tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post2537244585585740504..comments2024-03-18T15:57:33.286-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Mumford on metaphysicsEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger71125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83564955795807715652013-02-11T17:08:04.978-08:002013-02-11T17:08:04.978-08:00Mr. Green,
Thank you for that clarification re: G...Mr. Green,<br /><br />Thank you for that clarification re: God, artifacts and natural substances.<br /><br />I see now that an artifact is a <i>classification</i> - not necessarily related to a means of production.<br /><br />That said, I'm trying to understand substantial forms and immanent teleology in light of the Fifth Way - which says explicitly that teleology in mindless things is extrinsic - dependent upon the mind of another. Aquinas makes it clear that he means all natural substances and that he means God.<br /><br />For that reason, I tend to lump the final cause and the substantial form into one thing because I classify <i>all things</i> via a mind/matter division. <br /><br />To my understanding, a mindless material universe would be completely formless and void (if it could even exist) for, without a mind, there is no form. So, for me, the substantial form is mind-dependent (as opposed to matter-dependent) in that it is the result of God having imposed his direction upon matter (which ultimately has no direction of its own). <br /><br />Thus, the fact that hydrogen and oxygen combine to form water is <i>ultimately</i> due to a <i>decision</i> God made when he designed hydrogen and oxygen. But... (and this is the immanent part) God does not have to make that decision anew every time hydrogen and oxygen combine because he has designed hydrogen and oxygen to have those qualities immanently. (Although he sustains those qualities in existence - thus, if God goes away - those qualities go away as well.)<br /><br />Am I anywhere near close? Gosh I hope so because my head hurts!Liberteurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17878796551917615050noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-53126625215444789272013-02-10T22:21:13.411-08:002013-02-10T22:21:13.411-08:00HI, Daniel. I'm not quite sure whether this ad...HI, Daniel. I'm not quite sure whether this addresses the right problem, but you say the difference between artifact and substance is "blurred" for God, so perhaps this will help. When a bunch of things are combined, there are two possible kinds of results: that you end up with a bunch of things, i.e. a collection of substances (an artifact); or else you end up with a single new substance (and the original substances are gone). You can never have both, because artifact basically means "several substances together", and there will always be either one or more than one. Obviously, God cannot make one substance that is several substances any more than He can make a circular triangle (to use Kiel's example).<br /><br />What God can do is go above and beyond the normal causal possibilities, that is, the causal options that are open to us. For example, if you want to walk on water, you can do so by taking advantage of its causal properties and freezing it. Frozen water naturally (because of the kind of substance it is) becomes hard. God however, does not have to freeze the water first, because He can override the "laws" of nature. Now man can make artifacts, like a pile of stones by putting some stones together in the right way to make a pile. We can also make substances, like water, by putting some oxygen and hydrogen together in the right way. God, on the other hand, could make water out of anything; He could take some helium and change it into water... although "change it" isn't quite right here; when the oxygen and hydrogen become water, the substances of oxygen and hydrogen no longer exist, so they are not there to be said to have changed; rather, they go out of existence and the new substance of water comes into existence, and likewise if God replaced some helium with water. <br /><br />Something similar applies to God's forming Adam out of the mud of the earth. Now, this passage in Scripture might simply be a way of telling us that Adam is a material creature. Although possessing an intellect and will, he is not an angel who merely "appears" with a body (as angels sometimes do); nor is some kind of Platonic or Gnostic spirit who "drives" a body (that is not part of him, any more than your car is part of you). Adam's physical body is part of what he is. But let's suppose that Genesis is speaking more literally than that; does that mean that Adam could be an artifact built out of mud? The answer is no, for Adam is not a statue made out of mud, but a human being made out of flesh and bones. So even if God literally scooped up a handful of mud and began forming it into Adam's shape, at some point that matter was transformed — literally, its form changed — into the matter of a human body. At that point, it stopped being an artifact (a shaped pile of muddy molecules) and started being a single human substance. Any mud-form (mud is probably an artifact itself, being composed of a "pile" of water and dirt, or something like that) was driven out and replaced by the new, single, solitary human form. God does not need the natural setup, because He can cause anything directly; but any human God makes has to be a single substance because on the Thomistic view, that's what a human is.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88700874258748856762013-02-09T07:58:55.030-08:002013-02-09T07:58:55.030-08:00Kiel: I meant to say that God cannot create a bein...Kiel: <i>I meant to say that God cannot create a being with a substantial form directed towards a final cause and create another being with the same substantial form but then re-direct it towards an uncharacteristically distinct final cause. I hoped the example would show that this is incoherent because it is like saying it is possible for God to create a circular triangle.</i><br /><br />OK, that makes sense now. I misinterpreted your example. I agree that God can not take <i>the same</i> substantial form and, in two individuals, direct it towards contradictory ends. <br /><br /><i>Perhaps you're thinking of teleology like a property of substantial form as opposed to teleology being inherent or intrinsic to substantial form. As Aquinas has said, final cause is the cause of all causes. Perhaps it'll help to look at substantial form vis-a-vis final cause explicitly.