tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post2760416015874971379..comments2024-03-18T15:57:33.286-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Crickets still chirping... (Updated)Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger209125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-15294226457484417622013-05-13T21:09:36.180-07:002013-05-13T21:09:36.180-07:00Checkmate.Checkmate.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69852242287220605962011-11-18T13:57:26.355-08:002011-11-18T13:57:26.355-08:00>But instead the point is that, as you say, it ...>But instead the point is that, as you say, it would be incoherent for God to do certain things. <br /><br />Sadly in a world where people have an attention span of 20 minutes or less confusion is more easy to come by then understanding.<br /><br />Like trying to explain the Trinity to persons who insist at all costs of equating it with Tri-Theism.BenYachovhttp://www.catholic.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-56885903947498574262011-11-13T20:30:23.944-08:002011-11-13T20:30:23.944-08:00BenYachov: Well we can't blame him since he ha...BenYachov: <i>Well we can't blame him since he has no moral obligations to us. Aquinas said God has no obligations to us.</i><br /><br />Yes, of course. But that's not the point (nor anything to do with Theistic Personalism): I'm merely noting that to fix on that point could mislead someone into thinking that it's all right for God to do evil things because He can't be morally culpable for them. But instead the point is that, as you say, it would be incoherent for God to do certain things. <br /><br /><i>That is a possible response to Rowe if one take the Theistic Skeptical view but I think it is simply better to rather then find a way to get God off the hook show that God isn't the sort of Thing that can coherently be hooked in the first place.</i><br /><br />I also don't think "skeptical theism" is the right name for it. (I know that's not your term for it, but I think mischaracterises the real answer.) It's like somebody saying, "If I found a right-angled triangle where the square of the hypotenuse didn't equal the sum of the squares of the other two sides, then Pythagoras's Theorem would be wrong." The response isn't to say, "Oh well, we're not dealing with Euclidean triangles here anyway" (although that may <b>also</b> true, just as God is <b>also</b> not a moral agent). <i>If</i> somebody found such a triangle that would indeed be a problem for the Pythagorean Theorem; but the answer is that we know the theorem is true and therefore you will never find such a triangle. There's nothing skeptical about that — far from it. It's not that we are "skeptical" of ever successfully identifying such a triangle. It's that we have proof that there can be no such triangle.Mr. Greennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-68127662350772646222011-11-13T15:36:25.410-08:002011-11-13T15:36:25.410-08:00>It's not quite that simple. You make it so...>It's not quite that simple. You make it sound as though God could do horrible things but we just couldn't blame Him. <br /><br />Well we can't blame him since he has no moral obligations to us. Aquinas said God has no obligations to us.<br /><br />>However, theology teaches us that God is rational and loving,<br /><br />His "rationality" is analogously <br />to ours but completely incomprehensible. His love for us is simply His will for us to receive the ultimate good.<br /><br />God doesn't have emotions.<br /><br />>so we know there are things God wouldn't do regardless their moral status (or lack thereof).<br /><br />Rather "couldn't" do because it would be given His nature incoherent for him to do it. <br /><br />For example "Torturing babies to death for fun". A Sadist is the sort of person who feels pleasure inflicting pain on others. Evil is often the pursuit of a good in a disordered fashion. A Sadist wants to feel powerful because he feels helpless. God is already all powerful and God has no emotions thus he doesn't need to feel powerful or feel what He perfectly knows himself to be.<br /><br />That is one reason why just because God is not a moral agent he can't do what he wants.<br /><br />>The reason evil isn't a problem is because (as I believe George R. pointed out above), we can't identify any gratuitous evils. <br /><br />That is a possible response to Rowe if one take the Theistic Skeptical view but I think it is simply better to rather then find a way to get God off the hook show that God isn't the sort of Thing that can coherently be hooked in the first place.<br /><br />>The mere existence of suffering isn't enough, because there can be rational reasons to allow it.<br /><br />Knock yourself out but I see no reason to try and vindicate the Theistic Personalist God. The True God of the Catholic Church is sufficient. God is not a moral agent. God owes us nothing thus the Problem of Evil is a pseudo-problem according to Davies.BenYachovhttp://www.catholic.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61648543173579673692011-11-13T14:29:47.709-08:002011-11-13T14:29:47.709-08:00BenYachov: Sorry no but as Brian Davies proves if ...BenYachov: <i>Sorry no but as Brian Davies proves if God is not a moral agent then the problem of Evil is a non-problem. </i><br /><br />It's not quite that simple. You make it sound as though God could do horrible things but we just couldn't blame Him. However, theology teaches us that God is rational and loving, so we know there are things God <b>wouldn't</b> do regardless their moral status (or lack thereof). The reason evil isn't a problem is because (as I believe George R. pointed out above), we can't identify any gratuitous evils. The mere existence of suffering isn't enough, because there can be rational reasons to allow it.Mr. Greennoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39773484386850220012011-11-13T09:09:30.671-08:002011-11-13T09:09:30.671-08:00It's ironic that Stephen Law's "evil ...It's ironic that Stephen Law's "evil god challenge" is <i>itself</i> ruled out by empirical evidence - since he is unable to produce <i>any</i> empirical evidence to back his claim that "most Christians" rule out an evil god based on the good in the world.Daniel Smithhttp://thefoolishnessofgod.blogspot.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58012281409662130162011-11-13T00:20:34.288-08:002011-11-13T00:20:34.288-08:00BTW FunnyAtheists Blog is hysterical!
