tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post3519172656746950205..comments2024-03-28T07:47:38.176-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: The Incompetent HackEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger96125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44877111287925240292013-04-17T12:38:11.528-07:002013-04-17T12:38:11.528-07:00I think Chris Hallquist states himself he is "...I think Chris Hallquist states himself he is "unliterate":<br /><br />Hallquist own words (ironically):<br /><br /><i>""I refuse to apologize for not having read more theology, in the sense of the writings of people like Haught and the people he admires. That’s because they frequently don’t even try to write clearly. <b>My typical experience when picking up their books is to first notice they are using words in ways I am not used to. Then I start skimming to try to find the section where they explain what they mean by their words </b> (sometimes there are legitimate reasons for using words in unusual ways). Then I end up closing the book when I fail to find such a section."" <br /><br />(From Chris Hallquist, on his blog on Patheos Atheist Channel, August 30, 2012).</i> <br /><br /><br />Like saying: do not read difficult books!<br /><br />Just read books for "beginners", because people cannot evolve from 'ignorance' to 'being competent', I guess.<br /><br /><br />This is a gripe I have with Amazon reviewers as well. They 'knock' a book just because "It's hard" and "not for everyone".<br /><br /><br /><br />Anyway, confessing that he cannot understand what he readss and then makes himself important by criticizing it any way seems indeed like a rather nice example of the Dunning-Kruger effect. Ismaelnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61436953302521717722012-11-25T16:12:24.483-08:002012-11-25T16:12:24.483-08:003. Action at a distance. [...] Action at a distanc...<i>3. Action at a distance. [...] Action at a distance at the same time both affirms ("action") and denies ("at a distance") that such an update occurs.</i><br /><br />And here I agree with David: it affirms and qualifies, not denies. If we allow that "distant" just means that any cause must be mediated in some sense, then the question is whether that mediation (sending a message, etc.) can be instantaneous or not. Now given our laws of physics, instant effects may be impossible (according to relativity... QM is another story), but there is certainly nothing metaphysically impossible about that.<br /><br /><i>5. The two cards. We need to be careful here. Card A is (partly) responsible for card B's not falling over, and it keeps B from falling over by pushing B. However, its power to push B is inherent to it, by virtue of its mass. A's power to push B is not explained in terms of B, so there is no causal circle.</i><br /><br />Not quite... A's power to hold up B is explained in terms of its mass (to be pulled down by gravity), the gravity acting on it, its electromagnetic forces (to push against B and frictionally against the tabletop) — and its position! Putting card A on the other side of the room will not help to hold up B. And A's position is itself being (partly) caused by B's holding it where it is. <br /><br /><i>6. Hand-stick-stone. You write: "But my hand really is moving the stick is moving the stone." There's something funny about that sentence.</i><br /><br />Well, it's grammatically unconventional, which was of course a deliberate rhetorical choice to draw attention to the interplaying causes. Certainly we can focus on the stick and stone and ignore the hand's role in all this; but the fact remains that the stick cannot jump up on its own and starting pushing things around. Its pushiness is coming unavoidably from the action of the hand (or some hand-substitute).<br /><br /><i>A stick has an inherent power to push a stone. Ordinarily it won't do this, but if something (it doesn't matter what) brings it into contact with the stone, then it will push it.</i><br /><br />"Ordinarily it won't do this" means that the stick <i>doesn't</i> have the power to push. It has the <i>potential</i> to push (because of its nature as a solid object (i.e. one which can exchange virtual photons, etc. etc.)). But that potential is not actualised by the mere existence of the stick: something else must be added (e.g. an accelerating hand that actualises the stick's potential to be pushed at one end, which eventually results in its pushing [something else] at the other end). That "something (it doesn't matter what)" is precisely the <i>per se</i> or essential cause we were looking for.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44182493715976085092012-11-25T16:05:22.050-08:002012-11-25T16:05:22.050-08:00Vincent Torley: I can't see any relevant diffe...Vincent Torley: <i>I can't see any relevant difference between the acceleration of the boxcars and that of the dominoes. Readers seem to agree that a series of dominoes is a per accidens series</i><br /><br />Do they? I said that both series are comparable because they are both examples of <i>per se</i> causality.<br /><br /><br /><i>The point I'm making, in plain English, is that accelerating (vi) is like receiving a message, whereas accelerating (vt) is like transmitting a message. The causal series is not per se, because each car in the series has an inherent active capacity to transmit a message.