</i><br /><br />That's where my confusion sets in. This goes back to George R's comment at January 31, 2013 at 7:01 AM - specifically "B" of his A,B,C example - which really clarified the final cause for me.<br /><br />The final cause - the end to which a thing is directed - is <i>extrinsic</i> not intrinsic. So God determines what ends things should have and gives things 'a substantial form' directed toward those ends. The form is immanent but the end is not. So teleology is a mixture of intrinsic and extrinsic properties.<br /><br />So, when it comes to forms I get a bit confused. I understand that a substantial form is immanent - that is it is 'of the substance'. Yet, God ultimately <i>determined</i> what form a thing should take. So substantial forms are based on <i>decisions</i> made by God.<br /><br />To go back to Aquinas' arrow; the <i>direction</i> the arrow takes has nothing to do with the nature of the arrow - rather it owes its direction <i>completely</i> to the archer. The nature of the arrow, its substantial form, <i>is</i> necessary for the flight however - the archer could not get the same results with a wet noodle - but it does not determine the <i>direction</i> of the arrow.<br /><br />The essence of the Fifth Way is that only a conscious mind can set goals or determine direction for inanimate matter.<br /><br />That brings us to the question of artifacts vs. natural substances. When God made man, he took the dust of the earth - something with its own substantial form - and formed man out of it (like an artifact). But then he 'breathed the breath of life into him' and created a new being - a new substantial form. So God is able to take existing substantial forms, mold them into something else, and give them <i>new</i> substantial form.<br /><br />Man cannot do this. Man can only give things accidental forms.<br /><br />So, the line between artifact and natural substance is blurred with God but set in stone with man. For God can <i>create</i> a new substantial form while man cannot. The substantial form of a thing then, is something set by God and accidental forms are imposed on artifacts by man - or other forces.<br /><br />It would be nice if some of the Thomists around here would jump in and help clarify some of these things for us but I think this thread has been abandoned. That's just the nature of Blogger - it doesn't really highlight new posts in old threads so, unfortunately, I think we're on our own here.Liberteurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17878796551917615050noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-80109261702914658232013-02-08T22:21:16.435-08:002013-02-08T22:21:16.435-08:00Interestingly enough, I was just finished watching...Interestingly enough, I was just finished watching Prometheus where it suggested humans were the result of genetic engineering. That is, humans are artefacts or artworks created by aliens.<br /><br />I thought that was especially interesting in light of our current conversation and my comments. Perhaps I understand Daniel's question better now. If we re-program our material cause so we can bring about different final causes, we obviously become a different sort of being. Would this be an example of transubstantiation?<br /><br />Can a being loose substantial form and become only accidental form?<br /><br />Sometimes philosophy does my head in.Kielhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15905861091652423451noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54868820747593474892013-02-08T19:01:33.646-08:002013-02-08T19:01:33.646-08:00But I don't see how that applies to the rest o...But I don't see how that applies to the rest of the natural world. You are essentially saying that there is no other possible universe. If I understand your example, a substantial form is a logical necessity. Thus,for God to make anything other than what he has made would be illogical or contradictory. And I think that's not correct for most things; they could have been different - they could have pointed to other things. <br /><br />I'm not sure if I understand what you mean when you say: <i>"Thus,for God to make anything other than what he has made would be illogical or contradictory."</i> I didn't mean to say this. I meant to say that God cannot create a being with a substantial form directed towards a final cause and create another being with the same substantial form but then re-direct it towards an uncharacteristically distinct final cause. I hoped the example would show that this is incoherent because it is like saying it is possible for God to create a circular triangle.<br /><br />I did not mean to suggest that there is no other possible worlds; what is possible is whatever is not a contradiction.<br /><br />The Good Professor in his book Aquinas (bottom of page 11 to 12) says that for the Aristotelian, the potentiality of a natural being is grounded in its nature (i.e.: the substantial form).<br /><br />Perhaps you're thinking of teleology like a property of substantial form as opposed to teleology being inherent or intrinsic to substantial form. As Aquinas has said, final cause is the cause of all causes. Perhaps it'll help to look at substantial form vis-a-vis final cause explicitly.<br /><br />If a natural being A looks in every way identical to some other natural being B and being B has some different disposition or final cause to being A then being B has a different nature (substantial form).<br /><br />For example, if you saw what looked exactly like a stone but it suddenly moved away from you as you came closer to it (naturally moving like an animal would move, as opposed to moving artificially, say, by a prankster), it would be contradictory to assert what you saw was a stone because it is not in the nature of a stone to haul ass when you come near one. Common sense would identify it as a different type of being - which means a being instantiating a different substantial form.<br /><br />Beings are distinguished by the final causes of their nature/substantial form.