tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post3644415664896766170..comments2024-03-18T21:06:42.546-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Does existence exist?Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger205125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-34983244266460849252019-06-08T14:30:39.367-07:002019-06-08T14:30:39.367-07:00To exist is no more and no less than to be a membe...To exist is no more and no less than to be a member of the class of everything that is self-identical. The notion that 'existence' entails more than self-identicalness may lead to deficient ontologies (e.g., those in which there are no objects of mathematics, no objects of which mathematical truths are true), while the notion that 'existence' entails less than self-identicalness may lead to inflated ontologies (e.g., those in which there are supernatural objects, objects which are not self-identical and of which no assertion is a truth or a falsehood).<br /><br />"Existence exists" is, at best, an unfortunate (ambiguous) expression of the conviction that something exists that is self-identical and that only that which is self-identical exists. One may eschew the expression and share the conviction.<br />KennisonDFhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12488786743438396321noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55212560399584817632018-10-12T04:53:45.550-07:002018-10-12T04:53:45.550-07:00Prof.feser recently the objectivist Dawson Bethric...Prof.feser recently the objectivist Dawson Bethrick responded to your post http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/01/does-existence-exist.html regarding ayn rand http://bahnsenburner.blogspot.com/2018/05/edward-feser-on-ayn-rand.html it seems to me that his criticisms are very confused let me quote the following to indicate that thats the case ''Feser continues:<br />This is, for the Thomist, one reason (not the only one) for insisting on the real distinction between essence and existence.<br />Then Rand has at least one very good reason for denying the Thomist distinction between essence and existence!<br /><br />Feser goes on:<br />To deny the real distinction tends either to collapse essence into existence or collapse existence into essence.<br />No, it doesn’t, and Feser’s mere assertion that it does, does not constitute a proof that it does. Again, existence is metaphysical, essence is epistemological – having to do with completing the formation of concepts by identifying the essential characteristic(s) distinguishing one class of units from all other classes through the process of definition. Again, we need an objective theory of concepts to understand these complex relations, but where does Catholicism give us any theory of concepts, let alone an objective theory of concepts? Blank out.'' , ''The supposition that such a metaphysical dichotomy exists arises, so far as I can tell, as a result of failing to distinguish between what exists from how we know. Given the primacy of existence, the processes by which man conceptualizes what he finds in the world cannot overwrite the nature of what he finds in the world.<br /><br />Given the primacy of existence, one of Rand’s hallmark achievements, theism has lost the battle once and for all. Given the fact that existence holds metaphysical primacy over conscious activity, there’s no room for a metaphysics of ‘wishing makes it so’. Theism has no objective basis to enter any philosophical contest against the primacy of existence. I think Rand considered this obvious if not self-evident, given her grasp of what the primacy of existence means for philosophy in particular and human cognition in general. But it will likely take other thinkers a brutal degree of self-honesty to reach the level of understanding that was basic to Rand’s worldview, a degree which most thinkers will ditch at the first sign of threat to their allegiance to mystical views.'' im wondering what is your opinion on all this and will you make a blog responce ?monertyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10755980987943472621noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58817479255369684012014-12-02T16:10:06.489-08:002014-12-02T16:10:06.489-08:00I mentioned this article in my post Philosophy: Ex...I mentioned this article in my post <a href="http://briantakita.com/posts/philosophy-existence-is-god/" rel="nofollow">Philosophy: Existence is God</a>.<br /><br />The critique on Ann Rand's statement "Existence exists" depends on a certain definition of "Existence" & subsequently "exists".<br /><br />I utilized the definition of Existence as "Everything that 'is', or more simply, everything". That means Existence covers everything, including physical Existence & conceptual Existence. So Existence exists because Existence is the set of everything (the Universal set). According to wikipedia, the "Universal set is a set which contains all objects, including itself".Brian Takitahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05145263135844768540noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-208586302935441492014-02-22T21:00:38.234-08:002014-02-22T21:00:38.234-08:00@Douglas - I've decided to be charitable towar...@Douglas - I've decided to be charitable towards your bullshit. First, existence is not an object and not a property. If existence were an object, then only that object would exist because that object would be existence and thus the only thing able to exist. You obviously didn't pay any attn to the post because the idea of existence as something leads us to an infinite regress. But more importantly, if existence were a property, you are making the absurd claim that essence precedes existence. But an essence's existence precedes its existence or doesn't exist prior to the property that it exists. <br /><br />The best way to understand the place of existence is to understand that when we grasp x, we first encounter x in the senses, then x is grasped by the intellect, then we judge x to exist. There is some debate in this area, however, even among Thomists. Some would actually place the judgement of existence after contact with the senses but before the apprehension by the intellect. The reasoning here is that we become aware of SOMETHING (i.e., "what is THAT?") before we apprehend it. Perhaps we actually judge existence twice: we sense z, we judge that something exists (not yet x because we haven't apprehended it yet, only "sensed" it), we apprehend x and then judge that x exists. If existence were an accident, we would know it before apprehension like any accident, but we actually don't because we would in the most favorable case judge that something exists and not come to know "exists" as an accident. Denialmnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39268826645333365842014-01-29T15:23:52.118-08:002014-01-29T15:23:52.118-08:00But what does it mean to say that “they are all ra...<i>But what does it mean to say that “they are all rational”? What does “rational” mean here?