tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post3158272024936654193..comments2024-03-28T13:39:03.094-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: A further reply to Mark SheaEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger96125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-62429216272355621692019-09-19T05:12:51.392-07:002019-09-19T05:12:51.392-07:00Looks like Mark has decided to bring a real philos...Looks like Mark has decided to bring a real philosopher into the discussion <a href="https://virilityformula.ca/ingredients/" rel="nofollow">ingredients in vitality</a>alice cooperhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02381985707358530972noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33859759797222703102017-10-14T23:07:10.541-07:002017-10-14T23:07:10.541-07:00Dude I saw what you said about Pope Francis.
You...Dude I saw what you said about Pope Francis. <br /><br />You are not one to talk.<br /><br />_Jim the Scott aka BenYachov.Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40022023946725787022017-10-03T20:49:01.619-07:002017-10-03T20:49:01.619-07:00The author's first mistake was to respond to a...The author's first mistake was to respond to anything Mr. Shea has to say. It is not possible to discuss anything rationally or calmly with the man. He is always on a witch hunt, torch in hand.Dr. Timothy J. Williamshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00163313868802067411noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-82125010494951068742016-10-09T07:35:40.352-07:002016-10-09T07:35:40.352-07:00Imagine my surprise when i found a letter printed ...Imagine my surprise when i found a letter printed in "God in the dock" by CS Lewis that proved nothing has changed.<br /><br />"But I still think the abolitionists conduct their case very ill. They seem incapable of stating it without imputing vile motives to their opponents."Nate Winchesterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00630873800235819300noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88633826859715300902016-10-02T09:56:15.960-07:002016-10-02T09:56:15.960-07:00PII then goes on to make the assertion that DP is ...<i>PII then goes on to make the assertion that DP is never necessary to constitute an *adequate* punishment, </i> <br /><br />I don't think this reading of his position holds enough water to bear up. If you are suggesting that <i>for every crime for which death is a proportionate punishment, there is also a lesser punishment than death that ALSO serves as punishment fully proportionate to the crime</i>, this seems manifestly unsound and untrue. Since death is understood to be so much more grave than the other punishments available, <i>it cannot be proportionate</i> to the same crimes that those other punishments are proportionate to. That's just how proportions work. So if there is some crime for which death is a fit punishment in terms of proportion, then for that crime a lesser order of punishment is <i>not adequate</i> to serve to redress justice fully. <br /><br />If, on the other hand, you are suggesting that <i>there is no crime for which death is a proportionate punishment</i>, this too is a poor position to take here, for 2 reasons. First, because it is manifestly unsound in its own right: there are crimes too evil for lesser punishments to be the fully proportionate redress. Secondly, because it makes absolute HASH of JPII's overall argument. If there is no such things as a crime for which death is the proportionate punishment, then THat'S what he should have been saying point blank, up front, explicitly, and then it would fall out as proven that we should never use the death penalty, ever, under any circumstances. However, this would mean his leaving theoretical room for our using it in a few cases "very rarely, or none at all" <b>would have been wrong</b>. If there are no crimes - if there <i>cannot be</i> crimes - for which death is the proportionate punishment, then it is WRONG to say "it is licit for the state to use the DP in those grave cases where the offender's guilt is fully established and where there is no other way to keep society safe." That would be wrong, but JPII does say that. <br /><br />The only other option, so far as I can tell, is to adjust your comment so that what it means is that "adequate" here is taken to be <i>already</i> qualified by "not using death if not needed for safety". So, if we are willing to accept this lesser sense of "adequate", then yes, it is always possible to seek adequate punishment without death. To be perfectly clear, this sense of adequate entails a punishment that - in some cases - is not fully proportionate to the crime, and thus entails accepting that justice is not FULLY redressed. I note the scare quotes in your using "adequate". <br /><br />I see no other way of taking your comment that it is "never necessary to constitute an *adequate* punishment,". Do you? Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54143642885404066012016-10-02T04:16:57.955-07:002016-10-02T04:16:57.955-07:00"To repeat: if justice is the PRIMARY end, se..."To repeat: if justice is the PRIMARY end, secondary ends like rehabilitation etc are achieved in relation to that primary end. That's what it MEANS to be a secondary end, rather than an incidental end: related as subordinate. You cannot intelligibly seek a secondary end by choosing ordinarily to forego the primary end, this is incoherent."<br /><br />And also to repeat: that is correct, but that is *not* what (my reading of) JPII's position entails.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11872600152780566342016-10-02T04:15:00.054-07:002016-10-02T04:15:00.054-07:00"David, you are not taking seriously, or enga..."David, you are not taking seriously, or engaging seriously, the position laid out." -- Tony, I actually think *you* are not... Or at least you seem to be just not getting it.<br /><br />"So, when you simply claim that cold-blooded execution can never be justified to defend society, that is clearly just wrong., you are simply not engaging the thesis being maintained." -- This is a misquote. (Just noting.)<br /><br />"The position goes on to assert: cold blooded execution is _never_ strict self-defense, and that therefore execution cannot ever be justified as self-defense." -- You're right that it can never be justified as *strict* self-defence, but really, that's just obvious, and it's irrelevant. It can still be justified for the defence of society, which is self-defence in a broad sense. You're picking up on an irrelevant quibble about terminology and ignoring what is clearly the point.<br /><br />"As an example, one answer that springs from the position is to let the criminal go, put a sniper on him, and KILL HIM if and when he becomes an ACTUAL danger rather than a putative, possible, or future danger. That way killing him really will be self-defense." -- Okay, good example. Except: *in principle* there would be nothing wrong with doing that. Indeed, doing something like that is very much called for in the case of someone who presents a clear and present danger to society, but who cannot be feasibly or justifiably arrested and locked up (consider the case of a murderer who has been falsely acquitted, but who... etc.).<br /><br />Re. expanding "defence of society": JPII gave you the principle for not doing that. "The principle [is] set forth in the new Catechism of the Catholic Church [and] remains valid: 'If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons, public authority must limit itself to such means, because they better correspond to the concrete conditions of the common good and are more in conformity to the dignity of the human person.'" As for the empirical claim about what ordinary men need, I think it's extremely contrived and easily subjected to (perhaps equally contrived) counter-examples. It's not a helpful way to resolve this dispute.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27940567820594235432016-10-01T20:02:38.944-07:002016-10-01T20:02:38.944-07:00Regarding your claim that cold-blooded execution c...<i>Regarding your claim that cold-blooded execution can never be justified to defend society, that is clearly just wrong.</i> <br /><br />David, you are not taking seriously, or engaging seriously, the position laid out. The position (which I do not hold, but is a stumper for this tack on JPII's analysis) hangs on what it really means to kill in self-defense. The position reminds us that true (i.e. strict) self-defense is always "in the heat of the moment", that is, it is always at the <i>immediate</i> juncture of grave danger. It can never be <i>strict</i> self-defense if the danger is still a ways off into the future rather than imminent, or if it is probable rather than concrete. You cannot <b>pre-emptively</b> kill in self-defense before you are in grave danger. That's not self-defense. <br /><br />The position goes on to assert: cold blooded execution is _never_ strict self-defense, and that therefore execution cannot ever be justified <i>as self-defense</i>. <br /><br />So, when you simply claim that <i>cold-blooded execution can never be justified to defend society, that is clearly just wrong.</i>, you are simply not engaging the thesis being maintained. As an example, one answer that springs from the position is to let the criminal go, put a sniper on him, and KILL HIM if and when he becomes an ACTUAL danger rather than a putative, possible, or future danger. That way killing him really will be self-defense. In any case, the implied meaning you are using for "defend society" has to be a definition that expands "defense" beyond strict self-defense to something broader. Once you do that, you cannot just assume that the same old moral standards for self-defense apply anymore. <br /><br />You also lose any principled basis for objecting to expanding "defense of society" to EXACTLY the sense noted by R.C. above at September 29, 2016 at 11:36 AM. Which puts the death penalty right back in the spotlight, as the <i>ordinary</i> means of defending society from thick-headed men who NEED just and proportionate punishments to understand the dignity of each innocent man, the ordinary means of revealing the truth about man to himself in the context of protecting innocent life. <br /><br />To repeat: if justice is the PRIMARY end, secondary ends like rehabilitation etc are achieved <i>in relation to</i> that primary end. That's what it MEANS to be a secondary end, rather than an incidental end: related as subordinate. You cannot intelligibly seek a secondary end by choosing ordinarily to forego the primary end, this is incoherent. Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-50935612345917353862016-10-01T18:30:36.771-07:002016-10-01T18:30:36.771-07:00Tony:
"Would the Pope's qualifier "a...Tony:<br />"Would the Pope's qualifier "as a condition for the offender to regain... his freedom" allow for, or invalidate a sentence of life in prison as an impermissible penalty?"<br /><br />It's not addressing that question. It is just indicating what normally occurs, what the offender is normally (but defeasibly) hoping and aiming for (freedom), and making the point that an *adequate* punishment must be served/borne before that (regaining freedom) happens. JPII then goes on to make the assertion that DP is never necessary to constitute an *adequate* punishment, without addressing whether a (true) life sentence might sometimes be necessary (and I won't speculate on what his opinion was on the latter question - I really don't know, and if you think you do, textual justification for your view would be appreciated).<br /><br />The "abolished completely" was not a purely empirical observation. It was a preface to JPII's enunciation of his own view about restricting the use of the DP. It situates his own view as one that has gained recognition and support in recent times. (I think that is clearly the most reasonable reading, anyway.)<br /><br />Regarding your claim that cold-blooded execution can never be justified to defend society, that is clearly just wrong. If a society lacks the means to safely imprison a dangerous killer, then execution may be necessary to defend society. (And note, JPII never argued that a society *must* pour limitless resources into ensuring that it *never* lacks these means - he just believed that in fact most societies these days *don't* lack the means.) Such execution may be judged necessary and carried out in cold blood. That it is also a proportionate punishment is indeed irrelevant to why it is the punishment chosen - but that's just JPII's position. And that position in no way conflicts with the general requirement that punishments for various crimes be assigned 'proportionately.' It's just that there are other concerns that *also* must be considered. (Consider, for example, Feser's comments on the George post (in reply to James Chastek) on why certain 'medieval' (or modern 'Islamic') methods of execution are reasonably avoided, even though they may well be proportionate.)David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61252523157842060332016-10-01T12:29:53.535-07:002016-10-01T12:29:53.535-07:00Re. the claim that DP is in fact NEVER needed for ...<i>Re. the claim that DP is in fact NEVER needed for safety, I sympathize with your argument, but I think that that was exactly where JPII was heading. He was in fact open to that interpretation. That, and only that, fact explains the word 'abolish' showing up in EV 56 ("abolished completely").</i> <br /><br />David, I don't agree. First, his "abolished completely" was a purely _empirical observation_ that there is a "growing tendency" in society and the Church to call for it to be abolished. Whether this call is justified or not, the empirical observation is valid. <br /><br />I also disagree that "this was exactly where JPII was heading." I don't think his phrasing <br /><br /><i>"such cases are very rare, if not practically non-existent."</i> <br /><br />is compatible with the point I laid out. The position is that cold blooded execution is <i>never</i> self-defense, and that therefore execution <i>cannot ever be justified</i> as self-defense, and since we already have justification for killing in self-defense, there is no such thing as justified killing in cold-blooded execution. This is incompatible with "very rare, if not practically non-existent" in principle, because of course both "very rare" would allow some executions, and even "practically non-existent" allows a for the difference between "actually non-existent" and "practically non-existent". <br /><br />There is also a red-herring aspect to the whole analysis if you try to take it down this road, too: if the REAL basis for the killing being licit is that the person is a real and current grave danger (i.e. calling for killing in self-defense), then it is COMPLETELY IRRELEVANT that the prior crime is a crime whose proportionate punishment is grave enough to encompass the death penalty. If a person is convicted of drunk-and-disorderly and sentenced to 3 days in jail, but on the way to jail he goes berserk and <i>appears</i> to be truly endangering the lives of 30 other