<br /><br />Again, please someone strike me down if I am sprouting error.Kielhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15905861091652423451noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88938301348750987692013-02-08T16:08:34.326-08:002013-02-08T16:08:34.326-08:00Kiel: Triangularity is an abstraction distinct fro...Kiel: <i>Triangularity is an abstraction distinct from all others and it is a contradiction to say that triangularity could have been something else, such as circularity</i><br /><br />That makes sense re: triangularity. And I can see the truth of it within the framework of mathematics: 2 cannot be 3 and etc.<br /><br />But I don't see how that applies to the rest of the natural world. You are essentially saying that there is no other possible universe. If I understand your example, a substantial form is a logical necessity. Thus,for God to make anything other than what he has made would be illogical or contradictory. And I think that's not correct for most things; they could have been different - they could have pointed to other things. <br /><br />Then again, I'm the confused one here so I could be all wet!Liberteurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17878796551917615050noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77257747457379177262013-02-08T05:12:49.274-08:002013-02-08T05:12:49.274-08:00You cannot know know because the symbols have no i...<i>You cannot know know because the symbols have no immanent ability to communicate their meaning due to their accidental form.</i><br /><br />Due to their lack of accidental form, rather. Maybe I should quit.Kielhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15905861091652423451noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-63595358855385091452013-02-08T04:40:43.884-08:002013-02-08T04:40:43.884-08:00Daniel said:
OK, so I think I (almost) get the fac...Daniel said:<i><br />OK, so I think I (almost) get the fact that substantial forms are not "made".<br /><br />But (and here's where I lose it), didn't God "decide" what ends things would be directed toward? Isn't that the whole point of the Fifth Way? When God made the vine, he decided that it would have roots that seek nutrients and leaves that soak up sunlight, etc. - correct? As Aquinas says; things behave "not fortuitously but designedly". IOW, the form itself has an extrinsic goal or end imposed upon it.<br /><br />Or am I getting two things - forms and ends - mixed up?<br /></i><br /><br />ProFeser said earlier:<i><br />Hence, as I have explained in other posts, the key distinction is not really between man-made things and naturally occurring things, but rather between things having substantial forms and those having only accidental forms. And the difference there has to do with whether a thing and its parts have an inherent tendency toward some end or not.<br /></i><br /><br />Perhaps an exercise for Daniel and myself, if I may. Please someone, shoot me down and correct me if I get this wrong or if I mislead you. I'm also learning and cannot guarantee the correctness of my exercise.<br /><br />I, (the efficient cause) have decided to use pixels (the material cause), arranged in a set of symbols (the formal cause) for the end or purpose of communicating an idea or concept to you (the final cause): أ. مثلث, المثلث آلة, المثلث الغرامي <br /><br />Hopefully, for the sake of the exercise, you've no idea what the symbols mean. You cannot know know because the symbols have no immanent ability to communicate their meaning due to their accidental form.<br /><br />Now, I (the efficient cause) have decided to use some other pixels (the material cause), arranged in another set of symbols (the formal cause) for the end or purpose of communicating an idea or concept to you (the final cause): △<br /><br />You know what this symbol means because triangularity is immanent to the symbol itself by virtue of its substantial form (and perhaps combined with one or more accidental forms?). The symbols have an ability to communicate the intended meaning - triangularity - inherently.<br /><br />(Turns out, at least according to one web site, the Arabic I pasted above is a translation of the English word "triangle".)<br /><br />Perhaps now I am starting to address your question. Triangularity is an abstraction distinct from all others and it is a contradiction to say that triangularity could have been something else, such as circularity because triangularity is necessarily triangularity and circularity necessarily circularity. It makes no sense to say God could have made triangularity circularity and circularity triangularity because they are totally different abstractions. There is no possible world - it is totally inconceivable and incoherent - to have a triangular circle. Substantial forms, such as triangularity, are a specific type of abstraction distinct from others existing eternally in the eternal intellect of God.<br /><br />In the Fifth Way, Aquinas uses the analogy of an archer directing an arrow at the target. Ignoring that Aquinas places God as the archer in the analogy, imagine that the archer was only a type of being which by virtue of its substantial form could only shoot arrows at one and only one type of target. It would be to speak of a different type of being with a different substantial form (with different, immanent teleology) if the supposed archer was directing an arrow at some other target. God's omnipotence is the power to do only what is possible, not contradictory.<br /><br />It is late for me. And, I'm a philosophical hack (being 99% self taught and all). I really hope this is not erroneous for your sake and makes some sort of sense. And please, for the sake of truth and justice, if I'm wrong, someone please tell Daniel (and also me!).Kielhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15905861091652423451noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-65560272365739385232013-02-05T15:56:42.438-08:002013-02-05T15:56:42.438-08:00OK, so I think I (almost) get the fact that substa...OK, so I think I (almost) get the fact that substantial forms are not "made".<br /><br />But (and here's where I lose it), didn't God "decide" what ends things would be directed toward? Isn't that the whole point of the Fifth Way? When God made the vine, he decided that it would have roots that seek nutrients and leaves that soak up sunlight, etc. - correct? As Aquinas says; things behave "not fortuitously but designedly". IOW, the form <i>itself</i> has an extrinsic goal or end imposed upon it.<br /><br />Or am I getting two things - forms and ends - mixed up?Liberteurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17878796551917615050noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-22336706103652345162013-02-04T23:38:04.425-08:002013-02-04T23:38:04.425-08:00Hi Daniel,
