tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post3084612856004337152..comments2024-03-19T02:00:34.750-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Forgetting nothing, learning nothingEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger93125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-8632214816229915682016-07-14T12:42:58.877-07:002016-07-14T12:42:58.877-07:00Krauss is just trying to sell books to a secular l...Krauss is just trying to sell books to a secular loving atheistic society.raynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80259533810057772812016-02-12T18:08:28.982-08:002016-02-12T18:08:28.982-08:00The theory that the universe can come from nothing...The theory that the universe can come from nothing has one major flaw in it. Here is a link:<br /><br />https://sekharpal.wordpress.com/2015/10/23/a-fundamental-flaw-in-the-thesis-a-universe-from-nothing-part-I/<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-91286127766769154262015-03-06T11:58:21.788-08:002015-03-06T11:58:21.788-08:00Dear Mr. Feser!
Thank you very much for your inte...Dear Mr. Feser!<br /><br />Thank you very much for your interesting polemical articles.<br />God bless you!<br /><br />With best wishes,<br />Paul Yermolov,PhD in Art History,russian orthodox Christian,Moscow. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61601644030913405632013-12-21T23:50:17.374-08:002013-12-21T23:50:17.374-08:00Re: A physicist friend of mine and I ...He interru...Re: A physicist friend of mine and I ...He interrupted our conversation to note that he’d always found this typical bit of moth behavior annoyingly contemptible for its sheer stupidity -- for the stubborn pointlessness of the moth’s behavior, ...<br /><br />Your friend is not thinking intelligently. A moth is not a human, nor is its "idea" or final cause anthropomorphic. It is doing what it is supposed to do, it is the lightbulb that is "anti-natural," as it were. And how does your friend not know that perhaps in its desire for union with the light it does not participate in an ecstasy that God alone knows, and certainly not the purely profane mentality of your friend. Samuelnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-55765906206782427682013-05-12T15:30:51.671-07:002013-05-12T15:30:51.671-07:00@ dd said...
Anon @ 3:54 and Glenn,
"Do [un...@ dd said... <br />Anon @ 3:54 and Glenn,<br /><br />"Do [universals] exist only mentally or extra-mentally?"<br /><br />the answer to this question, i believe, is the one Avicenna (d.1037) gave viz., universals considered in themselves exist in neither mode, but can come to exist in one mode or the other."<br /><br />That can't be correct because the second we say that "universals... EXIST" then they must be real; if real, then they would necessarily have to fall into the categories of either the mental or the extra-mental, which means "in the mind" or "[anywhere] outside the mind", with the second category being a catch-all that would include everything and anything that could possibly be said to actually exist. Otherwise, I think, you'd necessarily have to (at least effectively) assert that they exist in nothing, which is impossible. <br /><br /><br />@ Quire said... <br />"http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/can-physics-and-philosophy-get-along/<br /><br />Wonder what everyone thought about this article? I think it's a pretty interesting - in particular, his response to the unintelligibility of the concept of "Absolute Nothing", which many of us here seem to be relying upon as an argument against Atheism."<br /><br />Of course absolute nothing would be unintelligible. That's the point: There is nothing to tell about it.<br /><br /><br /><br />@ "G"<br /><br />Ps 14:1 comes to mind.<br /><br /><br />@rank sophist<br /><br />rank sophist said... <br /><br />"This conclusion is incoherent unless you already accept intellectualism, the four causes, essentialism, eudaimonistic ethics and other things."<br /><br />Which objection is incoherent unless you already accept the intellctual concept of coherency, which is just logic, which is the basis of the Aristotelian tradition beginning, basically, with the Principle of Non-Contradiction, which of course was just a cultural product of the Greeks that could only make sense to them. Greek math, too, is essentially different from modern English math, which is essentially different from 18th century Geran math and even contemporary Japanese math; but for the classical Greeks, one and one obviously made three; for other cultures it added up to four hundred; and for yet others (e.g., the Hebrews) it added up to rank sophist's mom, who was worshipped as a goddess for giving birth to the demi-god Self-Contradiction, who in turn the Hebrew Prophets prophesied would Enlighten the modern age with the mental Tranquility of rank Scepticism (otherwise known as being a dunce).<br /><br />@ Dr. Feser:<br /><br />Still waiting for a defense of marriage.William Maximilien Dunkirkhttp://catholic.