</i><br /><br />It means the same thing that it always has for those analyzing form with the Porphyrian tree. It is a particular substance capable of knowing forms via the union of the form to the possible intellect. There are many substances that instantiate rationality, but, obviously, they do so in ways that are alike but not identical.<br /><br /><i>what they have in common is what Gregory of Nyssa would agree is their resemblance “in all points”, which you agree is “an early version of the identity of indiscernibles”, and not the similarity of indiscernibles.</i><br /><br />I can't tell exactly what Gregory is implying in the passage you quoted. The thought of the Church Fathers is in general far too unsystematic to make leaps of that kind. All I can say is that he seems to be saying that, between God and creatures, similarity in all respects entails absolute sameness.<br /><br />In any case, getting into a discussion about Gregory's theory of forms would be a worthless detour. I've appealed to him in the past on issues of divine analogy; not on the relationships between forms. His own theory on this matter is very strange and somewhat Hegelian, so it's irrelevant to our debate about Aquinas's theory of forms.<br /><br /><i>Or are you arguing that it is impossible for the intellect to abstract all differences which would leave commonality that is the same in each thing?</i><br /><br />My argument is fairly simple. The intellect possesses a form that is different from the forms in the things that it knows; but these forms are related by a certain absolute likeness that we call "formal sameness". This is weaker than identity but stronger than analogy. The reason that the intellect can know other forms is that it is united to them via this likeness. One cannot comprehend form "in itself"--separated from all particularity--, because form "in itself" does not exist and is instantiated nowhere. A thought about form in itself would be a thought about nothing. Instead, the intellect comprehends forms as they are instantiated in reality, which is to say particularly. But, because the form within the intellect is formally the same as the forms in various particular substances, it becomes possible for the intellect to understand that two substances are both lions, for example.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-20030688035539856172014-01-29T15:23:39.548-08:002014-01-29T15:23:39.548-08:00That is certainly how form appears within a compos...<i>That is certainly how form appears within a composite material entity, but that is not what form is. From what I’ve read, a form is an intelligible principle that accounts for what kind of thing something is supposed to be(come). On that definition, I don’t see why forms do not exist within the divine intellect.</i><br /><br />I disagree with your characterization of form, so there isn't much left to be said on that issue.<br /><br /><i>I don’t think there’s a clear-cut distinction between essence and form, and they basically mean the same thing.</i><br /><br />They did for Aristotle. For Aquinas, a form fits into the "incomplete constituent principle" framework, while an essence refers to the substance. Humans are essentially composed of form and matter; but they are not formally composed of form and matter. Essence is an ontological category, while form is ontic. <br /><br /><i>I agree that the divine essence is not known to us in this life, but the divine ideas are known to us, albeit in a distorted fashion. For example, we may never know all the ins and outs of what it means to be a tree, but we certainly have the form of treeness in our intellect, and the form of treeness must exist in the divine intellect as the ideal archetype of treeness from which all trees are derived from.</i><br /><br />Well, first of all, I disagree that the form of treeness exists in the divine mind in any but an indirect fashion. Perhaps some analogate of the essence of a tree exists there. Second of all, Aquinas disagrees that the eternal types are known in this life, which you still haven't grappled with.<br /><br /><i>There is nothing implicit that requires intermediary steps to make explicit in God’s mind, and that is precisely what “indirectly” means, i.e. not directly present to the intellect in an explicit fashion, but after a series of steps, becomes directly present to the intellect in an explicit fashion</i><br /><br />That isn't how I'm using the word. SCG b1 ch71.15:<br /><br />"We must likewise observe, as was shown above, that just as God in knowing Himself knows other things without any discursiveness of the intellect, so likewise it is not necessary that His knowledge be discursive if He knows the evil through the good. For the good is as the principle of the knowledge of what is evil. Hence, evils are known through goods as things are known through their definitions, not as conclusions are known through their principles."<br /><br /><i>First, you can’t have it both ways, though. It cannot be simultaneously an analogy and a metaphor, because they are different.</i><br /><br />I wasn't trying to have it both ways. My initial use of the word "metaphor" was sloppy and imprecise, and it caused the following confusion. My apologies.<br /><br /><i>If it is an analogy, then you must specify in what way there is a resemblance between the divine mind and something else that we know better.</i><br /><br />The analogy is the one that we've gone back to time and time again: the one between exemplar and product. It is the necessary, irreducible, one-way resemblance of the product to its archetype.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3066056540546407472014-01-24T12:18:25.093-08:002014-01-24T12:18:25.093-08:00A group of individuals that are very similar in ce...<i> A group of individuals that are very similar in certain ways. For example, rational beings are similar in that they are all rational, but in different ways. The similarity of their rationality cannot be reduced beyond a recognition that, yes, these rationalities are formally the same--which is to say that they are alike in a particular way.</i><br /><br />But what does it mean to say that “they are all rational”? What does “rational” mean here? I agree that there are differences between the rationality of different rational beings, but once those differences are abstracted away, what is left is what they all have in common, and what they have in common is what Gregory of Nyssa would agree is their resemblance “in <b>all</b> points”, which you agree is “an early version of the <b>identity</b> of indiscernibles”, and not the <i>similarity</i> of indiscernibles. Or are you arguing that it is impossible for the intellect to abstract all differences which would leave commonality that is the same in each thing?dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44260015828653168732014-01-24T12:17:47.353-08:002014-01-24T12:17:47.353-08:00Rank:
Wow, that sounds rough.
