tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post2322530481990551958..comments2024-03-28T10:44:57.324-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: The two Cartesian worldsEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger35125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-74396832166813880072018-06-27T17:32:25.355-07:002018-06-27T17:32:25.355-07:00So, in other words J., you're againg making a...So, in other words J., you're againg making a primal form of confusion to which A-T doesn't subscribe, not even the original Aristotle per se, because AT is concerned about studying and defining the reality of matter on an essential level, as prime matter, while quantitative measurements and physical science can only ever access matter in its substantial level, as materia secunda or materia signata quantitate - to use the Thomist term. This level, which is also the one immediately acessible to the empirical senses, constitutes what a good pre-modern metaphysical author of any sort, be they A-T, simply A or Platonic, would define merely as a the most inferior level of matter and reality as such. <br /><br />It's interesting to note, as a basic, that when the Ancients (esp. the Peripatetics) speak of prima materia, they speak of pure potentiality in need of determination. Not something you can actually touch with your bare hands, or measure with a ruler. Why? Because for A-T, the fundamental layer of reality lies in the Essence, constituted in the prima materia, not in the Substantial level - which is the actual level of materia secunda. <br /><br />Brute facts and a naked deterministic clockwork-like reality only become possible when we scrap this fundamental differentation and remain with naked visible matter alone, which as I said is only materia secunda, the substantial level of reality, to which the Scholastics correctly argued that there is nothing to be known at this level, ergo the fundamental level of substantial reality alone. Scholastic metaphysics was always concerned with natura naturans, or the generating principle, ergo what can be safely labeled as "metaphysics", and NOT the passive manifestation, the natura naturata, which belongs to the physical sciences alone. Rodrigo Sobotahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12478308082190256197noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-1533433146652134842018-06-27T16:57:29.068-07:002018-06-27T16:57:29.068-07:00You're confusing yourself with regards to the ...You're confusing yourself with regards to the senses of matter. What you take for matter and what is actually matter immediately visible in an empirical sense in the human body is actually materia secunda, not prima materia, according to the Scholastic conception. <br /><br />The same thing basic essential thing when approaching hylmeorphic dualism is that when the Scholastics talk about these ontological realities, they talk about res naturans and not res naturata. In sum, not passive second matter per se, but the underlying intellectual principle behind such said inert thing with atomic numbers, which science cannot go beyond. <br /><br />The problem itself is that the terminology is hard for moderns, immersed in a reductionist and often immanentist pantheism, to understand precisely because they have been thought to miss the point deliberately. We have never been able to prove that life emerges from dead inert matter, in fact even biological science explicitly dispproves this notion. Neither have we been able to prove that everything is reducible to the operations of dead inert matter and its innate properties, including atomic and mollecular compositions. The mind is the clearest example of this, anyway. Rodrigo Sobotahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12478308082190256197noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58853322032668536642018-06-26T23:27:31.688-07:002018-06-26T23:27:31.688-07:00The Cartesian framework isolates two dualities int...The Cartesian framework isolates two dualities into an irreconcilable stance. The only outcome of Cartesian dualism is either a world of "absolute idealism", which was actually a philosophical current of the late 19th and early 20th century, in which the whole reality becomes a subject and a production of the Ego, or an immanentist and mechanicalist framework where the mind is totally excluded from the systematic picture. Both have nil value as ontological paradigms, and only serve as a sort of buffer against the total lack of viability of a subjectivist theory of knowledge. <br /><br />The outcome of Descartes is Hegel, and the inevitable logical outcome of Hegel is Nietzsche. We all know how that plays out: Nihilism, relativism, degeneration of meaning. IMHO, for anyone capable of analyzing the history of modern post-Cartesian philosophy, one cannot hope but to think very accurately that it is a process where human subjectivity locks itself tightly within its own echo chamber and throws the keys away forever and ever and ever. Rodrigo Sobotahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12478308082190256197noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-22649559552877336942018-06-24T17:49:57.169-07:002018-06-24T17:49:57.169-07:00The Ontic of Being v. the Principle of Proportiona...The Ontic of <b>Being</b> v. the Principle of Proportionate Causality (... http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2011/07/first-without-second.html ...) both precedes and subsumes the Ontic of <b>Matter</b> (...whatever that is...). It’s uncanny that we find nothing of any sort of “dis-union” but, rather, we find an unavoidable <i>Downhill Ontic</i> within the particular “<i>traversal</i>” under review.