</i><br /><br />That <b>is</b> <i>per se</i>: as Anonymous pointed out, the boxcar has in itself the power to transmit the "message", but not to produce it in the first place. Thus the message-producing cause is a necessary or essential part of the causal chain as a whole, as opposed to being an accidental add-on to the chain. (The colour of the boxcars or whether it's raining, and so on, are part of the causal chain insofar as they are part of whatever actually happens during this whole locomotive event, but they are accidental rather than essential as far as the locomotion is concerned because they have nothing to do with producing and transmitting the "message".)<br /><br /><i>there is nothing to prevent a message from going back to infinity, without an original sender.</i><br /><br />Nothing to prevent it if the message actually exists. That existnece will be rather tricky without an original sender, which is the whole reason why simply saying, "... and so on to infinity" is not a sufficient answer. Now, I would argue that an infinite series of accelerating boxcars is possible because God could create the whole setup "in progress", i.e. with the message built-in. But that simply means that God is the "original sender", even though there is no "original" or "first" sender in the <i>physical</i> chain.<br /><br /><br /><i>2. Sertillanges' brush. [...] the parts of a paintbrush don't have an inherent capacity to transmit the highly specified information about precisely which way the brush should move, while the Mona Lisa is being painted.</i><br /><br />But that is exactly like the boxcars. Perhaps the locomotive "message" is too simple or boring to avoid taking it for granted. (But that it too must trace back to a mind is the point of the Fifth Way, right?) A boxcar can't accelerate by exchanging virtual photons with itself, it needs some further cause to actualise its potential for locomotion.<br /><br />(continued...)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28338166126177984812012-11-25T09:59:24.312-08:002012-11-25T09:59:24.312-08:00Black Luster: "Does this distinction have any...Black Luster: "Does this distinction have any ramifications?"<br /><br />Not in this context; each series is <i>per accidens</i>, and the continued existence of each domino after it topples its successor is irrelevant to the falling of the later ones in the series. The dominoes don't disappear after they fall, but if they did, that wouldn't stop the rest of them from falling.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27478012409788298922012-11-25T09:55:11.578-08:002012-11-25T09:55:11.578-08:00Black Luster: "Wait, since when is a domino s...Black Luster: "Wait, since when is a domino series per accidens? Each domino depends on the previous one in order to move."<br /><br />But not on the ones before the previous one. If you had a long row of dominoes, pushed over the first one, and went along picking them up as they fell, it wouldn't keep the rest of them from continuing to fall. The first domino doesn't need to go on doing anything in order for the last domino to fall; each domino has its own causal power to bring about the fall of the next one.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51924736220244567772012-11-25T09:31:37.792-08:002012-11-25T09:31:37.792-08:00Wait, since when is a domino series per accidens? ...Wait, since when is a domino series per accidens? Each domino depends on the previous one in order to move.Black Lusternoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29638929188747037412012-11-24T22:09:39.488-08:002012-11-24T22:09:39.488-08:00One difference between the domino series and the f...One difference between the domino series and the father-son series:<br /><br />In the domino series, all the members of the series are "fixed." In other words, all the dominoes in the series exist simultaneously.<br /><br />In the father-son series, the members of the series are not "fixed." They are coming into existence and going out of existence.<br /><br />Does this distinction have any ramifications?Black Lusternoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-78598518187102751992012-11-24T19:53:45.456-08:002012-11-24T19:53:45.456-08:00Hi everyone,
I'll keep this brief. I can'...Hi everyone,<br /><br />I'll keep this brief. I can't see any relevant difference between the acceleration of the boxcars and that of the dominoes. (The only physical difference is that whereas the dominoes move their neighbors by pushing them, the boxcars move their neighbors by pulling them.) Readers seem to agree that a series of dominoes is a <i>per accidens</i> series, and that as far as Aquinas is concerned, such a series could go back to infinity. If a series of pushes could go back to infinity, then so could a series of pulls.<br /><br />Now I admit that this has some odd implications. Imagine a rope which is infinitely long in both directions, and imagine that this rope is tied round people's waists, at intervals of one meter, so that the human beings constitute a chain of dominoes. You're standing somewhere in the chain. Suddenly you get knocked over by an approaching cascade of toppling people. You feel rather cross, but your neighbor assures you that the rope is infinite, and that there was no-one who started the process. No sooner has he finished explaining this than you get knocked over by a cascade of human dominoes, this time from the opposite direction. Once again, your neighbor tells you it's no-one's fault. The cascades continue from left and right all day long, and every time, you are told: "It's nobody's fault." <br /><br />What does all this prove? Clearly the example is <i>physically</i> possible: no laws are broken. If you want to argue that it's <i>metaphysically</i> impossible, then I see only one way to do so, in this case: you'll have to argue that there cannot be an actual infinite, and that the foregoing example (like Hilbert's hotel) constitutes a <i>reductio ad absurdum</i> for the notion of an actual infinite. But if you take that line, then you'll have to allow that kalam-style arguments work (which Aquinas didn't). That would be a philosophically interesting result, but it goes beyond the First Way, and shows that many other arguments can be used to demonstrate God's existence.Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfie.com/linux/vjtorley/index.hmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-24363223345567400072012-11-23T11:20:43.144-08:002012-11-23T11:20:43.144-08:00"Action at a distance at the same time both a..."Action at a distance at the same time both affirms ("action") and denies ("at a distance") that such an update occurs." - Surely not? It affirms and qualifies, not affirms and denies.Davidnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-42092243327393661462012-11-23T11:11:34.540-08:002012-11-23T11:11:34.540-08:00Hi Vincent,
I think that the way you've put th...Hi Vincent,<br />I think that the way you've put this is unnecessarily obscure. You wrote:<br />"The point I'm making, in plain English, is that accelerating (vi) is like receiving a message, whereas accelerating (vt) is like transmitting a message. The causal series is not per se, because each car in the series has an inherent active capacity to transmit a message. The last car in the series acts upon the message it gets from its neighbor, N-1."<br /><br />In even plainer English: The point you're making is that accelerating (vi) is like receiving a message (i.e., being the effect of a cause), whereas *causing acceleration* is like transmitting a message (i.e., acting as a cause). You claim that the causal series is not per se, because each car in the series has an inherent active capacity to transmit a message (i.e., to be a secondary cause). You say that the last car in the series acts upon the 'message' it gets from its neighbor, N-1 - in other words, the last car's acceleration is caused by the causal power of its neighbor N-1. But of course if N-1 is not the locomotive then it has only secondary causal power, which must be derived from the primary causal power of the locomotive, since the series of causes is indeed per se, since the 'inherent active capacity' you refer to is in fact only *active* in virtue of the locomotive.Davidnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33466652688547808702012-11-22T19:02:02.033-08:002012-11-22T19:02:02.033-08:00Is it more correct to say that the boxcars have th...Is it more correct to say that the boxcars have the powers to move AND be moved, or that they have the power to move (other things) WHEN moved?<br /><br />And say that the boxcars have the power to Transmit the message, does it follow that they have the power to Produce the message?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-5388867485744777602012-11-22T11:24:57.542-08:002012-11-22T11:24:57.542-08:001. More on the infinite series of boxcars. Whether...1. More on the infinite series of boxcars. Whether such a series is metaphysically possible is something about which I have an open mind. But if it isn't, then any argument establishing that fact would also establish the impossibility of an actual infinite. In other words, it would be a kalam style argument.<br /><br />2. Sertillanges' brush. In my opinion, this is not like the infinite series of boxcars. Whereas boxcars have an inherent capacity to transmit electrochemical signals, the parts of a paintbrush <i>don't</i> have an <i>inherent</i> capacity to transmit the <i>highly specified information</i> about precisely which way the brush should move, while the <i>Mona Lisa</i> is being painted. That information isn't inherent to matter; it has to come from a mind, in the long run.<br /><br />3. Action at a distance. I agree that God (whose power extends everywhere) is not spatiotemporally removed from anything. However, the reason why I consider action at a distance to be metaphysically impossible is because to say that A is <i>distant</i> from B <i>is</i> simply to say that B requires a message from A in order to be updated as to A's status. Action at a distance at the same time both affirms ("action") and denies ("at a distance") that such an update occurs. I can only make sense of it by supposing A to be somehow proximate to B, on some level (e.g. wormholes) - but then, it's not at a distance any more, is it.<br /><br />5. The two cards. We need to be careful here. Card A is (partly) responsible for card B's not falling over, and it keeps B from falling over by pushing B. However, its power to push B is inherent to it, by virtue of its mass. A's power to push B is not explained in terms of B, so there is no causal circle.<br /><br />6. Hand-stick-stone. You write: "But my hand really is moving the stick is moving the stone." There's something funny about that sentence. It needs a "which": "the stick, which is moving the stone." Once we put it like that, we can see at once that the stick's movement of the stone can be treated separately from the hand's movement of the stick. A stick has an inherent power to push a stone. Ordinarily it won't do this, but if something (it doesn't matter what) brings it into contact with the stone, then it will push it. The boxcar example proves that we can go back to infinity in the series of movements, because this is not a per se series: it's just a transmission. So the stick requires no original agent's hand.<br /><br />Now, you <i>can</i> say that "But my hand really is moving the stick <i>and thereby</i> moving the stone," precisely because you (as an agent) know how messages are transmitted between bodies, and you use the stick to achieve your end of moving the stone. So from your perspective, the stick is an instrument whereby you move the stone. My point is only that the stick doesn't care about that: it moves (vi) wherever it is moved (vt).<br />Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18837694036417468362012-11-22T10:36:18.118-08:002012-11-22T10:36:18.118-08:00Hi Mr. Green,