people (say he began yelling bloody murder, he knocked over one cop and grabbed a gun from another), the cops can licitly shoot to kill him. The fact that the crime of which he convicted is NOT one for which a grave sentence is proportionate is irrelevant to the killing, the current danger is what gives it its liceity. A severing of the licitness of the execution from the due proportion of punishment means that the due proportionate punishment <i>has no bearing</i> on the killing in self-defense, and the passage<br /><br /><i>Public authority must redress the violation of personal and social rights by imposing on the offender an adequate punishment for the crime</i> <br /><br />becomes irrelevant to why he would be killed if he is indeed killed morally - under that position laid out. The state can kill someone if killing him is the only way to keep society safe from him, and it doesn't need to resort to "proportionate punishment" to justify that. Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74924430828873272652016-10-01T09:25:57.395-07:002016-10-01T09:25:57.395-07:00"Public authority must redress the violation ...<i>"Public authority must redress the violation of personal and social rights by imposing on the offender an adequate punishment for the crime, as a condition for the offender to regain the exercise of his or her freedom."<br /><br />I think it's perfectly reasonable to read this as a defeasible "condition." It certainly doesn't negate the subsequent categorical claim: <br /><br />"the nature and extent of the punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society."<br /><br />To read into this latter claim a general exception of cases involving punishment of murderers is clearly contrived and unreasonable. </i> <br /><br />David, I don't understand what you are saying. <br /><br />Would the Pope's qualifier "as a condition for the offender to regain... his freedom" allow for, or invalidate a sentence of life in prison as an impermissible penalty? <br /><br />Which "this" are you claiming is defeasible - the condition, or the life sentence? If it is the life sentence, then it must be in principle appropriate <i>as a matter of justice</i> to impose a sentence of life in prison. While it is <i>permissible</i> for a state to revise a sentence out of mercy, it is not required in justice to revise a proportionate punishment that was justly imposed. What you seem to be suggesting (so far as I can guess, anyway), is that it would be JUST to impose a "life sentence" ONLY on the condition that the state re-consider the extent of the penalty and allow the criminal to regain his freedom if he is repentant and reformed. But this <i>just is</i> to say that no life sentence is a just and proportionate sentence. And that's just a road to confusion. <br /><br />So, I don't understand what you are saying. How is JPII's "public authority must...to regain the exercise of his freedom" compatible with a REAL life sentence? Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75574634831149321522016-10-01T04:10:14.459-07:002016-10-01T04:10:14.459-07:00Tony:
"It is another thing entirely to say th...Tony:<br />"It is another thing entirely to say that it is not just to seek retributive justice when not necessary for safety." - Quite right, but that was not my reading of EV. Rather, what JPII said there asserts a limit on the *kind* of retributive justice that is appropriate, namely: no DP when not necessary for safety. <br /><br />Re. the claim that DP is in fact NEVER needed for safety, I sympathize with your argument, but I think that that was exactly where JPII was heading. He was in fact open to that interpretation. That, and only that, fact explains the word 'abolish' showing up in EV 56 ("abolished completely"). In fact, however, he clearly does leave room in principle for cold prudential calculation that some individual should be executed in cold blood, in cases where we have grounds for thinking it is 'necessary' (for safety reasons).<br /><br />"Public authority must redress the violation of personal and social rights by imposing on the offender an adequate punishment for the crime, as a condition for the offender to regain the exercise of his or her freedom."<br /><br />I think it's perfectly reasonable to read this as a defeasible "condition." It certainly doesn't negate the subsequent categorical claim: <br /><br />"the nature and extent of the punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society."<br /><br />To read into this latter claim a general exception of cases involving punishment of murderers is clearly contrived and unreasonable.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-67331202030665657142016-10-01T03:48:50.160-07:002016-10-01T03:48:50.160-07:00I still think my reading is right, and I see now t...I still think my reading is right, and I see now that I'm agreeing with Robert George (that is, on the narrow question of what JPII is saying in EV).