tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post3719507070816494667..comments2024-03-28T10:15:27.193-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Vallicella on hylemorphic dualism, Part IIEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger65125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-50408224839551222092011-08-30T15:14:41.120-07:002011-08-30T15:14:41.120-07:00Dr. Feser,
I have not yet read part three, so per...Dr. Feser,<br /><br />I have not yet read part three, so perhaps you will answer my quesiton there.<br /><br />Edward Feser said...<br /><i>If hylemorphism is true, then human beings, like everything else, have a form. Since human beings are living things, their forms are souls (since "soul" for Aristotelians just means "form of a living thing"). And the soul is an active principle, that by virtue of which a living thing carries out its various operations.</i><br /><br />Thois is actually very close to the Jehovah's Witness notion of a soul, interestingly enough. However, it ties the operations of the form to the activities of the matter.<br /><br /><i>My point is that if we add to this the arguments for dualism -- which entail that some of these operations are immaterial -- </i><br /><br />However, these operations can not be wholly immaterial, as you have described a form. If the form is the processes by which activities are carried out in matter, than even operations which have an immaterial target or goal must be carried out in the physical substrate.<br /><br />Vallicella's soul seems more strongly dualist than your form, and you seem to be conflating the two notions. YOur vgersion of the soul offers no substrate over which wholly immaterial operations can be carried out.One Browhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11938816242512563561noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55049455044217485192011-08-27T08:22:08.581-07:002011-08-27T08:22:08.581-07:00I went looking for this James Chastek post, I can&...<i>I went looking for this James Chastek post, I can't keep up with the conversation but I can see the relatedness </i><br /><br />You should realize that the term "Darwinism" is something of a red flag indicating that someone doesn't understand either Darwin's work or the "Modern Synthesis Theory of Evolution" (which is the current form of the theory Darwin first proposed).<br /><br />But... as to the discussion you liked to... It seems like the author is trying to develop a definition of species that allows him to say "species don't evolve".<br /><br />But then all that is being said at that point is that X qualities define man. Which is well in line with Biology, as you have proto-human -> human -> {post-human or extinction}.<br /><br />You are still building a group of related properties and then calling any organism that has those properties a man.StoneTopnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-8923747150947619362011-08-26T21:27:28.474-07:002011-08-26T21:27:28.474-07:00I went looking for this James Chastek post, I can&...I went looking for this James Chastek post, I can't keep up with the conversation but I can see the relatedness<br /><br /> http://thomism.wordpress.com/2010/12/17/modes-of-considering-the-false/#commentsMartinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13750763393428404220noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-53625031782503407052011-08-26T20:59:00.283-07:002011-08-26T20:59:00.283-07:00What I was suggesting, of course, is that the mode...<i>What I was suggesting, of course, is that the modern biologist as such does not seem to be interested in essences.</i><br /><br />Why not? Questions of how/why we think and act are very much a part of biology.StoneTopnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67913434635073359582011-08-26T20:57:10.624-07:002011-08-26T20:57:10.624-07:00And "humanity" no more means "this ...<i>And "humanity" no more means "this group of interrelated individuals" than "circularity" does</i><br /><br />But doesn't circularity similarly represent a group of objects related by way of a property?<br /><br /><i>It's a question for the paleontologist, but for the philosopher the question is "what is a man?"</i><br /><br />Well aren't those similar questions? After all once you have defined what a man is you can then apply that definition to an organism to determine what a man is.<br /><br /><i>The way you're looking at this seems to suppose that there are no really common quidditative properties, only greater and lesser degrees of similarity.</i><br /><br />Yep... even though you and I are similar we are only identical in the broadest of categories (like the number of limbs or such).<br /><br /><i>To the realist metaphysician there is a real sense in which I and you and your father and my father are not merely more or less similar but the same - that is, with respect to our shared humanity - and all of us and any monkey are different.</i><br /><br />So at what point did that humanity emerge? And what is that "shared humaniyt"?StoneTopnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33809372430833921042011-08-26T14:45:52.030-07:002011-08-26T14:45:52.030-07:00George, frankly, that's a ludicrous reading of...George, frankly, that's a ludicrous reading of my comment.<br /><br />What I was suggesting, of course, is that the modern biologist as such does not seem to be interested in essences.Michael Sullivanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11191322302191384384noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-20219172985164562302011-08-26T13:53:36.039-07:002011-08-26T13:53:36.039-07:00Not at all, it's just that the biologist and t...