Wait until the kid...Rank:<br /><br /><i>Wow, that sounds rough.</i><br /><br />Wait until the kid arrives!<br /><br /><i> Anyway, Oderberg defines form as the "intrinsic incomplete constituent principle in a substance which actualizes the potencies of matter and together with the matter composes a definite material substance or natural body". And, as I've already illustrated, Aquinas believes that the Ideas cannot be described in this way.</i><br /><br />That is certainly how form appears within a composite material entity, but that is not what form <i>is</i>. From what I’ve read, a form is an intelligible principle that accounts for what kind of thing something is supposed to be(come). On that definition, I don’t see why forms do not exist within the divine intellect.<br /><br /><i>First of all, they apply to both matter and form, which means that they are essences rather than forms.</i><br /><br />I don’t think there’s a clear-cut distinction between essence and form, and they basically mean the same thing. <br /><br /><i>Second of all, they cannot be essences in themselves, because essences can be known by us and Aquinas denies that the Ideas are known to us in this life.</i><br /><br />I agree that the divine essence is not known to us in this life, but the divine ideas are known to us, albeit in a distorted fashion. For example, we may never know all the ins and outs of what it means to be a tree, but we certainly have the form of treeness in our intellect, and the form of treeness must exist in the divine intellect as the ideal archetype of treeness from which all trees are derived from. <br /><br /><i> God knows evil indirectly, and it isn't because of intermediary steps. Likewise with form and matter.</i><br /><br />Again, I don’t know what “indirectly” means in this context. Everything is known directly by God by virtue of being immediately present to the divine intellect. There is nothing implicit that requires intermediary steps to make explicit in God’s mind, and that is precisely what “indirectly” means, i.e. not directly present to the intellect in an explicit fashion, but after a series of steps, becomes directly present to the intellect in an explicit fashion. Such a transition is impossible in God, and so it seems that it is equally impossible to predicate any kind indirect knowing in God. <br /><br /><i> Aquinas's talk of the divine mind and the forms therein is an elaborate analogy. He is expressing the Neo-Platonist doctrine that the One includes and surpasses all things in absolute simplicity.</i><br /><br />First, you can’t have it both ways, though. It cannot be simultaneously an analogy and a metaphor, because they are different. An analogy presupposes resemblance of some kind, and a metaphor does not. If it is an analogy, then you must specify in what way there is a resemblance between the divine mind and something else that we know better. If it is a metaphor, then you must specify what property is being transferred from a created being to the divine intellect. Either way, I think you have to do a little more work than to just say that there is an analogy or metaphor going on.<br /><br />Second, the Neoplatonic account was always problematic, because it presupposed that absolute simplicity precluded any kind of multiplicity, and yet also affirmed that the forms in the Intellect were present <i>in some way</i> in a multiplicity within the One without compromising its simplicity. Aquinas’ solution to this problem, i.e. that only certain kinds of multiplicity are prohibited in God, is a good one, though. <br /><br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-17117702590223261812014-01-24T09:15:30.558-08:002014-01-24T09:15:30.558-08:00dguller,
It’s been busy at work, wife’s eight mon...dguller,<br /><br /><i>It’s been busy at work, wife’s eight months pregnant with our fourth child, and I threw my back out picking up a sock.</i><br /><br />Wow, that sounds rough.<br /><br />Anyway, Oderberg defines form as the "intrinsic incomplete constituent principle in a substance which actualizes the potencies of matter and together with the matter composes a definite material substance or natural body". And, as I've already illustrated, Aquinas believes that the Ideas cannot be described in this way. First of all, they apply to both matter and form, which means that they are essences rather than forms. Second of all, they cannot be essences in themselves, because essences can be known by us and Aquinas denies that the Ideas are known to us in this life.<br /><br /><i>I think what he meant was that the models of concrete individuals exist within the divine intellect, but not the individuals themselves.</i><br /><br />It's probably just a matter of semantics.<br /><br /><i>Indirect just means that there are a number of intermediary steps that one must use in order to reach one’s goal.</i><br /><br />God knows evil indirectly, and it isn't because of intermediary steps. Likewise with form and matter.<br /><br /><i>So, I agree with you that Aquinas denies that God knows the forms in the same way that humans know them, but it does not follow that forms do not exist in the divine intellect. He clearly affirms that they do.</i><br /><br />Aquinas's talk of the divine mind and the forms therein is an elaborate analogy. He is expressing the Neo-Platonist doctrine that the One includes and surpasses all things in absolute simplicity.<br /><br /><i>Even if you specified some way that X resembles Y, you could not appeal to “a single species” that X and Y belong to, because X and Y stand in completely unique relations of resemblance within the interconnected network of beings. What is the “single species” here?</i><br /><br />A group of individuals that are very similar in certain ways. For example, rational beings are similar in that they are all rational, but in different ways. The similarity of their rationality cannot be reduced beyond a recognition that, yes, these rationalities are formally the same--which is to say that they are alike in a particular way.<br /><br /><i>What does it mean to say that X is similar to Y in all respects?