tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post2532287643359489024..comments2024-03-19T02:00:34.750-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Atheistic teleology?Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger472125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-38024452866323682162012-07-28T08:59:51.869-07:002012-07-28T08:59:51.869-07:00Since you're talking about Aquinas and concept...Since you're talking about Aquinas and concepts I wanted to ask your opinion of the following criticism laid against Aquinas in the History of Western Philosophy by russell. It attacks Aquinas' discussion of God's essence and existence. Here's the quote:<br /><br />"“The contentions that God’s essence and existence are one and the same. That God is His own goodness, His own power, and so on, suggest a confusion, found in Plato, but supposed to have been avoided by Aristotle, between the manner of being of particulars and the manner of being of universals. God’s essence is, one must suppose, of the manner of universals, while His existence is not. It is difficult to state this difficulty satisfactorily, since it occurs within a logic that can no longer be accepted. But it points clearly to some kind of syntactical confusion, without which much of the argumentation about God would lose its plausibility.”<br /><br />I'm not sure if there is any veracity in the criticism myself as russell is being vague here. What is a bit confusing is that he insist that God's essence must be understood in the manner of universals whereas his existence should not. Is this dichotomy justified? Is he misreading Aquinas? Ignoring the doctrine of analogy completely in the predication of God's power and goodness?<br /><br />I must admit I am a little puzzled by what this criticism even means. Also, how would the Thomist respond to this criticism?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-40286938118319515342012-07-27T07:53:52.315-07:002012-07-27T07:53:52.315-07:00Josh:
Because according to the same abstract pri...Josh:<br /><br /><i> Because according to the same abstract principle present in each, the activity is represented in different ways. It's not two concepts joined together, one different and one same. The question asked of the scenario is What is in the exemplification in each Koufax and Mays that makes us able to call them great?</i><br /><br />Another thought about this. <br /><br />I think that we differ in that I see determinateness as a matter of degree, and you see it as a matter of kind. A maximal amount of determinateness occurs at the level of a particular instantiation. For example, when I say that “the dog is black”, this is maximally determinate, because it refers to a particular dog with a particular color (although, there is some indeterminateness in the color, because there are different shades of black). When I say “a dog is black”, then there is less determinateness, because “a dog” could refer to multiple possible dogs. However, it is not indeterminate, because it still determines <i>something</i> with a dog nature, and not a cat nature, or a squirrel nature, and so on. When I say, “a mammal is black”, then there is even less determinateness, because the set of “mammals” is larger than the set of “dogs”, and thus there are more possible particular referents to this statement. So, the more general, the less determinate, and the more specific, the more determinate. <br /><br />If you accept this framework, then when you apply it to statements like:<br /><br />(1) Jack is a great baseball player<br />(2) Jack is a great pitcher<br /><br />you see that (1) is more general, and thus less determinate, than (2). However, it does not follow that (1) is <i>indeterminate</i>. Furthermore, (2) is not even maximally determinate, because you could then ask specific questions, such as what it is about Jack’s pitching that makes it great? Does he have a great fastball? A great curveball? Great endurance on the mound? Few injuries? Great shoulder rotation? Great wrist flexibility? You can go as specific as you like, which would just increase the determinateness. However, just because you can go more specific does not mean that <i>everything</i> more general is <i>indeterminate</i>. It is just <i>less</i> determinate.<br /><br />Finally, (2) implies (1), although (1) does not imply (2). Why? Because (1) is the general category within which (2) occurs. And because we can refer meaningfully to this category, we can compare the specific instances to one another, because they share this category in common. And since we can meaningfully talk about this common category, you can have univocal meaning, unless you bring it extra conditions that don’t seem to be justified, such as <i>you cannot have univocal meaning between two terms if they are different instantiations of a common category</i>, which would undermine basically every analogy known to man, making them all incapable of univocal meaning.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-76633527875324496182012-07-27T03:20:15.915-07:002012-07-27T03:20:15.915-07:00Josh:
The people who bring that out don't thi...Josh:<br /><br /><i>The people who bring that out don't think the tautology true, which is why they make a joke of it. On the contrary, I think your 'great baseball playing'='excellently exemplifying the roles to win games' is true, and completely uninformative with respect to describing what makes Willie Mays such in comparison to Sandy Koufax. It's a proportional similarity in each guy relative to how they accomplish hitting on the one hand, and pitching on the other.</i><br /><br />“Completely uninformative”? Look at the following definition:<br /><br />X is good = X actualizes its nature to a maximal degree towards reaching its final cause<br /><br />Is it also “completely uninformative”? Do you learn absolutely nothing from it? Or, do you learn the formal structure to <i>any</i> discussion of “goodness”, which is certainly not “completely uninformative”. Sure, you’d want to know <i>more</i> information, such as what is X doing, what is X’s nature, how much actualization has occurred, what is its final cause, and so on, but that simply builds upon the foundational structure in the above definition.<br /><br /><i>Because according to the same abstract principle present in each, the activity is represented in different ways. It's not two concepts joined together, one different and one same. The question asked of the scenario is What is in the exemplification in each Koufax and Mays that makes us able to call them great?