<i>Not at all, it's just that the biologist and the philosopher have different concerns.</i><br /><br />Michael, this sounds like the infamous "doctrine of the double truth." Are you suggesting that something can be both true for the philosopher and false for the biologist at the same time?George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28229019259333053632011-08-26T13:26:45.042-07:002011-08-26T13:26:45.042-07:00unless you are trying to deliberately construct a ...<i>unless you are trying to deliberately construct a definition of "species" that does not allow for evolution to take place.</i><br /><br />Not at all, it's just that the biologist and the philosopher have different concerns. For the philosopher "humanity" is like "circularity" - a matter for definition and recognition of what fits that definition. But the definition doesn't change. And "humanity" no more means "this group of interrelated individuals" than "circularity" does.<br /><br /><i>thus the question becomes when did proto-human become human?</i><br /><br />The question for who? It's a question for the paleontologist, but for the philosopher the question is "what is a man?"<br /><br /><i>You and your father are similar, and you are similar to your grandfather (though not as much as your father). So to are you similar to me, but not as similar as you are to your siblings (should you have any). And so to are you similar to a bird, but not as similar as you are to a spider monkey.</i><br /><br />The way you're looking at this seems to suppose that there are no really common quidditative properties, only greater and lesser degrees of similarity. To the realist metaphysician there is a real sense in which I and you and your father and my father are not merely more or less similar but <i>the same</i> - that is, with respect to our shared humanity - and all of us and any monkey are <i>different</i>. This is, strictly speaking, what defines us.Michael Sullivanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11191322302191384384noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-82385086678567950602011-08-26T12:18:20.924-07:002011-08-26T12:18:20.924-07:00From the metaphysicians' perspective of course...<i>From the metaphysicians' perspective of course his sense of "species" is the actual species as opposed to biologists' classifications</i><br /><br />That doesn't make much sense... unless you are trying to deliberately construct a definition of "species" that does not allow for evolution to take place.<br /><br /><i>What actually exists is a lot of human beings that have a certain formal structure in common.</i><br /><br />Yep, but that has not always been the case. Go back a few million years and "human beings that have a certain formal structure in common" will not be found... thus the question becomes when did proto-human become human?<br /><br /><i>Well, personally I don't know enough about my distant ancestors to answer that question. George says such a change is impossible.</i><br /><br />Well George is rather obviously wrong. H.sapiens have only been around for about 250000 years, so there was clearly a time when there were no humans, and there are clearly humans now. Looking back at the remains we can see a rather clear line between the hominids (of which we are a part) and the rest of the great apes. The Australopithecus is more human then the rest of the great apes, but not as human as H. habilis, who in turn is not as human H. heidelbergensis.<br /><br /><i>To my mind the difficulty in clearly demarcating the line between species or the existence of intermediate forms is irrelevant to the question of whether there is a real species here and now. There is a clear difference between myself and a monkey which does not exist between myself and my father.</i><br /><br />True, and there are clear differences between you and I which do not exist between us and our fathers.<br /><br />Please not that my original comment was a response to:<br /><br /><i>while evolution depends on the occasional instances that happen outside of the main stream of nature</i><br /><br />So talking about species as collections of lifeforms with common traits as they exist now has nothing to do with what I was originally addressing... which was that evolutionary change is not based on occasional instances out side of the main stream of nature... but rather that evolutionary changes are part of the "main stream" of nature.<br /><br />You and your father are similar, and you are similar to your grandfather (though not as much as your father). So to are you similar to me, but not as similar as you are to your siblings (should you have any). And so to are you similar to a bird, but not as similar as you are to a spider monkey.StoneTopnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-15246325092301894082011-08-26T10:32:48.336-07:002011-08-26T10:32:48.336-07:00From the metaphysicians' perspective of course...From the metaphysicians' perspective of course his sense of "species" <i>is</i> the actual species as opposed to biologists' classifications. What metaphysics is concerned to explain is primarily the actual individuals that exist. What actually exists is a lot of human beings that have a certain formal structure in common.<br /><br /><i>I am a human, but follow my ancestry back a million years is my ancestor then a human? How about twenty million? If they are not human then when exactly did that change occur?</i><br /><br />Well, personally I don't know enough about my distant ancestors to answer that question. George says such a change is impossible.