Thanks very much for your reply. I&...Hi Mr. Green,<br /><br />Thanks very much for your reply. I'd like to deal with your cases, but in a different order. <br /><br />1. The infinite series of trains. You write: "Boxcars don't accelerate by themselves, and that's why the causality required is per se. Accelerating is not something the boxcars can do whether or not an engine applies some force; it is thus the engine that is the source of the motion, and one boxcar transmits this force (by tugging on the next) instrumentally." Thanks for making the example clearer: I see now that <i>acceleration</i> is what needs to be explained. <br /><br />The verb "accelerate" can be a transitive (vt) or an intransitive (vi) verb. The fact that a boxcar N doesn't accelerate (vi) by itself only proves that something (namely the car in front of it, N-1) must be accelerating (vt) it. However, it doesn't follow from this fact that something else (namely the car in front of that one, or N-2) must be accelerating N-1. <br /><br />Not only is N-1 is accelerating (vt) N, but N-1 is itself accelerating (vi). However, N-1's accelerating (vi) is not the action whereby it accelerates (vt) N. N-1 accelerates (vt) N by virtue of the fact that it has a causal power to attract (vt) N, and it exerts this power by transmitting a message to N, via force-carrying particles. (At the subatomic level, it's an electrochemical power of attraction, transmitted by photons emitted by the car's constituent protons and electrons.) Also, N-1's acceleration (vi) is not simultaneous with its acceleration (vt) of N; it occurs very slightly beforehand, as electrical forces take a finite time to transmit through space.<br /><br />N-1's power to electrochemically attract and accelerate (vt) N is <i>not</i> derived from N-2, but is <i>intrinsic</i> to it, by virtue of the electrical charges in its constituent subatomic particles (protons and electrons), so on a physical level, the regress stops here. Of course, one can legitimately ask why N-1's attractive power suddenly increased, causing N to subsequently accelerate (vi), and one might explain <i>that</i> fact in terms of an electrochemical message sent to N-1 slightly earlier by the constituent particles of the boxcar N-2, causing N-1 to accelerate (vi). But my point is that N doesn't care about <i>that</i> message. It only cares about the message it got from N-1, via the photons it absorbed from it.<br /><br />The point I'm making, in plain English, is that accelerating (vi) is like receiving a message, whereas accelerating (vt) is like transmitting a message. The causal series is not <i>per se</i>, because each car in the series has an inherent active capacity to <i>transmit</i> a message. The last car in the series acts upon the message it gets from its neighbor, N-1. <br /><br />Now let's get back to the train. In a finite series of boxcars, the burning of fuel (say, coal) in the engine imparts energy to the engine's mechanical components, causing them to accelerate and turn around, which in turn makes the locomotive's wheels move. In essence, all this is just the sending of messages, and we need a first one because the sudden acceleration (vi) of the engine's components is a fact which requires explanation, in terms of the fuel being burnt. But in an infinite series, the acceleration (vi) of each car can be explained in terms of the (electrochamically transmitted) message it gets from the car in front of it, and there is nothing to prevent a message from going back to infinity, without an original sender. (Think of an infinitely long game of Chinese whispers.) So as far as I can tell, an infinite series of boxcars is possible, as far as the laws of physics are concerned, and there is no need for an original locomotive.<br /><br />To be continued...<br />Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-68695804768989880562012-11-21T08:14:18.992-08:002012-11-21T08:14:18.992-08:00(ii) Anything which is spatio-temporally removed f...<i>(ii) Anything which is spatio-temporally removed from E is incapable of interacting with E.</i><br /><br />Again, true by definition or false. I would consider something's spatio-temporal position to be defined by the location of its (possible) effects — that why God is everywhere; not because He is "in" space or time at any particular point, but because His power extends everywhere and everywhen. Conversely, if you mean that in a sense in which the earth would be "removed" from the location of the moon, then it's false, even for our actual laws of physics, because the earth and the moon interact gravitationally. (No, I don't think that action at a distance is impossible. Certainly not as a metaphysical necessity, and even in our actual world, it would make physics unnecessarily "spooky".)<br /><br /><i>If on the other hand we supposed the track to be frictionless, then car X wouldn't need anything in front of it to pull it along, anyway. It would just keep going forever at the same velocity.