tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post4360450542965992038..comments2024-03-19T02:00:34.750-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Dude, where’s my Being?Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger476125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-2046717886685452262023-03-23T00:57:24.871-07:002023-03-23T00:57:24.871-07:00What possible middle ground could be had for the t...What possible middle ground could be had for the two? Is there a middle position? Also, can a Thomist retain Aristotelian Metaphysics even if say for the sake argument they don't hold to the absolute divine simplicity of Aquinas? Could they hold to a Palamite view instead while still being thomists in all other regards?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46599530880004140052013-12-25T18:31:56.151-08:002013-12-25T18:31:56.151-08:00See the discussions at SacredWeb.com, issues 30, 3...See the discussions at SacredWeb.com, issues 30, 31, and the coming issue 32.Brendannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4296666490286274932013-12-19T11:09:35.434-08:002013-12-19T11:09:35.434-08:00Josh:
I addressed this above: humans and animals...Josh:<br /><br /><i> I addressed this above: humans and animals explicitly do not differ qua animality; and when we predicate animal of them it is according to a univocal understanding, material, sensate being. No reference to rationality, which doesn't belong to animal nature as such.</i><br /><br />Rationality is virtually present in animality, i.e. as rational or non-rational. In other words, it is implicitly present, and can be made explicit by a specific difference. So, I don’t think that your response works, because animality is determinate in one sense, but indeterminate in another sense, and I think that C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being is also determinate in one sense, but indeterminate in another sense. In other words, C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being clearly states that C must exist in some mode of being, but it does not clearly specify <i>which</i> mode of being it is. Similarly, animality must exist as either rational or non-rational, but the form of animality itself does not specify which of these modes of animality it actually exists as. So, I’m still not seeing it.<br /><br /><i> You're either committed to saying that<br /><br />(1) X is C = X is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being the same as Y's<br />(2) Y is C = Y is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being the same as X's<br /><br />is univocal, or <br /><br />(3) X is C = X is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being<br />(4) Y is C = Y is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being<br /><br />is univocal.</i><br /><br />But (1) and (2) contain an equivocation. To say that C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being is the same as X’s or Y’s could mean either (a) that C-as-instantiated-in-<i>a</i>-particular-mode-of-being is the same in X and Y, <i>or</i> (b) that C-as-instantiated-in-<i>this</i>-particular-mode-of-being is the same in X and Y. I would say that both (a) is univocal predication <i>irrespective</i> of which particular mode of being of C is involved, and that (b) is univocal predication <i>only if</i> the same particular mode of being of C is involved in X and Y, and otherwise, would be analogical predication.<br /><br /><i> But all this can ever reveal meaningwise is the common reference point of the predicate. You aren't revealing anything positive that wasn't given already by the predication itself. The second set there is merely a necessary and not a sufficient condition for analogical and univocal predication.</i><br /><br />And I think that saying that C must be instantiated in <i>some</i> particular mode of being <i>does</i> reveal “something positive” about X and Y. The question is whether this revelation of something positive is <i>enough</i> to warrant univocal predication. I really don’t see why not.<br /><br /><i> The key to the semantic "emptyness" of this whole notion can be seen in the intellect/eye example. The intellect can be said to see in some sense, and it can be said to not see in some sense. All this proposition tells us is that the intellect sees, which is the R. I have no ability to judge whether sight predicated of those two subjects in that way is univocal or analogical.</i><br /><br />And again, I think that predicating sees-in-some-particular-mode-of-being <i>is</i> univocal predication, because the same sense and referent is preserved in both subjects. I think that you have to show that sees-in-some-particular-mode-of-being is empty, and I don’t think that you’ve done this. Otherwise, I could argue that predicating animality of a subject is equally empty, because it doesn’t specify <i>which</i> particular kind of animal you are talking about, e.g. rational or non-rational, and until you specify <i>this</i>, then it is “empty”.<br /><br />By the way, I think that we are zeroing in on the key difference between us on this matter, and I thank you for your patience and diligence in this regard.dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39849514559971175422013-12-18T09:37:47.061-08:002013-12-18T09:37:47.061-08:00f your objection were valid, then we could say tha...<i>f your objection were valid, then we could say that (3) and (4) are incomplete, because they do not explicitly mention whether the kind of animality is rational or non-rational, and to fully make that explicit, then we would have:<br /></i><br /><br />I addressed this above: humans and animals explicitly do not differ qua animality; and when we predicate animal of them it is according to a univocal understanding, material, sensate being. No reference to rationality, which doesn't belong to animal nature as such.<br /><br /><i>In the former pair of propositions, the predicate is “to see in some sense”, and I don’t see why that particular proposition has a different meaning in each predication.