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-73834376357830699772013-03-23T01:40:11.976-07:002013-03-23T01:40:11.976-07:00From the Amazon review of behavioral scientist and...From the Amazon review of behavioral scientist and economist Herbert Gintis, entitled "Excellent Exposition of Modern Cosmology, Questionable Metaphysics":<br /><br />"Here is Krauss's main point: "Including the effects of gravity in thinking about the universe allows objects to have... "negative" as well as "positive" engery....gravity can start out with an empty universe---and end up with a filled one." (p.99) This is because the conservation of energy allows for offsetting positive and negative energy. This seems like nothing new to me, and hardly a revelation. Electron-positron pairs are created from nothing and can go their own ways, so matter can be created from nothing.<br /><br />This is where Krauss's theology/metaphysics comes in. Because the universe could have been created from nothing (quantum fluctuation, empty space),there is no need to posit a Creator. But, the theologian will ask, who created the rules according to which the Big Bang was regulated? Krauss has no answer, except to say (a) there might be lots of different rules for different universes, and (b) if you are going to posit an eternal preexisting Creator, you are no better off that simply positing the eternal and preexisting laws of physics. But Krauss is wrong. When one posits a Creator, one is admitting that one's knowledge has limits, and there are higher orders of knowledge that are inaccessible to mere human intellect. We do not know anything about the realms of being of the Creator or Creators, but we believe they must exist beyond the limits of our understanding. Our reason for believing this is that we experience possessing forms of knowledge inaccessible to other species (amoebae, mushrooms,field mice, Capuchin monkeys, German Shepards, chimpanzees, and such). It would be completely arbitrary to claim there is no realm of intellect beyond ourse. Simply positing the eternality of the laws of physics is, in comparison, an unsatisfying alternative.<br /><br />Here is Krauss's faith: "Without science, everything is a miracle. With science, there remains the possibility that nothing is." (p. 183) I maintain that this is very likely incorrect, and hardly the basis for a firm metaphysics."Walker Wrighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06648863351382695638noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26306850997326152422013-03-10T09:53:51.610-07:002013-03-10T09:53:51.610-07:00"one has to presuppose that intellectualism i...<i>"one has to presuppose that intellectualism is axiomatic"</i><br /><br />You're really into the ism thing, but you're better off talking about the specific issues involved, especially when making claims about things being axiomatic.<br /><br />Experiential knowledge is made up of empirical and rational elements that must be assumed as a universal set (empirical mind-object elements) and a universal system (logic and general reason). Even the statement that experiential knowledge is made up of empirical and rational elements is a blend of both, precisely because, aside from being a rational statement, it pertains to, or is about, or refers to, the empirical, in what it predicates.<br /><br />As far as voluntarism goes, the will cannot be in any way superior to reason, since if it were, that fact could not be known except by submission to the principles of reason. Will itself exists only as an essential element of the self-presumption of being an evaluative reflective vantage point of thought. But that's all that the existence of will needs for will to be what it is.<br /><br />So the buck stops there with a necessary self-determining will that is the source---and evaluator and decider of last resort---of the analysis itself.<br /><br />Hence both will and reason are equally necessary presuppositions, but reason is the arbitration processing system partly made up of the most basic standards, standards even of statements about that system itself and its relation to will.<br /><br />In a sense, will is on its own, but being on its own requires reason to be operative. The independence of will is actually proportionate to how much of the system is assimilated and applied. The more one conforms to that system, the freer one's will due to the increase in intellectual power over one's situation caused by the increased understanding from more knowledge of that system and its relation to the world.machinephilosophyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07715878687266064548noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54701500229525672692013-03-06T19:08:21.014-08:002013-03-06T19:08:21.014-08:00machinephilosophy,