<br /><br />To my mind the difficulty in clearly demarcating the line between species or the existence of intermediate forms is irrelevant to the question of whether there is a real species here and now. There is a clear difference between myself and a monkey which does not exist between myself and my father. That specific difference is not eliminated just because I might be faced with a hard intermediate case: hard cases make bad law.<br /><br />It's like this: between medieval verse romances and modern prose novels there is a clear specific difference. Any decently literate person could spot the difference instantly when faced with a good example of each. And there was a definite change in literary productions which led to the near-complete extinction of the former and the rise of the latter. The fact that there might be some funny intermediate novelistic verse works or prose romances etc which are hard to classify or may be <i>sui generis</i> doesn't mean that there's no real commonality between Jane Austen and Thomas Hardy on the one hand, against Chretien de Troyes and the Gawain-poet on the other.<br /><br />The "relatively smooth continuum" of the development of English literature from the verse romances to Malory to Sidney to Defoe to Richardson to Scott to Dickens etc, along with intermediates and outliers and what not, doesn't abrogate the real specific commonality of form between novels on the one hand and verse romances on the other. <i>What primarily exists</i> are the individual works and their real commonalities and individualities, while the chain of ancestry and our classifications are secondary.<br /><br />This is how I think of living things as well.Michael Sullivanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11191322302191384384noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52825785863581826732011-08-26T10:14:01.669-07:002011-08-26T10:14:01.669-07:00For metaphysics "species" is the quiddit...<i> For metaphysics "species" is the quidditative form(ality) that all individuals of the same kind have in common.</i><br /><br />So then how does the metaphysical term "species" synch up with actual species?<br /><br />I am a human, but follow my ancestry back a million years is my ancestor then a human? How about twenty million? If they are not human then when exactly did that change occur?StoneTopnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74123798393926242262011-08-26T08:17:09.030-07:002011-08-26T08:17:09.030-07:00"Species" is just a term given to a coll...<i>"Species" is just a term given to a collection of closely related animals viewed through a narrow slice of time</i><br /><br />Maybe that's true in biology, but it's not true in a non-nominalist metaphysics. For metaphysics "species" is the quidditative form(ality) that all individuals of the same kind have in common.Michael Sullivanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11191322302191384384noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-42717274336582741322011-08-26T03:59:46.019-07:002011-08-26T03:59:46.019-07:00while evolution depends on the occasional instance...<i>while evolution depends on the occasional instances that happen outside of the main stream of nature</i><br /><br />It is important to note that this is not true... Though massive mutations can occur suddenly the process of speciation usually occurs over the span of generations.<br /><br />"Species" is just a term given to a collection of closely related animals viewed through a narrow slice of time. If we looked at a species across time, say by taking you and showing all your ancestors back to the first cell, we would see a relatively smooth continuum. You could pick out individual species, but there would likely be no single point in continuum where you could say "before this point was species A, after this point was species B"StoneTopnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16805532515432610782011-08-25T09:34:15.560-07:002011-08-25T09:34:15.560-07:00If you weren't hazy, you would be a Thomist.If you weren't hazy, you would be a Thomist.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67914637298859341172011-08-25T09:01:31.713-07:002011-08-25T09:01:31.713-07:00George, I'm not hazy. I'm just not a Thomi...George, I'm not hazy. I'm just not a Thomist. Nor a Darwinist, for that matter.Michael Sullivanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11191322302191384384noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39641872488102714012011-08-25T09:00:40.423-07:002011-08-25T09:00:40.423-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.Michael Sullivanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11191322302191384384noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33625773850343516152011-08-25T08:46:33.105-07:002011-08-25T08:46:33.105-07:00Michael, I suggest you investigate into what biolo...Michael, I suggest you investigate into what biologists have and have not actually discovered, and contemplate more on what exactly substantial being is and what it isn’t. You seem to be a little hazy on this subject.<br /><br />Btw, I'll let you in on a little secret: no one knows more than biologists what a complete crock Darwinism is, but it's the ruling paradigm in academia, and, therefore, must be adored.