</i><br /><br />You're not dealing with how I teased out the definitions--again, You're either committed to saying that<br /><br />(1) X is C = X is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being the same as Y's<br />(2) Y is C = Y is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being the same as X's<br /><br />is univocal, or <br /><br />(1) X is C = X is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being<br />(2) Y is C = Y is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being<br /><br />is univocal. These two are not the same, and in the second case, <b>there is nothing to differentiate it from analogical predication</b>, precisely because you've abstracted away the difference. But all this can ever reveal meaningwise is the common reference point of the predicate. You aren't revealing anything positive that wasn't given already by the predication itself. The second set there is merely a necessary and not a sufficient condition for analogical and univocal predication.<br /><br />The key to the semantic "emptyness" of this whole notion can be seen in the intellect/eye example. The intellect can be said to see in some sense, and it can be said to not see in some sense. All this proposition tells us is that the intellect sees, which is the R. <b>I have no ability to judge whether sight predicated of those two subjects in that way is univocal or analogical.</b><br /><br />Joshuahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03854212736162113327noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-446294256127764232013-12-18T07:24:08.080-08:002013-12-18T07:24:08.080-08:00Josh:
The words you're using are the same, b...Josh:<br /><br /><i> The words you're using are the same, but if the predication itself isn't univocal, then exactly the opposite is true: C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being isn't the same in both X and Y. Very simply put, unless you include an implicit meaning of the senses as same or different, you aren't really predicating anything. That formulation you have is neither univocal nor analogical in nature.</i><br /><br />And that’s what I don’t understand, because you could say the same thing about the following:<br /><br />(1) Socrates is an animal<br />(2) Fido the dog is an animal<br /><br />After all, what this ultimately means is:<br /><br />(3) Socrates is animal = Socrates is the form of animality-instantiated-in-a-particular-being<br />(4) Fido the dog is an animal = Fido is form of animality-instantiated-in-a-particular-being<br /><br />If your objection were valid, then we could say that (3) and (4) are incomplete, because they do not explicitly mention whether the kind of animality is rational or non-rational, and to fully make that explicit, then we would have:<br /><br />(5) Socrates is animal = Socrates is the form of animality-instantiated-in-a-particular-being-that-is-rational<br />(6) Fido the dog is an animal = Fido is form of animality-instantiated-in-a-particular-being-that-is-non-rational<br /><br />And certainly (5) and (6) are not univocal at all, because of the different modes of animality involved, i.e. rational or non-rational.<br /><br /><i>Nope, using the words you've set there doesn't get you to either univocal or analogical predication. We have to know whether the meanings are being applied in the same way across the two subjects for us to have a case of univocal predication; it's a necessary condition. I don't know how else to point this out.</i><br /><br />But we do know that they are being applied in the same way, because “C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being” means the same thing in both predications. Sure, <i>which</i> particular mode of being may be different, but that would conflate a higher category or genus (or whatever you want to call it) and its particular instantiations. I would say that C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being is the higher category of genus (or whatever), and what the particular mode of being that C is instantiated <i>as</i> is lower in the chain of classification, much like whether an animal is rational or non-rational is lower down the chain. <br /><br /><i> By your lights, both of these sets would be "univocal" predications, when in the first case it would be false to say so and true in the second. This wouldn't be the case if they were truly univocal predications.</i><br /><br />I agree that they would both be univocal predications. In the former pair of propositions, the predicate is “to see in some sense”, and I don’t see why that particular proposition has a different meaning in each predication. Sure, it can be further analyzed into what precise sense of sight is involved, but if we stay on the higher category (or whatever), then the meaning remains the same, I think.<br /><br />So, maybe our disagreement is about whether a higher category (or whatever) can retain the same meaning when predicated of two different subjects while one abstracts away the different particularizing features that are implied within that higher category? I say "yes", and you seem to say "no".<br /><br />Any thoughts?dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52416425538323570002013-12-17T15:24:33.315-08:002013-12-17T15:24:33.315-08:00Concrete example might serve better:
Taking "...Concrete example might serve better:<br /><br />Taking "C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being" to be functionally equivalent to "sense":<br /><br />1. The intellect can be said to see in some sense<br />2. The eye can be said to see in some sense<br /><br />1. Socrates is a human in some sense<br />2. Plato is a human in some sense<br /><br />By your lights, both of these sets would be "univocal" predications, when in the first case it would be false to say so and true in the second. This wouldn't be the case if they were truly univocal predications.<br /><br />Secondly, you can't have it both ways; if you agree that the dfs. are properly:<br /><br />Univocal<br />Same R predicated of two subjects according to the same S<br /><br />Analogical<br />Same R predicated of two subjects according to different S<br /><br />Then removing 'same' and 'different' gives you the same df.:<br /><br />Same R predicated of two subjects according to an S (which may or may not be the same)<br /><br />And ipso facto, one has no warrant to say this is <i>univocal</i> at all.Joshuahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03854212736162113327noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-32082446006858116642013-12-17T14:47:25.611-08:002013-12-17T14:47:25.611-08:00I mean, C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-...<i>I mean, C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being is the same in both X and Y.</i><br /><br />The words you're using are the same, but if the predication itself isn't univocal, then exactly the opposite is true: C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being <i>isn't</i> the same in both X and Y. Very simply put, unless you include an implicit meaning of the senses as same or different, you aren't really predicating anything. That formulation you have is neither univocal nor analogical in nature.<br /><br /><i>All that matters, as far as I can tell, is that there is something that is the same in terms of modus and res that is present in both X and Y, and certainly C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being should count for that, no? </i><br /><br />Nope, using the words you've set there doesn't get you to either univocal or analogical predication. We <i>have to know</i> whether the meanings are being applied in the same way across the two subjects for us to have a case of univocal predication; it's a necessary condition. I don't know how else to point this out.<br /><br />One last shot:<br /><i>(1) X is C = X is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being<br />(2) Y is C = Y is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being</i><br /><br />There is equal weight, when considering the meanings here, on either univocal predication or analogical predication. Just from what is given, we can't figure out which it is.Joshuahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03854212736162113327noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-57126967953560721812013-12-17T13:59:39.548-08:002013-12-17T13:59:39.548-08:00David M,
You seem not to be grasping the elementa...David M,<br /><br />You seem not to be grasping the elementary point that <i>you</i> are objecting to <i>my</i> argument; that's what started this whole discussion. And with your<br /><br /><i>(1) Sure.<br />(2) Indubitably.<br />(3) Of course. </i><br /><br />you have conceded that you have no substantive objection to the claim you were objecting to in the first place. So that when you say in response to my clarification of my original argument,<br /><br /><i>And I never said it did, did I? (Again, ignoratio elenchi.) </i><br /><br />the irony is extraordinary, since the thing you claim you never said is in fact the claim I was opposing in the argument <i>you originally objected to</i>; and thus that it is you who are guilty of ignoratio elenchi. And that this failure of yours to keep on track is not due to any great inarticulateness on my part is evidenced by the fact that Glenn saw the point at once.<br /><br />The fact that you won't even bother to keep track of the argument you are objecting to, or even the fact that you are the one objecting to it, and then try to blame other people for your failures and get out of serious argument by mere sarcasm, merely establishes that you are once again wasting my, and everyone else's, time. I certainly have no more time to waste on you.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-45866905340683304032013-12-17T12:36:24.364-08:002013-12-17T12:36:24.364-08:00Josh:
These categories are irreducible, for obvi...Josh:<br /><br /><i> These categories are irreducible, for obvious reasons. Abstracting the 'different from' and 'same as' from the equations doesn't add anything, or even less, get at a commonality; it's just incomplete analysis.</i><br /><br />And that’s exactly what I’m not seeing is incomplete analysis. Sure, abstracted the “different from” and ‘same as” from the equations results in something short of the concrete actual entities in question, and in that sense could be considered “incomplete”, but then you could say the same thing about any abstraction from concrete reality. <br /><br />I guess the question is why C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being is itself insufficient to warrant univocal predication. I mean, C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being <i>is</i> the same in both X and Y. Sure, there are further identities and differences involved, but why is that relevant? All that matters, as far as I can tell, is that there is <i>something</i> that is the same in terms of modus and res that is present in both X and Y, and certainly C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being should count for that, no? <br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-87128346466233370012013-12-17T11:32:01.825-08:002013-12-17T11:32:01.825-08:00Agreed, but I’m wondering if there is a univocal c...<i>Agreed, but I’m wondering if there is a univocal core within the analogical predication, as above.</i><br /><br />To be clearer:<br /><br />Univocal:<br /><i>(1) X is C = X is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being the same as Y's<br />(2) Y is C = Y is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being the same as X's</i><br /><br />Analogical:<br /><i>(1) X is C = X is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being different from Y's<br /><br />(2) Y is C = Y is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being different from X's</i><br /><br />These categories are irreducible, for obvious reasons. Abstracting the 'different from' and 'same as' from the equations doesn't add anything, or even less, get at a commonality; it's just incomplete analysis.Joshuahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03854212736162113327noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72053670587070047012013-12-17T11:13:39.873-08:002013-12-17T11:13:39.873-08:00DavidM,
(3) Of course.