<br /><br />(...several overlapping contours at https://www.metachristianity.com/absolute-reference-frame-pure-act-incarnation-time/ ...)<br /><br />MetaChristianityhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03782828324290721542noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-2504334247604203672018-06-22T01:22:24.038-07:002018-06-22T01:22:24.038-07:00Yes, Gyan, I understand what you mean. I get that ...Yes, Gyan, I understand what you mean. I get that (under hylemorphic dualism) the soul is the form of the human being. I have difficulty with soul being the form of the physical body. Aristotelianism seems to admit only one form per thing (the 'substantial form' – 'things' that have only an 'accidental form' are not really things), yet it is obvious to me that the body is a thing and has a form, quite apart from the soul being the form of the whole man. I don't think there is this difficulty with Platonism, where many forms can (and usually do) participate in one thing. One could say that either the 'animal soul' or the 'vegetative soul' is the form of the living body, but I am not sure that I want to go there. <br />I think that the way I would want to approach your comment is to say that conceptually the demarcation line between form and matter can be drawn in different places. I would guess that there could be a progressively thinning of the concept of matter as more and more properties are drawn into 'form'. Think of an iron ball. The form is spherical, and the matter is iron. But wait! Iron itself has a form – a physical/chemical composition if you like. So the matter is reduced to sub atomic particles. But wait! These particles too have form. Whatever has properties, has form. What is left when we have abstracted all the properties? Not much, at any rate. Nothing physical for sure. A haecceity maybe. It could be prima materia (whatever that is) – but I find it hard to distinguish prima materia from nothing. <br />So when I said that the body is the matter of the human being, I was speaking of matter in a very thick sense. <br />Geradenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16493390748713308061noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-50212588471692270042018-06-19T23:15:12.292-07:002018-06-19T23:15:12.292-07:00It is not quite correct to say that for human bein...It is not quite correct to say that for human being "the body is its matter".<br />Body is composed of matter and informed by the form.<br />However, your larger point stands. There is a fatal equivocation in hylemorphic anthropology regarding human soul. Is it a universal "rational animal" kind of thing or a particular soul or spirit of a particular human being?Gyanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09941686166886986037noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88295594793676039452018-06-19T15:43:00.575-07:002018-06-19T15:43:00.575-07:00@Anonymous for the same reason the vegetative soul...@Anonymous for the same reason the vegetative soul survives non-lethal amputations, and yet body parts can still be lost via amputation. The soul is an organizing principle, but it needs something to organize. So the dog soul needs the matter of the arm to organize and give power to the material arm. Once the arm is lost, the soul still “wants” to organize and give power to the arm, but there is nothing there to be organized. If the dog gets an arm transplant, the soul will then be able to take over again. For the human soul, death is like a full body amputation. The soul “wants” to organize and give power to a material body, but there is nothing to empower. It does not die however because it has faculties that transcend matter (intellect and will). However, these faculties are greatly diminished (without divine action) because they are so reliant on matter in this life (for sense images, etc.). Now when a dog dies, the soul does not remain because there is no higher faculty of the dog soul apart from organizing the matter of the dog. Once the matter is disintegrated enough for death, there is nothing left for the soul to be the soul of. In humans, after death, the soul is still the soul of our intellectual and voluntary faculties.<br /><br />Is that helpful?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00481589239954065668noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18218213682051584172018-06-19T10:55:00.457-07:002018-06-19T10:55:00.457-07:00I hope to get to Aquinas someday. In the meantime ...I hope to get to Aquinas someday. In the meantime I am not sure understand why the answer to the mind body problem should not be simple, that is people have a soul. As Allan Bloom made note of that after the Enlightenment people became secular. So the problem is the Mind body problem --not the mind soul problem.Avraham https://www.blogger.com/profile/07822433921393627746noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-41359054803026348452018-06-19T08:28:20.588-07:002018-06-19T08:28:20.588-07:00A question I have regarding thomistic dualism is t...A question I have regarding thomistic dualism is that if the soul is immaterial and hence immortal, and if the soul is the form of the living human body, why is the body not also naturally immortal in accordance with its form? Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-50893411475784113922018-06-19T06:56:32.389-07:002018-06-19T06:56:32.389-07:00@Simon As a reductionist, how would you explain th...@Simon As a reductionist, how would you explain the unity of consciousness?Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00481589239954065668noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-38022486143178378142018-06-19T06:50:00.674-07:002018-06-19T06:50:00.674-07:00@Red Yes, most arguments for holism could be given...@Red Yes, most arguments for holism could be given for non-reductive physicalism, which is really a type of holism. To refute the physicalism, you would have to make some sort of argument for the immateriality of the intellect or of God. Consciousness (at least as far as sensation and phantasms are concerned, is a material process on the hylemorphic analysis (which is why physical states such as intoxication can deprive us of consciousness). Furthermore, even our immaterial intellect relies on our material bodies. So the hylemorphic dualist needs to argue that the intellect can do things over and above what can be explained by any indeterminate physical state (using the definition of determinacy from philosophy of mind). And I think Edward Feser has a particular expertise in that field of argumentation.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00481589239954065668noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-9099337552010027692018-06-18T18:30:20.437-07:002018-06-18T18:30:20.437-07:00@ Scott Lynch
Some very nice points, lot to think...@ Scott Lynch<br /><br />Some very nice points, lot to think about, later.<br /><br />For now do you think some of what you say can also be brought in defense of non-reductive physicalism ? <br /><br />This above problem also seem to affect it as it too requires composition to be real, it seems. Redhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05569340378356607760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6593894235589356742018-06-18T03:13:31.206-07:002018-06-18T03:13:31.206-07:00I am with you, Simon.
Hylemorphic dualism seems ...I am with you, Simon. <br /><br />Hylemorphic dualism seems to be fairly successful as a model for understanding the world. I don't think it is so successful in giving an ontological explanation of things. In particular it breaks down precisely where it seems to be most needed: in anthropology. What I mean is this: The general scheme of hylemorphic dualism is that form provides the whatness of things, while what individuates is matter. When we get to anthropology, we are told (a) that the soul/mind/spirit is the form of the human being, while the body is its matter and (b) the soul/mind/spirit is what individuates the human being, its haecceity, so to speak. I find it hard to fit this into the general Hylemorphic scheme. <br /><br />I also have problems with moderate (immanent) realism regarding universals which seem to me unable to bear the weight of being both the formal cause of things, and also of being the epistemic cause of our knowledge of things. To me, only transcendent realism can do both of these at the same time. <br /><br />I have come to view matter (philosophical matter, that is) as an unnecessary addition to ontology. The will and knowledge of God are sufficient to instantiate that which He wills to be: we do not need in addition to posit some prima materia which somehow becomes signata when participated by a form. Physical matter, is, of course something for empirical research, but it does not need philosophical matter to underpin it in addition to the underpinning of the will and knowledge of the Deity: which is in itself sufficient to cause the being of anything that is. <br /><br />Or so it seems to me. <br />Geradenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16493390748713308061noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11611927669891257032018-06-17T23:10:34.611-07:002018-06-17T23:10:34.611-07:00@Red Virtual substances do not have the same ontol...@Red Virtual substances do not have the same ontological status as a true substance. The reason is that a virtual substance is pointing to its relationship to the whole (true substance). For example, the human body is the designated matter directed by the soul. It makes no sense to speak of a body without a soul (for them it would be a mere aggregate of dead flesh). That it must reference the whole does not mean that it is not real or really a part of the person in question. It does do some ontological work insofar as it gives an incomplete explanation of the capacities of a substance. However, it cannot be made sense of without the whole substance. For example, the behavior of an electron in a helium atom cannot be made sense of without reference to the other electron and the nucleus (its spin is constrained via the Pauli Exclusion Principle, for