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35377485616589794972011-08-24T13:24:53.866-07:002011-08-24T13:24:53.866-07:00George, a horse and a donkey generate something wh...George, a horse and a donkey generate something which is neither a horse nor a donkey. I'm no biologist and I'll leave it to someone who knows better to come up with more nuanced examples. My understanding is that what usually happens in these sorts of cases is that two dogs generate something which is mostly doggish but has some trait that does not belong to caninity, a new difference, which then multiplies.<br /><br /><i>And the reason for this is that substantial form does not actualize determinate matter but primary matter, which can never be qualified by accidental forms, or corruptions, or whatever else.</i><br /><br />Now this I disagree with, for a variety of metaphysical reasons. <i>One</i> of these reasons is that act implies potency, and biologists tell us that these sorts of things actually happen. Mutations large and small as a result of radiation or whatever do occur, and cumulatively these give rise to new natural kinds. I understand that this has been actually observed in the case of small organisms with rapid lifespans where large numbers of generations can be monitored. If your metaphysics insists that events are impossible which are observed to happen, your metaphysics is wrong.<br /><br />However, your principle that I'm taking issue with revolves around the unicity of substantial form, and that might be an argument for another day.Michael Sullivanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11191322302191384384noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61194560739889064362011-08-24T11:58:16.943-07:002011-08-24T11:58:16.943-07:00…because through some per accidens interference in...<i>…because through some per accidens interference in the process of generation what is generated is not specifically identical with the generator. And that this does happen is an empirical fact, since monstrosities and "sports" do in fact occur, although not always or for the most part.</i><br /><br />Michael, are you claiming that every once in a while a woman gives birth to a non-human being? Or that, now and then, two dogs generate a non-dog, and that this is an “empirical fact?” If so, I am amazed, because I’m quite sure that no such event has ever been recorded.<br /><br />As for your suggestion that accidental interference could conceivably cause such an event, this, as I’ve argued many times, is metaphysically absurd. For, while accidental interference can cause sometimes that nothing be generated, or, in the case of mutations, that a real ugly thing be generated, it can never cause something substantially different to be generated. And the reason for this is that substantial form does not actualize determinate matter but primary matter, which can never be qualified by accidental forms, or corruptions, or whatever else.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23416658773466110712011-08-24T09:11:41.904-07:002011-08-24T09:11:41.904-07:00George, I don't say that part of the form is p...George, I don't say that part of the form is passed on and part is not. What I say is that a specific form is generated which is similar to but not identical with that of the generator, because of some distortion or corruption of the matter, so that the end of generation - the communication of the specific form - is partially fulfilled, in that something is generated, but not wholly fulfilled, because through some per accidens interference in the process of generation what is generated is not specifically identical with the generator. And that this does happen is an empirical fact, since monstrosities and "sports" do in fact occur, although not always or for the most part.<br /><br />The theory of evolution demands that such monstrosities or sports happen frequently enough and that they are often enough not harmful but beneficial to the monster as to explain the gradual variation of species. Whether such in fact occurs is again not a matter for philosophy but for empirical research.Michael Sullivanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11191322302191384384noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83935801811326788472011-08-24T07:41:20.810-07:002011-08-24T07:41:20.810-07:00Natural selection and random mutation require that...<i>Natural selection and random mutation require that sometimes an organism by chance produces what a scholastic would rightly think of as a monstrum, a corruption of the species whereby the whole of the specific form fails to be passed on from cause to effect.</i><br /><br />The problem, of course, Michael, is that from an A-T point of view the specific form is one and indivisible. Therefore, any suggestion that a part of the form is passed on while another part is not is absurd (again, from an A-T point of view). This is the whole thrust of my argument, and why I say that one must either reject Thomism or reject evolution.George R.noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-73121089554449945562011-08-23T21:05:10.283-07:002011-08-23T21:05:10.283-07:00To add to what Mr Green is saying, from a scholast...To add to what Mr Green is saying, from a scholastic point of view the process of evolution is contrary to the nature of any given species even if compatible with nature in the wider sense. Natural selection and random mutation require that sometimes an organism by chance produces what a scholastic would rightly think of as a monstrum, a corruption of the species whereby the whole of the specific form fails to be passed on from cause to effect. Most of the time, as is normal with monsters, the corruptions simply die out. Sometimes, again by chance from the point of view of the original reproducing species, the monstrum with a distorted kind is better able to survive than its parent which failed to adequately pass on its specific form. The monsters multiply, their own (new) kind is perpetuated, the earlier species ceases to exist, etc.