</i><br /><br />Sure — which in the example as usually given, is zero. In a given boxcar's frame of reference, it will remain at rest unless and until a force accelerates it. The car's continued inertial motion (relative to some external frame of reference) is a red herring. Boxcars don't accelerate by themselves, and that's why the causality required is <i>per se</i>. Accelerating is not something the boxcars can do whether or not an engine applies some force; it is thus the engine that is the source of the motion, and one boxcar transmits this force (by tugging on the next) instrumentally. (So it is like falling dominoes: the initial push from your finger is what topples the first domino, and thus indirectly topples all the rest; the dominoes do not have the power to topple themselves, as though the finger-push were an accidental action that merely happened to coincide with the dominoes' toppling themselves regardless.)<br /><br /><i>I'd also say that as regards per se causes of existence, we can only go two layers deep: only God can maintain a thing in existence. Thus we should never find a per se causal chain in any world of depth greater than 3 (where we conflate chains of being and becoming).</i><br /><br />Since only God can create (or conserve), there will not be any intermediate causes of existence; but that is not the case with motion (that would deny secondary causes). I'm not sure about your "agent-centred" and "object-centred" view, but your seem to be talking about something different from Aquinas's idea of efficient causes that work in an essential chain, as surely they do (again, unless we opt for occasionalism or something like that). The point isn't that we need to go back more than one step to explain the motion of the stone <b>directly</b>, but that whatever caused that motion in the previous step must itself have been caused to move in turn, until we hit an unmoved Mover. But my hand really is moving the stick is moving the stone.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16266585702336341952012-11-21T08:06:55.250-08:002012-11-21T08:06:55.250-08:00Hi, Vincent:
On the question of whether 'first...Hi, Vincent:<br /><i>On the question of whether 'first cause' in the context of a per se causal series means 'the cause coming before the second, third, fourth, etc.' or 'something with underived causality,' I would agree that the latter meaning is primary, but I would also argue that unless a first cause is the one before the second, it cannot be an underived cause.</i><br /><br />Is that not always true in a trivial sense, though? That is, either there is an underived cause or there isn't. If there isn't, then the series can't get off the ground. If there is, and we want to count stuff, then that cause is by definition number one. Where we go from there, or what other ways one might arrange the elements of the series for counting them according to some other criterion doesn't matter (in this context).<br /><br /><i>If we allow that a thing can be prior to itself as an explanation then we end up destroying the very notion of an explanation.</i><br /><br />Well, it could be "prior" to itself in different ways, e.g. by one <i>part</i> being prior to another part. Consider two playing cards leaning against each other: card A is the cause of card B's not falling down, and vice versa. The symmetry makes a "circular" event, but that isn't a problem.<br /><br /><i>Such a regress explains nothing. But if it explains nothing, then there is no per se causal chain in the first place. It would therefore follow that the thing to be explained must depend on God and God alone.</i><br /><br />There's a big difference between "does not explain everything" and "explains nothing". An infinite regress does not obviate the need for a Prime Mover any more than any secondary cause obviates the need for the Primary Cause. <br /><br /><i>(i) In order to count as an explanation of an effect E, a per se cause must be capable of interacting with E.</i><br /><br />Either trivially true or false. If "interaction" just means causing something, then it's true by definition, but doesn't tell us anything about what that causation consists in. If it doesn't mean that, then I'm not sure what it does mean.<br /><br /><i>(continued)</i>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-20002602438294532512012-11-20T20:25:36.049-08:002012-11-20T20:25:36.049-08:00I think the totality of comments in response to th...<i>I think the totality of comments in response to this post can be summed up by the phrase: "OH SNAP!"</i><br /><br />I was more thinking along the lines of "How the hell can people miss something so easy to grasp?"E.H. Munrohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09038816873823422488noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-41624472722806704052012-11-19T11:59:31.538-08:002012-11-19T11:59:31.538-08:00I think the totality of comments in response to th...I think the totality of comments in response to this post can be summed up by the phrase: "OH SNAP!"Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-89622820146411048022012-11-19T09:28:56.580-08:002012-11-19T09:28:56.580-08:00Mr. Green,