Let's try this. Go back to my sta...Hi Daniel,<br /><br />Let's try this. Go back to my standard example of the liana vines. The vines have an inherent or built in tendency to sink roots, take in nutrients, grow, etc. They do not have an inherent tendency to function as a hammock. They also do not have an inherent tendency to grow into a shape that looks, specifically, vaguely like the letter "S." If one such vine should do so, it would be the result of chance.<br /><br />Now, for a thing to have inherent tendencies of the sort in question (sinking roots, taking in nutrients, etc.) is just for it to have them by virtue of a <i>substantial</i> form, and for the directedness or teleology associated with the tendencies to be <i>immanent</i>. And for a thing to exhibit a non-inherent pattern like the vines' hammock-like structure or "S" shape in the examples in question is for it to have an <i>accidental</i> form and a directedness or teleology that is at best derived or even just "as if" (to borrow some language John Searle uses in the context of discussing intentionality). That is to say, the hammock-like shape or "S"-like shape could have come about through someone's deliberate interference (derived teleology) or instead just by chance ("as if" teleology -- i.e. it's "as if" someone made it look that way for a purpose, but no one did, in the case where it was just a chance growth pattern). Either way, the pattern in these cases is not intrinsic to the vines, not an outcome of any built-in tendency.<br /><br />Now, notice that the key distinction here is between what results from an inherent tendency and what does not. The question of whether some accidental pattern was imposed by an external agent is secondary -- in some cases this might be the source, but in other cases the pattern might result from chance. What matters to whether something is a substantial form, in either case, is whether the outcome flows from something within the thing in question (the vines, in this case).<br /><br />This is important to emphasize, because you seem to keep focusing on <i>who</i> made this or that as if it were relevant. It isn't. And for that reason, it also isn't quite right to speak of anyone "making" substantial forms -- not even God. No one "made" it the case that having the substantial form of a liana vine would involve sinking roots, taking in nutrients etc. -- as if having the substantial form of a liana vine could have involved something else instead. That's like saying that someone decided that 2 would be an even number. No one "decided" either thing, not even God. Not because there's some limit on God's power, but because there's no sense to be made in the first place of "making" the substantial form of a liana vine involve some other kinds of activities, any more than there is such a thing as "making" the number 2 an odd number.<br /><br />In short, you seem to be treating substantial forms as if they were accidental forms that God happened to be the one to make. But that's precisely what they are not. God doesn't "make" them any more than He "makes" the laws of logic or any more than He "makes" it true that 2 + 2 = 4. To assume otherwise is to be committed to an essentially voluntarist-cum-nominalist conception of God -- which is of course precisely what the Thomist rejects.<br /><br />God does, of course, make the things that <i>have</i> the substantial forms, but that doesn't entail that He makes the forms themselves in the relevant sense, any more than the fact that he makes things that follow the laws of logic entails that He "makes" the laws of logic. "Making" a substantial form is like "making" a law of logic -- neither notion makes sense, because both notions falsely assume that the things in question (the substantial form of a thing, a law of logic) could in principle have been other than they are. The whole point is that they could <i>not</i> have been.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14075628289478212652013-02-04T16:59:51.863-08:002013-02-04T16:59:51.863-08:00Ed: As I've said, human beings are involved in...Ed: <i>As I've said, human beings are involved in making all sorts of things with substantial forms -- synthesizing water in a lab, making new breeds of dogs, or even just having babies.</i><br /><br />I'm getting more confused by the minute! These are all things that already have forms - water, dogs, babies. We are not really making new forms are we? Maybe I just don't understand what a substantial form is. I associate substantial form with final cause. Maybe that's my problem. I think of it as "that which determines what a thing is for and how it behaves".<br /><br /><i>In answer to your earlier point, yes, when God takes dust and makes a man out of it, He gives it a new substantial form. Just like when we take oxygen and hydrogen and get water out of it in the lab, the matter loses the substantial form of hydrogen and oxygen and takes on the substantial form of water.</i><br /><br />But that seems to imply that we could just throw the ingredients of a 'human being' together and synthesize one - like we do water. I thought God created the substantial form 'man' ex nihilo when he made man out of dust? I assumed (in that instance at least - if not in all instances) that God alone can <i>create</i> a substantial form.<br /><br /><i>Again, the origin of a thing is not what is essential to the question whether it has a substantial form. So I'm not sure why you seem to be asking "Could human beings make something with a substantial form?" or "Wouldn't God have given this thing a substantial form?" Being man-made or directly made ex nihilo by God does not by itself have anything to do one way or the other.</i><br /><br />What about the origin of the form? I understand that man - throwing together things with their own forms - only gets an accidental form. It seems though that God sets up the forms in the beginning and determines what things are 'about'. Thus a "man" is this, this and this. That's not something we can decide. It seems like something that only God can do.Liberteurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17878796551917615050noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83355133421719860402013-02-03T23:32:03.073-08:002013-02-03T23:32:03.073-08:00Dr. Feser,