(3) Huh? Could you phrase...DavidM,<br /><br /><i>(3) Of course. <br />(3) Huh? Could you phrase that more clearly?</i><br /><br />Aquinas is clear that the source of the wrongness of some of the most important positions of people with false metaphysics can be found in poor analogical predication, i.e., in analogical predication having gone awry.<br /><br /><i>(4) Non sequitur, and ignoratio elenchi.</i><br /><br />Not at all. <br /><br />Though the premises of an argument may be false, the reasoning itself of the argument may be valid; similarly, though the metaphysical assumptions behind an analogical predication may be false, the predication itself may be true. <br /><br />And just as the correctness of the reasoning nestled between starting premises and conclusion may be addressed, discussed and evaluated, so too may the correctness of analogical predication nestled between starting metaphysical assumptions and whatever point or position the predication is meant to help establish or buttress.<br /><br />It seems clear to this reader that at least three participants in the discussion have homed in on that middle.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-79232860710200974032013-12-17T10:50:16.237-08:002013-12-17T10:50:16.237-08:00David M:
For Aquinas, there is no C such that it...David M:<br /><br /><i> For Aquinas, there is no C such that it has this kind of determinate conceptual content and can be univocally applied to both God and creatures.</i><br /><br />And that is what I’m trying to show is necessary. Have a look at the following:<br /><br />(1) X is C = X is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being<br />(2) Y is C = Y is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being<br /><br />I would say that (1) and (2) would be an example of univocal predication, such that you have the same term (i.e. “C”), the same mode (i.e. -as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being), and the same res (i.e. C itself or C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being). <br /><br /><i> If you think there is, then what is that term (that C)? My contention is that the only term you can come up with is one with a purely nominal definition: 'C' is, by definition, whatever real predicate can be univocally predicated of God and creatures. Fine, but according to Aquinas, no such C exists. That is, there is no univocal foundation in reality from which we can abstract such a concept and subsequently (truly) predicate it of real things.</i><br /><br />And that’s what I’m having a hard time understanding. If creation is like God, as an effect is like its cause, then God and creation must have something in common C, and C must be present in God and in creation, as far as I can tell. Furthermore, C must be “formally” identical in both God and creation. Otherwise, what possible sense is there it saying that creation is like God at all, which is a fundamental claim of Thomist metaphysics and theology by virtue of the principle of proportionate causality. In other words, there <i>must</i> be C for the account to be possible at all. <br /><br />Now, C must exist in <i>some</i> mode, and there are basically two kinds of modes in this case: divine (i.e. simple, perfect, infinite and unparticipated) and creaturely (i.e. composite, imperfect, finite and participated). These would correspond to the different modes of signification involved in analogical predication, and thus if analogical predication is to correspond truly to reality, then I think this is an essential condition for that very possibility. <br /><br />If all of the above is valid, then we can certainly say the following:<br /><br />(1) X is C = X is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being<br />(2) Y is C = Y is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being<br /><br />And in (1) and (2), as I’ve said above, you have univocal predication.<br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54838229387183557962013-12-17T10:40:23.092-08:002013-12-17T10:40:23.092-08:00Josh:
Analogical would carry the further distinc...Josh:<br /><br /><i> Analogical would carry the further distinction (to amend):<br /><br />(1) X is C = X is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being different from Y's<br /><br />(2) Y is C = Y is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being different from X's</i><br /><br />Right, but you can see how one could believe that within analogical predication, at least in this case, there is a univocal core:<br /><br />(1) X is C = X is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being<br />(2) Y is C = Y is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being<br /><br /><i>Again, we agree that you have to have C, but in order for there to be analogy, the particular-mode-of-being-of-C has to be different, and not in some unrelated way to C, but directly related to C.</i><br /><br />Agreed, but I’m wondering if there is a univocal core within the analogical predication, as above.<br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25762048165128306052013-12-17T08:52:34.132-08:002013-12-17T08:52:34.132-08:00Brandon,
