tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post1708681612449471726..comments2024-03-19T02:00:34.750-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Mind-body interaction: What’s the problem?Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger72125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71586260250659378332019-06-21T15:55:04.210-07:002019-06-21T15:55:04.210-07:00Jesus has two natures in One Person, and indeed He...Jesus has two natures in One Person, and indeed He is His Body, in a sense, much like how we are our bodies, in a sense. Anonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11122746359465351676noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-73885229165188493922019-06-21T15:53:48.799-07:002019-06-21T15:53:48.799-07:00There is a noted difference between involuntary mo...There is a noted difference between involuntary movements and voluntary movements. Indeed, we can do something to the brain to make someone involuntarily raise an arm, but not to think they voluntarily did so. Anonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11122746359465351676noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-30463142325876744422018-09-05T08:54:07.782-07:002018-09-05T08:54:07.782-07:00> Optical illusions or dreams show we can't...> Optical illusions or dreams show we can't tell the difference between real life and errors.<br /><br />If we can't tell the difference, how are you able to assert a distinction in the first place?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88402806209367228982016-10-14T01:15:55.761-07:002016-10-14T01:15:55.761-07:00@Dianelos Georgoudis
Thanks for reply.
“God cert...@Dianelos Georgoudis<br /><br />Thanks for reply.<br /><br /><i>“God certainly and angels presumably know all the digits of pi” I am not so certain about that. It seems to me that God, the greatest conceivable being, knows anything God wants to know, and if there are things that God does not want to know then certainly God does not know them.</i><br /><br />If God is omniscient, He knows all the digits of pi (assuming that it mathematically possible). If you deny that as a Christian, you are committing heresy. Not that it affects the argument. If God knows only as many digits of pi as humans know, my reasoning still follows.<br /><br /><i>Surely it's not like God's will is limited in this sense. Now I see no reason why God would want to know all digits of pi, and therefore I see no reason to believe that God does know all digits of pi.</i><br /><br />I don't accept your insights as authoritative on the nature of God. In classic theism, God is omniscient. But again: it doesn't affect the argument. God knows more than human beings and is therefore more complex than human beings.<br /><br /><i>“But where is that information stored and processed” This question fits mechanical systems, but makes no sense in the context of God.</i><br /><br />It makes perfect sense. To "know" the first digit of pi (in base 10) is to hold some representation of the number 3 in one's mind (and to understand what is held there). That is, one has some way of differentiating between 3 and other digits. Differentiation is "information" (in the technical sense), however that information is held: in a material, mechanical system or an immaterial, amechanical system. <br /><br /><i>“how can God be called "simple"”<br /><br />The greatest conceivable beings is also the metaphysical ground of all reality, and as such reason clearly shows us that God is simple.</i><br /><br />"Greatest" contradicts "simple", as I've pointed out with reference to God's omniscience. For God to have infinite (or very great) knowledge, He must hold complex information in His immaterial "mind". That is, He cannot be simple.<br /><br /><i> (For something that is not simple cannot be the metaphysical ground of all reality since its complexity must be grounded on something else.) <br /><br />But God is not only simple. Propositions about God (indeed even propositions about mere existents) make sense and thus have a truth value only when understood in the proper context. For example the proposition “this apple is make up mainly of empty space” is true and also false depending on how it is meant.</i><br /><br />So you say that God is simple and not only simple. Is that like saying Bill Gates is poor and not only poor? Classic theism states that God is both omniscient and simple. As I've pointed out, this is contradictory -- unless the definition is extended as you suggest: "God is both omniscient and simple (but not only simple)".De Rerum Naturanoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-5633076629272276802016-10-01T23:42:35.497-07:002016-10-01T23:42:35.497-07:00@ De Rerum Natura
“God certainly and angels presu...@ De Rerum Natura<br /><br />“God certainly and angels presumably know all the digits of pi”<br /><br />I am not so certain about that. It seems to me that God, the greatest conceivable being, knows anything God wants to know, and if there are things that God does not want to know then certainly God does not know them. Surely it's not like God's will is limited in this sense. Now I see no reason why God would want to know all digits of pi, and therefore I see no reason to believe that God does know all digits of pi. <br /><br />“But where is that information stored and processed”<br /><br />This question fits mechanical systems, but makes no sense in the context of God. <br /><br />“how can God be called "simple"”<br /><br />The greatest conceivable beings is also the metaphysical ground of all reality, and as such reason clearly shows us that God is simple. (For something that is not simple cannot be the metaphysical ground of all reality since its complexity must be grounded on something else.) <br /><br />But God is not only simple. Propositions about God (indeed even propositions about mere existents) make sense and thus have a truth value only when understood in the proper context. For example the proposition “this apple is make up mainly of empty space” is true and also false depending on how it is meant.