tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post235063698589523013..comments2024-03-28T21:43:44.433-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Some brief arguments for dualism, Part IIEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-36990842130668396422008-10-01T17:24:00.000-07:002008-10-01T17:24:00.000-07:00Hello thomism, I agree completely.Hello thomism, I agree completely.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-82686155884882560872008-09-30T08:32:00.000-07:002008-09-30T08:32:00.000-07:00Another argument to the same end is that the via m...Another argument to the same end is that the via moderna, at its heart, thinks all knowledge is sense knowledge- and all the rest follows. <BR/><BR/>They abandoned final causes because they abandoned causes; they lost causes because they could not see how two things (cause and effect) could form one (this is the real heart of Hume. His claim is the same as Democritus's), but they lost this because they identified intellect with sensation. <BR/><BR/>Without a power of intellect as opposed to sensation, potency becomes impossible to know (we cannot sense potency). But in losing this, we lose Aristotle's only way of making one thing out of two. Even _phyical_ interaction becomes impossible, still less mind body interaction. No causality at all. As an added anti-bonus, now that our mind is seen as a sense power, it corrupts with death.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-73642260779247271752008-09-28T23:13:00.000-07:002008-09-28T23:13:00.000-07:00Hi ZC, I'm sympathetic to the view that even the s...Hi ZC, I'm sympathetic to the view that even the sorts of mental states you refer to have a kind of intentionality. E.g. pain is arguably "directed towards" the part of the body in which the pain is felt. Tim Crane has defended this view at length (e.g. in his book Elements of Mind) and I say a little about it in my book Philosophy of Mind.<BR/><BR/>Re: the interaction problem, I think I'll address that in a post within a day or so.Edward Feserhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58206724712519702822008-09-27T14:39:00.000-07:002008-09-27T14:39:00.000-07:00Hi Professor Feser, another excellent post!I'm a d...Hi Professor Feser, another excellent post!<BR/><BR/>I'm a dualist. But I admite that dualism (like materialism) have some problems. <BR/><BR/>The most frequently objection is the "interactionism problem". How to connect an inmaterial substance (soul/mind) with a material brain?<BR/><BR/>Another objection is that dualism violates the law of conservation of energy, because it implies a causal energy of the soul to move matter. I'm not sure about the force of that objection, because in quantum mechanics have been experimentally verified the violation of conservation of energy:<BR/><BR/>http://www.physlink.com/Education/AskExperts/ae605.cfm<BR/><BR/>Another objection is that dualism, as a hypothesis, isn't falsifiable. In my opinion, that objection isn't correct, because dualism is a philosophical hypothesis, not a scientific one. And the popperian falsiability isn't a criterium for a philosophical position, but only of scientific hypothesis.<BR/><BR/>But materialism have many problems too. For example, philosopher William Lycan (a materialist) wrote: <B>Though the arguments for dualism do (indeed) fail, so do the arguments for materialism. And the standard objections to dualism are not very convincing; if one really manages to be a dualist in the first place, one should not be much impressed by them. My purpose in this paper is to hold my own feet to the fire and admit that I do not proportion my belief to the evidence</B><BR/><BR/>http://www.unc.edu/~ujanel/Du.htm<BR/><BR/>Also, materialism haven't explained the problem of "qualia" or the "hard problem of consciousness". In fact, in some cases, materialists have explained it away (e.g. as seen in eliminative materialists)<BR/><BR/>It seems that many materialists accept materialism as a default (and unexamined) position.<BR/><BR/>ZC <BR/><BR/>PD.<BR/>Professor Feser, I have a doubt: does all the mental states have intentionality? Or only some of them have it? I'm thinking in pains and nausea as examples of feelings without a clear "aboutness"Zetetic_chickhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06520593161180787019noreply@blogger.com