I'm not sure what was misguided abou...Brandon,<br /><br />I'm not sure what was misguided about my sarcasm. And maybe you didn't understand my argument? Anyway, re. your "it's all quite simple":<br /><br />(1) Sure.<br />(2) Indubitably. <br />(3) Of course. <br />(3) Huh? Could you phrase that more clearly?<br />(4) Non sequitur, and ignoratio elenchi.<br /><br />"Any account of analogy that fails to make it serviceable to sacra doctrina is a nonstarter."<br /><br />I have no idea what you have in mind here - what is the point of your saying this?<br /><br />"What is more, as I already said, it's a manifest fact that heretics and idolators often predicate terms of God and creatures univocally, because that's what makes them heretics and idolators;"<br /><br />... unless, of course, they are heretics and idolators because of other reasons.<br /><br />"likewise, terms are often predicated analogically between the true metaphysics and the false metaphysics. And sacred doctrine has to talk about these, and may sometimes be comparing two false views, one of whose terms are predicated analogically when compared with the terms of the other. Thus, while metaphysics gives reasons for analogical predication in this or that case, analogical predication does not of itself tell us anything about the metaphysics."<br /><br />And I never said it did, did I? (Again, ignoratio elenchi.)David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-89107400832905137192013-12-16T20:43:26.983-08:002013-12-16T20:43:26.983-08:00Thank you for that.
Now I have something to mull....Thank you for that.<br /><br />Now I have something to mull.Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55222507226164789952013-12-16T20:11:50.456-08:002013-12-16T20:11:50.456-08:00Ben,
There are probably others who could answer t...Ben,<br /><br />There are probably others who could answer the question better; it has been quite some time since I've looked closely at either. But in a nutshell, the major difference between Cajetan and McInerny is exegetical: Cajetan as usually understood takes Aquinas's discussion of analogy in the Sentences commentary to be the key to understanding Aquinas on analogy, and on the basis of it builds the famous classification of different kinds of analogy (attribution, etc.). McInerny thinks that Cajetan has misinterpreted the Sentences discussion, so that it is not possible to build a classification of kinds of analogy on it, that the Sentences discussion is not as important for the later discussions as Cajetan makes it, and that Cajetan's actual classification is untenable because Cajetan fails to distinguish properly between what is essential to analogy and what is not. Probably the most important practical difference is that McInerny thinks there is no classification of analogy: Aquinas just gives us a range of different phenomena in which it can be found, precisely to make the point that analogy can be found in lots of different things.<br /><br />I said 'Cajetan as usually understood' above because there's recently been some argument (by Hochschild) that this is actually Cajetan as misunderstood, and that Cajetan is not trying to give an account of Aquinas's doctrine of analogy, or even a general account of analogy, but that he is trying to adapt ideas in Aquinas to deal with arguments raised by Scotists. (Although Hochschild does think that Cajetan's account remains consistent with Aquinas's.) I'm not sufficiently well-read in Cajetan to say.<br /><br />That's all very general, I know, and doesn't really get into the meat of the difference between them.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00475433359202518234noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4102381987261076972013-12-16T19:05:35.738-08:002013-12-16T19:05:35.738-08:00@Brandon
If you get a moment (& if you don...@Brandon<br /><br />If you get a moment (& if you don't I understand) what is the basic difference between Cajetan on analogy vs McInerny the later calls analogy a logical doctrine?Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19239474578424708182013-12-16T14:56:25.275-08:002013-12-16T14:56:25.275-08:00David M,
I notice that, despite the misguided sar...David M,<br /><br />I notice that, despite the misguided sarcasm, you have no actual argument against anything I've pointed out.<br /><br />It's all quite simple:<br /><br />(1) The theory of analogical predication is a theory of how we can predicate terms or names of subjects.<br /><br />(2) The reason Aquinas talks about analogy in the context of the divine names in a textbook on sacred doctrine, is that it is supposed to be useful for sacred doctrine.<br /><br />(3) Sacred doctrine regularly has to consider and show what is wrong with the positions of people with false metaphysics, like heretics or idolators.<br /><br />(3) Aquinas is quite clear that analogical predication covers some of the most important of these cases when compared to the way terms are predicated of God in sacred doctrine.