I'm glad that we're mo...machinephilosophy,<br /><br />I'm glad that we're mostly on the same page. I agree that intellectualism is ultimately existential.<br /><br />When I mentioned "one possible choice", I meant that the intellect could come to logical deductions that the will could then accept or not. Here's an example that I used in the most recent combox:<br /><br />1. Intellectualism is axiomatic.<br />2. I reached logical deduction X.<br />3. Therefore, I must accept the truth of logical deduction X.<br /><br />1. Voluntarism is axiomatic.<br />2. I reached logical deduction X.<br />3. Therefore, I may accept or reject the truth of logical deduction X.<br /><br />As you said, if we play the game, then we must follow the rules of logical obligation. I agree that using voluntarism as a reason in a sense puts us into that game. It's impossible to escape axioms of one kind or another. But, in the case of voluntarism, the obligation stops at the axiomatic level. Once we have a reason to believe that deductions are not binding on the will, that we can accept or reject any and all deductions without thereby engaging in a deduction, then every deduction that we make is called into question.<br /><br />At first glance, this might seem to result in a contradiction: if voluntarism means that our deductions are called into question, then even the deduction that deductions are called into question can be called into question. The intellectualist would take this as patent self-refutation. It isn't, though. Because voluntarism is just as existential (or reflexive) as intellectualism--it's an axiom that we have to presuppose before any deductions can take place--, it doesn't lead us to the contradiction of accepting a position that relativizes itself. The voluntarist always has a solid (and non-deductive) reason to reject deductions--a reason that is prior to deductions and untouchable by deductions.<br /><br />When I mentioned reframing, the above is kind of what I had in mind. If the intellectualist accuses the voluntarist of contradicting himself, then the voluntarist can accuse the intellectualist of begging the question: one has to presuppose that intellectualism is axiomatic and that voluntarism is a deduction for the voluntarist's logical mess to be a true contradiction. If we take voluntarism to be prior to intellectualism, then the logical mess is <i>simply the way things are</i>, and intellectualism is just another ideology to be questioned. Essentially, intellectualists and voluntarists are incapable of communicating with each other, because each side is necessarily false from the point of view of the other.<br /><br />Because there is no middle ground between voluntarism and intellectualism, it becomes impossible for logic to mediate between the two positions. The best you can hope for is that one side gets dissatisfied with its own system and converts to the other. This is what Hart means when he says that no one is obliged to follow natural law unless his worldview has already been reshaped prior to logic.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23626068301832314862013-03-06T15:52:53.004-08:002013-03-06T15:52:53.004-08:00Maybe Krauss meant "non-being" and is in...Maybe Krauss meant "non-being" and is in fact arguing for the existence of Aristotelian matter?Steffen Laursennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80738228101478321482013-03-05T23:15:29.322-08:002013-03-05T23:15:29.322-08:00Don't understand the one possible choice thing...Don't understand the one possible choice thing.<br /><br />Our decision to follow logic is not contained within logic, although if it is a argued decision it of course proceeds according to logic. That decision is merely what puts us in the operating system of obligations, if-then triggers in a preferential hierarchy of values and priorities. And our thinking according to rules is an approximation to a moral ideal of thought, because of the ought implied in the set of conditional preferences, and because of the abstract universal level and necessity of its application.<br /><br />To want to see it as a logical deduction is a feature of the value hierarchy of reason, as is requesting valued logical reasoning for the ultimacy, adequacy, and efficacy of logic and reason.<br /><br />I'm a voluntaristic empirical rationalist, but at the core of our thinking it's the principles and processes of reframing that there's no real choice about.<br /><br />Yeah, it's a chosen system. It's only within that system that there's logical and rational obligation. All other obligation, propriety, normativity derive from basic universal principles and values merely held in an existential situated grasp.<br /><br />But it's held as an integral system, and truth is necessarily what fits in that system.<br /><br />Finite beings can only approximate the ideality of reason and logic because of finite resources and entropy.<br />So there's a general tendency toward self-contradiction in spite of the unavoidable ideal.<br /><br />The obligation to supply reasons in relation to why type questions is already operative.<br /><br />If you're playing the game, you're playing the game according to rules to some extent. Whether you play the game is not something I've addressed, but my above remarks should clarify this. The valuing of reason and logic is completely existential in a sense. But if you're signed on to them, then all obligation and an ideal of goodness proceed from their nature as idealities, which is an integrated purposive moral system.