</i><br /><br />Again, that skips the last question I had in the paragraph you cited. I asked: “Why not also say that “animal” cannot be univocal, because it must also include the kind of animal that is exemplified by “animal”?” <br /><br />Think about it. Take the following:<br /><br />(1) A lion is like a tiger<br /><br />We agree that for this to be possible, a lion and a tiger must share something in common. I think that we would agree that could be the fact that they are both animals. So, I can further say:<br /><br />(2) A lion is an animal<br />(3) A tiger is an animal<br /><br />My contention is that “animal” in (2) and (3) means the same thing, and you would agree. However, why couldn’t I just pull the move that you keep doing here? I should be able to say: “No, no. But <i>how</i> they express their animality is <i>different</i> in both. The ‘activity is represented in different ways’, and thus they <i>cannot</i> be univocal.” That is certainly just as true in this case as in the cases that you have mentioned. So, why in <i>this</i> case does this fact become irrelevant, but in the <i>other</i> cases, become incredibly relevant?dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-41016420060878992112012-07-26T20:21:27.145-07:002012-07-26T20:21:27.145-07:00"Can the same be said of the analogon that is..."Can the same be said of the analogon that is the <i>ratio entis</i>? As was noted from <i>De Ver.</i> 1, 1c, being is the concept into which all others are resolved. Those others include the ten genera of substance and the various accidents. The differences that mark the accidents also present the analogon of being. The chasm between them and substance is not so wide that being fails to cross it. Elsewhere Aquinas refers to an accident as an <i>ens entis</i>. Nor is it necessary that the accidents be physical accidents and not immaterial activities such as thought and willing. These too Aquinas ascribes to the study of metaphysics, whose subject is <i>ens inquantum ens</i>. Even mental items like privations and negations also are regarded as falling within being. Finally, the perfection of the <i>ratio entis</i> is reflected in Aquinas' later remarks about its key note of <i>esse</i> or <i>actus essendi</i>. <i>Esse</i> is the 'act of all acts and the perfection of all perfections,' and 'all perfections pertain to the perfection of being [<i>perfectio essendi</i>].' So unlike other analogons, being has an all-perfect or infinite intelligible wealth and plentitude. Among analogons it deserves a special and distinctive name. Maritain remarks that the Scholastics called being a 'transcendental.' Being is an intelligibility that contains the differences of all things not just implicitly and potentially (<i>implicite et potentialiter</i>), as generic notions do. Being contains the abysmal differences of things implicitly and actually." (p. 148-9)Sobieskinoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46328065369185133162012-07-26T20:20:23.845-07:002012-07-26T20:20:23.845-07:00"These descriptions of analogical conceptuali..."These descriptions of analogical conceptualization entail that it is an exceptionally fit tool for dealing faithfully with reality. No content of the instances is placed outside the concept. The abstractive dumbing down of the differences consists only in rendering the differences implicit, not also in rendering them potential. The conceptualization effects no impoverishment. In a science grounded in analogical concepts, one need not fear that the concepts have left something out. Rather, the concepts present an intelligible world that can be patiently explored on the basis of the offered analogates. Progress in science consists not in substituting new concepts for the old, but in an ever deepening understanding of old concepts." (ibid., p. 136-8)<br /><br />"Within the above general notion of analogy as sameness-in-difference, Aquinas distinguishes types of analogy. The principle of distinction is the manner in which the analogon is found in its analogates. If the analogon is found in the instances according to a priority and a posteriority, one finds the first type of analogy. A non-metaphysical example of this first type might be what is meant by <i>holiness</i> as it is ideally realized in Christ and subsequently realized in some follower. Here no one instance is the embodiment of the analogous notion itself. Presumably God the Father is that. Nevertheless, Christ is an ideal realization of it, while the follower is a realization derivative from an imitation of Christ.<br /><br />"On the other hand, if the analogon is found without reference between the analogates, that is, with a certain equality, one finds a second type of analogy. A non-metaphysical example again is what we mean by <i>sanctity</i> as that is realized among Teresa of Avila, Francis Xavier, Augustine, and so on. <i>In their differences</i> all these followers of Christ express <i>sanctity</i> among themselves. Yet no reference of one to the other exists. Among themselves each is an independent realization of the analogous notion...<br /><br />"Aquinas has names for these two types of analogy. He labels the first analogy of proportion, and the second analogy of proportionality." (p. 146; cf. <i>De Ver.</i> 2, 11c)<br /><br />"As mentioned, an analogon, understood as a sameness-in-difference, possesses an astonishing intelligible wealth and plentitude. This wealth and plentitude superabounds the parade of its analogates. As I said, after decades of watching the game of baseball, would anyone be so foolish to claim that he has seen all there is to great baseball playing? The foolishness of such an individual in 1930 is now apparent. So too for him in 1970, 1990. And how could we excuse ourselves in 2000? Yet as ample as the intelligible plentitude of <i>great baseball player</i> is, it is not infinite. Some items are not and never wil be analogates of this analogon. For example, unique as my way of playing baseball is, it will never be a difference that will carry greatness. Also, trees, flowers, and four-legged animals will never be analogates of the analogon. So though its richness is awesome, <i>great baseball player</i> is not all-encompassing. Some differences are impermeable to this sameness; not all things are its analogates.