<br /><br />(4) Therefore, while true metaphysics is the reason for analogical predication within sacred doctrine, it is not necessary for analogical predication that the metaphysical assumptions behind the predication be true.<br /><br />Any account of analogy that fails to make it serviceable <i>to sacra doctrina</i> is a nonstarter. What is more, as I already said, it's a manifest fact that heretics and idolators often predicate terms of God and creatures univocally, because that's what makes them heretics and idolators; likewise, terms are often predicated analogically between the true metaphysics and the false metaphysics. And sacred doctrine has to talk about these, and may sometimes be comparing two false views, one of whose terms are predicated analogically when compared with the terms of the other. Thus, while metaphysics gives reasons for analogical predication in this or that case, analogical predication does not of itself tell us anything about the metaphysics.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-12550763927751252932013-12-16T14:41:42.949-08:002013-12-16T14:41:42.949-08:00Brandon:
"Other people not doing it correctl...Brandon:<br /><br />"Other people not doing it correctly, to name just one."<br /><br />So "other people not predicating correctly" can be a reason for predicating without regard to metaphysical restrictions?? Wow, confused.<br /><br />"The discussion of divine names in the Summa."<br /><br />Wherein, naturally, Aquinas examines the case of God and things opined to be gods and shows that analogical predication is actually consistent with any possible metaphysical situation, because naming does not directly correspond to reality, but depends on how we understand it. Right. Thanks.<br /><br /><br />me: "Couldn't you just as well add, "But since we can't assume that our metaphysical understanding does not derive from just any possible 'metaphysical situation' but must assume that it in fact is directed towards understanding the actual one, this mention of the indirectness of naming's correspondence with reality is irrelevant. (It merely identifies a universal background feature of all human cognition.)"<br /><br />Brandon: "I don't know what this means."<br /><br />So it appears:<br /><br />"Any position on the subject that requires that we always predicate correctly is obviously wrong: certain heretics, for instance, clearly are predicating terms univocally of God and creatures."<br /><br />My position does not require that we always predicate correctly - as I stated, our metaphysical claims are always directed towards understanding reality (by predicating correctly); this does not mean that they always succeed.<br /><br /><br />"You're making the same mistake as dguller: If I say P is predicated of S 'in an unrestricted way' this can only be taken as relative to the ways in which one can predicate terms; you can't conflate the predication with the metaphysics." <br /> <br />But I didn't conflate the terms. I made a claim about the intrinsically metaphysical intent of real acts of predication. Am I mistaken about this? Your best counter-example so far is the case of heretics, but heretics don't intend to speak metaphysical falsehood, so that example doesn't work.<br /><br />"A term could be predicated as a genus, or as a property, etc. or, in the case of God, it is theologically incorrect to predicate it as a genus, etc., but as not restricted in the ways predication as a genus, etc., is."<br /><br />??<br /><br />"It's not difficult at all; you can do it at will. But I've already given examples of this above: I can say, "Socrates is wise" with the intent, or in a context which requires, that 'wise' be predicated of Socrates in exactly the way it is correctly predicated of God in sacra doctrina. And, of course, it will be certainly false. But anyone can do it, just as idolators and heretics not uncommonly predicate things of God in creaturely ways, or of creatures in ways only appropriate to God."<br /><br />I think you're clearly just missing my point. If you point out to a heretic or an idolator that his acts of predication are metaphysically untenable, he won't likely reply, "That's nice, but I'm an idolator and a heretic, so I can predicate practically anything of practically anything in a metaphysically unrestricted way."<br /><br />But come to think of it, it's not difficult at all: if you're stark raving nuts - "I AM GOD! OBEY ME!" -, then, yes, metaphysical reality will not be a constraint upon your predicational practices. But there's not much point in pretending to have an intelligent conversation with someone who is completely nuts, is there? Does someone who isn't just wrong, but doesn't even make any sense, doesn't even care whether their acts of predication are constrained by reality, really have the ability to perform genuine acts of predication? I would say no, not in any relevant sense.