic. He's just one example of that, if a little esoteric.<br /><br />I also don't think Frank Tipler's Omega Point is a good example of 'final cause.'<br /><br /><i>The contrast with AT-metaphysics is clear, for example, in Feser's latest post, where he notes that a soul can persist in mental activity without a physical body, given divine "sustenance" from god. This is in sharp contrast to the core physicalist thesis, that every mental fact supervenes on physical facts. </i><br /><br />Again, 'God' just isn't relevant to this particular discussion - you don't have to be a theist to abandon physicalism and naturalism. And if someone is arguing that intentionality is built into the physical, if meaning is 'intrinsic' and such-and-such brain pattern intrinsically means X, then materialist and physicalist views fall by the wayside in favor of something else. It certainly sounds like a form of A-T to me.<br /><br />Sure, someone can just keep redefining 'physical' if they like. I also have no doubt someone can redefine it to the point where the God of classical theism is just 'the ultimate physical cause, the physical first mover'. But at that point, what's it all matter anyway? And I think similar can be said of this issue. <br /><br /><i>Specifically on final causes, note that physicalists general don't deny them.</i><br /><br />Physicalists in general do seem to, at least in the relevant sense. You say physicalists regard final causes as 'rare and not fundamental'. First, if they're not 'fundamental', I'm not sure you're talking about final causes at all anymore. And rare? If brain states are intrinsically directed towards X - and, unless I misunderstand you, this is a view you are defending physicalists on behalf of - then final causes are extraordinarily common and fundamental after all. But if that 'direction' is not fundamental - if it's just derived, an interpretation - then it looks like the physicalist view is going to collapse into the materialist view, which you don't question the relevance of Feser's criticism regarding.Crudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04178390947423928444noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-24446198303154414562013-10-15T12:21:04.007-07:002013-10-15T12:21:04.007-07:00@Yair:
"What Feser shows is something like &...@Yair:<br /><br />"What Feser shows is something like 'Given all <b>physical</b> data, it is impossible to <b>infer</b> whether brain state Y conforms to meaning A, or meaning B, or...'<br /><br />What he needs for (2) is something like 'Given all <b>physical and non-physical</b> data, brain state Y does not <b>actually</b> conform to meaning A, or B, or...'<br /><br />These are quite different."<br /><br />Yes, they are, but I think they're also each different from what Ed is trying to show.<br /><br />His argument is not about inference; that's an epistemological issue, and he's at some pains to make clear that he's arguing a metaphysical point. That point is, to phrase it along your lines, something like "Given all physical data, brain state Y is indeterminate as to meaning A, or B, or . . . " And that, so far as I can see, is exactly what he needs for (2).<br /><br />As I understand your reply (and do please correct me if I'm wrong), you're saying that physicalism in principle allows that supervenient non-physical properties, processes, and/or phenomena could make up the insufficiency here and serve to fix a meaning even though the physical properties, processes, and/or phenomena alone didn't.<br /><br />If that's what you mean, then I don't think it's right. Supervenience here just <i>means</i> that the physical stuff is sufficient to determine the non-physical stuff; if the physical-plus-non-physical were sufficient for determinacy of meaning, then so should the physical alone be.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18908341712923378952013-10-15T12:10:11.877-07:002013-10-15T12:10:11.877-07:00@ Crude:
"What do you take final causes to b...@ Crude:<br /><br />"What do you take final causes to be?" <br /><br />Explanations in terms of what something is directed to.<br /><br />"I think it's entirely possible for 'physicalists' to redefine 'matter' and 'physical' to the point where it's almost indistinguishable from (among other things) an A-T view, just with a somewhat different vocabulary. If so, at that point, successfully denying 2 just doesn't mean all that much."<br /><br />We agree then the physicalist can deny 2, the question is what then remains of "physicalism". <br /><br />The contrast with AT-metaphysics is clear, for example, in Feser's latest post, where he notes that a soul can persist in mental activity without a physical body, given divine "sustenance" from god. This is in sharp contrast to the core physicalist thesis, that every mental fact supervenes on physical facts. <br /><br />So I disagree - physicalism remains quite distinct from AT. <br /><br />Specifically on final causes, note that physicalists general don't deny them. The argument was rather about whether final causes are rare and not fundamental (physicalism), or endemic and metaphysical(AT theism). But even this is a minor issue, not the core of physicalist worldviews. I can certainly see people arguing for, say, a singularity in the future as the "final cause" of our universe, who nevertheless are very much physicalists. (Frank Tipler does something very similar with his Omega Point, only he then adds further assumptions to make his view a (rather unique) theological one. This shows well it's those extra assumptions that make the difference between physicalism and theism.)<br /><br />Yairיאיר רזקhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15798134654972572485noreply@blogger.com