<br /><br />continued...Sobieskinoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46057063807413765472012-07-26T20:17:41.190-07:002012-07-26T20:17:41.190-07:00Since the Knasas citation seemed useful, here'...Since the Knasas citation seemed useful, here's some more text you might enjoy ruminating on:<br /><br />"As the Maritain texts make clear in their talk of <i>ens</i> as predicable of electrons and angels, analogy is an abstraction without precision. But one cannot leave it at that. Univocal concepts, for instance, 'man,' are also abstracted without precision [as contrasted with the abstraction with precision, 'humanity']. They too continue to 'hug' the instances sufficiently to be predicable of them. They also have an intimate relation with the differences of the instances. Cannot univocal concepts also be described as making an 'incomplete abstraction' from the instances? Complete abstraction would be the prerogative of precisive abstraction. In sum, need exists to describe more accurately the abstraction without precision of a univocal concept versus the abstraction without precision of an analogous concept. It is somewhat of a delicate affair. We do not want to describe analogical conceptualization so that univocal conceptualization becomes precisive; and we do not want to describe univocal conceptualization as so non-precisive that no logical room exists for analogical conceptualization.<br /><br />"Fortunately, Neo-Thomists have taken the lead here. One is Maritain himself in the texts cited. In contrast to univocal concepts, analogical concepts harbor an 'actual' multiplicity. Their abstraction is so incomplete that no 'dumbing down' of the multiplicity occurs. Not stated, but presumably the case, univocal concepts would harbor the differences of the instances only 'potentially,' not actually. Maritain does say that the univocal notion is 'invariant without actual multiplicity.' But this description of the analogical concept is unsatisfying. If in analogical conceptualization the multiplicity is left actual, in what sense can an abstraction be said to have occurred? Why are we not simply at the start of an abstraction rather than at its term? How can one express that an abstraction of an analogous commonality has occurred while conceding the actual presence of the multiplicity?<br /><br />"Another Neo-Thomist helps. In his <i>Bond of Being: An Essay on Analogy and Existence</i>, James Anderson says an analogous concept abstracts from its inferiors imperfectly 'so as to include them actually and implicitly.' Also, 'The analogical concept is radically different: it has only a relative or proportional unity, and it does not include the diversity of its inferiors potentially... In order that it may not be univocal in any degree, therefore, the analogical concept must include diversity actually, without in any way rendering that diversity explicitly.' Instead of employing just the terminological pair of actual/potential, Anderson enlists the further pair of implicit/explicit. with both pairs he can better articulate the nature of analogy versus univocity. The sameness-in-difference idea of analogical conceptualization is conveyed by saying that the abstracting keeps the differences of the instances actual though rendering them implicit. On the other hand, the sameness-apart-from-difference, characteristic of univocal non-precisive abstraction, is glossed as an abstracting that not only renders the differences implicit to the commonality but potential to the commonality as well. Because in both cases, the differences are rendered implicit, then in both cases the abstraction is non-precisive. But since in one case the implicitness is congruent with their actual presence, while in the other with their potential presence, the abstraction can be respectively analogical or univocal.<br /><br />continued...Sobieskinoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-53046752748308444032012-07-26T16:15:10.773-07:002012-07-26T16:15:10.773-07:00Maybe a more fun example:
Think about what it mea...Maybe a more fun example:<br /><br />Think about what it means to say "great musician" when predicated of J.S. Bach and John Lennon. They fall under the common notion of 'great musician,' but for your schema to work I need a univocal predication of this proper to each that doesn't just restate something uninformative, unless you then use that to prepare the ground to say something informative.Joshuahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03854212736162113327noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-43599861203274004892012-07-26T16:02:49.928-07:002012-07-26T16:02:49.928-07:00Glenn,
Most gracious of you! Cheers
Dguller,
An...Glenn,<br /><br />Most gracious of you! Cheers<br /><br />Dguller,<br /><br /><i>And you are just repeating the parody of Moliere with respect to final causes</i><br /><br />The people who bring that out don't think the tautology true, which is why they make a joke of it. On the contrary, I think your 'great baseball playing'='excellently exemplifying the roles to win games' is true, and completely uninformative with respect to describing what makes Willie Mays such in comparison to Sandy Koufax. It's a <i>proportional similarity</i> in each guy relative to how they accomplish hitting on the one hand, and pitching on the other.<br /><br /><i>But why that restriction? What justifies setting that limit? Why can’t the fact that they exemplify the same underlying abstract principle count as univocal?</i><br /><br />Because according to the same abstract principle present in each, the activity is represented in different ways. It's not two concepts joined together, one different and one same. The question asked of the scenario is What is in the exemplification in each Koufax and Mays that makes us able to call them great?Joshuahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03854212736162113327noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-33797576048645455092012-07-26T13:52:25.535-07:002012-07-26T13:52:25.535-07:00Josh:
Animal is a univocal concept when predicat...Josh:<br /><br /><i> Animal is a univocal concept when predicated of two animals! How is this remotely a counterexample?</i><br /><br />But according to your line of reasoning, it is indeterminate, because to <i>truly</i> understand its content, you <i>have</i> to mention specific animals. And if you push this line of reasoning to its limit, then in order to understand anything, you have to understand everything, which is absurd. Just because you can better understand some concepts by providing examples does not mean that the concepts themselves are indeterminate. They are more determinate with specific examples, because the more specificity, the more determinateness, but this is a matter of degree, and not kind.<br /><br /><i> ? Really it's easier than all this. If I'm saying two different modes of baseball player are both great baseball players, and I ask why, and you say, because they exemplify their modes well in playing baseball, you've just parroted back to me. How do you not see that?