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3704530650069023492013-12-16T14:29:36.470-08:002013-12-16T14:29:36.470-08:00Since it keeps coming up, and since it does seem c...Since it keeps coming up, and since it does seem common for people to skip over it in discussing analogy, here is Aquinas on predicating the name God (ST 1.13.10), in the Dominican Fathers translation:<br /><br />"For this name "God," as signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used to denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by participation, we understand by the name of god some likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we understand and signify something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said analogically. "<br /><br />I've found over the years that this passage, so often ignored, is almost always the major test case for whether an interpretation of Aquinas's account of analogy is viable.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23043194812356245862013-12-16T14:13:47.580-08:002013-12-16T14:13:47.580-08:00dguller,
I don’t think that I was sufficiently cl...dguller,<br /><br /><i>I don’t think that I was sufficiently clear. You can certainly have analogical predication independent of ontological likeness, but the analogical prediction will be false. </i><br /><br />Only propositions are actually false, and there will always be at least two propositions involved. Even if we confine ourselves to cases in which both propositions are true, I'm not so sure: consider the real divine vs. divine in opinion case again--<br /><br />The one true God is their God.<br />Mumbo-Jumbo is their God.<br /><br />Both of these can be true of a group of people who only worship the false god Mumbo Jumbo, just not if we are predicating univocally. This is because in the first case, we could mean that the one true God is their God whether they believe it or not, whereas the second can mean, analogically, that Mumbo Jumbo is what is their God, in tribe X's opinion.<br /><br /><i>Then either “some particular way or mode of being” is either (a) a disjunctive predicate, but indefinite, or (b) not a disjunctive predicate, but definite. Would (a) or (b) preserve univocal predication?</i><br /><br />Univocal predication requires sameness of mode of predication, and so (a) could not possibly do it. (b) is consistent with univocal predication; but only if it were the same definite mode of predication.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61750007376151846852013-12-16T14:03:00.645-08:002013-12-16T14:03:00.645-08:00guller:
"My question about univocal predicat...guller:<br /><br />"My question about univocal predication is whether one can predicate C-as-instantiated-by-either-God-or-creation of God and creation in such a way that one is using the same term, which has the same res (i.e. C) and the same modus (i.e. -as-instantiated-by-either-God-or-creation). Or perhaps the real res is C-as-instantiated-by-either-God-or-creation, and the modi would have to be -as-instantiated-by-God or -as-instantiated-by-creation, which are clearly different. You seem to be leaning more towards the latter than the former, but is there any reason to do so?"<br /><br />Hmm... I don't know about all that. Maybe this will help:<br /><br />"Adam is a man." <br />"Brian is a man."<br /><br />The significate (res) of 'man' in each case is the individualized human nature. Adam and Brian do not have different modes/senses of human nature. Human nature is found in each in the same way. Same applies to "Adam the ant and Brian the baboon are animals." 'Animal' has a determinate conceptual content, and this content can be univocally applied to both subjects.<br /><br />For Aquinas, there is no C such that it has this kind of determinate conceptual content and can be univocally applied to both God and creatures.<br /><br />If you think there is, then what is that term (that C)? My contention is that the only term you can come up with is one with a purely nominal definition: 'C' is, by definition, <i>whatever real predicate can be univocally predicated of God and creatures</i>. Fine, but according to Aquinas, no such C exists. That is, there is no univocal foundation in reality from which we can abstract such a concept and subsequently (truly) predicate it of real things. <br /><br />You could say that there must BE such a concept, but it could only be that 'concept' which is identical to the divine intellect itself, which comprehends all of being in the act of comprehending itself (the purely actual intellect which makes all things). Since we have no such comprehensive a priori conception of being, we have no way of arriving at any concept with determinate content that transcends the ontological difference between Being itself and beings. We can only point to this difference (not conceptualize it) and acknowledge the humbleness (and yet greatness) of our own human understanding in the face of it.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-90847169529350657052013-12-16T14:02:43.756-08:002013-12-16T14:02:43.756-08:00David M,