<br />Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-34058684088344845502016-09-29T02:13:16.984-07:002016-09-29T02:13:16.984-07:00How does an incorporeal being have a memory or a m...How does an incorporeal being have a memory or a means to reason? For example, God certainly and angels presumably know all the digits of pi and whether the Riemann hypothesis is correct. But where is that information stored and processed (in the case of those incorporeal beings that exist within time)? And how can God be called "simple" if He is omniscient, i.e. in possession of infinitely complex information that requires infinite intelligent to understand.<br /><br />"Hence they don’t “interact” because they aren’t two substances in the first place, but rather two principles of the same one substance, viz. the human being. Talk of them “interacting” is a kind of category mistake, like talk about the form of a triangle and the matter that makes up the triangle “interacting.” So there is no problem of explaining how they interact."<br /><br />How does one incorporate the subconscious into this scheme? Or the effects of LSD, alcohol, language, etc? Or the question of whether computers and robots can be conscious?De Rerum Naturanoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35833779557335336512016-09-28T14:36:59.565-07:002016-09-28T14:36:59.565-07:00
@Marc Stacey,
A collection of items about this i...<br />@Marc Stacey,<br /><br />A collection of items about this is at http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2011/05/mind-body-problem-roundup.html and may offer several looks at the topic in its multiple links. scbrownlhrmnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39152232330594887322016-09-26T19:53:09.969-07:002016-09-26T19:53:09.969-07:00Question: What is meant by "principle" i...Question: What is meant by "principle" in Thomist thought? Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-57117516108606084032016-09-24T16:01:39.356-07:002016-09-24T16:01:39.356-07:00@ Gene,
I don't know if you've ever opera...@ Gene,<br /><br />I don't know if you've ever operated a forklift but it is bad news if a driver thinks he "feels" the forklift like it were an extension of his body. It's bad news because it radically isn't and it's exactly on account of the fact that it isn't that forklift drivers need to operate with care and always according to certain rules, steps and procedures. You never "feel" the forklift, which is exactly why a good forklift operator doesn't pretend he does. Indeed, new forklift drivers are typically quite panicky when operating those machines exactly because they don't feel like they can feel enough to get a sense of the physics that is going on.<br /><br />If you study any decent ordinary driver's learning manual, it should tell you that there are two periods of a driver's life when they are most liable to accident: when they are new at it and when they are older and become overly confident.<br /><br />Indeed, you need to be conscious that the thing isn't a part of extension of your body and that you don't and can't really feel it. Failure to do this leads to assumptions or presumptions and causes injuries, accidents or even death.<br /><br />Another analogy to illustrate the point might be like the Star War's idea of the Force, as I hinted at in my above post. Obviously Yoda does not "feel" the object he is moving in any meaningful sense whatever - more obviously here because the object itself doesn't even have senses. But he is mentally conscious of the object - he knows what it is and he knows what he intends or desires it to do. However, there is still in Saint Thomas's opinion a sense in which a spirit is or can be present in a body in a way a telekinetic puppeteer or a Force user is not present in the object he is manipulating or moving telekinetically. Timocratesnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51221477129386379992016-09-24T14:05:50.741-07:002016-09-24T14:05:50.741-07:00"...angels can assume bodies, and that they c..."...<i>angels can assume bodies, and that they can cause physical objects to move</i>."<br /><br />"May the Force be with you." ;-) <br /><br />This kind of thinking also helps us to understand the paranormal in more scientific terms rather than relegating it into the realm of fantasy ("nothing to see here folks - move along!"), magic, lunacy or superstition.<br /><br />Indeed, only in materialism is there something wholly strange about something immaterial affecting something material. In reality, we are doing it all the time every time we consciously seek to accomplish some goal and proceed to do it. Again in reality, the cause of your house and the cause of its being really or actually one thing rather than a plurality is a single plan but you are beside yourself if you think that the actual design of your house is a seperate substance (or at all separate) from your actual house or, worse, if you actually believe the design of your house is present as material in your house: as if the design was a something you can make things out of like puddy or wax.