</i><br /><br />And you are just repeating the parody of Moliere with respect to final causes. Recall that he mocked final causality by saying the opium causes sleep, because of its dormitive power, which is supposed to not add anything to our knowledge. However, it does identify a deep metaphysical truth about opium, namely, that it has the power to perform a particular physical action in the world. You seem to agree with Moliere in that my saying that a good baseball player is one that exemplifies the function of his particular role in the baseball team to facilitate victory, is utterly empty and circular. This is not circular reasoning, but rather an abstract metaphysical point, which I’m sure you will agree with. Sure, you can flesh it out with details, but to complain that an abstract principle is not concrete enough is to commit a category error.<br /><br /><i> Of course not. Once again, you are leaving predication out of two subjects, I really don't understand why. Plus, the predication was 'great baseball player,' which demands that we consider what great means in each subject. A univocal predication, as per Aquinas, would demand that they are great not only just according to the absolute concept of "exemplifying their functions, etc.", but according to their mode of exemplifying.</i><br /><br />But why that restriction? What justifies setting that limit? Why can’t the fact that they exemplify the same underlying abstract principle count as univocal? Why not also say that “animal” cannot be univocal, because it <i>must</i> also include the <i>kind</i> of animal that is exemplified by “animal”?dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-8179785578379305732012-07-26T12:59:25.799-07:002012-07-26T12:59:25.799-07:00Josh wrote,
the common indeterminate concept cont...Josh wrote,<br /><br /><i>the common indeterminate concept contracts to each individual's determinate role, which is different between the two when it's predicated.</i><br /><br />Succinct. Pristine. Beautiful. <br /><br />Thank you.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75495611677546920572012-07-26T12:40:23.355-07:002012-07-26T12:40:23.355-07:00But that is like saying that “animal” is indetermi...<i>But that is like saying that “animal” is indeterminate to a specific animal until you predicate it of a particular animal. Really? So, you cannot just talk about “animal” in general without bringing in particular animals? And how can you talk about “animal” without also talking about “vegetable”? And how can you talk about “vegetable” without talking about animate versus inanimate entities? So, to talk about anything, you have to bring in everything? That doesn’t seem right</i><br /><br />Animal is a univocal concept when predicated of two animals! How is this remotely a counterexample?<br /><br /><i>Here’s a mathematical example.</i><br /><br />? Really it's easier than all this. If I'm saying two different modes of baseball player are both great baseball players, and I ask why, and you say, because they exemplify their modes well in playing baseball, you've just parroted back to me. How do you not see that?<br /><br />It's just reiterating 'great baseball player' using different words, and it doesn't answer the question at all. The point is, to answer the question satisfactorily, you have to explicitly refer to the differing modes, showing that under the common notion, the two differ profoundly.<br /><br /><i>I disagree. I think that “being a baseball player” has a determinate content. I don’t think that if someone asks, “What does Jack do?” and is answered, “Jack is a baseball player”, the other person would just stare at you in befuddlement, and ask, “What do you mean?</i><br /><br />Of course not. Once again, you are leaving predication out of two subjects, I really don't understand why. Plus, the predication was 'great baseball player,' which demands that we consider what great means in each subject. A univocal predication, as per Aquinas, would demand that they are great not only just according to the absolute concept of "exemplifying their functions, etc.", but according to their mode of exemplifying.Joshuahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03854212736162113327noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44907809868620100472012-07-26T12:19:30.625-07:002012-07-26T12:19:30.625-07:00Josh:
There are degrees of determination, which c...Josh:<br /><br />There are degrees of determination, which correspond to the degrees of generality. For example, take the following sentences:<br /><br />(5) Jack is moving.<br />(6) Jack is athletic.<br />(7) Jack is a sports player.<br />(8) Jack is a baseball player.<br />(9) Jack is a pitcher.<br />(10) Jack is a pitcher who throws curveballs.<br /><br />I think that we would agree that (5) is less determinate than (10). However, would you say that (5) is <i>indeterminate</i>? I don’t think so, even though “moving” is quite general, and could mean a number of possible <i>kinds</i> of motion. Nonetheless, despite the fact that you can add details does not detract from the determinate nature of the movement in (5). In other words, you know that Jack is changing position in space-time. Sure, that sounds general, but you perfectly understand it, even without the specific details. I doubt that you would say that it “answers nothing”, if one asks, “What is Jack doing?” Sure, it doesn’t answer a lot, but it is not nothing.<br /><br /><i> The key here: the common indeterminate concept contracts to each individual's determinate role, which is different between the two when it's predicated.</i><br /><br />I disagree. I think that “being a baseball player” has a determinate content. I don’t think that if someone asks, “What does Jack do?” and is answered, “Jack is a baseball player”, the other person would just stare at you in befuddlement, and ask, “What do you mean?”dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61377146683411958482012-07-26T12:19:09.748-07:002012-07-26T12:19:09.748-07:00Josh:
Of course that's all it means, conside...Josh:<br /><br /><i> Of course that's all it means, considered absolutely in itself, as a simply apprehended concept. Then when you apply that to two different roles, the predication of said concept becomes analogical by virtue of the sameness within the difference.</i><br /><br />Like I said many times before:<br /><br />(1) X has the following properties --> A, B, C, D<br />(2) Y has the following properties --> A, B, E, F<br /><br />When you say that X is like Y, you are saying that they are partially the same (i.e. both have A and B), and partially different (i.e. X does not have E and F, and Y does not have C and D). Of course, X is not identical to Y, because they differ in some properties, and of course, X is not totally different from Y, because they share some properties together. Similar <i>means</i> “sameness within the difference”. We don’t disagree about this.<br /><br />Where we differ is that I think that you can further say:<br /><br />(3) X has A<br />(4) Y has A<br /><br />And that A means the same thing in both. You claim that that is impossible, because X has some different properties than Y, and I find that difficult to understand. After all, I am not saying that X is the same as Y. That would be identity, not similarity. I am saying that there are aspects or parts of X that are the same as aspects or parts of Y, and <i>those aspects or parts</i> are the same, even though X and Y may differ in other aspects or parts.<br /><br /><i> 'Great baseball player' in itself is indeterminate to a particular role, until you predicate it of a subject that instantiates the predicate in a determinate role.</i><br /><br />But that is like saying that “animal” is indeterminate to a specific animal until you predicate it of a particular animal. Really? So, you cannot just talk about “animal” in general without bringing in particular animals? And how can you talk about “animal” without also talking about “vegetable”? And how can you talk about “vegetable” without talking about animate versus inanimate entities? So, to talk about anything, you have to bring in everything? That doesn’t seem right.<br /><br /><i> Here you'd presumably say, "they both exemplify their roles to win games," but that doesn't answer the question at all. It's just answering "What makes them great baseball players," with words that are synonymous with "great baseball player." Which of course answers nothing.</i><br /><br />Here’s a mathematical example. Take the formula: y = 2x. You can understand this formula without plugging anything into y and x, because you know that whatever you put into x will be doubled and become y. Sure, you can flesh it out more by actually plugging in values, and maybe even graphing the results, but that is just extra. The formula is the abstract representation of the relationship being graphed. You would argue that y = 2x is indeterminate until you start adding values for y and x. I think that demands a very particular understanding of “determinate”.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-15117530733655775072012-07-26T11:22:30.789-07:002012-07-26T11:22:30.789-07:00Quoting Knasas:
How else than by describing the h...Quoting Knasas:<br /><br /><i>How else than by describing the hitting and fielding would you begin to answer the question, Why is Mays a great baseball player like Koufax? Further, is not Koufax called great because<br />of his pitching?</i><br /><br />Here you'd presumably say, "they both exemplify their roles to win games," but that doesn't answer the question at all. It's just answering "What makes them great baseball players," with words that are synonymous with "great baseball player." Which of course answers nothing.<br /><br /><i>But Mays’ way of hitting and fielding is what just Mays possesses and not Koufax, and Koufax’s pitching is simply<br />what he possesses and not Mays. So to find what makes both the<br />same, you have to go to the very things that differentiate both.</i><br /><br />The key here: the common indeterminate concept contracts to each individual's determinate role, which is different between the two when it's predicated.Joshuahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03854212736162113327noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-12146508524901286292012-07-26T11:07:43.875-07:002012-07-26T11:07:43.875-07:00A baseball player is someone who plays on a baseba...<i>A baseball player is someone who plays on a baseball team and fulfills a particular role on that team. There are a number of roles, such as hitter, catcher, pitcher, outfielder, and so on. If anyone excels in any of these roles, i.e. maximally actualizes the nature of that role by attaining the final end, then they can be called “great”. That is all it means.</i><br /><br />Of course that's all it means, considered <i>absolutely in itself</i>, as a simply apprehended concept. Then when you apply that to two different roles, the predication of said concept becomes analogical by virtue of the sameness within the difference.<br /><br />'Great baseball player' in itself is indeterminate to a particular role, <i>until you predicate it of a subject that instantiates the predicate in a determinate role</i>.<br /><br />Of course I understand the indeterminate concept; the point is how it's predicated.Joshuahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03854212736162113327noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58752751027908293092012-07-26T10:54:41.942-07:002012-07-26T10:54:41.942-07:00Josh:
Seriously, when someone says that X is a gr...Josh:<br /><br />Seriously, when someone says that X is a great baseball player, do you not understand what they mean? You understand that X has maximally fulfilled their role on the team. That’s all “great baseball player means”. Sure, you can flesh it out some more by asking what exactly they did on the team that was so great, and that may be pitching, catching, or whatever, but that is focusing upon the species, as it were, when the original remark was about the genus. Unless you want to say that you cannot talk about the genus without including the species, then I’m not too sure where you can go with this. I mean, if you want to say that it is impossible to talk about general abstractions without including concrete particulars, then you’ve undermined logic and mathematics.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-90042747670912531012012-07-26T10:54:07.800-07:002012-07-26T10:54:07.800-07:00Josh:
Are you saying that X exists and X does no...Josh:<br /><br /><i> Are you saying that X exists and X does not exist are equal in terms of knowledge of a thing? I don't see how that follows at all. An act of existing is a positive thing, even though it's indeterminate in essence.</i><br /><br />This is not particularly relevant, but I would say that it depends upon the context. As you mentioned, negation can be a source of knowledge, and knowing that something does not exist can be more significant than knowing that something does exist, in some settings. For example, knowing that there are no monsters under the bed can be quite important to a child who is frightened. <br /><br />But I would agree that to say that X exists is to say something positive, i.e. affirming that something is truly the case in reality, rather than the absence of something, which is a negation. However, as mentioned earlier on this thread, something that does not exist can have a positive impact upon existent beings. For example, a hole is characterized by the absence of solid earth, and one can fall and injure oneself in that hole, which is something real that happens.