tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post245976511183621840..comments2024-03-18T15:57:33.286-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Can you explain something by appealing to a “brute fact”?Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger95125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83384995981412692842014-03-19T05:28:46.469-07:002014-03-19T05:28:46.469-07:00@donjindra:
"Either matches have the same se...@donjindra:<br /><br />"Either matches have the same set of possible potentialities from moment to moment or they do not. [<i>That's true, but irrelevant.</i>] These potentialities are actualized in the same ways when excited by the same externals or they are not. [<i>That's true, but irrelevant.</i>] If they are not, you cannot possibly be a follower of Aristotle. [That's false, and irrelevant. Where do you think Aristotle claims that natural potencies are always actualized in the same ways when excited by the same externals?]"<br /><br />To your second question, I take it you don't understand the meaning of the phrase 'in the abstract'? For some reason you think it is synonymous with the phrase 'in a match'? With due respect, <i>dictionaries</i> are often helpful in such a situation.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-17525686802087692512014-03-18T16:41:56.300-07:002014-03-18T16:41:56.300-07:00DavidM,
"That is false and irrelevant. And t...DavidM,<br /><br /><i>"That is false and irrelevant. And the all-too-obvious fact remains that 'potentiality in the abstract' is not the same as 'potentiality in a match.'"</i><br /><br />Please explain what was false, why it is false, and how the second sentence has meaningful content.<br />donjindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09204496435655660609noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46632407434767539752014-03-17T14:15:48.834-07:002014-03-17T14:15:48.834-07:00@David M:
"Okay, but it seems to me that the...@David M:<br /><br />"Okay, but it seems to me that there is an order of <i>instrumentalization</i>, i.e., the order strictly of <i>being able to make neat stuff that 'works'</i> - and this is the level of reality that people like Oerter always appeal to. And the explanations required at this level - that of 'art' (or technology) - are insensitive to whether or not the person using them understands the necessary conditions, i.e., broader explanations, <i>metaphysical or epistemological</i>, for their existence."<br /><br />Fair enough; I certainly agree that this level exists. I'm less sure, though, that it's the level to which Oerter is appealing; such an appeal wouldn't appear to support his claim that it was <i>Science®</i> (and not just "know-how") that made all this neat stuff technologically possible. At the very least his claim seems to depend on our being able to articulate general laws—someone's ability, that is, not necessarily the artisan's/craftsman's. But I may be wrong.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-41236825901997761662014-03-17T13:31:56.955-07:002014-03-17T13:31:56.955-07:00...IOW, the person tempted by philistinism points ......IOW, the person tempted by philistinism points to the success of the 'craftsman' and say, "Behold; there is our foundation - what more need have we for <i>understanding reality</i> (metaphysics) or for <i>justifying our knowledge</i> (epistemology)?"David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27836326058325799672014-03-17T13:24:06.133-07:002014-03-17T13:24:06.133-07:00@Scott:
"I think you're absolutely right...@Scott:<br /><br />"I think you're absolutely right that scientific/technological explanations don't depend on Aristotelian explanations in that sense. But I'd call that an epistemological sense rather than a metaphysical one, and make much the same distinction we've already made in the previous discussion: the A-T framework of explanation accounts metaphysically for the fact that practical explanations work, even though we don't epistemologically have to know that ourselves while developing and using those explanations."<br /><br />Okay, but it seems to me that there is an order of <i>instrumentalization</i>, i.e., the order strictly of <i>being able to make neat stuff that 'works'</i> - and this is the level of reality that people like Oerter always appeal to. And the explanations required at this level - that of 'art' (or technology) - are insensitive to whether or not the person using them understands the necessary conditions, i.e., broader explanations, <i>metaphysical or epistemological</i>, for their existence.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-17443648437591485412014-03-17T10:56:13.535-07:002014-03-17T10:56:13.535-07:00@David M:
"I'm not sure Aristotelian exp...@David M:<br /><br />"I'm not sure Aristotelian explanation explains any 'stunning record of success' of 'scientific' explanation, as if 'scientific' explanations, <i>qua explanations which we can (usefully) invoke when making stuff</i>, directly depended on the deeper (Aristotelian) framework of explanation."<br /><br />I think you're absolutely right that scientific/technological explanations don't depend on Aristotelian explanations in that sense. But I'd call that an epistemological sense rather than a metaphysical one, and make much the same distinction we've already made in the previous discussion: the A-T framework of explanation accounts <i>metaphysically</i> for the fact that practical explanations work, even though we don't <i>epistemologically</i> have to know that ourselves while developing and using those explanations. And it was the former that I had in mind.<br /><br />"[F]or Oerter to demand an account of the 'practical success' of any kind of 'non-scientific' explanation already proves that he is in need of some kind of 'non-scientific' explanation in order to intelligibly pose his question in the first place."<br /><br />That is true and an excellent point.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-87402243330781876112014-03-17T09:59:18.218-07:002014-03-17T09:59:18.218-07:00@Scott, addressing Oerter:
"[S]cientific exp...@Scott, addressing Oerter:<br /><br /><i>"[S]cientific explanations of the kind I've been talking about have a stunning record of success. Engines, TVs, computers, cell phones - all of modern technology stems from our ability to explain things in terms of unifying regularities. In contrast, Aristotelian explanation has been around for more than 2000 years: what practical successes can it claim?"<br /><br />Explaining why science has such a stunning record of success—and encouraging it not to cut off the branch on which it's standing by adopting incoherent messes like the D-N model.</i><br /><br />For the most part I think Scott's reply is accurate, sufficient, and elegant. But I'm not sure Aristotelian explanation explains any 'stunning record of success' of 'scientific' explanation, as if 'scientific' explanations, <i>qua explanations which we can (usefully) invoke when making stuff</i>, directly depended on the deeper (Aristotelian) framework of explanation. The reason for this is that these 'explanations,' <i>insofar as they can be instrumentalized</i>, are insensitive to whether or not the person using them understands the necessary conditions for their <i>existence</i>. But when it comes to understanding and assessing the very notion of something like 'practical success,' 'scientific' explanation is of no use (there is no purely 'scientific' (non-teleological) account of anything like 'practical success'), so for Oerter to demand an account of the 'practical success' of any kind of 'non-scientific' explanation already proves that he is in need of some kind of 'non-scientific' explanation in order to intelligibly pose his question in the first place. So the question to him becomes: Do you really want to ask that question?David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51939117090728528832014-03-17T09:56:25.872-07:002014-03-17T09:56:25.872-07:00[S]cientific explanations of the kind I've bee...<i>[S]cientific explanations of the kind I've been talking about have a stunning record of success.</i><br /><br />This is a pretty serious elision of two different topics. We aren't talking here about scientific explanations as opposed to other explanations; we're talking about what is required to have a genuine explanation at all, which means that the point at hand is what is actually involved in scientific explanation that makes it explanation at all. The D-N model has only been around since Hempel, and its problems are widely recognized: it needs to distinguish between universal law and accidental generalization and no attempt to distinguish them in a way that stays within the D-N framework has ever succeeded; it allows 'explanations' that appear to be irrelevant; it treats explanation as a symmetrical relation in contrast to common practices of explanation; it doesn't handle statistical explanation well; it apparently cannot give an adequate account of explanatory reduction and elimination; it consistently makes an utter mess of biological and historical explanations; and the kinds of explanations it seems to fit best are often pseudoscientific rather than scientific. It has largely been dead in the water as a serious account of scientific explanation even among strong naturalists for the past thirty years. <br /><br />So the D-N model of explanation does not share at all in the success of scientific explanation itself; and it pretty clearly does do a worse job of accounting for a wide variety of scientific explanations than the Aristotelian model of explanation does, even if (as serious naturalists today generally hold) there is another model of explanation that is better than either.Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06698839146562734910noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-45103205574838288712014-03-17T09:49:36.868-07:002014-03-17T09:49:36.868-07:00(I should probably clarify that I don't think ...(I should probably clarify that I don't think the D-N model is an incoherent mess considered purely <i>as</i> a "model" and applied strictly within its fairly narrow scope. But it's an incoherent mess to whatever extent it's taken to be a complete metaphysical account of what "explanation" is.)Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77763097467152445272014-03-17T09:40:19.771-07:002014-03-17T09:40:19.771-07:00@donjindra:
"What in the world are you talki...@donjindra:<br /><br />"What in the world are you talking about?"<br /><br />Brute fact: If you still don't know, then I fear it may be a waste of time (for me, Scott, Greg, or anyone else) trying to explain. (Is it possibly possible for you to <i>try</i> harder to understand?)<br /><br />"Either matches have the same set of possible potentialities from moment to moment or they do not. These potentialities are actualized in the same ways when excited by the same externals or they are not. If they are not, you cannot possibly be a follower of Aristotle."<br /><br />That is false and irrelevant. And the all-too-obvious fact remains that 'potentiality in the abstract' is not the same as 'potentiality in a match.'<br /><br />"As for my "arrogance," that's your invention and has nothing to do with these issues."<br /><br />No and not so. (And I think you really need to pick up a few books and ground yourself in some fundamentals if you want to engage in any kind of intelligent, constructive debate on these issues. I think people would be more ready to overlook your belligerence and arrogance if you weren't so ignorant.)David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14959042823600955872014-03-17T09:21:41.088-07:002014-03-17T09:21:41.088-07:00@Robert Oerter:
"As usual, I'm late to t...@Robert Oerter:<br /><br />"As usual, I'm late to the party."<br /><br />Not at all. The party doesn't start until you're here. ;-)<br /><br />In the interests of space I'll just offer a couple of short replies that I think go to the heart of the matter. You write:<br /><br /><i>[W]e can provide a [deductive-nomological] explanation of the forest fire as follows:<br /><br />1. L1: Lightning causes fires.<br />2. C1: There was a lightning strike.<br /><br />Under the D-N model, the lightning strike is an explanation of the forest fire, even if we have no explanation of the lightning itself (i.e, it was a brute fact).</i><br /><br />Now, I see two major problems with this.<br /><br />The first problem is that according to Ed (and me, for whatever that's worth), if the lightning really were a "brute fact," you wouldn't have L1 at all. In accepting L1, you're already implicitly acknowledging that lightning is intelligible (and indeed known to you) at least as a cause of fire, and therefore also as something whose own potencies require actualization by something else. (Ed already discusses these points at some length in the OP in this thread, and I don't see that you've given any response to his arguments.) If, that is, we know what lightning is well enough to know that it <i>can</i> cause fires, then we already know that it (or its occurrence, or the fact that it causes fires) <i>isn't</i> a "brute fact."<br /><br />The other problem is that, despite Ed's careful and explicit distinction between "metaphysical" and "epistemological" brute facts, you seem yet again to be equating our not <i>having</i> an explanation with there not <i>being</i> one. At most, your example (if otherwise sound) would show that your proposed D-N explanation is successful as far as it goes even when we don't <i>have</i> an explanation for the occurrence of the lightning, a point with which I don't think anyone has disagreed.<br /><br />In other words, if you omit your final parenthetical remark equating our not having an explanation with something's actually being a brute fact, your example isn't on point—and if you include it, you're begging the very question at issue while ignoring the fact that Ed has already explicitly addressed it.<br /><br /><i>[S]cientific explanations of the kind I've been talking about have a stunning record of success. Engines, TVs, computers, cell phones - all of modern technology stems from our ability to explain things in terms of unifying regularities. In contrast, Aristotelian explanation has been around for more than 2000 years: what practical successes can it claim?</i><br /><br />Explaining <i>why</i> science has such a stunning record of success—and encouraging it not to cut off the branch on which it's standing by adopting incoherent messes like the D-N model.<br /><br />Here again, you seem to think that Aristotelianism/Thomism is supposed to offer some sort of <i>alternative</i> to ordinary scientific explanations. On the contrary, any A-T philosopher worth his or her salt will refer anyone who asks to those very explanations (and, in general, to defer happily to empirical science on empirical questions).<br /><br />But the fact that those explanations are <i>successful</i> doesn't mean they're not <i>partial</i>. They are so, in the sense that, in order for them to be genuine explanations, they have to be part of an overall intelligible system. At least that's what's under discussion here, and to recast the matter as though science and A-T were offering rival <i>scientific</i> explanations is to miss the point.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25528559010561242622014-03-17T05:51:49.936-07:002014-03-17T05:51:49.936-07:00As usual, I'm late to the party.