<br /><br />Crude: "questions of justice are manifestly not the Pope's primary concern with regards to the culture of death." I'm not sure what you mean by that or how you would justify it, but it sounds antecedently implausible. Certainly justice is an essential concern here (for JPII and for us), even if somehow it's not primary.<br /><br />Jeremy: Yes, well, there's also Moses and divorce. The general point is that the OT is historical (not irrelevant, just historical), in continuity with the NT, and that history is one of progressive revelation, God choosing and drawing a people to himself from within a particular culture, culminating in the definitive fullness of revelation only through the God-man Jesus Christ.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-41863543232741721182016-09-30T20:01:27.725-07:002016-09-30T20:01:27.725-07:00The primary purpose of the punishment which societ...<i><b>The primary purpose of the punishment which society inflicts is "to redress the disorder caused by the offence".</b>46 Public authority must redress the violation of personal and social rights by imposing on the offender an adequate punishment for the crime, as a condition for the offender to regain the exercise of his or her freedom. In this way authority also fulfils the purpose of defending public order and ensuring people's safety, while at the same time offering the offender an incentive and help to change his or her behaviour and be rehabilitated.47<br /><br />It is clear that, for these purposes to be achieved, the nature and extent of the punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society.</i> <br /><br />Let me point something out here: in the second sentence the phrase "to regain the exercise of his or her freedom" <i>presupposes</i> a situation in which "to regain freedom" is not diametrically opposed to the "redress of the disorder caused by the offense". But that rules out life in prison, also. Same with "incentive to change" and be rehabilitated. In effect, the Pope's "safety" analysis ONLY WORKS in reference to crimes not severe enough to demand life in prison. Are we now going to invent a brand new theory that NO POSSIBLE CRIME could demand life in prison as the proportionate punishment? <br /><br />The analysis used in this passage is a limited one. It takes as its context an <i>assumption</i> that the proportionate punishment could leave the criminal to "regain the exercise of his freedom" and an "incentive to change". It therefore cannot actually address the situation where the proportionate punishment <i>does not</i> leave these possible. It simply does not speak to that situation. When the Pope says "for these purposes to be achieved" he is, again, framing the context, a context in which these purposes - regaining his freedom and an incentive to change - are consistent with the proportionate punishment that redresses the disorder. IN THAT CONTEXT, his prescription is definitive. Outside of that context, his prescription does not come to bear. Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-85928957104419667552016-09-30T19:43:32.682-07:002016-09-30T19:43:32.682-07:00He just takes a rather dogmatic position on it: th...<i>He just takes a rather dogmatic position on it: that the DP is just only insofar as its application is not warranted *only* by the demand for a just (proportionate) punishment; it is warranted (demanded by justice) only as a necessary defensive measure.</i> <br /><br />I am afraid, David, that this turns topsy-turvy the entire 2000 years of Christian teaching before him. It is one thing to say that we should not seek retributive justice when greater good would be harmed by seeking that justice, as can sometimes happen. It is another thing entirely to say that <i>it is not just</i> to seek retributive justice when not necessary for safety. <br /><br />God Himself attests to the <i>justice</i> of the death penalty as an appropriate punishment for taking a life, and this not on account of ongoing danger, but rather "for man is made in God's image". God does not qualify the rationale by "when the danger persists" in any sense. <br /><br />I have another thought about this "never unless needed for safety" approach. Actually, it's not mine, it's a friend's who is ABSOLUTELY opposed to the death penalty: It is NEVER needed for safety - it can't be. Think about it: when you execute someone, (i.e. not in battle on the battlefield), you are in complete control of him. You can and do by force put him on the chopping block, or in the noose, or in the chair. You had complete control of him during his trial, and after. You may have had handcuffs or chains on his arms and legs. You are not in <i>immediate</i> danger from him, he is not a danger RIGHT NOW. The only thing you can say about his being an ongoing danger is that he MIGHT be a danger in the future. Maybe. But that kind of "maybe" ONLY obtains if you choose to deal with him in ways that open you up to such danger - i.e. differently from now, because now he is no danger. You can, if you continue to spend enough effort, render him no danger to society. And, even if "something happens" later and he becomes an actual danger then