In answer to another question of yours...Mr. Green,<br /><br />In answer to another question of yours, I <i>would</i> in fact claim that it is impossible in any physical world for A to be moved by B, which is moved by C, where A, B and C are all part of a <i>per se</i> causal series. Such series can only be two layers deep, because of the spatio-temporal contiguity requirement. I'd also say that as regards <i>per se</i> causes of existence, we can only go two layers deep: only God can maintain a thing in existence. Thus we should never find a <i>per se</i> causal chain in <i>any</i> world of depth greater than 3 (where we conflate chains of being and becoming).<br /><br />Of course it would be ridiculous to deny that the agent's hand moves the stone by moving the stick, in Aquinas' example. In the order of <i>intentions</i>, causal chains of movement can be as long as we like, and they need not be simultaneous. <br /><br />From an <b>agent-centered perspective</b>, a causal chain of becoming may be very long and simultaneity need not hold. But if we start at the other end and look at the thing moved (the stone), then from an <b>object-centered perspective</b>, it is never necessary, <i>or</i> possible, to go back more than one step in the <i>physical</i> realm, in order to explain its motion. Of course, God's causal activity lies <i>behind</i> the physical mover's action, so that makes two steps. Additionally, God's causal activity is also <i>concurrent</i> with the physical mover's action.Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27922860235542217312012-11-19T07:00:44.787-08:002012-11-19T07:00:44.787-08:00Mr. Green,
Just a couple of quick comments, as I&...Mr. Green,<br /><br />Just a couple of quick comments, as I'm a little rushed for time.<br /><br />1. Earlier, I argued that a <i>per se</i> cause has to be simultaneous with its effect, because anything which is no longer present when an effect occurs is incapable of explaining that effect. You replied that to say the cause has to be "present" is question-begging.<br /><br />OK, what about this syllogism?<br /><br />(i) In order to count as an explanation of an effect E, a <i>per se</i> cause must be capable of interacting with E.<br /><br />(ii) Anything which is spatio-temporally removed from E is incapable of interacting with E.<br /><br />(iii) Therefore anything which is spatio-temporally removed from E is incapable of being a <i>per se</i> cause of E.<br /><br />By "spatio-temporally removed from E" I mean "located at a point in space or time which is some distance from E." Premise (ii) trades on the metaphysical intuition that action at a distance is impossible. (Even Newton thought so.) Of course, God is not "spatio-temporally removed from E" as He is outside space and time.<br /><br />2. Re the infinite series of boxcars: I'm afraid the popular intuition that it needs a caboose at the front is mistaken. If you don't believe me, ask a physicist. If the track is <i>not</i> perfectly smooth, then the car in front of car X needs to continually be tugging X, in order to stop it from slowing down. But it takes a very small but finite time for a tug at the front of X to be felt at the end of X, and to be conveyed to the car behind X. So we're back with a "dominoes example" again. Just as the generation of fathers and sons could theoretically go back to infinity, so too could the series of tugs by cars further up the chain. Therefore you <i>could</i> have an infinite series of boxcars in front of X. Of course, that would be a <i>per accidens</i> series.<br /><br />If on the other hand we supposed the track to be <i>frictionless</i>, then car X wouldn't need anything in front of it to pull it along, anyway. It would just keep going forever at the same velocity.<br /><br />Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-41001836669777263502012-11-19T06:32:19.074-08:002012-11-19T06:32:19.074-08:00Hi Ed,
At last we are making progress! You wrote:...Hi Ed,<br /><br />At last we are making progress! You wrote:<br /><br />"As I've said I don't know how many times now, 'first cause' in the context of a per se causal series does not primarily mean 'the cause coming before the second, third, fourth, etc.' but rather 'something with underived causality.' The point is that created causes have no inherent causal power but are all 'secondary' or derivative causes, which requires that there be a 'first' or underived cause. That is why the length of the chain of derivative causes -- or for that matter, whether that chain loops around in a circle -- is not to the point."<br /><br />On the question of whether 'first cause' in the context of a per se causal series means 'the cause coming before the second, third, fourth, etc.' or 'something with underived causality,' I would agree that the latter meaning is <i>primary</i>, but I would also argue that unless a first cause <i>is</i> the one before the second, it cannot be an underived cause.<br /><br />You write that "the length of the chain of derivative causes -- or for that matter, whether that chain loops around in a circle -- is not to the point." I think it is, because if we allow circular <i>per se</i> causal chains, then we destroy the very notion of an explanation, and in so doing, undercut the possibility of arguing to God. <br /><br />Foe example, if A is a <i>per se</i> cause of B, which is a <i>per se</i> cause of A, then we are saying that A is explanatorily prior to itself. That statement makes no sense, even if we <i>additionally</i> suppose God to be standing outside the causal circle, keeping both in existence. If we allow that a thing can be prior to itself as an explanation then we end up destroying the very notion of an explanation.<br /><br />The same goes if we consider an infinite chain. Even if each member of the chain is kept in existence by God, an infinite chain is still an infinite regress of explanations. Such a regress explains nothing. But if it explains nothing, then there is no <i>per se</i> causal chain in the first place. It would therefore follow that the thing to be explained must depend on God and God alone.