<br /><br /><i>"Why assume that logical deductions inherently carry obligations?"</i><br /><br />That's a request for reasons. Is there any obligation to supply reasons?<br /><br />Intellectualism is axiomatic. An existential "without which, nothing", but it's a system. There's no logical foundation for logical foundations. But that doesn't weaken logical foundations in the least, partly because we define them as the end of the logically justificatory line, and partly because they too have to have some justification, even though in the nature of the case there can be no logically prior justification, only an existential all-or-nothing grasp of the necessity for an ideal inexorable system.<br /><br />Voluntarism is one of the basic assumptions that runs in parallel with other things, but your question is itself a request for reasons. So there's a truth-determining ideal, and one can and does constantly choose how closely one wants to approximate it.<br /><br />You'll have to elaborate on the thing about the intellectualist begging the question in arguing that voluntarism is contradictory.<br /><br /><i>"This is also, I might add, the reason why the earliest voluntarists believed in divine command theory. They didn't think that logic in itself was binding: it had to be enforced by a command."</i><br /><br />It's a wonder they thought that, since such thinking requires logic. Is there any evidence that any of them opted out as a general stance?<br /><br /><i>"Logic was only relevant to obligation if God's will was behind it, and so the human will was ultimately only obligated by an even higher will. Take God out of the equation and the voluntarist isn't obligated by deductions at all."</i><br /><br />All that depends on logic in advance to be meaningful etc., and it assumes that one is obligated by the cited considerations to construe obligation that way.machinephilosophyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07715878687266064548noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51517738908590104422013-03-05T15:06:20.592-08:002013-03-05T15:06:20.592-08:00machinephilosophy,
You have a point, to a large e...machinephilosophy,<br /><br />You have a point, to a large extent. I'm not entirely sure how a voluntarist would respond, but I'll give it my best guess.<br /><br />We can certainly say that logic obligates us in the sense that it gives us one possible choice, but how are we going to say that our decision to follow logic is contained within logic itself? Why can't we do something irrational instead? Why do we accept the idea that no one willing acts against logic? I don't see how this is a logical deduction in itself. We can frame random-seeming decisions so that they are always seeking after some kind of good deduced by the intellect, but the same scenarios can be reframed in a voluntarist way as well.<br /><br />An intellectualist interpretation of the decision to indulge in vice: a man deduces that vice is harmful, but he elevates its good qualities in his intellect to convince himself to do it.<br /><br />A voluntarist interpretation of the decision to indulge in vice: a man deduces that vice is harmful, but then indulges in it simply because he wants to.<br /><br />I see no contradiction in the voluntarist position here. Both options are valid. In response to the further claim that voluntarism is founded on logical obligation, a voluntarist can just ask why we should assume that there is actually such a thing. Why assume that logical deductions <i>inherently</i> carry obligations? After all, intellectualism must always be taken as axiomatic: it isn't itself a deduction. So why not choose voluntarism as your axiom instead? From that angle, the intellectualist who argues that voluntarism is contradictory merely begs the question.<br /><br />This is also, I might add, the reason why the earliest voluntarists believed in divine command theory. They didn't think that logic in itself was binding: it had to be enforced by a command. Logic was only relevant to obligation if God's will was behind it, and so the human will was ultimately only obligated by an even higher will. Take God out of the equation and the voluntarist isn't obligated by deductions at all.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9259633988932190982013-03-05T08:15:20.223-08:002013-03-05T08:15:20.223-08:00Anonymous said...
Dr. Feser, I know that G...Anonymous said...<br /><br /> <i>Dr. Feser, I know that G's comment is rather long-winded, but I really think you should consider adding it to the quotes at the top of your page. It strikes me as such a sublime distillation of new atheist argumentation!"</i><br /><br />Rereading this thread through, I see that Anonymous made his suggestion a full day before I more long-windedly said almost the same thing.<br /><br />The cranks deserve a wall of shame, even if it is in some back page corner or file. "Lest we forget", as they say.DNWnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51455535202469172013-03-05T04:18:00.875-08:002013-03-05T04:18:00.875-08:00seanrobsville said...