you can kill him then, not now. There is no plausible argument that the <i>possibility</i> that he will in the future become a danger great enough to warrant killing him then in STRICT self-defense renders killing him NOW to be self-defense. That's not how self-defense works. So, there should NEVER be an execution (i.e. sober, measured, cautious, carefully applied action intended explicitly to KILL), there can be moral killing ONLY in self-defense, and only because in so acting you are unable to render him no danger to others by some lesser violence. <br /><br />If the "safety" clause were valid as an argument to render "unjust" all executions other than those needed for safety, it would actually render unjust all executions altogether, and leave killing only in strict self-defense as morally licit. Which even JPII was unwilling to assert. <br /><br />No, the best defense of the Pope's position is that while the death penalty is JUST, mercy is an even better route to take and we should not impose the just punishment of death when we can be merciful. This, at least, does not eradicate the entire human understanding of retributive justice. It is debatable as a proposition, at least. Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19751596654855883432016-09-30T17:28:34.219-07:002016-09-30T17:28:34.219-07:00But his rationale (against your objection, anyway)...<i>But his rationale (against your objection, anyway) seems to be straightforward: the New Testament (in particular the Sermon on the Mount) presents a more developed awareness of the absolute value of human life than does the OT, so that according to the proper understanding of the fullness of Christian revelation justice (alone) never demands (or warrants) DP as a punishment.</i><br /><br />In the OT, doesn't God command the death penalty for certain acts? It seems quite a development to go from that to the awareness that the death penalty is never demanded or even warranted.Jeremy Taylornoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-21373575841309377362016-09-30T15:31:56.401-07:002016-09-30T15:31:56.401-07:00David,
But his rationale (against your objection,...David,<br /><br /><i>But his rationale (against your objection, anyway) seems to be straightforward: the New Testament (in particular the Sermon on the Mount) presents a more developed awareness of the absolute value of human life than does the OT</i><br /><br />The absolute value of human life is still no barrier to it being condemned to hell for all eternity on the NT view. Now, said value does mitigate against death-as-a-solution in the broad sense. Again, PJPII was very explicit about that. The question of justice, however, just is ignored by him altogether. And that's not even very surprising, because questions of justice are manifestly not the Pope's primary concern with regards to the culture of death.<br /><br />So saying this:<br /><br /><i>that the DP is just only insofar as its application is not warranted *only* by the demand for a just (proportionate) punishment</i><br /><br />...just doesn't fly. I don't think we can get his opinion on justice for free just by saying, well, he didn't discuss it, therefore clearly he meant... etc. It'd be one thing if we didn't have a very long history of church thought, teaching, and even action on this matter. But we do.Crudehttp://crudeideas.blogspot.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74293053730513589742016-09-30T11:18:19.282-07:002016-09-30T11:18:19.282-07:00[And the further claim that it is NOT (any more) a...[And the further claim that it is NOT (any more) a 'necessary' defensive measure is an empirical claim, disputable on empirical (and prudential) grounds. But the principles seem explicit enough, even if not well-grounded.]David Mnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18547102979083231122016-09-30T11:12:55.349-07:002016-09-30T11:12:55.349-07:00"he thought that DP is not ever demanded for ..."he thought that DP is not ever demanded for the sake of justice when safety can be ensured without it." - Okay, Tony, but then it is not ever demanded for the sake of justice (period) - not as a punishment, anyway. It is only ever demanded as a defensive measure.<br /><br />I sympathize with the view that he didn't provide much of an argument for this claim. But his rationale (against your objection, anyway) seems to be straightforward: the New Testament (in particular the Sermon on the Mount) presents a more developed awareness of the absolute value of human life than does the OT, so that according to the proper understanding of the fullness of Christian revelation justice (alone) never demands (or warrants) DP as a punishment.<br /><br />Crude, I think you're right, in that he *doesn't* actually simply ignore the question of justice. He just takes a rather dogmatic position on it: that the DP is just only insofar as its application is not warranted *only* by the demand for a just (proportionate) punishment; it is warranted (demanded by justice) only as a necessary defensive measure.David Mnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4492597773818491962016-09-30T05:49:38.060-07:002016-09-30T05:49:38.060-07:00David,