Read his St...BTW FunnyAtheists Blog is hysterical!<br /><br />Read his Stephen Law demotivator.<br /><br />Beyond funny....<br /><br />Follow the link from his name to the blog. <br /><br />Too funny. Love that blog.<br /><br />FunnyAtheist vs TOF?<br /><br />I can't choose.BenYachovhttp://www.catholic.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-32604469302129388872011-11-13T00:15:50.534-08:002011-11-13T00:15:50.534-08:00>Also, lets scrap the insults, don't use na...>Also, lets scrap the insults, don't use names such as "Funnyatheists".<br /><br />I disagree at some point you have to use satire against willfully ignorant persons.<br /><br />Funnyatheists is an anonymous gadfly who shows up now and the to tweak the noses of the Fundie Class of Atheists who take themselves way too seriously.<br /><br />I welcome it.<br /><br />That having been said we should strive for clarity but we should throw our pearls before swine either.<br /><br />Cheers friend.BenYachovhttp://www.catholic.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88936405129375608112011-11-12T17:30:29.476-08:002011-11-12T17:30:29.476-08:00I don't understand some people who attack some...I don't understand some people who attack some argument P against concept Q and maintain P is a failure for not refuting R. <br /><br />I think we should recognize that faulting some argument against theistic-personalism for not refuting classical theism is a mistake. We should rather strive for clarity by authors by pressing that they ought to make note that their argument P refutes Q but not R.<br /><br />Also, lets scrap the insults, don't use names such as "Funnyatheists". Instead encourage clarity and education on topics by showing that some argument P refutes Q, but Q is different than R so R still stands untouched. <br /><br />As an irrelevant side note: Would theists here be fine with an atheist using the name "Funnytheists" to mock young earth creationists such as Ray Comfort? I doubt it.Ryan Mhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15738381414795204410noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88528467419708440942011-11-12T15:39:07.854-08:002011-11-12T15:39:07.854-08:00Law,
Maybe I can help out here. You say that sin...Law, <br /><br />Maybe I can help out here. You say that since the existence of an evil god can be ruled out empirically, the existence of a good god can be ruled out empirically. <br /><br />What Crude and everyone else here is trying to point out is that none of us here think an evil god is ruled out empirically. <br /><br />Your response is that <b>most Christians do</b>. Crude is saying that he doesn't believe this, so you need to give us reason to think so by quoting someone who makes that argument. After-all, you cannot simply assert that most Christians believe 'a' without supplying support.<br /><br />But you do not provide any support. In fact, you reply that no one has ever argued that. So, if no one has ever made that argument, why do you say they have, Law?<br /><br />Secondly, it doesn't really matter if the whole world thinks the existence of good disproves an evil god. We do not believe it here so you need to support it. You cannot simply say that some unspecified empirical evidence disproves an evil god and tell us we need to agree with that because most Christians (who we have never met and you have been unable to show) say so. <br /><br />If you are unable to support the idea that an evil god can be ruled out empirically (without appealing to the people), then you are making no argument, Law. <br /><br />Support your premise.<br />What empirical evidence disproves an evil god?<br /><br />Do me a favor and chew on this comment for a while before responding to it. You don't need to misunderstand me the way you've been misunderstanding Crude. He's merely asking you to support your argument with some evidence and I agree with him completely.ogunitracyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00290778671829228577noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11862536906020874592011-11-12T14:52:05.480-08:002011-11-12T14:52:05.480-08:00I just realized one way Stephen Law may be approac...I just realized one way Stephen Law may be approaching these questions.<br /><br />I get the impression Stephen Law thinks something like this goes on:<br /><br />* We have our various metaphysical views and arguments. Let's say these establish the existence of God, and this God is good. Let's say we also establish that the existence of an evil god is impossible.<br /><br />* Stephen takes these metaphysical conclusions as amounting to an empirical claim. Something along the lines of, 'If these metaphysical arguments are correct, then empirically we would expect to see...'Crudehttp://crudeideas.blogspot.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-5850929188718735212011-11-12T14:06:05.990-08:002011-11-12T14:06:05.990-08:00@Prof Law