"... but in using Von N...seanrobsville said...<br />"... but in using Von Neuman's derivation to claim that everything is derived from mathematics, it seems to be confusing the map with the territory, leading to the 'everything is nothing' absurdity."<br /><br />Indeed. But not everyone has read Korzybski, alas.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40203390085182437632013-03-05T03:53:22.503-08:002013-03-05T03:53:22.503-08:00"The idea that reason (i.e. the intellect) ob...<i>"The idea that reason (i.e. the intellect) obligates the will to do this or that is called intellectualism. It isn't built in to logic itself--it's an added concept. One could accept voluntarism instead and deny that reason or teleology or human nature obligated them to do anything. The intellectualist could try to reframe the debate by saying that the voluntarist was still stuck using reason--just that his premises were emotional, impulsive or fideistic. The voluntarist could respond by accusing the intellectualist of begging the question: the idea that reason directs the will is presupposed in that argument. A counter-example that recast the system in voluntarist terms could then be presented. And on and on."</i><br /><br />The problem is that your position---or any position that opposes this---must bank on that same obligating force to make its own point. That obligation is not built into reason but added, and other similar points is simply more of the same obligation-to-construe principle all over again but at an even higher level of supervisory authority. Reason and logic already ARE systems of obligation in order to have any function or purpose at all in thought. Denials, reframing, arguments between various construances of reason etc. are simply repeats of my point. To deny in any argued way the obligating force of reason is to presuppose it in that very process. If it's all will-directed, so is the will-directed reduction that one ought to believe that voluntarism is the case.machinephilosophyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07715878687266064548noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33406021790418060022013-03-04T14:03:15.968-08:002013-03-04T14:03:15.968-08:00machinephilosophy,
The idea that reason (i.e. the...machinephilosophy,<br /><br />The idea that reason (i.e. the intellect) obligates the will to do this or that is called intellectualism. It isn't built in to logic itself--it's an added concept. One could accept voluntarism instead and deny that reason or teleology or human nature obligated them to do anything. The intellectualist could try to reframe the debate by saying that the voluntarist was still stuck using reason--just that his premises were emotional, impulsive or fideistic. The voluntarist could respond by accusing the intellectualist of begging the question: the idea that reason directs the will is presupposed in that argument. A counter-example that recast the system in voluntarist terms could then be presented. And on and on.<br /><br />It isn't as easy as finding a fallacy. Both options are coherent and incompatible in strictly logical terms. rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58075001105336212472013-03-04T08:06:09.966-08:002013-03-04T08:06:09.966-08:00Blogger rank sophist said...
"In any case, i...Blogger rank sophist said...<br /><br />"In any case, if it could be shown that mechanism was a logical contradiction, then I'd be forced to admit that I was wrong on that point. That doesn't mean that the four causes are the only remaining option, though. Other systems can be and have been devised.<br /><br />March 3, 2013 at 8:19 PM"<br /><br />Yeah, this is probably one of those areas where painstaking - and a possibly dreary - analysis of the matter being mooted, is probably called for.<br /><br />It's not so simple, as everyone here recognizes, as noticing a syllogistic fallacy of form, or some antinomy contained in a more lengthy argument.DNWnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28359826812241417562013-03-04T07:54:56.482-08:002013-03-04T07:54:56.482-08:00I know that professor Feser has requested that tro...I know that professor Feser has requested that trolls be ignored, but I would like to recommend he retain "G's" hostile tirade as something of a memento, not to say trophy. <br /><br />Quite possibly he might one day include a number of such remarks in a sidebar or a link: "Notes from our critics".<br /><br />Now I say this not because I wish to defend a 5th century BC cosmology, or because I am myself a Thomist, but because G's rant so perfectly illustrates the mindset of those ideologically impelled militant materialists who, we are assured, no longer exist. A group, we are told which have moved on to much more philosophically sophisticated and physically nuanced understandings of reality than those possessed by their mechanism parading, social engineering, crank forebears.<br /><br />The perfervid sputterings of half-educated ideologues leveraging off of the latest issue of some science quarterly are a thing of the past. Because, no reputable, practicing, peer reviewed, tenured scientist, (did I say from the best schools?) would ever engage in the kind of histrionic nonsense which retrograde types like Feser accuse them of. Nor, and this is important, would their followers and disciples.<br /><br /><br />There is therefore no reason for Feser to waste our time refuting billiard-ball materialism, or behaviorism, or inferences drawn from other historical curiosities; and, Feser should instead just shut up. Maybe register at a community college in Minnesota and take a biology class. The world is round you know!