Yes, that is certainly true--the citat...Dr. Feser,<br /><br />Yes, that is certainly true--the citation I gave shows that that is indeed what you said in your reply to Marie George.<br /> <br />The citation given by George R a little more than 18 months ago on June 16, 2011 likewise shows the same thing--which is why George R then did not say that Marie's criticism clarified the truth, but that it was <i>helpful</i> in clarifying the truth, its helpfulness being in the eliciting of your subsequent, explicit affirmation.<br /><br />The source of Daniel's confusion, in part, seems not to have been due to prior non-exposure to that explicit affirmation (he had had exposure to it when George made his citation (<a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2011/06/on-aristotle-aquinas-and-paley-reply-to.html" rel="nofollow">here</a>)), but due to, for him, an <i>unresolved</i> juxtaposition of both that explicit affirmation and the earlier explicit affirmation, each of which seemed to be quite contrary to the other.<br /><br />I'll suggest that the most important thing here is that someone who has wanted to understand a particular point, has made an effort to do so and has asked for help, now has the understanding he desired.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-48278411748340494022013-02-03T10:57:03.787-08:002013-02-03T10:57:03.787-08:00Glenn,
I'm not sure what you think you'r...Glenn, <br /><br />I'm not sure what you think you're up to -- some kind of gotcha game, I guess. But what I said above was that had George R. read my reply to Marie George, he would have seen that I there explicitly affirmed that there is a difference between the directedness toward the end (intrinsic to a thing) and the end itself (external to a thing). And the citation you give shows that that is indeed what I said there. <br /><br />Whether Marie George herself was being uncharitable in her reading of my "Teleology" article -- I think so, but I wasn't even getting into that here -- is another question, and irrelevant to my remark to George R.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69459145971120064042013-02-03T10:47:51.571-08:002013-02-03T10:47:51.571-08:00Hi Daniel,
As I've said, human beings are inv...Hi Daniel,<br /><br />As I've said, human beings are involved in making all sorts of things with substantial forms -- synthesizing water in a lab, making new breeds of dogs, or even just having babies.<br /><br />In answer to your earlier point, yes, when God takes dust and makes a man out of it, He gives it a new substantial form. Just like when we take oxygen and hydrogen and get water out of it in the lab, the matter loses the substantial form of hydrogen and oxygen and takes on the substantial form of water.<br /><br />Again, the origin of a thing is not what is essential to the question whether it has a substantial form. So I'm not sure why you seem to be asking "Could human beings make something with a substantial form?" or "Wouldn't God have given this thing a substantial form?" Being man-made or directly made ex nihilo by God does not by itself have anything to do one way or the other.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74659219028301731272013-02-03T09:29:33.903-08:002013-02-03T09:29:33.903-08:00I need some clarification here.
Can man give anyt...I need some clarification here.<br /><br />Can man give <i>anything</i> substantial form?<br /><br />Or is substantial form wholly dependent upon God? Liberteurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17878796551917615050noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-7291643707623709752013-02-03T08:49:30.979-08:002013-02-03T08:49:30.979-08:002. Excerpt from Marie George's Response
Feser...<b>2. Excerpt from <a href="http://www.epsociety.org/userfiles/art-George%20(ResponseToFeser).pdf" rel="nofollow">Marie George's Response</a></b><br /><br />Feser maintains that for Aristotle "the end or goal of a material substance is inherent to it." Aristotle indeed sees the ordering to an end of an artificial thing to be imposed on it from without (by humans or other animals), whereas the ordering to an end of a natural thing follows upon its form. However, it is not the end itself which is inherent in the natural thing, but rather the inclination or tendency to the end. If being down inhered in a rock or being up inhered in fire, then each respectively would always have to be down or up, and they would never need to move to their proper places. Final causes can inhere in a natural thing, as is the case of health, which is the "that for the sake of which" living things eat; but it is not essential that they be such. According to the A-T tradition, what is inherent in natural things are "natural inclinations" or "natural appetites" for certain determinate ends. Without passing judgment on whether it is necessarily inappropriate and misleading to use the expression "intrinsic teleology" to express this ordination, my point, again, is that it is not accurate to say that the goal of a natural substance, as such, is inherent to it.<br /><br /><br /><b>3. Excerpt from <a href="http://www.epsociety.org/userfiles/Feser-Reply%20to%20Marie%20George%20_revised_.pdf" rel="nofollow">Dr. Feser's Reply</a></b><br /><br />George takes issue with my statement that for Aristotle, "the end or goal of a material substance is <i>inherent</i> to it." To this she replies that "it is not the end itself which is inherent to the natural thing, but rather the inclination or tendency to the end." This is an odd bit of nitpicking. Naturally, I agree with George; <i>being down</i> (to use one of her examples) is not in the stone itself, but is rather the end toward which the stone tends. Indeed, on the very same page as the sentence she complains about I explain that the Aristotelian notion of final causes concerns "inherent goal-<i>directedness</i>," "inherent <i>tendency</i>," and "the end or goal towards which a thing naturally <i>points</i>." Strictly speaking, what is inherent is only the pointing, tendency, or directedness itself, and (obviously) not the end that is pointed to. Hence when I wrote that "the end or goal of a material substance is inherent to it," I would have thought it obvious that I was speaking elliptically. Certainly this minimally charitable reading might at least have been considered by George before putting fingers to keypad. In any event, though she makes much of this "criticism," it plays no role in her subsequent discussion.