>The issue of moral goodness is irre...@Prof Law<br /><br />>The issue of moral goodness is irrelevant. God does not even need be a moral agent in order for the evidential problem of evil to be a problem. <br /><br />Sorry no but as Brian Davies proves if God is not a moral agent then the problem of Evil is a non-problem. It's like debating wither or not Tennis players should be able to run the mile in under 10 minutes. Well being a tennis players isn't the sort of thing that requires running the mile well but in playing tennis well. <br /><br />The Problem of Evil assumes a morally good God who is obligated to give us the best possible world. Theodicy then comes in to play to explain how God can be morally justified in allowing certain evil in order to bring about some type of Good which is not possible without tolerating certain evil.<br /><br />The evidentalist argument of evil is Rowe's excellent response to Plantinga's Free Will defense but it is clearly a non-starter to any view of God's Goodness that excludes Him being a moral agent.<br /><br />God has no moral requirements to us and can't coherently be thought of having any as such in the Classical Theistic Sense.<br /><br />>The question remains, why would a wholly good creative force (whether or not morally good - e.g...hundreds of millions of years of animals suffering...suffering children etc.....<br /><br />Sorry Prof Law but after having read Davies I can't take this response seriously since it equivocates really badly. It still assumes the existence of a morally good God who has obligations to us. So it is a non answer. It's sticking your fingers in your ears and pretending all Theism is Theistic Personalism.<br /><br />God is not coherently moral or immoral. God is purely actual and thus Good and God could only be evil in that He fails to exist.<br /><br />>It is, indeed, like you guys have your fingers in your ears!<br /><br />>Bye...!<br /><br />I see you are bound and determined to make me look like a fool for sticking up for you as a rational Atheist. Now you are acting like a Gnu. Sad!<br /><br />Knowing what I know if I stopped believing in God tomorrow your argument is still a non-starter. <br /><br />Live with it.BenYachovhttp://www.catholic.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-48911385003138013582011-11-12T12:37:21.580-08:002011-11-12T12:37:21.580-08:00Untenured,
Stephen Law is committing a very basic...Untenured,<br /><br /><i>Stephen Law is committing a very basic mistake and refuses to acknowledge it. He is treating metaphysical demonstrations as if they were empirically defeasible arguments which could be overturned by empirical evidence even after they have been certified as sound. I am sorry, but this is flat out confused.</i><br /><br />I agree. He also seems to be treating the empirical evidence as something which everyone is going to evaluate equally, regardless of what metaphysical commitments, basic beliefs or anything else they bring to the table. But what really bothers me about his argument here is that, to even have the prospect of doing any work, it requires the assumption that an evil god is rendered absurd based on the empirical evidence alone. And when someone denies that, he starts in with tremendous psychoanalysis and zero argument. It really doesn't speak well of his argument.Crudehttp://crudeideas.blogspot.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-87097720076805844222011-11-12T11:08:17.959-08:002011-11-12T11:08:17.959-08:00There isn't any particular definition of "...There isn't any particular definition of "good" and "evil" in Law's original article and there is no evidence that he has any understanding of the classical theistic notion or position on good and evil.<br /><br />One has to wonder how he is going to empirically approach either of his hypotheses without a clear definition of good and evil. <br /><br />He should try harder to actually make the "challenge" relevant to classical theism.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28407225543385880692011-11-12T08:01:06.771-08:002011-11-12T08:01:06.771-08:00And I think that a Manichaean would happily accept...And I think that a Manichaean would happily accept Laws premesis to the point where he rules out the existence of an evil god on empirical grounds. He would just say: No, we are only justified in concluding that there are two gods, a good god and an evil god.radhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15971384998033929481noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18589216866930950102011-11-12T07:49:12.121-08:002011-11-12T07:49:12.121-08:00Correction: privation doctrine of evilCorrection: privat<b>ion</b> doctrine of evilradhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15971384998033929481noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23172828651247848852011-11-12T07:46:49.835-08:002011-11-12T07:46:49.835-08:00@Untenured