And of course it may; but what else coul...David M,<br /><br /><i>And of course it may; but what else could be a reason ("assuming we're doing it correctly")? </i><br /><br />Other people not doing it correctly, to name just one.<br /><br /><i>I don't understand your argument here. What text are you referring to?</i><br /><br />The discussion of divine names in the Summa.<br /><br /><i>Couldn't you just as well add, "But since we can't assume that our metaphysical understanding does not derive from just any possible 'metaphysical situation' but must assume that it in fact is directed towards understanding the actual one, this mention of the indirectness of naming's correspondence with reality is irrelevant. (It merely identifies a universal background feature of all human cognition.)"</i><br /><br />I don't know what this means. Any position on the subject that requires that we always predicate correctly is obviously wrong: certain heretics, for instance, clearly are predicating terms univocally of God and creatures.<br /><br /><i>My point was that 'unrestricted' doesn't mean anything in itself (i.e., as explicitly divorced from any metaphysical constraints). ('unrestricted' relative to the laws of the state of Massachusetts? 'unrestricted' relative to the statutes of the Rotary Club of America?) Am I wrong about this? </i><br /><br />You're making the same mistake as dguller: If I say P is predicated of S 'in an unrestricted way' this can only be taken as relative to the ways in which one can predicate terms; you can't conflate the predication with the metaphysics. A term could be predicated as a genus, or as a property, etc. or, in the case of God, it is theologically incorrect to predicate it as a genus, etc., but as not restricted in the ways predication as a genus, etc., is.<br /><br /><i>Can you give me an example of a context where "we could predicate practically anything of practically anything in the relevant unrestricted way," i.e., a context wherein metaphysical reality is not a controlling 'restriction' on our acts of predication? </i><br /><br />It's not difficult at all; you can do it at will. But I've already given examples of this above: I can say, "Socrates is wise" with the intent, or in a context which requires, that 'wise' be predicated of Socrates in exactly the way it is correctly predicated of God in sacra doctrina. And, of course, it will be certainly false. But anyone can do it, just as idolators and heretics not uncommonly predicate things of God in creaturely ways, or of creatures in ways only appropriate to God.<br />Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-2536322111350114132013-12-16T13:53:11.490-08:002013-12-16T13:53:11.490-08:00What I see is the same term (i.e. “C”), the same m...<i>What I see is the same term (i.e. “C”), the same mode (i.e. -as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being), and the same res (i.e. C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being), which I would call univocal predication of the term, “C”.<br /><br />What do you think?</i><br /><br />Yeah, sure, that's univocal predication. Analogical would carry the further distinction (to amend):<br /><br />(1) X is C = X is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being different from Y's<br /><br />(2) Y is C = Y is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being different from X's<br /><br />E.g.;<br />Socrates is human<br />Plato is human (univocal)<br /><br />Socrates is wise<br />God is wise (analogical)<br /><br />Again, we agree that you have to have C, but in order for there to be <i>analogy</i>, the particular-mode-of-being-of-C has to be different, and not in some unrelated way to C, but directly related to C.Joshuahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03854212736162113327noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55606732304934020812013-12-16T13:20:35.600-08:002013-12-16T13:20:35.600-08:00Josh:
Right, there's a disjunction when the ...Josh:<br /><br /><i> Right, there's a disjunction when the two subjects instantiate C or whatever differently. I don't think there's any disagreement here from me at least. Except that when we are saying 'what is C,' and C is wisdom or one of the transcendentals or whatnot, then we're analyzing the concept in itself as general, and that won't be univocal, analogical, equivocal in itself obviously. That only comes into play when it's predicated, as Scott was pointing out.</i><br /><br />Right.<br /><br />So, have a look at the following statements:<br /><br />(1) X is C = X is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being<br />(2) Y is C = Y is C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being<br /><br />What I see is the same term (i.e. “C”), the same mode (i.e. -as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being), and the same res (i.e. C-as-instantiated-in-a-particular-mode-of-being), which I would call univocal predication of the term, “C”. <br /><br />What do you think?dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.com