Since my co...As usual, I'm late to the party. <br /><br />Since my comment got rather long, I've posted it on my blog:<br />http://somewhatabnormal.blogspot.com/2014/03/facts-brute-and-otherwise.htmlRobert Oerterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09708981993708509662noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-1863874505920462802014-03-15T16:32:07.801-07:002014-03-15T16:32:07.801-07:00Methinks the trouble lies in different understandi...Methinks the trouble lies in different understandings of "explanation". It's been awhile since I've read TLS + Aquinas, and I'm getting lost here.<br /><br />Can anyone give me a brief summary?<br /><br />You don't have to. It would just be nice.<br /><br />Thanks,<br /><br />TyTynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69514758089967162952014-03-15T10:31:52.492-07:002014-03-15T10:31:52.492-07:00DavidM
"But 'potentiality in the abstrac...DavidM<br /><br /><i>"But 'potentiality in the abstract' is not always actualized in 'the potentialities of matches'!"</i><br /><br />What in the world are you talking about? Either matches have the same set of possible potentialities from moment to moment or they do not. These potentialities are actualized in the same ways when excited by the same externals or they are not. If they are not, you cannot possibly be a follower of Aristotle.<br /><br />That consistency is indeed a 'brute fact.'<br /><br />As for my "arrogance," that's your invention and has nothing to do with these issues.<br />donjindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09204496435655660609noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-79647208957748677612014-03-14T17:54:39.939-07:002014-03-14T17:54:39.939-07:00To put the relevant point another way (and, I hope...To put the relevant point another way (and, I hope, succinctly and accurately):<br /><br />The actualization of every potency has its own explanation. That doesn't mean there's a single explanation for the actualization of potency as such, because there's no such thing as "potency as such."Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-15965486372133899302014-03-14T10:08:56.015-07:002014-03-14T10:08:56.015-07:00donjindra:
"It's possible I don't un...donjindra:<br /><br />"It's possible I don't understand. It's possible you don't understand. It's more likely neither of us understand."<br /><br />I don't know Greg, we aren't collaborating behind your back, and it seems from his response to both of our comments that I understood his comment (and understood what it was that you failed to understand) and you did not. That's one reason why it can be helpful to get third party input. In this case it indicates that you are indeed the one not understanding the claims being made (whether or not those claims are ultimately true).<br /><br />"I'm regularly astonished at how much I don't know. But I prefer to stick to pertinent issues rather than looking for personal faults." <br /><br />Which begs the question: why do you assume that your personal faults (e.g., your arrogance, your lack of willingness to learn) are not a 'pertinent issue' here?<br /><br />"It's true that sometimes when we strike a match it doesn't ignite, but I think we all agree that when it doesn't ignite it's not because the match itself changed its set of potentialities."<br /><br />Yes, we agree about that. But what does that have to do with anything Greg (or I, or Feser, or anyone) said? Matches, as such (assuming they are non-defective), always have the potentiality of igniting when struck. But 'potentiality in the abstract' is not always actualized in 'the potentialities of <i>matches</i>'! That would only be true if everything other than God was a match (which, I believe, is not the case).David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-15443312903718372872014-03-14T08:29:15.850-07:002014-03-14T08:29:15.850-07:00DavidM,