<br /><br /><i> On the other, I'll just say that if you can predicate Being with an identical sense and reference, where 'sense' is taken as mode/act of being, then Scotus contra Aquinas is settled. I have yet to see this happen. Your argument against Knasas' baseball example could serve as a useful way to illustrate the difference.</i><br /><br />Let’s have a look.<br /><br /><i> Can you not see here that there is a difference in the very sameness, that "exemplification of their functions" invites an understanding that must include hitting and pitching as an understanding of the term 'exemplification'? Univocality would demand that what makes each analogate a 'great baseball player' be the same, identical; but what makes Mays great just is his hitting/fielding, and what makes Koufax great just is his pitching. If you abstract those differences out, you just imply circularity; i.e., what makes each a great baseball player is that each is a great baseball player.</i><br /><br />I disagree. There are three different claims here, and the logic of each is different.<br /><br />(1) X is a great baseball player.<br />(2) X is a great pitcher.<br />(3) Y is a great baseball player.<br />(4) Y is a great hitter.<br /><br />A baseball player is someone who plays on a baseball team and fulfills a particular role on that team. There are a number of roles, such as hitter, catcher, pitcher, outfielder, and so on. If anyone excels in any of these roles, i.e. maximally actualizes the nature of that role by attaining the final end, then they can be called “great”. That is all it means.<br /><br />All great pitchers are necessarily great baseball players, because all pitchers are baseball players. All great hitters are necessarily great baseball players, because all hitters are baseball players. What makes them great is that they excel in their respective roles on the team, i.e. pitching and catching. <br /><br />When you want to say that (2) is analogous to (4), then this is possible, because (2) implies (1), and (4) implies (3), and both (1) and (3) have the same meaning of “baseball player”, i.e. someone who plays on a baseball team and fulfills a particular role. “Great” in terms of (1) and (3) is that they maximally fulfill their purpose on the team, i.e. actualizes their nature towards their final end. That is the sameness that makes the analogy possible. <i>Of course</i>, there are differences, because their roles on the team are different, but so what? That is why it is an analogy and not an identity. However, you can still narrow your focus upon the commonality, which is that they are both great baseball players.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9512254367945602012-07-26T10:16:58.003-07:002012-07-26T10:16:58.003-07:00Dguller,
You bring up a multitude of issues, most...Dguller,<br /><br />You bring up a multitude of issues, most of which I am not competent to answer. I see a clear line of demarcation here though:<br /><br /><i>But how can you know that something exists before you know what it is. Like I said above, say I say “X exists”. What do you know? Nothing. X could be anything. You know as much as if I had said “X does not exist”. Again, X could be anything. X must have content before you can assert its existence.</i><br /><br />Are you saying that X exists and X does not exist are equal in terms of knowledge of a thing? I don't see how that follows at all. An act of existing is a positive thing, even though it's indeterminate in essence.<br /><br />On the other, I'll just say that if you can predicate Being with an identical sense and reference, where 'sense' is taken as mode/act of being, then Scotus contra Aquinas is settled. I have yet to see this happen. Your argument against Knasas' baseball example could serve as a useful way to illustrate the difference.<br /><br />You say:<br /><i>What makes both the same is that they exemplified their functions in the baseball team in order to win games. Sure, their functions were different, i.e. Mays was a hitter and Koufax was a pitcher, but they were both part of a baseball team, and had particular roles in the baseball team, which they fulfilled to a large extent. I mean, is it simply unintelligible to say any of this? Is it impossible to abstract from “great hitter” and “great pitcher” to get “exemplified their role in a baseball team with the purpose of winning games”? Sure, there are particular differences, but we are talking about the sameness.</i><br /><br />Can you not see here that there is a difference <i>in the very sameness</i>, that "exemplification of their functions" invites an understanding that must include hitting and pitching as an understanding of the term 'exemplification'? Univocality would demand that what makes each analogate a 'great baseball player' be the same, identical; but what makes Mays great just is his hitting/fielding, and what makes Koufax great just is his pitching. If you abstract those differences out, you just imply circularity; i.e., what makes each a great baseball player is that each is a great baseball player.Joshuahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03854212736162113327noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44475197184208255272012-07-26T09:35:45.200-07:002012-07-26T09:35:45.200-07:00Josh:
See distinction between Scotus/Aquinas on ...Josh:<br /><br /><i> See distinction between Scotus/Aquinas on the meaning of univocal above.</i><br /><br />I have, and agree with Aquinas that when it comes to meaning, you must take the sense into account, as well as the reference. However, I don’t see why you cannot find a common sense and reference to Being when you are talking about what actual being and potential being have in common. Maybe focus upon <i>what can or does exist</i> as the common concept? <br /><br />Of course, this raises all kinds of other issues. If God is outside of space-time, and can perceive all events in space-time as a 4-dimensional totality, then what sense is there about what <i>could</i> exist? I mean, an acorn could become an oak within space-time, but when the total space-time continuum is taken into account, an acorn that didn’t become an oak, never <i>could</i> have become one at all? This gets into predestination issues, which complies our ideas about possibility and potentiality. In reality, there is only what has happened in space-time, and that is actual from outside space-time in the divine perspective. Where does possibility come from, except perhaps from human ignorance within space-time? And then possibility is not an ontological category, but an epistemological one. <br /><br /><i> We can take that bit out to get at a composite concept of being, and abstract further to get at the abstract common thing signified among all beings, act of existence. But the complete meaning is found in the intellect's use of judgment, as opposed to a concept like whiteness, where the complete meaning can be found in simple apprehension of the concept in itself.