<br /><br />But if we allowed that an infinite regress of explanations <i>could</i> explain something, then that would invite the question: what need do we have of God, then?<br /><br />Call me old-fashioned if you like, Ed, but I consider it theologically dangerous to grant, even for argument's sake, the possibility of an infinite or circular chain of <i>per se</i> causes. <br /><br />I hope I've clarified my meaning, Ed. Cheers.Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18663844485219478392012-11-18T17:55:58.691-08:002012-11-18T17:55:58.691-08:00Daniel Smith: [...] every event has multiple cause...Daniel Smith: <i>[...] every event has multiple causes, that each of those causes has its own multiple causes, and so on exponentially, and that they all wrap around and are interconnected (like a spider web). </i><br /><br />My reaction is to ask why we should consider this a separate argument. Sure, in real life instead of chain-links we have chain... mail(?!), but the principles at work are still the same. The boxcar is not only being pulled ahead by the engine, but also being pulled down by gravity. That obviously doesn't change the need for the engine.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-50654793731288202352012-11-18T17:40:50.182-08:002012-11-18T17:40:50.182-08:00Vincent Torley: It seems that Ed now allows that t...Vincent Torley: <i>It seems that Ed now allows that there could be an infinite regress of per se explanations.</i><br /><br />Since it seems he always allowed that, I guess he does "now". And he's allowing it hypothetically, from what I've seen; that is, there may be <i>other</i> reasons why such an infinite chain is impossible, but if we focus only on the nature of <i>per se</i> causal chains, merely having an infinite number of steps is not a problem in and of itself.<br /><br /><i>Precisely because per se causes aren't merely conditions for their effect, but actually serve as explanations of that effect, I maintain there must be a first member of the series. All explanations have to end somewhere. I don't know why anyone would want to look outside a series of explanations for something that gives them their causal power; what you really need to do is identify the terminus of the series: the first member, or the Explainer that needs no further explanation.</i><br /><br />I don't understand your distinction between "condition" and "explanation", but I suspect that's a terminological quibble. Of course there is a "first" cause in the series, i.e. a logically or causally primary effect. If your problem is that you are watching the infinite number of boxcars pass in front of you, and you cannot get to the "first" one numerically, then you are counting the wrong thing. The prime cause is not "outside" the series in the sense of being outside of the causal chain; it is outside of the numerical sequence that you are trying to count. That is no more a problem than it is that the engine pulling boxcars is "outside" the set of boxcars. <br /><br />Perhaps consider it this way: suppose you are looking at the engine, with an infinite number of boxcars behind it. The engine is clearly "first", so there is no problem. But what if you are in the middle of train, with boxcars infinitely stretching out on both sides? Still no problem: let's add an engine by converting one of the boxcars (stick a jet engine on its roof). Now count our makeshift engine as "one", the boxcar to its left as "two", the one to its right as "three", the second-from-left "four", the second-from-right "five", and so on. But really, the point is not to enumerate the causes in the chain but to work back until we can work back no further, i.e. until we hit an unmoved Mover. The size of the chain is a red herring.<br /><br /><br /><i>"Does the hand stopping cause the stone to stop?" No. If the stone is rolling along a perfectly smooth surface, it need never stop, once it has started moving.</i><br /><br />Eh, it's clear from the context that Daniel wasn't referring to that sort of motion. The point of the example is not to see if we can come up with any other possibilities why a stone might move when a stick is nearby. The point is to think of a case where the hand IS moving the stick IS moving the stone. (You can think of it all as simultaneous because that's the way everyone including physicists do think of such an event in real life, or if you really want to, think of it with nanoscopic delays.) <br /><br />The only way to object would be to claim that it is impossible — not just according to the laws of physics as we know them, but impossible in principle, in any world, with any laws of physics — for a stone to move insofar as it is being pushed by a stick that moves insofar as it is being manipulated by a hand. Since we all accept that the hand really is somehow in some sense (at some time, immediately or not!) causing the stick to move, and the stick really is moving the stone, then the rest of the argument falls into place, and there must be a prime Mover.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46283722832632612242012-11-18T17:32:42.862-08:002012-11-18T17:32:42.862-08:00Vincent Torley: For Aquinas, Divine causality is p...Vincent Torley: <i>For Aquinas, Divine causality is per se. It's not some new third kind of causality. That's why it makes no sense to say God's causality is neither horizontal nor vertical, as Mr. Green proposes.