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-85083162326023916132013-02-03T08:45:48.273-08:002013-02-03T08:45:48.273-08:00That readers may judge for themselves (on the off ...That readers may judge for themselves (on the off chance anyone might actually care about this dead horse):<br /><br />1. Excerpt from Dr. Feser's Article<br />2. Excerpt from Marie George's Response<br />3. Excerpt from Dr. Feser's Reply<br /><br /><br /><b>1. Excerpt from <a href="http://www.epsociety.org/library/articles.asp?pid=81" rel="nofollow">Dr. Feser's Article</a></b><br /><br />Teleology's controversial status in modern philosophy stems from the mechanistic conception of the natural world, which early modern thinkers like Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, Hobbes, Boyle, and Locke put in place of the Aristotelian philosophy of nature that featured in medieval Scholasticism. Following Aristotle, the Scholastics took the view that a complete understanding of a material substance required identifying each of its "four causes." Every such substance is, first of all, an irreducible composite of <i>substantial form</i> and <i>prime matter</i> (irreducible because on the Scholastic view, substantial form and prime matter cannot themselves be understood apart from the substances they compose, making the analysis holistic rather than reductionist). The substantial form of a thing is its nature or essence, the underlying metaphysical basis of its properties and causal powers; it constitutes a thing's <i>formal cause</i>. Prime matter is the otherwise formless stuff that takes on a substantial form so as to instantiate it in a concrete object, and apart from which the form would be a mere abstraction; it constitutes a thing's <i>material cause</i>. That which brings a thing into existence constitutes its <i>efficient cause</i>. And the end or goal towards which a thing naturally points is its <i>final cause</i>.<br /><br />As the last sentence indicates, the notion of a final cause is closely tied to that of a <i>telos</i> and thus to the notion of teleology. But the adverb "naturally" is meant to indicate how the Aristotelian notion of final cause differs from other conceptions of teleology. For Aristotle and for the Scholastics, the end or goal of a material substance is <i>inherent</i> to it, something it has precisely because of the kind of thing it is by <i>nature</i>. It is therefore not to be understood on the model of a human artifact like a watch, whose parts have no inherent tendency to perform the function of telling time, specifically, and must be forced to do so by an outside designer. For example, that a heart has the function of pumping blood is something true of it simply by virtue of being the kind of material substance it is, and would remain true of it whether or not it has God as its ultimate cause.<br /><br />The thinkers who founded modern philosophy and modern science rejected this picture of nature. In particular, they rejected the notions of substantial form, of matter as that which takes on such a form, and of a final cause as an <i>inherent</i> end or <i>telos</i> of a thing. Of Aristotle's four causes, only efficient cause was left in anything like a recognizable form (and even then the notion was significantly altered, since, as we shall see, efficient causes were regarded by the Scholastics as correlated with final causes). Material objects were reconceived as comprised entirely of microscopic particles (understood along either atomistic, corpuscularian, or plenum-theoretic lines) devoid of any inherent goal-directedness and interacting in terms of "push-pull" contact causation alone...<br /><br />(cont)Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-12385453660782136382013-02-03T08:23:14.877-08:002013-02-03T08:23:14.877-08:00George,
It seems you are making the same mistake i...<i>George,<br />It seems you are making the same mistake in interpreting my views that Marie George made in her Philosophia Christi response to my teleology article. I responded to her here, and explicitly affirmed the difference between A and B:<br />http://www.epsociety.org/library/articles.asp?pid=83&mode=detail</i><br /><br />Hmm.<br /><br /><b>1.</b> Functioning as a red herring in the reply is the fact that <i>on the very same page as the sentence she complains about I explain that the Aristotelian notion of final causes concerns "inherent goal-</i>directedness<i>," "inherent </i>tendency<i>," and "the end or goal towards which a thing naturally </i>points<i>."</i> <br /><br />The reason why this is a red herring is because Marie did not 'complain' about something having been said to the contrary.<br /><br /><br /><b>2.</b> The fourth paragraph of the article to which Marie responded reads in part as follows:<br /><br /><i>The thinkers who founded modern philosophy and modern science rejected [the Aristotelian and Scholastic] picture of nature. In particular, they rejected the notions of substantial form, of matter as that which takes on such a form, and of a final cause as an </i>inherent<i> end or </i>telos<i> of a thing. Of Aristotle's four causes, only efficient cause was left in anything like a recognizable form (and even then the notion was significantly altered, since, as we shall see, efficient causes were regarded by the Scholastics as correlated with final causes). Material objects were reconceived as comprised entirely of microscopic particles (understood along either atomistic, corpuscularian, or plenum-theoretic lines) devoid of any inherent goal-directedness and interacting in terms of "push-pull" contact causation alone...