</i><br /><br />It would appear that Gregory is appealing to an early version of the identity of indiscernibles. rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-50649049939102573062014-01-24T05:22:41.688-08:002014-01-24T05:22:41.688-08:00The similarity of squares is different from the si...<i>The similarity of squares is different from the similarity of circles. By "similar", I mean the way in which forms of a single species are identified with one another. You see this as being absolute sameness; I see it as being absolute likeness.</i><br /><br />I’m not sure that’s right. Every thing resembles every other thing in some way. So, saying that X resembles Y is empty, tautological and completely uninformative. Even if you specified some way that X resembles Y, you could not appeal to “a single species” that X and Y belong to, because X and Y stand in completely unique relations of resemblance within the interconnected network of beings. What is the “single species” here? <br /><br /><i>Except that "semblance" does not mean "identity" but "resemblance", and so your account falls apart. Gregory is simply stating that if the image was like God in all ways, then it would not be distinct from God. It is like God in some ways and unlike him in others. For example, a stone is like God in that it exists, but unlike him in that it is subject to privations.</i><br /><br />What does it mean to say that X is similar to Y <i>in all respects</i>?dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-5100260718379497212014-01-24T05:22:27.337-08:002014-01-24T05:22:27.337-08:00Rank:
Sorry about the lateness of my reply. It’s ...Rank:<br /><br />Sorry about the lateness of my reply. It’s been busy at work, wife’s eight months pregnant with our fourth child, and I threw my back out picking up <i>a sock</i>. Oh well. So it goes.<br /><br /><i>A form is an ontic constituent within a substance that actualizes it as a particular kind of thing. An eternal type is an absolute category similar to Plato's ideas.</i><br /><br />I would slightly modify your account. A form is that which accounts for what something is. When a form is present within a substance, it is, as you have said, that which causes it to engage in the characteristic activity of the kind of thing it is, i.e. its formal cause, but when a form is present in the divine intellect, then it is the primary and fundamental archetype or model of what something is, irrespective of whether that “something” is actually real, or only potentially real. I think that is why Aquinas calls the divine ideas “forms” at ST 1.15.1, because they are what accounts for what kinds of things substances can be or are by virtue of their status as ideal archetypes or models of the kings of things that substances can be. <br /><br /><i>ST I q14 a11. Individuals pre-exist in God.</i><br /><br />I think what he meant was that the <i>models</i> of concrete individuals exist within the divine intellect, but not the individuals <i>themselves</i>. <br /><br /><i>He's saying that God knows the composite directly, and that he virtually comprehends form and matter because he knows the composite.</i><br /><br />First, it does not follow that God’s intellect does not contain forms, if by “form” one means the ideal archetype or standard that determines what something acts to be(come). <br /><br />Second, I still don’t understand what “virtually” means. Whatever it is, you seem to contrast “directly” with “virtually”, which would make “virtually” a kind of indirect knowledge in God. But how can indirect knowledge be possible in God? Indirect just means that there are a number of intermediary steps that one must use in order to reach one’s goal. But God knows everything at once in an eternal atemporal “moment”, and thus there are no intermediary steps that he must follow in order to know anything. <br /><br /><i>And, regarding God's knowledge through forms, you have to be careful with translations here. Aquinas certainly is not saying that God understands things via "forms" in the same sense that humans do, because he expressly denies this in ST I q84 a5. The eternal types are forms in a distantly analogous way, since they are the principles of the forms we know.</i><br /><br />God understands things via understanding himself as the source and origin of the intelligible principles of all created things. But those intelligible principles must exist in God in order for him to understand them via understanding himself. As he writes: “the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition of things” (ST 1.14.11). And those intelligible principles <i>are</i> the forms. At least, that’s always been my understanding. So, I agree with you that Aquinas denies that God knows the forms in the same way that humans know them, but it does not follow that forms do not exist in the divine intellect. He clearly affirms that they do.<br /><br /><i>There is no archetype F within the divine intellect. This is a metaphor for the virtual containment of all things within the divine substance, which is, again, simply the doctrine that all things resemble the divine substance in some way.</i><br /><br />Like I said, I think that Aquinas would disagree with you here. He clearly talks about “forms” and “intelligible species” in the divine intellect. If all this talk is a metaphor, then a true property of creation has been projected upon our concept of God, even though it is, strictly speaking, false to affirm that property of God. What is the property in question? Also, to say that “all things resemble the divine substance in some way” would require you to describe, albeit imperfectly, in <i>what</i> way. <br /><br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-57065058269307509442014-01-22T15:59:51.910-08:002014-01-22T15:59:51.910-08:00First, what is the difference between “the eternal...<i>First, what is the difference between “the eternal types” and forms?</i><br /><br />A form is an ontic constituent within a substance that actualizes it as a particular kind of thing. An eternal type is an absolute category similar to Plato's ideas.<br /><br /><i>Second, what do you mean when you say that the divine intellect contains “individual substances”?</i><br /><br />ST I q14 a11. Individuals pre-exist in God.