<br /><br />This helps us to understand why formal and final causes overlap while remaining distinct. All the material parts of your house were fashioned and placed <i>according to</i> the plan/design. That is the most intellectually fatal error, arguably, of materialism: imagining the material parts either <br />a) necessitated the whole or <br />b) that the whole exists for the sake of or on account of any or even all of the material parts. <br /><br />But is quite obviously the other way around and this is no less true (indeed more true, if anything) of living nature especially: in living nature, the material parts even follow the substance in existence and is developed by an innate principle of operation in that sustance. A cat doesn't come to be that a paw might exist nor are cats built like a house: starting with the foundation (the paws) then the supports (legs, skeleton, organs) and finally the roof (skin). <br /><br />"<i>though in fact Descartes’ account of matter as pure extension makes causal interaction even between corporeal substances themselves problematic, but that is another issue</i>"<br /><br />No small matter, either! Lines of course do not interact with each other qua lines (nor do planes or sufaces or even body - there is no "body in general"). They are all abstractions and formal. It is much more absurd to imagine that an immaterial body as such could interact with the physical world than a disembodied soul or spirit might be able to.Timocratesnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69317018509495416322016-09-23T11:39:36.253-07:002016-09-23T11:39:36.253-07:00Hello Dr. Feser-,
Any chance you can link me to th...Hello Dr. Feser-,<br />Any chance you can link me to the posts about you responding to the interaction problem from an A-T perspective? Or how hylemorphism responds to other problems in the Philosophy of mind (other minds, interaction problem, etc)?<br /><br />Thanks!Marc Staceyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07047707532865091599noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46286629685124592452016-09-22T22:27:27.022-07:002016-09-22T22:27:27.022-07:00Aquinas clearly believed that the will was an effi...Aquinas clearly believed that the will was an efficient cause of movement:<br /><br />"I answer that, A thing is said to move in two ways: <br /><br />First, as an end; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end. <br /><br />Secondly, <b>a thing is said to move as an agent</b>, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. In this way <b>the will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul</b>, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De Similitudinibus). The reason is, because wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which regards the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends. ... Now the object of the will is good and the end in general, and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore <b>the will as agent moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts</b>, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our will." (S.T. I q. 82 art. 4)<br />Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-25202189511355539812016-09-22T05:25:21.043-07:002016-09-22T05:25:21.043-07:00I scarcely think it's plausible that if we hav...I scarcely think it's plausible that if we have free will the animals closest to us in intelligence do not! Same goes for having a soul.Ian Wardellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-31379107234834585952016-09-22T04:47:55.307-07:002016-09-22T04:47:55.307-07:00Ian Wardell,
"consciousness per se is causall...Ian Wardell,<br />"consciousness per se is causally efficacious, then we have free will. "<br /><br />Higher animals are conscious but have no free will. Gyanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09941686166886986037noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-27348529659818500802016-09-22T04:44:20.664-07:002016-09-22T04:44:20.664-07:00Aquinas has written that stones move by necessity,...Aquinas has written that stones move by necessity, the animals move by instinctive judgment and man moves by free judgment.<br />Thus, per Aquinas, the animals do not move by necessity. That is, the animal motion is not captured by the laws of necessity i..e the laws of physics. <br />This appears to be something that the modern Thomists again neglect. It would seem that the formal causes have a role to play even in animal motion.Gyanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09941686166886986037noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-78050362179515832062016-09-21T13:38:55.365-07:002016-09-21T13:38:55.365-07:00"If it were, bodily movements would have the ..."If it were, bodily movements would have the feel of a kind of telekinetic puppet show."<br /><br />How do you know what telekinetic puppet shows feel like?<br /><br />What about prostheses? Whether permanently attached (a leg) or temporarily (a forklift, a blind man's cane) they begin to feel like part of the body.gcallahhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10065877215969589482noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-30178159842861699052016-09-21T06:28:08.118-07:002016-09-21T06:28:08.118-07:00I said:
"If a libertarian maintains that to h...I said:<br />"If a libertarian maintains that to have free will I would (or at least might) act differently if we reran the Universe, then that is effectively to introduce an element of randomness in our choices".<br /><br />Anonymous Vincent Torley<br />"Why? The fact that I might choose differently in the same circumstances doesn't mean my choice was random; it simply means my reason for making that choice was not a compelling one".<br /><br />I say:<br />This would mean that if we were able to travel backwards in time, and if hypothetically we managed not to disturb the environment in any way, then people in the past might behave and say different things than what our history books say. But why would they do and say things differently given the exact same state of the Universe including their brains? I mean their brains would be in the exact same state, and mental states are correlated to brain states (or so it's claimed), so they would be in exactly the same mental state too. So how could they make a different decision?<br /><br />Ian also writes:<br /><br />... *we* determine our own actions. Let me stress I believe in free will in the *full-blooded sense*. That is to say that, in regards to my voluntary behaviour, it is my self -- which I regard as a substantial non-physical self -- that decides my actions. And I can decide whatever I want to do.<br /><br />Vincent Torley<br />"Fine. But if my decisions are proximately determined by me, but ultimately determined by prior physical causes which are beyond my control, then that does indeed make a mockery of freedom. That's why I believe compatibilism is incoherent".<br /><br />I say:<br />I don't really understand the libertarian/compatiblist distinction. I've never read anything about it. I don't see the notion of free will as being problematic (the interaction issue is a different thing of course). I think so long as consciousness per se is causally efficacious, then we have free will. <br /><br />Prior physical causes might cause me to be parched. So if I find water I will inevitably drink it. I would never choose not to do so. But that couldn't possibly have any implications for my free will! I mean the "inevitability" here doesn't appear to be of same type of inevitability that an apple will fall when released. Even though we inevitably will drink water, we nevertheless have the *capacity*, the *ability*, to not drink the water, even though that choice would never be exercised. <br /><br />Ian Wardellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6464411602081211792016-09-21T05:54:16.174-07:002016-09-21T05:54:16.174-07:00@ bulldog91
Feser reviewed Alfred Mele's book...@ bulldog91<br /><br />Feser <a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2015/04/review-of-mele.html" rel="nofollow">reviewed</a> Alfred Mele's book on why science hasn't disproved free will. Mele is a libertarian.Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-64895389970789555352016-09-21T05:35:59.530-07:002016-09-21T05:35:59.530-07:00(in their view)
(in the view of libertarians), th...<i>(in their view)</i><br /><br />(in the view of libertarians), that is.Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86862655314909730882016-09-21T05:35:09.904-07:002016-09-21T05:35:09.904-07:00@ Ian
Not so far as I am able to discern.
Let me...@ Ian<br /><br /><i>Not so far as I am able to discern.</i><br /><br />Let me help you then:<br /><br /><i>One of the compatibilist strategies will be to suggest that there is a sense of "ability" in which someone who is determined by some event prior to his existence is nevertheless "able to do otherwise".<br /><br />So Dennett, for instance, thinks that genuine indeterminism yielding arbitrary decisions would be no better than really deterministic processes that work like random number generators. People who act freely are "able to do otherwise" in the sense that, in possible worlds in which the circumstances are indistinguishable to normal observers (but not identical), they do otherwise, even though in any possible world with an identical history and set of laws of nature, they act in the same way.</i><br /><br />This articulates the sense of "able to do otherwise" that compatibilists care about. The last sentence implies that one is only "able to do otherwise" (in their view) if there are multiple real possibilities for action even in possible worlds with identical histories and sets of laws of nature.<br /><br /><i>Then your labelling me as a compatibilist is false.</i><br /><br />That was a libertarian denial of your claim, so I do not understand this remark.<br /><br /><i>I'm getting the impression you are not particularly inclined to make your points as clearly as possible and certainly, whether my fault or not, I am unable to discern anything substantive in what you say.</i><br /><br />Frankly, I did not think there was any need to repeat myself. You suggested that the libertarian/compatibilist distinction is confused. The standard way to rebut such a charge is to point out that there are positions that clearly fall on one side of the distinction or the other, which is what I did with my example of Dennett and my suggestion that others reject that his understanding of ability is the salient one.<br /><br />I was puzzled when you said that I did not offer such examples. In fact, you are the one who has suggested that a distinction is "confused" without providing a clear account of what you mean by that or how you would go about classifying standard positions on the issue, such as those of Dennett, van Inwagen, and Chisholm, or, historically, Leibniz, Hume, and Kant. If the distinction is confused, then presumably the differences between authors such as them are apparent; that's a rather bold thesis that would require at least some defense.