</i><br /><br />If (as is intimated by the red herring) it is reasonable to expect that a reader will take away from this that the Aristotelian and Scholastic picture of nature included natural things having an inherent goal-<i>directedness</i>, then it is equally reasonable to expect that a reader will take away from it that the Aristotelian and Scholastic picture of nature included natural things having an <i>inherent</i> end or <i>teleos</i>.<br /><br />Marie was economical, if not charitable, in not 'complaining' about this reinforcement.<br /><br /><b>3.</b> The explicit affirmation in the reply is: <i>Strictly speaking, what is inherent is only the pointing, tendency, or directedness itself, and (obviously) not the end that is pointed to.</i><br /><br />Well, then, the explicit affirmation constitutes an agreement with the point of Marie's first criticism (which, as she points out at the end of that criticism, does not involve "passing judgment on whether it is necessarily inappropriate and misleading to use the expression 'intrinsic teleology'", but simply that "it is not accurate to say that the goal of a natural substance, as such, is inherent to it").<br /><br /><br /><br />If George R's comments have been unwarranted, it is difficult to see where they have been anywhere near as unwarranted as it has been striven to make them appear to be. (Though, admittedly, it might have been better had 'obfuscatory' been used in lieu of 'obscure'.)Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11945809494494508192013-02-02T08:42:25.732-08:002013-02-02T08:42:25.732-08:00Ed: If the status of what George labels B (the end...Ed: <i>If the status of what George labels B (the end toward which a thing is directed) has been one of the questions you've had about my position, I'm glad that that has been cleared up. However, as far as I can recall your main objection has always been that you had trouble seeing how it could be true both that what George calls A (a thing's directedness toward an end) is immanent and that God directs things toward their ends. Are you saying that you are not in fact confused about that much?</i><br /><br />Yes. "B" was the missing link in my mind for understanding that issue - the "target" to Aquinas' "arrow". I now understand that it is the <i>aiming</i> of the arrow towards the target that requires a mind - not the actual shooting of the arrow. Direction vs directedness, etc.<br /><br /><i>Hence an organism is a paradigm example of a true natural substance because it and its parts to inherently tend toward certain ends -- namely the survival, and flourishing, and reproduction of the organism -- whereas a watch is a paradigm example of a non-substance because it does not have qua watch such an inherent tendency.</i><br /><br />I do understand the distinction you are making. But the creation of man is an example of God taking an existing substance (mud, dust, slime), refashioning it into a something else (a human being), and giving it a new substantial form at the same time.<br /><br />For me, this says that God is able to do that. Essentially my view it that all substantial forms come from God - whether he throws something together from other parts (man) or creates ex nihilo (the Earth).Liberteurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17878796551917615050noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-50323358764896737632013-02-02T08:26:35.813-08:002013-02-02T08:26:35.813-08:00Sorry Glenn, I was meant George R.
Sorry Glenn, I was meant George R.<br /><br />Liberteurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17878796551917615050noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51966608650655150182013-01-31T22:23:52.388-08:002013-01-31T22:23:52.388-08:00Daniel,
Maybe it's because Glenn and I have s...Daniel,<br /><br /><i>Maybe it's because Glenn and I have similar backgrounds as far as ID,</i><br /><br />Hey... I haven't any background in ID, and don't know why it might be thought that I do. <br /><br />That aside, I'm glad you're finding certain points to be clearer now, however and by whatever means.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-56943158485779599152013-01-31T17:33:34.687-08:002013-01-31T17:33:34.687-08:00Hi Daniel,
If the status of what George labels B ...Hi Daniel,<br /><br />If the status of what George labels B (the end toward which a thing is directed) has been one of the questions you've had about my position, I'm glad that that has been cleared up. However, as far as I can recall your main objection has always been that you had trouble seeing how it could be true both that what George calls A (a thing's directedness toward an end) is immanent and that God directs things toward their ends. Are you saying that you are not in fact confused about that much? If not, great. But if so, then the issue has nothing necessarily to do with my exposition, since the claim in question is one that George says he agrees with me about.<br /><br />Anyway, I know you are not nit-picking but raising honest questions. And as I said before, my comments about Aristotle presenting the nature/art distinction as an obvious one was in no way meant as a criticism of you. I didn't mean "This is obvious, Daniel, why are you nit-picking?" What I meant was rather: "Aristotle intends this as a distinction that doesn't require any fancy background metaphysics to see, but is just calling to mind something common sense is familiar with; hence it is possible that your difficulty with it might rest on the assumption that he must be saying something more controversial and high-falutin' than what appears at face value."<br /><br />Re: your question about the watch vs. the organism, a key point to keep in mind is that for the Aristotelian, what a thing essentially is does not depend on its origin, and can be known without knowing its origin. Hence, as I have explained in other posts, the key distinction is not really between man-made things and naturally occurring things, but rather between things having substantial forms and those having only accidental forms. And the difference there has to do with whether a thing and its parts have an inherent tendency toward some end or not. <br /><br />Hence an organism is a paradigm example of a true natural substance because it and its parts to inherently tend toward certain ends -- namely the survival, and flourishing, and reproduction of the organism -- whereas a watch is a paradigm example of a non-substance because it does not have qua watch such an inherent tendency. <br /><br />Now of course watches are man-made and their parts have their function imposed by us, whereas organism occur in the wild, but that is a secondary point. A random pile of stones might also occur in the wild, but qua pile it has no substantial form but only an accidental form; while a domesticated dog, though it exists only because human beings have interfered, is still a natural substance with a substantial form.