<br /><br /><i>So, he’s not saying that divine ideas are not forms, but only that in the case of divine ideas about material entities, there must be a divine idea that corresponds to the form-matter composite itself, and not a specific divine idea for the form and another divine idea for the matter.</i><br /><br />He's saying that God knows the composite directly, and that he virtually comprehends form and matter because he knows the composite. <br /><br />And, regarding God's knowledge through forms, you have to be careful with translations here. Aquinas certainly is not saying that God understands things via "forms" in the same sense that humans do, because he expressly denies this in ST I q84 a5. The eternal types are forms in a distantly analogous way, since they are the principles of the forms we know.<br /><br /><i>But the common origin is not the divine substance itself, but rather the divine archetype F that exists within the divine intellect.</i><br /><br />There is no archetype F within the divine intellect. This is a metaphor for the virtual containment of all things within the divine substance, which is, again, simply the doctrine that all things resemble the divine substance in some way.<br /><br /><i>But the form of squareness is also similar to the roundness of A and B insofar as squareness and roundness are both geometric shapes.</i><br /><br />The similarity of squares is different from the similarity of circles. By "similar", I mean the way in which forms of a single species are identified with one another. You see this as being absolute sameness; I see it as being absolute likeness. <br /><br /><i>I take him to mean that the relationship between the prototype and the image is such that in some respects, the image is identical to the archetype, and in some other respects, the image is different from the archetype.</i><br /><br />Except that "semblance" does not mean "identity" but "resemblance", and so your account falls apart. Gregory is simply stating that if the image was like God in all ways, then it would not be distinct from God. It is like God in some ways and unlike him in others. For example, a stone is like God in that it exists, but unlike him in that it is subject to privations.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-998776739033294132014-01-22T13:53:57.668-08:002014-01-22T13:53:57.668-08:00The forms in the intellect are numerically differe...<i>The forms in the intellect are numerically different from the forms of the things that the intellect understands.</i><br /><br />Yes, but that is the only difference between them. In every other respect, they are the same. <br /><br />You have a high opinion of Gregory of Nyssa, and so it may be helpful to pay attention to some things he wrote that touch upon these issues. In <i>On the Making of Man</i> 16.9, he writes:<br /><br />“While two natures— the Divine and incorporeal nature, and the irrational life of brutes— are separated from each other as extremes, human nature is the mean between them: for <b>in the compound nature of man we may behold a part of each of the natures I have mentioned</b>—of the Divine, the rational and intelligent element, which does not admit the distinction of male and female; of the irrational, our bodily form and structure, divided into male and female: for <b>each of these elements is certainly to be found in all that partakes of human life</b>.”<br /><br />Note how he says that human nature is partly the divine, immaterial and intellectual nature and partly the brutish, material and irrational nature. Also note how he says that the divine nature and the brutish nature are both “to be found in all that partakes of human life”. In other words, the divine nature is present as part of human nature, and the brutish nature is present as part of human nature. <br /><br />More important is at 16.12, where he writes:<br /><br />“Now as <b>the image bears in all points the semblance of the archetypal excellence</b>, if it had not a difference in some respect, being absolutely without divergence it would no longer be a likeness, but will in that case manifestly be absolutely identical with the Prototype.”<br /><br />I take him to mean that the relationship between the prototype and the image is such that in some respects, the image is identical to the archetype, and in some other respects, the image is different from the archetype. If there were no respect in which the image differed from the archetype, then the image would be identical to the archetype. <br /><br />Applying this line of reasoning to the forms that you mentioned, if the form-in-intellect resembles the form-in-X, then there must be something about the former that “bears in all points the semblance” of the latter, and there must be something about the former that differs in some respect from the latter. The latter accounts for the numerical distinction, and once it is abstracted away, all that one is left with is the common and identical commonality between them. <br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9259870961991285762014-01-22T13:53:35.289-08:002014-01-22T13:53:35.289-08:00Rank:
The divine intellect does not contain form...Rank:<br /><br /><i> The divine intellect does not contain forms. It contains A) the eternal types and B) the individual substances in which forms exist</i><br /><br />First, what is the difference between “the eternal types” and forms? <br /><br />Second, what do you mean when you say that the divine intellect contains “individual substances”? <br /><br /><i>. In God "there is no idea corresponding merely to matter or merely to form" (DV q3 a5).</i><br /><br />First, it seems that the passage that you’ve quoted specifically is talking about whether there is a divine idea of prime matter. And he says that in a narrow definition of “idea”, since a material entity is such that it necessarily is composed of form and matter, such that neither can exist without the other, then any idea will have to “corresponds to the entire composite—an idea that causes the whole, both its form and its matter” rather than one “idea corresponding merely to matter or merely to form”. However, in the broad definition of “idea” “as meaning an intelligible character or likeness, then both matter and form of themselves can be said to have an idea by which they can be known distinctly, even though they cannot exist separately”. <br /><br />So, he’s not saying that divine ideas are not forms, but only that in the case of divine ideas about material entities, there must be a divine idea that corresponds to the form-matter composite itself, and not a specific divine idea for the form and another divine idea for the matter. At least, that’s how I read him.