<br /><br /><br />By the way thanks to Mark Szlazak for:<br /><br /> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D5in5EdjhD0"<br /><br />It contains much more than some rumination regarding a biological basis for a Kantian-like epistemology. The remarks regarding the concepts of matter and materialism are particularly interesting. <br /><br />Whether as a matter of historical fact and development it is too much to root the current conceptual difficulties in certain problems regarding "occult" forces, and action at a distance, noticed by Galileo and Newton, and which have supposedly never been overcome (actually understood) I'll let someone else decide.DNWnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-90086761851696153262013-03-04T06:00:27.622-08:002013-03-04T06:00:27.622-08:00It's not that an ought can be derived from an ...It's not that an ought can be derived from an is, but that normativity and obligation are already embedded in what it means to be rational. The whole point of his own essay itself is that one OUGHT to construe things (including morality) in one way as opposed to some other.<br /><br /><i>"This conclusion is incoherent unless you already accept intellectualism, the four causes, essentialism, eudaimonistic ethics and other things"</i><br /><br />Uh, I just got through saying that rationality, which entails "A is B unless you already accept C" type reasoning has no obligating force unless obligation is already built into rationality itself.<br /><br />You respond with just more of the same. My position doesn't require any of those things to be "coherent" (which just begs the same question once again), since such a requirement is already bogus if rational constraints are not already obligating to begin with.<br /><br />To respond with "but p, q, and r! Therefore your position is incoherent!" is---aside from ignoring the alleged problems in ITSELF---just more of what I've pointed to, namely that reason is held to be universally obligating in any issue whatsoever, aside from and in advance of any moral or ethical theorizing.<br /><br />Hence some core notion of natural law is already operative, even in arguments against it.machinephilosophyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07715878687266064548noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-5598214608665780862013-03-04T05:24:17.158-08:002013-03-04T05:24:17.158-08:00"Dr. Feser, what do you think of the objectio...<i>"Dr. Feser, what do you think of the objection that the laws of physics don't actually exist, but they're just descriptions of observable phenomena in the universe?"</i><br /><br />I doubt that is a problem for a Tomist. <br /><br />One could argue that the Laws of Physics do not exists, but TELEOLOGY exists and indeed that the 'Laws of Physics' are nothing more than the empirical observation of teleology of things. <br /><br />Wether we can accept this or not, however, it's irrelevant to Krauss' book, since whatever the case you still need SOMETHING, either a law of physics or a 'quantum field'.<br /><br />--<br /><br /><i>""And if so, why is mathematics so unreasonably effective in modelling physical systems?"" </i><br /><br />You must realize that mathematics is in essence a language that describes things.<br /><br />A very peculiar form of language, of course, since it give quntitative description rather than a qualitative description as 'common' languages do.<br /><br />Mathematics deals also with abstract entities and concepts, which might not be physical at all. <br /><br />When we do physics we practically choese among these concepts (like a particular set of functions) that does indeed describe the physical system.<br /><br />One might ask of course if the mathematical concepts are something akin to universals or not...Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75038888063401237152013-03-03T20:19:05.752-08:002013-03-03T20:19:05.752-08:00Joe,
It's perfectly okay for you to ask. I...Joe,<br /><br />It's perfectly okay for you to ask. I'm not really playing devil's advocate--Hart's thought has had a huge impact on me. <br /><br />I picked natural law before I'd started to delve into Hart and historicism, but I can say that my decision was based on a couple of factors. At the time, despite being a nominal Christian, I had bought in to mechanism, scientism and the rest, and I'd realized that nihilism was the only possible result. I didn't even know that mechanism had a name--I thought it was just the way things were. I came across this blog around that time, which is where I was introduced to essentialism, the four causes, the Five Ways and natural law. When on put on those "glasses", so to speak, my view of the world totally changed. I realized that the same objective data--the natural world, etc.--could seem completely different depending on how you looked at it.<br /><br />When I saw the world before, it was hostile, pointless, depressing and Godless. It made me feel empty. The new way changed everything. I was freer and happier than I'd felt in years. And natural law morality (at best, I'd subscribed to divine command theory in the past) had a beauty to it that really appealed to me. The notions of virtue, moderation and self-control had an aesthetic pull--and they made me feel better than I had in a long, long time.<br /><br />Obviously, logic had a big role as well. I spent a significant amount of time reading Prof. Feser's work, so that I could be sure that it wasn't just self-delusion. Seeing him tear apart the logical contradictions I'd absorbed through the culture was huge. But I can safely say that it was the realization that the world differs based on how you see it that grabbed me, and that I would never have stuck with Thomism if it hadn't changed how I felt.<br /><br />Hopefully that's not too long-winded. I think you can see where I'm going with this, though. As Hart says in The Beauty of the Infinite, you convert people through preaching, rhetoric and aesthetic appeal. If Thomism's arguments for God had led to the tyrant of Calvinism, I would have rejected them. I would have preferred the freedom of total liberal nihilism over that. I think a lot of people these days are the same way: they realize on an intuitive level that the slavery entailed by modern theology must be false. They just don't understand that traditional Christianity and its history of thought is the freedom they're all looking for.