<br /><br />I would say that the "nature vs. art" distinction is a loose way of putting things which in most cases tracks the deeper distinction insofar as the <i>paradigm cases</i> of things with substantial forms are things that occur without human interference and the <i>paradigm cases</i> of things that have only accidental forms are man-made things. But there are, as I have said, man-made things that are nevertheless natural substances (water synthesized in a lab, cloned animals, etc.), and naturally-occurring things that do not have substantial forms and thus are not true substances (piles of rocks or dirt, beaver dams, etc.)<br /><br />Similarly, whether God directly makes something is not what determines whether or not it is a true substance (e.g. organisms, water) or instead only a collection of parts which do not have a substantial but rather only an accidental unity (e.g. watches, piles of stones) -- any more than whether something is a triangle or a circle depends on whether God made it or we made it. What determines all that is rather the nature of the thing itself.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-38049414502786108322013-01-31T16:18:54.634-08:002013-01-31T16:18:54.634-08:00Jules: Your position seems to be that God give the...Jules: <i>Your position seems to be that God give the ability to act and from this every human acts as a 'independent' being/cause, not being moved by God anymore.</i><br /><br />You seem to view every cause as direct and nothing as indirect. That's your mistake.<br /><br /><i>Well, that seems incompatible for me with the foundations of Aristotelian philosophy of nature that Aquinas uses to construct his philosphy, so this is why I have a doubt about the internal coherence of this notion.</i><br /><br />I think it's pretty clear that you don't understand Aristotle or Aquinas. Their writings are full of distinctions like the ones you're ignoring (or are unaware of). You might want to understand the positions of Aristotle and Aquinas better before you declare them to be lacking in internal coherence.Liberteurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17878796551917615050noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-812759054825910392013-01-31T16:10:48.488-08:002013-01-31T16:10:48.488-08:00In your response to Marie George you say:
when I ...In your response to Marie George you say: <br /><i>when I wrote that “the end or goal of a material substance is inherent to it,” I would have thought it obvious that I was merely speaking elliptically.</i><br /><br />The problem I (and perhaps others) have is that we <i>don't</i> see that as obvious. <br /><br />As an example: Glenn's explanation and A,B,C example really cleared things up for me as to what precisely is intrinsic and extrinsic re: teleology. Sometimes your explanations just confuse me more. Maybe it's because Glenn and I have similar backgrounds as far as ID, or maybe it's because you say things like “the end or goal of a material substance is inherent to it” and just expect us to know that you are speaking 'elliptically'.<br /><br />I'm sorry for nit-picking. I hope you take this as <i>constructive</i> criticism from someone who wants to understand but keeps getting genuinely confused.<br /><br />I <i>do</i> understand the idea of substantial form vs. accidental form better now than I did before but I'm still wondering about this: <br /><i>A watch miraculously caused to exist directly by God is no more a natural object that a watch made by Seiko.</i><br /><br />It would seem that the only reason this is true is because it is a watch - a known man-made artifact. But what if it wasn't a watch? What if God fashioned, from non-living parts, a self-replicating biological organism? How would we know an artifact from a substance in that case?Liberteurhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17878796551917615050noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51702527207535862182013-01-31T11:13:44.990-08:002013-01-31T11:13:44.990-08:00About my exchange with Daniel on free will,
I wou...About my exchange with Daniel on free will,<br /><br /><b>I would not agree with #4 the way it is stated. There is a lot going on with causes per se and per accidens, direct and indirect, etc. that gets papered over there.</b><br /><br />Elaborate please. Are you saying that the change of the human act does not happen in a essentially ordered way also? Remember that the Aristotelian Cosmological Argument can be grounded from the observation of <i>any</i> change, which obviously would include human acts.<br /><br /><b>If you are arguing that God gives us the ability to sin, then I have no argument with that.</b><br /><br />I'm not arguing that at all. In fact, I'm just trying to clarify the "Thomistic" position that you guys seems to adopt on this blog on its internal coherence, because the observation of the late American philosopher Roderick Chisholm seems right to me:<br /><br /><i>"(...)we should remind that it also conflicts with a familiar view about the nature of God-with the view that St. Thomas Aquinas expresses by saying that 'every movement both of the will and of nature proceeds from God as the Prime Mover'.³ If the act of the sinner did proceed from God as the Prime Mover, then God was in the position of the second agent we just discussed- the man who forced the trigger finger, or the hypnotist- and the sinner, so-called, was not responsible for what he did" (Roderick Chisholm, Human Freedom and The Self).</i><br /><br />Your position seems to be that God give the ability to act and from this every human acts as a 'independent' being/cause, not being moved by God anymore. Well, that seems incompatible for me with the foundations of Aristotelian philosophy of nature that Aquinas uses to construct his philosphy, so this is why I have a doubt about the internal coherence of this notion.Julesnoreply@blogger.com