<br /><br />Second, Aquinas has also written at ST 1.15.1: <br /><br />“It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind. For the Greek word Idea is in Latin "forma." Hence <b>by ideas are understood the forms of things</b>, existing apart from the things themselves.”<br /><br />And<br /><br />“As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear later (46, 1), <b>there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the world was made</b>. And <b>in this the notion of an idea consists</b>.”<br /><br /><i>The common origin is the incomprehensible divine substance, so no.</i><br /><br />But the common origin is not the divine substance itself, but rather the divine archetype F that exists within the divine intellect. The divine archetype F is just the ideal and perfect model or standard that any particular instantiation of F aspires to approximate in reality, and by which any particular F must be measured against. If this is “incomprehensible”, then we have no grounds to compare X and Y in terms of which is the better F, because we literally have no idea what the ideal F would be.<br /><br /><i>It's more like there is something in the intellect that is similar to the roundness of A and B, which allows us to understand roundness as it exists in A and B. This would be a particular form of roundness.</i><br /><br />But the form of squareness is also similar to the roundness of A and B insofar as squareness and roundness are both geometric shapes. So, if the form of roundness is “something in the intellect that is similar to the roundness of A and B”, then this “something” could literally be <i>anything</i>, because everything is similar to everything else. <br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-53116648043701100142014-01-22T12:55:49.789-08:002014-01-22T12:55:49.789-08:00They do exist, by virtue of the agreement of the p...<i>They do exist, by virtue of the agreement of the participants, which would make it an artifact in some sense, but not one of language.</i><br /><br />The participants are united nominally. Pretty basic.<br /><br /><i>Second, what would the resemblance theorist say about the relationship between the forms in creation and the forms in the divine intellect?</i><br /><br />The divine intellect does not contain forms. It contains A) the eternal types and B) the individual substances in which forms exist. In God "there is no idea corresponding merely to matter or merely to form" (DV q3 a5).<br /><br /><i>In other words, just because X and Y come from the same place, they go different ways.</i><br /><br />Indeed.<br /><br /><i>But then I wonder if it is possible to abstract away the different paths, and just focus the intellect upon the common origin.</i><br /><br />The common origin is the incomprehensible divine substance, so no.<br /><br /><i>I would imagine that the resemblance theorist would say that this is precisely where the intellect must stop in its process of abstraction, and that it simply recognizes in a primordial fashion that roundness-in-A resembles roundness-in-B.</i><br /><br />It's more like there is something in the intellect that is similar to the roundness of A and B, which allows us to understand roundness as it exists in A and B. This would be a particular form of roundness.<br /><br /><i>However, I don’t see why the intellect cannot perform one more abstraction that removes –in-A and –in-B from roundness-in-A and roundness-in-B, which would just leave roundness, independent of any instantiation, and absent any particularities that would result in numerical distinction.</i><br /><br />The forms in the intellect are numerically different from the forms of the things that the intellect understands.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-48754559775622940802014-01-22T11:20:52.889-08:002014-01-22T11:20:52.889-08:00Scott:
Not at all. The resemblance theorist can ...Scott:<br /><br /><i> Not at all. The resemblance theorist can perfectly well acknowledge that they belong to the same team; he merely has to deny that their common membership entails the existence of some "abstract" or "generic" attribute that Michael Jordan and Scotty Pippen literally share. Sure, there's just one team, but each of them has his own unique "property" of belonging to it: "Michael Jordan's belonging to the Bulls" is not the same property as "Scottie Pippen's belonging to the Bulls." A resemblance theorist would simply say that their respective properties of "belonging to the Bulls" resemble each other but are not identical. (A resemblance nominalist would say that this was the case even if their relationships resembled each other exactly.)</i><br /><br />I still see a problem, though. What does <i>Michael Jordan’s belonging to the Bulls</i> have in common with <i>Scottie Pippen’s belonging to the Bulls</i>? That they <i>both</i> belong to the Bulls. Sure, they belong to the Bulls in different ways, i.e. they play different positions on the team, but if <i>belonging to the Bulls</i> just means <i>occupying a position on the Bulls</i>, then that means the same thing when predicated of both Michael Jordan and Scottie Pippen. Sure, <i>which</i> position that they occupy is different, but <i>that</i> they occupy <i>a</i> position on the Bulls is the same. Again, why isn’t an <i>indeterminate</i> attribute the same in both athletes? <br /><br />I was trying to get at this idea when I talked about the different nodes within a network. If <i>belonging to the network</i> just meant <i>either being node1 or node2 or node3 or …</i>, then <i>either being node1 or node2 or node3 or …</i> would be the same attribute of any node in the network. I agree that this attribute is indeterminate in the sense that it does not specify <i>which particular node</i> in the network one is talking about, but it is certainly determinate in terms of specifying what it means to be <i>a node in the network</i>. If one objects to this, then that would be the same as objecting to talking about <i>human nature in general</i> while remaining silent about <i>which particular human being</i> you are talking about. I don’t think the resemblance theorist would deny that we can talk about human nature in general while remaining silent about particular human beings.