The fact that he says what he says - all &...David,<br /><br /><i>The fact that he says what he says - all 'pragmatic' like - and ignores the question of justice pretty clearly implies, it seems, that he thought that DP is not ever demanded by justice.</i><br /><br />I don't think that's true. If that were the case, he wouldn't ignore the question of justice - he'd argue that the death penalty's application would be unjust.<br /><br />JPII's discussion of the culture of death was centered heavily on pragmatism, because the pragmatic application of death was precisely the thing he was trying to counter. Justice wasn't discussed, because justice wasn't the concern - one way or the other.Crudehttp://crudeideas.blogspot.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-65226098095311065142016-09-30T04:12:21.614-07:002016-09-30T04:12:21.614-07:00and ignores the question of justice pretty clearly...<i>and ignores the question of justice pretty clearly implies, it seems, that he thought that DP is not ever demanded by justice. It's either that, or he was just a muddlehead on the issue (which is really what you seem to be implying, Tony).</i> <br /><br />I do think you are right, David, that he thought that DP is not ever demanded for the sake of justice when safety can be ensured without it. That, I think, is his intent. <br /><br />But it is equally clear that HE NEVER ARGUES THIS POINT. He never even attempts to frame the argument that justice is not an important enough good, even though it is the "primary purpose" of punishment. He never even begins to set forth the <i>principles</i> that would have to be used to prove as a general thesis that "one must not use DP to achieve the justice of proportionate retribution when safety can be achieved with a lesser punishment." The closest he comes - the discussion with Cain - is simply inadequate to the universal thesis: its context (like that of Christ and the adulterous woman) is a single incident, and nothing God says in its course presents us with a direct general conclusion like the "thou shalt not"s of the commandments or the "by man shall his blood be shed" of Genesis 9:6. <br /><br />I don't think JPII was a muddlehead. I think he gave the best available basis for what he was pushing for, i.e. the position that DP is never "needed" for the sake of justice when safety can be achieved otherwise. It's simply that in the current state of theology and philosophy, there is no argument at present that takes on the needed issue head on. Nothing, for example, that takes on Genesis 9:6 head on and shows why it is not a generally applicable truth of human social order. No argument available that shows the relation between justice and the other goods to be sought, so that an ordering and hierarchy of goods can be laid out that makes sense and <i>proves</i> that the justice of proportionate punishment should not be sought when not needed for safety. He was facing what is effectively a blank slate of theoretical and general arguments, so he did the best he could: circumstantial arguments, probable arguments, hints and suggestions. <br /><br />Some people say that he was engaged in the "development of doctrine". I say that this will be known clearly if and when we ever do develop the general principles, the universal arguments of the sort I mentioned above. At that point, we will be able to see his attempts as the first steps of a development. I would be more willing to grant the plausibility of a future development along these lines if it were not the case that (just to pick one reason) we get SO MANY people trying to justify the thesis (that DP is never needed other than for safety) via arguments that range from bad to worse, eg we get princes of the Church holding that DP is immoral in principle (!!) Or bishops who argue in one breath that our culture has "morally developed beyond" the need for DP in one breath, while with the next breath arguing that being saturated in this culture of death, our society is <i>no longer able</i> to see the proper dignity of the human person and that in this condition we are so unjust that we cannot licitly employ that gravest of just punishments. I don't think what we are seeing is how development happens. Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69926063017089477012016-09-30T03:17:14.132-07:002016-09-30T03:17:14.132-07:00[For context I should have included:]
55. ...Unfo...[For context I should have included:]<br /><br />55. ...Unfortunately it happens that the need to render the aggressor incapable of causing harm sometimes involves taking his life. In this case, the fatal outcome is attributable to the aggressor whose action brought it about, even though he may not be morally responsible because of a lack of the use of reason. 45 <br /><br />56. This is the context...David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-91156832424198028052016-09-30T03:08:50.575-07:002016-09-30T03:08:50.575-07:00...