<br /><br />In any case, if it could be shown that mechanism was a logical contradiction, then I'd be forced to admit that I was wrong on that point. That doesn't mean that the four causes are the only remaining option, though. Other systems can be and have been devised.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86157818873294280662013-03-03T18:43:38.119-08:002013-03-03T18:43:38.119-08:00I think then that we agree on the disagreement. It...I think then that we agree on the disagreement. It's merely a matter of whether the underlying philosophy is sufficient at convincing you (or anyone, whatever their historical context). You don't think it is. You just don't think someone Has presented an argument that shows mechanism to be false. Or, perhaps more extreme, that someone Can.<br /><br />Which, of course, makes me ask you: why do you happen to pick natural law conclusions over other modern, mechanistic ones? It just feels right? Or, both arguments got you to a point where you had to take a leap at one? Why that one though? Is it even possible to give a Reason for this that could ever be convincing to another human being?<br /><br />And what if someone presented arguments that undermined one of the things you, going in, assumed couldn't be undermined? Would you push the problem back a step, or would you accept it as sufficient?<br /><br />Maybe you're playing devil's advocate a little for Hart, so I apologize for those type of questions if they really aren't appropriate, but it feels like there's something more there.Bhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10872384675415092134noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83431056078547127992013-03-03T17:59:17.876-08:002013-03-03T17:59:17.876-08:00That is, if someone shows that the two causes just...<i>That is, if someone shows that the two causes just Don't work, then the response should be "well, actually the two causes Do work (with argument), and the four causes are wrong!" not "well, you can only understand why the two causes don't work considering the underlying classical background." The argument itself is About that background. There has to be a point where you can't hide behind a historicist shield.</i><br /><br />The question is whether or not such an argument can be presented. Is it really possible to show that mechanism contradicts itself? I don't think that it is. Certainly you can point to the various counter-intuitive conclusions that mechanism reaches, but, again, one could just accept skeptical solutions and keep going. Showing that it contradicts common sense is not enough. Showing that it makes science impossible is not enough. Showing that it leads to skepticism is not enough. Showing that it leads to nihilism is not enough. These arguments may convince some, but only because of prior commitments that are not purely logical. From a logical standpoint, one can accept all of the above conclusions without contradiction. <br /><br /><i>In other words, I don't think the classicalist would Agree with you when you say "It is impossible to wholly "disprove" the modern picture of reality." Or, the classicalist would say that the modernist has to Rely on classical philosophy to even Get to a modernist picture of reality in a way that makes that modernist picture incoherent.</i><br /><br />Again, I don't think that such an argument could be presented. The premises of classical philosophy and modern philosophy are different, and so their conclusions will be different. Which premises are "correct"? That supposes a further neutral ground from which we can criticize them, which simply does not exist. Logic is the most neutral ground that we have, and it allows both to exist coherently.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-15765291745839868822013-03-03T17:58:21.051-08:002013-03-03T17:58:21.051-08:00I just stopped by to see if anyone responded to my...<i>I just stopped by to see if anyone responded to my question, but I'm not totally sure this point is made as easily as you think it is. At a certain level it almost sounds like you're saying "bad explanation of existence" is as valid as "good explanation of existence" because someone might happen to choose "bad explanation of existence." It's almost like a backhanded way to give bad philosophy merit.</i><br /><br />The response that a historicist like Hart would give--which I'm increasingly sympathetic with--is that you can only determine what a "bad explanation" or a "good explanation" <i>is</i> once you've entered history and taken a side. A bad explanation for a Christian is a good explanation for a Muslim, for instance. There is no way to make judgments like these via "a view from nowhere" (i.e. a totally impartial ground). However, reason obviously does tell us that certain things are off the table. A line of thinking that denies the possibility of thinking (like materialism) is self-refuting--neither a bad explanation nor a good explanation, but a non-explanation.<br /><br />I am not saying that moral relativism, for example, has merit. It's a horrible ideology. But impartial logic alone cannot get me to that conclusion.<br /><br /><i>As you and I have already discussed, it's very true that the foundation of natural law is not "relevant" to the modern world, in the sense that the modern world doesn't understand it or is just ignorant of it. But this doesn't really have anything to do with whether that foundation (and the natural law consequences that follow) are correct.