</i><br /><br />I don’t see the relevance to how many steps it takes to get the concept. Whether it is directly through apprehension, or through a further process of judgment, the bottom line is the final product, i.e. the concept. After all is said and done, you have a concept of Being. My question is when we are talking about <i>this</i> concept of Being, the one that is shared by both potential being and actual being, why can’t we mean the same thing? Like you keep saying, <i>that</i> something exists is distinct conceptually from <i>how</i> it exists, which is actually a mixed concept that combines elements of existence and essence, kind of like potential being combines elements of actual being and non-being.<br /><br />What do you think?dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-24102190597051001562012-07-26T09:35:21.873-07:002012-07-26T09:35:21.873-07:00Josh:
But when Being is the concept or formal pe...Josh:<br /><br /><i> But when Being is the concept or formal perfection, we are understanding not through simple apprehension, but judgment primarily, which alone includes the understanding/affirmation that something is or is not.</i><br /><br />I don’t understand. Judgment is the faculty that can assert whether X exists or not. Fine. But it seems that judgment presupposes the concept of Being in order to be able to make that assertion at all. So, is it a priori, and completely independent of our experience? I mean, to affirm whether X exists, I must already have the concepts of Being and Negation. Where did these concepts come from? <br /><br /><i> As in, we are taking in Being when we know that something is, prior to knowing what it is. It's not an essence/form that we abstract.</i><br /><br />But how can you know <i>that</i> something exists before you know <i>what</i> it is. Like I said above, say I say “X exists”. What do you know? Nothing. X could be anything. You know as much as if I had said “X does not exist”. Again, X could be anything. X must have <i>content</i> before you can assert its existence. Sure, the <i>concept</i> of X must exist before you can affirm whether X actually exists. I would agree with that, but that would keep everything in the mind rather than in external reality.<br /><br /><i> So you can have 'animality' as a form abstracted from an individual. And that's part of an essence. But that animal's act of existence is not part of its essence to be abstracted, rather it is a function of existence in union with the essence. So how do we arrive at the concept without a property to abstract from an essence? By way of affirming or denying existence to the essence through judgment, which in turn implies negations in the mind, which in turn provides distinctions which allow a meaningful concept to be formed which can apply to all beings according to different modes.</i><br /><br />Again, how can you affirm or deny existence to an essence “through judgment” without already having the essence in mind? It seems that abstracting the form from a particular being is necessary <i>before</i> the judgment can do its thing. You need the concept in order to apply affirmation or negation to it in the judgment. In other words, you need the common concept before the judgment can act, and thus the common concept of Being cannot reside in the judgment, unless it is an a priori part of our cognitive apparatus that is just built in. But if it is part of our judgment, and we can extract the concept from our judgment by virtue of our intellect’s capabilities, then we can have a concept of Being, and can talk about Being. In that case, why can’t we talk about the <i>same</i> meaning of Being when talking about what actual being and potential being have in common? Again, the genus-species issue is irrelevant here. What objection is left?dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35194597247956690802012-07-26T09:34:37.103-07:002012-07-26T09:34:37.103-07:00Josh:
Gotcha. That's probably a topic for a ...Josh:<br /><br /><i> Gotcha. That's probably a topic for a different day.</i><br /><br />Ha! So be it.<br /><br /><i> Refers to the properties of Being considered as transcendental: One, True, Good. These encompass Being as a whole as opposed to considering essences over existences or vice versa.</i><br /><br />First, transcendentals are properties of Being, considered under different aspects, and that all beings share. They are beyond the categories altogether due to their utter generality, which makes them beyond the genus-species structure. They include: thing, one, true, good, and something. They come together in something like, <i>the degree to which a particular thing actualizes its nature is the degree to which that particular thing is considered true and good</i>. “True” and “good” are just our labels for how much a thing perfects its nature, which is coextensive with the degree to which it actualizes the potentiality in its nature, so really there is just individual things with specific natures, each striving in a teleological fashion, to actualize their potential natures. <i>That</i> is reality, and “goodness” and “truth” are just our way of talking about this reality, which I think means that we can do without them, as they are just words that paraphrase what is really happening.<br /><br />Second, we can talk about all of this coherently. My argument is that this common core of the transcendentals -- the degree to which a particular thing actualizes its nature, and you can choose to include or ignore “truth” and “goodness” here -- has a univocal meaning, because it applies to all things identically, even though they may differ in terms of <i>how</i> they go about actualizing their nature, <i>what</i> their nature is, the <i>degree</i> to which they actualize their nature, <i>whether</i> they have any potential at all left over, and so on. These are all differences, but they share the common core, which we can speak of, even though it is beyond the Tree. Why not say that we mean the same thing when discussing different beings? It seems irrelevant whether this is part of the Tree or not.<br /><br />Third, I don’t see how you can avoid talking about essences and existence when focusing upon the whole of Being. The totality of Being involves particular beings striving to actualize their natures, and thus you have essence (i.e. their natures) and existence (i.e. actualization) involved. It doesn’t seem to be avoidable since the whole thing hangs together in a holistic fashion.