It's possible I don't understand....<br />DavidM,<br /><br />It's possible I don't understand. It's possible you don't understand. It's more likely neither of us understand. I'm regularly astonished at how much I don't know. But I prefer to stick to pertinent issues rather than looking for personal faults.<br /><br /><i>"But 'potentiality in the abstract' (which is what Greg was talking about) is not 'actualized in the same manner every time' - that's a ridiculous claim."</i><br /><br />I admit I don't understand what you mean by that. It's true that sometimes when we strike a match it doesn't ignite, but I think we all agree that when it doesn't ignite it's not because the match itself changed its set of potentialities.<br /><br /><br />donjindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09204496435655660609noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88771908616602607002014-03-13T15:50:05.016-07:002014-03-13T15:50:05.016-07:00"If "potentiality" is "actuali..."If "potentiality" is "actualized" in the same manner every time then it does indeed "exist," not as material substance but as a Socratic "form' or a pattern or whatever you want to call it. If you cannot explain why that regularity happens, it boils down to a brute fact."<br /><br />It looks to you like a brute fact because you continue to wear Humean spectacles where dispositions still look to you as if they Humean regularities that lack explanation.<br /><br />"IOW, you have found something you feel does not need explanation, like I find laws of nature need no explanation."<br /><br />Again, no, within A-T metaphysics, the laws of nature do have an explanation; however, the laws of nature understood within a Humean background appear brutally factual.dover_beachnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14149533980447990362014-03-13T10:40:23.342-07:002014-03-13T10:40:23.342-07:00To speak of ""potentiality in nature, in...<i>To speak of ""potentiality in nature, in the general sense" seems not to directly distinguish from particular potentialities.</i><br /><br />Sorry, I mean that to speak of potentiality "in the general sense" <i>does</i> seem to distinguish from particular potentialities. It seems to accuse potency (as opposed to act) as lacking in explanation "globally." That was my interpretation, but since it seems entirely foreign to you, I'm guessing it was not your intention.Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16519021180878110982014-03-13T10:38:36.633-07:002014-03-13T10:38:36.633-07:00@donjindra,
And I'm accused of a rhetorical g...@donjindra,<br /><br /><i>And I'm accused of a rhetorical game?</i><br /><br />As DavidM indicates, I'm talking about potentiality in the abstract. I found your original usage of the term--""Potentiality" in nature, in the general sense, has no explanation."--vague. To speak of ""potentiality in nature, in the general sense" seems not to directly distinguish from <i>particular</i> potentialities.<br /><br /><i>If "potentiality" is "actualized" in the same manner every time then it does indeed "exist," not as material substance but as a Socratic "form' or a pattern or whatever you want to call it. If you cannot explain why that regularity happens, it boils down to a brute fact.<br />[...]<br />IOW, you have found something you feel does not need explanation, like I find laws of nature need no explanation.</i><br /><br />A tree tends (lets say) to light on fire when struck by lightning. You are saying that even given Aristotelian forms (I suppose--I don't know where "Socratic" comes from), this regularity remains brutally factual.<br /><br />But you seem to be inverting the order of explanation in Ed's argument. We <i>observe</i> such regularities. We posit forms with final causes because we don't believe that they <i>are</i> brutally factual. And contrary to your insistence, the Thomist <i>does not</i> then throw up his hands, believing that hhe has "found something [he feels] does not need explanation," for this is <i>precisely</i> where arguments like Aquinas's Second and Fifth Ways <i>begin</i>.<br /><br />You say that the invocation of Aristotelian substances as an alternative to Humean causation is still the invocation of brute facts. But the Thomist explicitly argues that explanations of substantial unity and finality are still required, and that those explanations terminate in God.Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39175217505555888042014-03-13T09:39:29.110-07:002014-03-13T09:39:29.110-07:00@donjindra,