56. This is the context in which to place the ......<br />56. This is the context in which to place the problem of the death penalty. On this matter there is a growing tendency, both in the Church and in civil society, to demand that it be applied in a very limited way or even that it be abolished completely. The problem must be viewed in the context of a system of penal justice ever more in line with human dignity and thus, in the end, with God's plan for man and society. The primary purpose of the punishment which society inflicts is "to redress the disorder caused by the offence".46 Public authority must redress the violation of personal and social rights by imposing on the offender an adequate punishment for the crime, as a condition for the offender to regain the exercise of his or her freedom. In this way authority also fulfils the purpose of defending public order and ensuring people's safety, while at the same time offering the offender an incentive and help to change his or her behaviour and be rehabilitated. 47<br /><br />It is clear that, for these purposes to be achieved, the nature and extent of the punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society. Today however, as a result of steady improvements in the organization of the penal system, such cases are very rare, if not practically non-existent.<br /><br />In any event, the principle set forth in the new Catechism of the Catholic Church remains valid: "If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons, public authority must limit itself to such means, because they better correspond to the concrete conditions of the common good and are more in conformity to the dignity of the human person".David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19033460040064732612016-09-30T03:08:23.788-07:002016-09-30T03:08:23.788-07:00I agree that there is an important lacuna in JPII&...I agree that there is an important lacuna in JPII's EV discussion of the DP. All the same, I think his intent is clear. The fact that he says what he says - all 'pragmatic' like - and ignores the question of justice pretty clearly implies, it seems, that he thought that DP is not ever demanded by justice. It's either that, or he was just a muddlehead on the issue (which is really what you seem to be implying, Tony).<br /><br />Evangelium vitae, excerpts:<br /><br />9. ... Not even a murderer loses his personal dignity, and God himself pledges to guarantee this. And it is precisely here that the paradoxical mystery of the merciful justice of God is shown forth. As Saint Ambrose writes: "Once the crime is admitted at the very inception of this sinful act of parricide, then the divine law of God's mercy should be immediately extended. If punishment is forthwith inflicted on the accused, then men in the exercise of justice would in no way observe patience and moderation, but would straightaway condemn the defendant to punishment. ... God drove Cain out of his presence and sent him into exile far away from his native land, so that he passed from a life of human kindness to one which was more akin to the rude existence of a wild beast. God, who preferred the correction rather than the death of a sinner, did not desire that a homicide be punished by the exaction of another act of homicide".<br /><br />40. ... The commandment regarding the inviolability of human life reverberates at the heart of the "ten words" in the covenant of Sinai (cf. Ex 34:28). In the first place that commandment prohibits murder: "You shall not kill" (Ex 20:13); "do not slay the innocent and righteous" (Ex 23:7). But, as is brought out in Israel's later legislation, it also prohibits all personal injury inflicted on another (cf. Ex 21:12-27). Of course we must recognize that in the Old Testament this sense of the value of life, though already quite marked, does not yet reach the refinement found in the Sermon on the Mount. This is apparent in some aspects of the current penal legislation, which provided for severe forms of corporal punishment and even the death penalty. But the overall message, which the New Testament will bring to perfection, is a forceful appeal for respect for the inviolability of physical life and the integrity of the person. It culminates in the positive commandment which obliges us to be responsible for our neighbour as for ourselves: "You shall love your neighbour as yourself" (Lev 19:18). <br />...David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-37774171010689068612016-09-29T16:19:57.627-07:002016-09-29T16:19:57.627-07:00"justice should be foregone if you can achiev...<i>"justice should be foregone if you can achieve safety" - Actually, isn't that a pretty good paraphrase of JPII's intent, insofar as one holds that DP *is* often the most appropriate act of (penal) justice?</i><br /><br />David, I invite you to re-read the passages in question, such as Evangelium Vitae 56. He says <i>death</i> should be foregone if safety can be achieved. He does NOTHING AT ALL to relate this to <i>justice</i>. After talking about justice as the primary end of punishment, he just DROPS it as a topic and takes up safety. Nowhere does he explicitly attempt to relate the two ends, nor does he attempt to actually argue about how to rightly assess the need for justice in pursuing the other goods available (such as the life of the criminal). He never addresses it, never even nods at the concept, he just ignores it as if it didn't exist. It is perhaps the biggest lacuna in his writings. <br /><br />The notion that you could have a sound justice / penal system, while <i>systematically</i> foregoing what you have ALREADY SAID is the <i>primary</i> purpose of that penal system, is fraught with many, many difficulties. R.C. pointed out some, and there are more. For example: the relationship between primary and secondary ends (such as reform) is more significant than the almost non-existent relationship between a primary end and mere<i>incidental</i> ends. The secondary ends cannot be pursued intelligibly except in virtue of pursuing the primary. Tonynoreply@blogger.com