</i><br /><br />It isn't just a matter of rediscovering the correct premises. Aristotelian thinkers like Scotus were the ones who undermined natural law in the first place, and they understood more about ancient philosophy than most philosophers today. <br /><br /><i>This historicist issue is also an ultimately pointless discussion to have. If modern (that is, rejecting classical) arguments Are valid (which you seem to be implying that they are), then we should be discussing them, not whether people do or are willing to accept them (or their converse). <br /><br />Which is why I don't totally understand your point here. If materialism is just not valid at all (which you say), then there must be modern conclusions that are to which you are appealing. As such, your beef is really with the natural law arguments Themselves, not whether people are able to accept them considering their historical context.</i><br /><br />Modern and pre-modern arguments about morality are based on different starting premises. On one hand you have <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intellectualism#Medi.C3.A6val_metaphysical_intellectualism" rel="nofollow">intellectualism</a>, which Christian tradition embraced for a long time. On the other hand you have <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voluntarism_(metaphysics)" rel="nofollow">voluntarism</a>, which Scotus created and which is still the basis of modern moral theory. Both of these are self-coherent. Voluntarism became popular because it was compatible with a certain interpretation of Scripture and the Church Fathers, just as intellectualism was compatible with a different interpretation. Which one is correct? Logic alone can't tell us. But you have to pick a side before you can say anything about natural law: there is no neutral ground between the two positions. That's Hart's point. Telling a world built on voluntarism that it should follow natural law is a bit like yelling in German at a man who only speaks French. Natural law is not a universal language that can bridge the gap between traditions.rank sophisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01644531454383207175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69777487309496948052013-03-03T17:42:29.491-08:002013-03-03T17:42:29.491-08:00At first, I thought Hart was simply addressing a p...At first, I thought Hart was simply addressing a practical matter: surely we have all come across people who argue some pet point of theirs by stipulating that it follows from Natural Law™ (much as some other folks try to appeal to Science!™). It's hard to draw black-and-white conclusions beyond broad principles, so in many detailed practical situations, natural law simply doesn't add much. (You'll never derive an incontrovertible proof of the ideal tax-code from natural law any more than Newtonian physics is <i>in practice</i> going to help you predict which balls will bounce out in tomorrow's lottery drawing). <br /><br />But then he seems to make the mistake that Machine Philosophy criticises. Hart says, "the additional claim that we are morally obliged to act in accord with [our nature]", but of course there is nothing additional. To call for reasons why we "should" act in accord with reason is silly: if you don't accept reasons, then more reasons won't help. That's the key point behind natural law — having such-and-such a nature just <i>is</i> the reason to act that way; that's what it means to have a nature! <br /><br />I was surprised to see Hart take that track, but perhaps he still meant that only from a practical perspective, because he goes on to note that someone who doesn't accept that we have natures is obviously not gong to be moved by any claims based on that. After all, that's why certain people are so desperate to avoid any direction or intent in evolution — if it's completely "random", then there is no such thing as human nature, only "human accidental coincidences" at most, and thus there is no way we <i>should</i> be, no behaviour we <i>ought to</i> follow. And given that starting point, which to be sure is in some sense culturally determined, then yes, arguing from natural law is pointless. <br /><br />However, it can be shown by reason that the foundation on which natural law rests must be true. In practice, we will never convince everyone, nor can we evaluate precise moral details with mathematical rigour, but — since we're talking practically — that doesn't matter. You can defend the Decalogue naturally (give or take some variation in the first three laws), which is why they can be found in some form across all cultures. That's already a big improvement on what we have now. And most people are disposed to accept the background that leads to natural law — although currently we face many challenges in how philosophically misguided people generally are, most of them are not willing to be moral eliminativists. Rank Sophist is right that anyone can escape an argument from a natural law simply by denying there is such a thing as human nature, but the actual number of people who are willing to do so, once they see the resulting morality (or lack thereof!) is quite small... certainly too small to steer the culture as a whole. <br /><br />In short, while Hart may be technically correct, I think he is too pessimistic. Maybe he thinks that it will be too hard to re-educate the populace in some decent fundamentals of philosophy — Feser's main project — but I'm not convinced of that. Getting people to the point where they <i>can</i> understand the moral problems of the general modern view is a challenge, but most people instinctively reason that way already (they just do it in a confused and ignorant way).Mr. Greennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74077356748188741362013-03-03T16:36:37.267-08:002013-03-03T16:36:37.267-08:00In other words, I don't think the classicalist...In other words, I don't think the classicalist would Agree with you when you say "It is impossible to wholly "disprove" the modern picture of reality." Or, the classicalist would say that the modernist has to Rely on classical philosophy to even Get to a modernist picture of reality in a way that makes that modernist picture incoherent.<br /><br />Again, That's what's at issue.Bhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10872384675415092134noreply@blogger.com