example. The bound electron (virtual substance) behaves very differently than a free electron (substance). Someone denying holism would have to refute these very convincing “emergent” phenomena for virtually all substances in the world before verifying monism or atomism. The holist needs only a single example to prove his point. <br /><br />As for substance dualism permitting merelogical nihilism (rejection of composition) via denial of the reliability of the senses, I think that is an uphill battle. Even once you concede substance dualism, you still have to accept the cold reality of the unity and composition of conciousness. Our conscious experience gives witness to composition. I have a left field of vision and a right field, and I am aware of them both at the same time. I am also aware of sounds, smells, etc. This unified composition seems to refute any kind of immaterial atomism (like a Russelian neutral monism, perhaps). The fact that we learn things and forget things seems to refute monism. How could a single substance experience accretion and diminution if it is the totality of existence? The composition denier this does not seem to benefit much from his dualistic position.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00481589239954065668noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-49790378658626661872018-06-17T14:16:45.971-07:002018-06-17T14:16:45.971-07:00Most atheists/naturalists subscribe to reductionis...Most atheists/naturalists subscribe to reductionist/emergentist materialism. Their view of matter is not dissimilar to that of Descartes, but they view the mind as somehow being "produced" by matter, whether they want to describe that "production" as "reduction" or "emergence" or whatever. They usually are aware of Cartesian substance dualism, and often have reasonable grounds for rejecting it, including grounds like those Dr. Feser describes here. Most of them however are largely ignoring any alternatives to materialism or substance dualism, hylemorphic dualism included.<br /><br />I think, to get from materialism to something like Berkeleyan idealism, is maybe not going that far. A reductionist materialist can just choose to swap the direction of the arrow of reduction–instead of reducing mind to matter, start reducing matter to mind. Materialism and idealism are (to some extent) mirror images of each other, so I think that means the distance from one to another is relatively small.<br /><br />On the other hand, hylemorphic dualism requires the acceptance of a whole lot of A-T metaphysics, such as substance-accident theory, moderate realism, the four causes, etc. It is a lot further away from reductionist materialism than reductionist idealism is. It is a very different way of thinking. And, I think from a sort of apologetic perspective, it may be much easier to convert a reductionist to a different form of reductionism (idealist rather than materialist), than to convert them to the A-T worldview. (Certainly, I managed to convert myself to a different form of reductionism, I am still unconvinced by A-T.)Simon Kissanehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04941945851547545249noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-83123790992011369472018-06-17T10:44:22.306-07:002018-06-17T10:44:22.306-07:00Haha! No I am not. I have heard of him, though.Haha! No I am not. I have heard of him, though.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00481589239954065668noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-49555849681728509042018-06-17T10:09:45.839-07:002018-06-17T10:09:45.839-07:00Substance dualism is not a denial of composition. ...<i>Substance dualism is not a denial of composition. It is saying that there are extended substances and spiritual substances, but it does not necessarily perceive extended substances in atomistic or monistic terms. The point is,</i><br /><br />That is true, its not necessarily a denial of composition in itself but it is still an option for composition denier to accommodate mind and persons in his view. The whole objection to mereological nihilism that it is incompatible with existence of persons is only tenable if Substance dualism is false. <br /><br /><i>The point is, I think, that the holism, atomism, monism debate is not particularly relevant to the hylemorphic vs substance dualism debate since they can both concede a holistic metaphysics.</i><br /><br />But it is relevant because one of these is not compatible with mereological nihilism.<br /><br /><i>I’m not talking about virtual particles when I say virtual substance. For example, my left arm is not a substance in its own right. It IS a part of the whole substance which is my body, however. It is a virtual substance insofar as it has the potential to become an aggregate of dead flesh (if it were cut off). </i><br /><br />There are questions about this view.<br />In what sense do <i>virtual substances</i> exist? <br />If virtual substantial parts have the same ontological status as other substances then the term doesn't do any work any we face same kind of problem about relation of parts and wholes.Redhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05569340378356607760noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28897017056894519082018-06-16T20:26:07.384-07:002018-06-16T20:26:07.384-07:00@Scott Lynch no I mean, are you the fantasy noveli...