</i><br /><br />Actually, I was simply pointing out that if you want to distinguish God's causation from some (so-called) "vertical" causes, then you have to call it something else. Or call the other causes something else; the vertical/horizontal thing is just a picturesque metaphor. If you turn a map on its side, you can't insist that north is still at the top. But really, I don't think the "vertical" image is helpful when it comes to positing an infinite chain, because we cannot <b>picture</b> an infinity regardless of whether it's horizontal or vertical. <br /><br /><i>Intelligent beings in the multiverse made our universe and maintain it in existence with its laws. Intelligent beings in the supermultiverse keep the multiverse in existence, and so on. [...] If you allow an infinite regress of per se explanations, then it's pretty hard to refute a smart-aleck atheist like this guy.</i><br /><br />As Crude says, welcome to theism (of the polyistic variety). But it is nothing more than smart-aleckery, because so far we have only the formal structure of a hypothetical superdupermultipleverse that <i>could</i> exist. That doesn't explain why it <i>does</i> exist: I'll return to the traditional example of a locomotive engine pulling boxcars. Boxcars do not pull themselves, even an infinite number of them. I don't see why God couldn't create a train of infinitely many boxcars, but to make them start and stop, you'd still need some kind of an engine. I don't see how your infinitely-nested universe example in any way avoids that.<br /><br /><i>Finally, a per se cause has to be simultaneous with its effect, because anything which is no longer present when an effect occurs is incapable of explaining that effect.</i><br /><br />George R. said the same thing. We've gone from suggesting that no <i>per se</i> chains are simultaneous to saying all of them are! Which is clearly incorrect. A hypothetical causal chain <i>could</i> be simultaneous, if the laws of physics allow it. It is claimed that the actual physics that God chose to create does not allow such a thing. The reason why that doesn't matter is because, while the example of simultaneous causes is more obvious to the imagination, non-simultaneous causes can equally well be <i>per se</i>. To say it has to be "present" simply begs the question.<br /><br /><i>In the hand-stick-stone case, the hand's movement is simultaneous with that of the top end of the stick, and the bottom end's movement is simultaneous with the stone, but the top end cannot simultaneously move the bottom end. The stick is really a very long series of atomic dominoes.</i><br /><br />But the whole chain is a series of <i>per se</i> causality — the dominoes in between just as much as the dominoes at either end. And since a chain of dominoes does not fall all at once, clearly simultaneity is not needed. The toppling middle dominoes are not merely accidental events, as though they could tip over under their own power. <br /><br />Since we are concerned with a metaphysical principle, it will apply regardless of the particular laws of physics of this universe. The particles at the end of your fingertip could move simultaneously with the particles in the tip of the stick (with the subsequent movements delayed across time). Or we could have different laws of physics where the hand, stick, and stone really do all move instantly and together. Or we could have physics that never has any simultaneous motion: where the tip of your finger moves at time <i>t₁</i> and the tip of the stick does not start moving until time <i>t₂</i> (when your finger tip has stopped). There is nothing impossible about any of these scenarios; it's a question for science to determine what kind of physical laws actually apply to the real world. The underlying principles of causality remain the same.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-13303492393807718552012-11-18T14:30:51.170-08:002012-11-18T14:30:51.170-08:00Hi Ed,
In regard to that:
I've encountered th...Hi Ed,<br /><br />In regard to that:<br />I've encountered the argument that there is no such thing as a "chain" of causality - that every event has multiple causes, that each of those causes has its own multiple causes, and so on exponentially, and that they all wrap around and are interconnected (like a spider web). Is your statement about the need for an external first cause relevant to that argument as well?<br /><br />Thanks!Liberteurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17878796551917615050noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67728936684969893342012-11-18T11:15:06.704-08:002012-11-18T11:15:06.704-08:00It seems that Ed now allows that there could be an...<i>It seems that Ed now allows that there could be an infinite regress of per se explanations.</i><br /><br />I never said any such thing. Precisely because even in such a (for the sake of argument) infinitely long series the causes would all be instrumental, there would have to be some non-instrumental cause outside the series. That means that the series of <i>explanations</i> does terminate, in this non-instrumental cause.<br /><br />As I've said I don't know how many times now, "first cause" in the context of a per se causal series does not primarily mean "the cauae coming before the second, third, fourth, etc." but rather "something with underived causality." The point is that created causes have no inherent causal power but are all "secondary" or derivative causes, which requires that there be a "first" or underived cause. That is why the length of the chain of derivative causes -- or for that matter, whether that chain loops around in a circle -- is not to the point.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.com