<br /><br /><i> With respect to the divisions of Being in (2) as you put it there, it's acts of existence. And the negations that serve to divide in the mind can be seen in the 6 propositions you included in your previous post.</i><br /><br />So, “acts of existence” are what are negated in Being. How does that work? You have the totality of what exists, which includes what is actually existing, and what <i>could</i> exist, but does not, i.e. potential being. How does this division happen by negation? You start with “what is”, and then you say the negation, which is “what is not”, but this could include either potential being or non-being. How do you negate “what is not” to get these two further divisions? When you negate “what is not”, you just get “what is”. <br /><br />Maybe to get to potential you have to add the following negation, neither “what is not” nor “what is”? I don’t think that works, because it has the structure that violates the law of non-contradiction. In other words, it is not-(p or not-p), which is incoherent. You don’t get to potential being, unless you <i>take</i> something from <i>both</i> “what is” and “what is not” and <i>create</i> a new division, i.e. potential being. But that is not negation, that is cutting and pasting, so to speak. And I don’t think you can do this at all without <i>already</i> having the concept of “what could be”. So, where did this concept come from, if not via negation?<br /><br />I don’t think negation is enough to account for these divisions in Being. There are already divisions, which negation can add to.dgullernoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-57819616424593419242012-07-25T16:03:35.420-07:002012-07-25T16:03:35.420-07:00@dguller
Same to you. Thanks for the conversation...@dguller<br /><br />Same to you. Thanks for the conversation and take care.Sobieskinoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51652500887677073612012-07-25T14:49:09.247-07:002012-07-25T14:49:09.247-07:00Forget that last post. Let me see if I can't m...Forget that last post. Let me see if I can't make this clearer:<br /><br />Socrates is a man.<br /><br />Here we have a judgment, where a subject has something predicated of him. From this, we can apprehend the concept or "form" of Being to reside in the intellect, as you will, to shape our knowledge, and enable analogical predication. How? We have to consider the meaning of 'is' in the judgment.<br /><br />Humanity [has an (essential) act of existence] in Socrates.<br /><br />We can take that bit out to get at a composite concept of being, and abstract further to get at the abstract common thing signified among all beings, act of existence. But the complete meaning is found in the intellect's use of judgment, as opposed to a concept like whiteness, where the complete meaning can be found in simple apprehension of the concept in itself.Joshuahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03854212736162113327noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72295935783642041442012-07-25T14:02:48.728-07:002012-07-25T14:02:48.728-07:00But Being has an essence, i.e. a whatness that def...<i>But Being has an essence, i.e. a whatness that defines what it is, i.e. That Which Exists</i><br /><br />There is a difference between saying that Being has an essence and Being is essence.<br /><br /><i>And in that case, is there any objection to saying that when you are talking about what is common between actual being and potential being, i.e. Being, you are speaking univocally?</i><br /><br />See distinction between Scotus/Aquinas on the meaning of univocal above.<br /><br /><i>Does each mode of existing have its own form?</i><br /><br />I've never denied that conceptualization of Being takes place, but simply that it doesn't follow the same process as whiteness would, for example.Joshuahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03854212736162113327noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-42689435095503641422012-07-25T13:41:51.035-07:002012-07-25T13:41:51.035-07:00Dguller,
Also, I still think that there is an int...Dguller,<br /><br /><i>Also, I still think that there is an interaction problem if you want to say that the intellect is immaterial and can exist independently of the body, albeit in an imperfect fashion, because it requires bodily organs to supply the sensory information that universals are abstracted from.</i><br /><br />Gotcha. That's probably a topic for a different day.<br /><br /><i>So, does (3) refer to just God or God plus his creation?</i><br /><br />Refers to the properties of Being considered as transcendental: One, True, Good. These encompass Being as a whole as opposed to considering essences over existences or vice versa.<br /><br /><i>What exactly is being negated within Being? In other words, when you say not-X, what is X? </i><br /><br />With respect to the divisions of Being in (2) as you put it there, it's acts of existence. And the negations that serve to divide in the mind can be seen in the 6 propositions you included in your previous post.<br /><br /><i>I still don’t understand how this works. So, Being is not a genus, but is a “common concept”? What is a “common concept”? Is it a form?</i><br /><br />We apprehend an essence or form or potentiality or concept through simple apprehension, abstracting away things to form the concept. <br />But when Being is the concept or formal perfection, we are understanding not through simple apprehension, but judgment primarily, which alone includes the understanding/affirmation that something is or is not.<br /><br />As in, we are taking in Being when we know that something is, prior to knowing what it is. It's not an essence/form that we abstract.<br /><br />That comes after, when the intellect forms a concept that arises as a result of considering the act of existence in judgment, which is common to all.<br /><br />So you can have 'animality' as a form abstracted from an individual. And that's part of an essence. But that animal's act of existence is not part of its essence to be abstracted, rather it is a function of existence in union with the essence. So how do we arrive at the concept without a property to abstract from an essence? By way of affirming or denying existence to the essence through judgment, which in turn implies negations in the mind, which in turn provides distinctions which allow a meaningful concept to be formed which can apply to all beings according to different modes.Joshuahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03854212736162113327noreply@blogger.com