@Scott Lynch no I mean, are you the fantasy novelist known as Scott Lynch, author of <i>The Gentleman Bastards</i> series?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81611021247057500812018-06-16T17:05:15.396-07:002018-06-16T17:05:15.396-07:00@Cogniblog What do you mean? I am definitely not t...@Cogniblog What do you mean? I am definitely not the writer of this blog. Edward Feser is. I’m sure he would argue more precisely than me (an amateur), but I am espousing A-T sentiments. And I do not think that Substance Dualism requires atomism or monism. Furthermore, in order for even a monist to deny composition, he basically has to deny change, which substance dualists do not in my experience. Therefore, I do not see the belief in composite substances to be particularly of interest to the hylemorphic vs. substance dualism debate.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00481589239954065668noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-7962406524123376362018-06-16T13:54:02.891-07:002018-06-16T13:54:02.891-07:00@Scott Lynch are you the writer?@Scott Lynch are you the writer?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-32169987092413370262018-06-15T19:49:16.429-07:002018-06-15T19:49:16.429-07:00@tony,
The standard interpretation of QM is falla...@tony, <br />The standard interpretation of QM is fallacious as Fr Jaki explained -the uncertainty principle equivocates between two different senses of the word "undetermined ". If you read discussions of the uncertainty principle, they are always about inability to measure precisely the momentum of the particle when it position is known precisely and vice-versa <br />The fallacy consists in equating this indeterminacy in measurement to the ontological indeterminacy Gyanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09941686166886986037noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-73097131129207100032018-06-15T17:08:33.025-07:002018-06-15T17:08:33.025-07:00I’m not talking about virtual particles when I say...I’m not talking about virtual particles when I say virtual substance. For example, my left arm is not a substance in its own right. It IS a part of the whole substance which is my body, however. It is a virtual substance insofar as it has the potential to become an aggregate of dead flesh (if it were cut off). The status of protons and quarks is besides the point. It is simply an example. Holism does not stand or fall with emergent properties of protons (although I think there is very strong case for considering protons substances as opposed to aggregates. <br /><br />Substance dualism is not a denial of composition. It is saying that there are extended substances and spiritual substances, but it does not necessarily perceive extended substances in atomistic or monistic terms. The point is, I think, that the holism, atomism, monism debate is not particularly relevant to the hylemorphic vs substance dualism debate since they can both concede a holistic metaphysics.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00481589239954065668noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4597205864165647312018-06-15T10:29:55.060-07:002018-06-15T10:29:55.060-07:00According to Aquinas, the intellect moves the will...According to Aquinas, the intellect moves the will as a <b>final cause</b>, but the will moves the intellect as an <b>efficient cause</b> (in this case, an agent):<br /><br />"I answer that, A thing is said to move in two ways:<br /><br />"First, as an end; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end.<br /><br />"Secondly, a thing is said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De Similitudinibus). The reason is, because wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which regards the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends. And we may observe this both in nature and in things politic... Now the object of the will is good and the end in general, and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as agent moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our will." (S.T. I, q. 82, art. 4)<br /><br />It is thus incorrect to claim that the soul only moves the body as a final cause. Something has to move my arm when I decide to raise it. And St. Thomas seems to be saying that my act of will is what makes my arm go up.Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-87482460011044353942018-06-15T09:33:14.047-07:002018-06-15T09:33:14.047-07:00@Tony
Science cannot tell us what does not exist b...@Tony<br />Science cannot tell us what does not exist by what it fails to observe. There's a world of difference between <i>unexplained</i> and <i>uncaused</i>.Billhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08001130202947985336noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-2228752348854733402018-06-15T06:39:23.238-07:002018-06-15T06:39:23.238-07:00Well, is the brain in the vat (evil genius+some ma...Well, is the brain in the vat (evil genius+some material world) a possibility in the A-T framework? Can it be disproven for certain? Imo it doesn’t seem like it can be disproven but it amounts to no importance practically speaking. Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com