<br /><br />So, while the Aristotelian teaching that in natural kinds like produces like in a multiplication of instances of a single specific form is true (dogs produce dogs not cats), it is true in the sense that it is natural and "natural" is what happens "always or for the most part" - while evolution depends on the occasional instances that happen outside of the main stream of nature - not always and not for the most part, but occasionally - to explain the appearance of new natures.<br /><br />To my mind there's nothing inconsistent with Thomism in this account.Michael Sullivanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11191322302191384384noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81512015064996713002011-08-21T17:45:18.248-07:002011-08-21T17:45:18.248-07:00George R: By evolution I mean the changing of one ...George R: <i>By evolution I mean the changing of one substance into another through a certain number of generations. This is impossible in Thomistic hylemorphism</i><br /><br />But that's now what anyone else means by "evolution" — or at the very least, that's not a reasonable or necessary meaning in a Thomistic context. I acknowledge that the wording "species changing into different species" or "animals evolving into new kinds" is liable to such a metaphysically-impossible interpretation, but I submit that it's only intended as a loose way of speaking, and acceptably so in casual conversation. It's like those cartoons that show a creature crawling out the sea and sprouting limbs and so on as the animation morphs from one kind of drawing to the next — nobody is claiming that a single animal was squashed and stretched until an eel ended up as an elephant. Similarly, biological evolution of species does not claim that any individual ever <i>changed</i> its species, only that animals of one species can (occasionally) produce offspring that belong to another species. And this claim is entirely possible under Thomism.<br /><br />Of course, "evolution" and "creation" are terms that are bandied about with a plethora of different and subtly incompatible meanings, so it's necessary to define exactly what is meant practically every time they are used, but I think the definition I used above — "organisms producing offspring of a different kind" — is the relevant one here.Mr. Greennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-45180091302356900942011-08-20T11:04:37.409-07:002011-08-20T11:04:37.409-07:00George,
That's cool, then. By "YEC"...George,<br /><br />That's cool, then. By "YEC" I didn't mean the whole 6000 years thing, but a literal Genesis that doesn't mean interpretation/commentary. My bad.<br /><br />Anyhow, Origen's orthodoxy was doubted for a long time, but he has been revived as of late. Pope Benedict has made many positive remarks about his work. Maybe one day we'll call him a "true Church father."<br /><br />(Word verification "sapidi" augh yea).Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25966425887852169242011-08-20T08:20:44.921-07:002011-08-20T08:20:44.921-07:00First of all, Anon, Origen was not really consider...First of all, Anon, Origen was not really considered a true Church Father because of his many errors on matters of faith. Moreover, nowhere in the passage you quote does Origen refer to the subject of the age of the world. But the worst part (for you) is that Origen explicitly taught precisely what you suggest he didn't believe.<br /><br />Origen, <i>Against Celsus</i>, Book 1 Chapters 19, 20:<br /><br /><i>After these statements, <b>Celsus, from a secret desire to cast discredit upon the Mosaic account of the creation, which teaches that the world is not yet ten thousand years old, but very much under that</b>, while concealing his wish, intimates his agreement with those who hold that the world is uncreated. For, maintaining that there have been, from all eternity, many conflagrations and many deluges, and that the flood which lately took place in the time of Deucalion is comparatively modern, he clearly demonstrates to those who are able to understand him, that, in his opinion, the world was uncreated. But let this assailant of the Christian faith tell us by what arguments he was compelled to accept the statement that there have been many conflagrations and many cataclysms, and that the flood which occurred in the time of Deucalion, and the conflagration in that of Phæthon, were more recent than any others. And if he should put forward the dialogues of Plato (as evidence) on these subjects, we shall say to him that <b>it is allowable for us also to believe that there resided in the pure and pious soul of Moses</b>, who ascended above all created things, and united himself to the Creator of the universe, and <b>who made known divine things with far greater clearness than Plato, or those other wise men (who lived) among the Greeks and Romans, a spirit which was divine</b>. And if he demands of us our reasons for such a belief, let him first give grounds for his own unsupported assertions, and then we shall show that this view of ours is the correct one.<br /><br />Chapter 20<br />And yet, against his will, Celsus is entangled into testifying that the world is comparatively modern, and not yet ten thousand years old, when he says that the Greeks consider those things as ancient, because, owing to the deluges and conflagrations, they have not beheld or received any memorials of older events.</i>George R.noreply@blogger.com