"That is like saying "Yes, y...@Untenured<br /><br />"That is like saying "Yes, you have a sound argument that the primes are infinite. But suppose it isn't sound, we might still ask whether our experience makes it more reasonable to believe in an infinite number of primes than a finite number....""<br /><br />Yes, I know! I tried to press this point with him. <br /><br />What I meant in my above remark was that the definition of God, the private doctrine of evil, and the doctrine of the transcedentals just show that an evil god is a contradiction. This follows even if we have no arguments for God.radhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15971384998033929481noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35528138890178862492011-11-12T07:40:14.943-08:002011-11-12T07:40:14.943-08:00@rad:
Maybe. But Law himself says:
My point is t...@rad:<br /><br />Maybe. But Law himself says:<br /><br /><i>My point is that even if it could be shown that an evil god is an impossibility (and that does seem to be your strategy, after all), we might still ask, "But supposing it wasn't an impossibility..."</i><br /><br />That is like saying "Yes, you have a sound argument that the primes are infinite. But suppose it isn't sound, we might still ask whether our experience makes it more reasonable to believe in an infinite number of primes than a finite number...."<br /><br />Like Ed, I thought this might have been a typo, because the underlying point is so manifestly confused. But it isn't, because he keeps doubling-down on it. He really seems to think that a <i>sound metaphysical demonstration</i> could be defeated by empirical evidence. <br /><br />That is just a basic failure to understand the kinds of arguments that the Classical Theist is deploying. <br /><br />Trust me: This one is over. At this point Law is like Monty Python's black knight, de-limbed and squirting blood everywhere while insisting it 'tis but a flesh wound.Untenurednoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-90533038105811049132011-11-12T07:35:53.942-08:002011-11-12T07:35:53.942-08:00Clarification: I did not mean to say, that there a...Clarification: I did not mean to say, that there arent any good arguments. I just mean that Laws argument fails even without them.radhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15971384998033929481noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9611472374402025412011-11-12T07:30:53.775-08:002011-11-12T07:30:53.775-08:00Untenured,
I dont think that there even have to b...Untenured,<br /><br />I dont think that there even have to be sound arguments for the God of classical theism for Laws argument to fail. The classical definition of God, the doctrine of the transcedantals and the privation doctrine of evil are enough to make Laws arguments fail against classical theism. It seems that he does not get the radical asymmetry between God and his evil god which is, as I have said now many times, a contradiction in terms.radhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15971384998033929481noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-21506106633121185692011-11-12T07:30:34.646-08:002011-11-12T07:30:34.646-08:00Suppose we bracket the necessity of God being good...Suppose we bracket the necessity of God being good for a moment. Then it is possible to say that, if someone finds an evil god absurd on the basis of the evidence of the world, then they will also find a good God absurd. But absurd here can only mean 'implausible', not impossible, as the argument is evidential. But now let's unbracket the necessity of God being good. Ed thinks that God's existence is shown by Aquinas' natural theological arguments (the five ways). Moreover, the sort of god shown to exist by those arguments is necessarily good, due, presumably, to the Thomistic considerations that Ed is eager to claim that Stephen has overlooked. But if that is so, then, given that the natural theological arguments and Thomistic considerations are deductively secured, what we need to do is compare the evidential premises of the evidential argument from evil and the five ways, and assess their relative plausibility. Given that the five ways form a cumulative case, targeting different facts about the world, and given the obviousness of these facts (change occurs, something is in motion), it seems that Stephen needs to argue against Aquinas' natural theology if he is going to persuade Ed of his conclusions.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26637276481239007612011-11-12T07:21:36.782-08:002011-11-12T07:21:36.782-08:00@Crude:
I had a friend in the English department....@Crude:<br /><br />I had a friend in the English department. He used to always tell me that there were no objective truths, just "asymmetries of power" or some cognate bit of nonsense. When I asked whether the proposition "There are no objective truths" is objectively true, he could never quite answer the question. And yet, he insisted that there was something I just didn't understand.<br /><br />Reading this exchange, it is like deja vu all over again.<br /><br />Stephen Law is committing a very basic mistake and refuses to acknowledge it. He is treating metaphysical demonstrations as if they were empirically defeasible arguments which could be overturned by empirical evidence <i>even after</i> they have been certified as sound. I am sorry, but this is flat out confused.<br /><br />If I have a sound argument which establishes that some proposition is true <i>with the force of metaphysical necessity</i>, then no empirical evidence can show otherwise. I don't have to weigh the evidence provided by my sound argument against any amount of potentially disconfirming empirical evidence. Indeed, If the argument is sound, then necessarily its conclusion is true and there is no such thing as even potentially disconfirming empirical evidence.<br /><br />Thus, once I have constructed a sound argument that Fermat's theorem is true, or that the primes are infinite in number, or that God is<br />pure act, no amount of empirical evidence is going to overturn these propositions. <br /><br />Thus, it is not as if someone could come along and say "Ah! Yes, Godel may indeed have a sound argument that any formal system with the expressive power of arithmetic cannot be both complete and consistent, but might some empirical discovery show that he was wrong after all?" Nobody would take that question seriously even for a second, and yet Law is asking us to do something analogous with his "Evil God" challenge.<br /><br />Now, Law might decide to retrench with some kind of Quinean view and argue that all propositions are revisable in light of empirical evidence. I don't think that dog can hunt, but it would be a reasonable move to make here. <br /><br />What is <i>not</i> reasonable is for him to keep insisting that we have misunderstood him, or that we have to take the EGC seriously <i>even if</i> there are sound metaphysical arguments for a being that is pure act. If he really can't see this, he is the one who is confused.Untenurednoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44404193960543925172011-11-12T07:01:48.728-08:002011-11-12T07:01:48.728-08:00Mr. Law,
I think we've already given you good...Mr. Law,<br /><br />I think we've already given you good reasons why theists believe God is good. <br /><br />In any case, Craig also gave you an answer. From his moral argument; if God can be the only ground for objective morality (since I don't see how it can be grounded on anything else), then our moral obligations necessarily have to be grounded on a good God. <br /><br />also<br /><br />The resurrection gives us good grounds for believing God is good. If Jesus did in fact resurrect, then that somewhat validates the character of the God he was revealing.<br /><br />also<br /><br />The evil being a privation of good argument of Mr. Feser.<br /><br />So, it isn't clear to me why you keep saying no reasons were given to believe in a good God rather than an evil one.Johnny Boyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02740205023903547365noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69085178296016368122011-11-12T06:57:34.666-08:002011-11-12T06:57:34.666-08:00Stephen, you have got to be kidding me with this.
...Stephen, you have got to be kidding me with this.<br /><br />If you think the tone over here is bad with the commentators what do you think of your own combox comments?<br />"Fingers in their ears" as if people really aren't engaging your argument? Come on. The majority of the commentators over here are much more willing to charitably engage with your position than people over at your blog would be willing to do with Feser (in a charitable manner of course.... which is your gripe over here).<br /><br /><br />This is upsetting to see you act this way.Buckeyenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11395616463703843972011-11-12T06:01:28.052-08:002011-11-12T06:01:28.052-08:00My scholasticism getting in the way again: by moto...My scholasticism getting in the way again: by motor I meant motus in the scholastic sense of moving object. <br /><br />In any case, the point is that there can't be evidence that points to "an evil almighty creator God"; there can only be evidence of no God at all. Law's argument, though he is presumably no longer around to hear this, amounts to saying, "We can deduce from the speed of this object that it's either moving or immobile."Codgitator (Cadgertator)https://www.blogger.com/profile/00872093788960965392noreply@blogger.com