<br /><br /><i>for attributes, similarity is cashed out on a case-by-case basis by seeing whether the similarity ultimately bottoms out in an identity or in a resemblance that we can't further reduce; and that the test for the latter is whether we can isolate a fully specific attribute that the two substances or particulars share.</i><br /><br />Can you explain what mean by “a fully specific attribute that the two substances or particulars share”? It might be helpful if you also provide an example of a similarity that can be reduced to an identity and one that cannot.<br /><br />Thanks.dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-41207901244858856332014-01-22T10:41:53.757-08:002014-01-22T10:41:53.757-08:00And incidentally, what do you think happens in the...And incidentally, what do you think happens in the intellect during the process of abstraction? My understanding was always that particularities were removed by the intellect until something that is the same in the individuals in question is reached, and that would be the common form. Would you say that abstraction removes differences and retains basic resemblances? <br /><br />Take the following scenario. Say that there are four entities, A, B, C and D. A is red and round, B is blue and round, C is red and square, and D is blue and square. A, B, C and D all resemble one another. My thinking is that what the mind does when it compares A and B, for example, is that it looks at A as red and round, B as blue and round, sees that A differs from B in that A is red and B is blue, and abstracts away those particular differences, which leaves roundness-in-A and roundness-in-B. <br /><br />I would imagine that the resemblance theorist would say that this is precisely where the intellect must stop in its process of abstraction, and that it simply recognizes in a primordial fashion that roundness-in-A resembles roundness-in-B. However, I don’t see why the intellect cannot perform one more abstraction that removes –in-A and –in-B from roundness-in-A and roundness-in-B, which would just leave <i>roundness</i>, independent of any instantiation, and absent any particularities that would result in numerical distinction. And I would say that if a process of abstraction can end at the same point, then <i>that destination</i> is the partial identity between two things that are being compared. After all, once one has arrived at a destination, the path becomes irrelevant, and one can focus entirely upon the destination itself, even though different routes may have brought one to the destination.<br /><br />Any thoughts?dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75886461637838622842014-01-22T10:41:39.782-08:002014-01-22T10:41:39.782-08:00Rank:
"Being on a team" is not an onti...Rank:<br /><br /><i> "Being on a team" is not an ontic or ontological state. It's an artifact of language agreed upon by a community of language users. There's no reason to say that they aren't on the same team, since the resemblance theorist is concerned with ontic and ontological resemblance only.</i><br /><br />First, it is not an artifact of language that sports teams exist. They do exist, by virtue of the agreement of the participants, which would make it an artifact in some sense, but not one of language. <br /><br />Second, what would the resemblance theorist say about the relationship between the forms in creation and the forms in the divine intellect? If they have no objection to saying that different teammates participate in the same team, and not on similar teams, then why wouldn’t the same logic apply to the created forms that participate in the same divine idea? <br /><br />For any created beings X and Y in which X is F and Y is F, F-in-X and F-in-Y stand in a resemblance relation to one another, and in a resemblance relation to the divine archetype F. If that is true, then it would be true that F-in-X is like F-in-Y in that F-in-X and F-in-Y are both derived from one and the same divine archetype F. In other words, F-in-X is <i>derived from divine archetype F</i> and F-in-Y is <i>derived from divine archetype F</i>. That is what they share in common, which is what grounds the resemblance at all. <br /><br />The question is whether <i>being derived from divine archetype F</i> is the same in F-in-X and F-in-Y (in the sense of non-numerical identity). The resemblance theorist would say that <i>being derived from divine archetype F</i> is not the same in F-in-X and F-in-Y, but rather is similar. What I take that to mean is that although the resemblance theorist would agree that F-in-X and F-in-Y are derived from <i>the same divine archetype F</i>, the <i>derivation</i> itself is not the same, because it follows divergent pathways from the common origin. In other words, just because X and Y come from the same place, they go different ways.<br /><br />But then I wonder if it is possible to abstract away the different paths, and just focus the intellect upon the common origin. If it is possible, then <i>having the same origin in the divine archetype F</i> seems to be the same in F-in-X and F-in-Y, much like <i>having the same father</i> would be the same in two sons of the same father. And in that case, it seems to be true that <i>having the same origin in the divine archetype F</i> would be a good candidate for partial identity between F-in-X and F-in-Y.<br /><br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-82517200088627211512014-01-22T10:25:44.791-08:002014-01-22T10:25:44.791-08:00surely it is apocryphal, right? Gretzky hasn't...surely it is apocryphal, right? Gretzky hasn't played in years. :-)<br /><br />I figured that if Jordan and Pippen can be spoken of as "belong[ing] to the same team" (or at least belonging to "teams that just resemble one another"), there's no good reason why Gretzky can't be still playing hockey. :) (Ah, but he is missed. (Jordan, too.))Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6830593864604952642014-01-22T09:59:56.283-08:002014-01-22T09:59:56.283-08:00Glenn, that's a great and funny account of the...Glenn, that's a great and funny account of the hockey game, but surely it is apocryphal, right? Gretzky hasn't played in years. :-)Billnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26311219332198903262014-01-22T08:24:17.314-08:002014-01-22T08:24:17.314-08:00@William Dunkirk:
It's very brief; it's i...@William Dunkirk:<br /><br />It's very brief; it's in the next-to-last paragraph on p. 20, beginning with "Even the perception of a single quality . . . "Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-3292190896575376202014-01-22T06:12:59.378-08:002014-01-22T06:12:59.378-08:00@ Scott,
I am reading your book, which is very go...@ Scott,<br /><br />I am reading your book, which is very good. I did notice your arguments about the trouble of the same property even persisting <i>in the same thing</i> through time; I don't know if I have caught your point about existing in the same thing throughout a space yet.William Dunkirkhttp://catholic.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-92188937690889817062014-01-21T20:09:00.304-08:002014-01-21T20:09:00.304-08:00I attended a hockey game earlier this evening with...I attended a hockey game earlier this evening with two philosopher friends, Brendan and Shanahan. During the third trimester (during the third period, that is) I went to the concession stand, where I laid out an exorbitant $17.95 for one egg salad sandwich and one small soda. Returning to my seat, I overheard the following:<br /><br />Brendan: <i>...Take a specific claim, and assume someone is a resemblance theorist about it. "How does Michael Jordan resemble Scotty Pippen?" "Well, they both scored points for the Chicago Bulls, for instance." "Ah, so there is this one thing identical in each that is 'scored points for the Chicago Bulls'?" "No, it's just that there are a bunch of men that had careers that resemble each other in having scored points for the Chicago Bulls." "But isn't this identical in each?" "I don't see why it would be. They just resemble each other on certain aspects of their careers as professional basketball players a lot more than they resemble other men on the same aspects."</i><br /><br />Shanahan: <i>Just to make sure I understand. Michael Jordan is like Scotty Pippen in that Michael Jordan has point-scoring skills and Scotty Pippen has point-scoring skills. Point-scoring skills are what Michael Jordan and Scotty Pippen have in common. But the point-scoring skills of Michael Jordan are not the same as the point-scoring skills of Scotty Pippen. The best that we can say is that the point-scoring skills of Michael Jordan resemble the point-scoring skills of Scotty Pippen, and all that ultimately means is that point-scoring skills of Michael Jordan resemble the point-scoring skills of Scotty Pippen more than they resemble the point-scoring skills of hockey players (for example). Would the same reasoning apply to something like laying eggs? Say that the chicken lays eggs and the platypus lays eggs. </i>[Reminded that platypi lay eggs, I glanced at the sandwich in my hand.]<i> Do they both lay the same kind of eggs, or eggs that just resemble one another? Hmm. As a reasonable man I must acknowledge that it does seem that the resemblance theorist would not be incorrect in denying that chickens and platypi lay the same kind of eggs.</i><br /><br />I didn't get to hear Brendan's response to Shanahan's musing, for just then the crowd erupted with a roar as Gretzky maneuvered the puck onto the blade of his stick, then dunked the puck into the net (off the goalie's back).Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-831679992153828302014-01-21T13:51:34.837-08:002014-01-21T13:51:34.837-08:00@dguller:
"[I]f the resemblance theorist aff...@dguller:<br /><br />"[I]f the resemblance theorist affirms that some resemblances can be cashed out in terms of partial identity and partial difference, and other resemblances cannot, then do you know what the criteri[on] is that the resemblance theorist uses to determine when a resemblance can be cashed out in such a way, and when it cannot?<br /><br />I'd appreciate Scott's input, as well, if he has the time."<br /><br />Well, since you ask . . ;-)<br /><br />I won't presume to speak for all resemblance theorists, but one obvious criterion is the one I've suggested already: that for <i>substances</i> and/or <i>particulars</i>, similarity has to be cashed out in the similarity of their attributes; that for <i>attributes</i>, similarity is cashed out on a case-by-case basis by seeing whether the similarity ultimately bottoms out in an identity or in a resemblance that we can't further reduce; and that the test for the latter is whether we can isolate a fully specific attribute that the two substances or particulars share.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75795600767793168402014-01-21T13:44:41.307-08:002014-01-21T13:44:41.307-08:00@dguller:
"It seems that the resemblance the...@dguller:<br /><br />"It seems that the resemblance theorist would have to deny that they belong to the same team."<br /><br />Not at all. The resemblance theorist can perfectly well acknowledge that they belong to the same team; he merely has to deny that their common membership entails the existence of some "abstract" or "generic" attribute that Michael Jordan and Scotty Pippen literally share. Sure, there's just one team, but each of them has his own unique "property" of belonging to it: "Michael Jordan's belonging to the Bulls" is not the same property as "Scottie Pippen's belonging to the Bulls." A resemblance theorist would simply say that their respective properties of "belonging to the Bulls" resemble each other but are not identical. (A resemblance <i>nominalist</i> would say that this was the case even if their relationships resembled each other <i>exactly</i>.)Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.com