"If "potentiality" is ...@donjindra,<br /><br />"If "potentiality" is "actualized" in the same manner every time then it does indeed "exist,"..."<br /><br />Hmmm... But 'potentiality in the abstract' (which is what Greg was talking about) is not 'actualized in the same manner every time' - that's a ridiculous claim.<br /><br />It's rather amusing and embarrassing when you consistently and dogmatically interpret your own lack of success in understanding various concepts and explanations as evidence that the people explaining those concepts are not giving you any clear answers. Can't you see that there are other possibilities - e.g., that you're just not getting it? - and that in light of this the sensible thing to do would be to evince a little more humility? Do you think it might be a 'brute fact' that <i>you</i> just don't get it? And that if you were more open to learning, and less prone to jumping to the conclusion that you understand what you're talking about, regardless of how many people tell you that you don't, then maybe you <i>would</i> be able to 'get it'?David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71547213974804054602014-03-13T08:32:05.073-07:002014-03-13T08:32:05.073-07:00Greg,
"I mean that potentiality in the abstr...Greg,<br /><br /><i>"I mean that potentiality in the abstract--apart from any substantial form--does not have an explanation, in that there is not some general explanation for all potentiality as such...But that is because potentiality in the abstract and apart from any substantial form does not exist."</i><br /><br />And I'm accused of a rhetorical game?<br /><br />If "potentiality" is "actualized" in the same manner every time then it does indeed "exist," not as material substance but as a Socratic "form' or a pattern or whatever you want to call it. If you cannot explain why that regularity happens, it boils down to a brute fact.<br /><br /><i>"any particular potentiality is adequately explained by the actuality of the existence and subsistence of its respective substance"</i><br /><br />IOW, you have found something you feel does not need explanation, like I find laws of nature need no explanation.<br /><br />Of course some people don't want me around here. And, honestly, I've lost a lot of interest in this A-T stuff since it's clear there will be no serious answers forthcoming.donjindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09204496435655660609noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-49827929825046378942014-03-13T08:19:53.421-07:002014-03-13T08:19:53.421-07:00(I should perhaps clarify that in saying, "Ep...(I should perhaps clarify that in saying, "Epistemically, sure," I'm agreeing just that it would be better under those circumstances to conclude that an explanation isn't be epistemologically available to us, not that there isn't one at all.)Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-47853358560141689282014-03-13T07:55:22.392-07:002014-03-13T07:55:22.392-07:00@Step2:
"That's only true if there is a ...@Step2:<br /><br />"That's only true if there is a way to prove beyond a reasonable doubt it was arson. If there is no strong evidence it is better to conclude there is no explanation rather than try to unjustly blame someone."<br /><br />Epistemically, sure, but that leaves the metaphysical issue untouched. Again, the fact that we don't <i>have</i> a satisfying and 100% warranted explanation doesn't mean there <i>isn't</i> one.<br /><br />The point of Greg's example was that the homeowner's interest affects what he'll take to be a sufficient explanation <i>for his purposes</i>. Even if we couldn't identify an arsonist beyond reasonable doubt, or even be sure the cause was arson at all, the homeowner <i>trying to identify the cause of the fire</i> isn't going to be satisfied by being told that "the fire was the proximate cause of his house's burning, and that is explanatorily sufficient." He thinks <i>there is</i> (metaphysically) a more complete (indeed comprehensive) explanation even if we don't yet <i>have</i> one (epistemologically), and even if, practically speaking, we can't get one.<br /><br />I see Greg has replied while I was typing this, so please take the preceding paragraph as an amplification of/addendum to his post.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-77207250623390196542014-03-13T07:44:02.098-07:002014-03-13T07:44:02.098-07:00@Step2,
That's only true if there is a way to...@Step2,<br /><br /><i>That's only true if there is a way to prove beyond a reasonable doubt it was arson. If there is no strong evidence it is better to conclude there is no explanation rather than try to unjustly blame someone.</i><br /><br />You're right that we should not conclude that it was arson if we don't have evidence for that. That does not imply that "it is better to conclude there is no explanation," though; it implies that it is better to conclude that there is some other explanation (or to remain agnostic about what the particular explanation is).Gregnoreply@blogger.com