<br /><br />On the face of it, determinism (the van Inwagen definition I have given) is coherent and comprehensible: determinism is true if given any description of the world at some time and the laws of nature, one can deduce every subsequent description of the world. Further, on the face of it, compatibilism, libertarianism, and free-will denial are exhaustive possibilities. Denial of either of those theses requires argument. It's incumbent on someone who claims his view does not fall under any of those theses to say something about how that trilemma is false.Gregnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-22293503232992366742016-09-21T05:17:55.695-07:002016-09-21T05:17:55.695-07:00Given that the conversation has moved in this dire...Given that the conversation has moved in this direction, does anybody know if Feser has explicitly addressed the compatibilist versus libertarian issue for the AT conception of free will? He has alluded to it indirectly in a few places (eg in his review of Michael Gazaniga's book) but I'd be curious in seeing him spell out his own views on the topicbulldog91noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-1989774829667974292016-09-21T00:27:55.938-07:002016-09-21T00:27:55.938-07:00It is interesting to observe how the discussion ha...It is interesting to observe how the discussion has gravitated towards the issue of free will. In this context I would like to make the following two related observations:<br /><br />First, given the human condition it is prima facie so obvious that free will exists that reason requires a very strong defeater before one embraces the belief that it doesn't. Unless one has such a defeater, reason requires that one reject any metaphysics that entails the non-existence of free will. A metaphysics according to which reality is at bottom of a mechanical nature entails the non-existence of free will (I am speaking of free will proper, not about “compatibilist free will”, a term which makes as much sense as to speak about a particular kind of gray which is colorful). Therefore, unless one has such a defeater, reason leads one to reject any mechanistic metaphysics. Practically all atheists in the West believe in a mechanistic metaphysics. Therefore, unless one has such a defeater, reason leads to recognize that the worldview of practically all atheists in the West is unreasonable. <br /><br />Thus, secondly, the only question is whether there is such a defeater. Scientifically informed atheists strongly believe there is. Their argument is as follows: <br /><br />1. All physical phenomena can be understood by the deliverances of the physical sciences, i.e. on purely mechanistic grounds.<br /><br />2. All phenomena ascribed to human free will are phenomena related to the movement of human bodily parts and thus physical.<br /><br />3. Therefore all phenomena ascribed to human free will can be understood on purely mechanistic grounds.<br /><br />4. If free will exists then all phenomena ascribed to human free will cannot be understood on purely mechanistic grounds.<br /><br />5. Therefore free will does not exist.<br /><br />This appears to be a very persuasive argument. It would seem that the only questionable premise is #1, but given the success of the physical sciences reason moves us to accept it. The probability that the spirit will make itself visible to the physical sciences as some kind of anomaly in their observations is very small indeed. <br /><br />The false premise is #4. From the fact that free will itself is intrinsically non-mechanistic it does not follow that its visible or physical effects cannot be understood on purely mechanistic grounds. Indeed modern physics describes precisely how this is possible. Actually it is quite remarkable that modern physics is such that makes space for free will. Even more remarkable is that in the same way modern physics also makes space for God's special providence, say in freely designing and creating humankind through natural evolution, or in interacting with an individual's life or with human history in. All that classical theism claims about God's work in the world turns out to be not only logically compatible with modern physics, but to sit naturally with it. Or virtually all - my argument does not concert itself with miracles. <br /><br />I describe the argument in the post starting with “I have claimed that in a dualistic reality it is possible for the conscious dimension to cause events in the physical plane, while all events on that plane remain causally closed” here: <a href="http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2009/08/31/more-on-naturalism-and-consciousness/" rel="nofollow">http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2009/08/31/more-on-naturalism-and-consciousness/</a><br /><br />I think the argument is quite simple. If the reader has any questions or can offer some counterargument I would very much like to know it.Dianelos Georgoudishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09925591703967774000noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35655407838473330402016-09-20T23:27:31.825-07:002016-09-20T23:27:31.825-07:00George Le Sauvage writes:
The notion that our wil...George Le Sauvage writes:<br /><br /><i>The notion that our willing is "just" or "merely" a product of our brain events depends (so far as I can see) on believing that efficient causality being a full, perfect, and sufficient explanation for anything which occurs. Again, this is precisely what Aristotelians deny.</i><br /><br />The real problem is that if you accept (a) Newtonian mechanics and (b) the causal closure of the physical, efficient causes <i>are</i> sufficient conditions for their effects. Now you might say that Newtonian mechanics is out-of-date, but by itself, that won't solve the problem. First, at a macro-level, it's still accurate in the vast majority of cases. Second, quantum randomness <i>by itself</i> doesn't make us freer. <br /><br />Ian Wardell writes:<br /><br /><i>If a libertarian maintains that to have free will I would (or at least might) act differently if we reran the Universe, then that is effectively to introduce an element of randomness in our choices. </i><br /><br />Why? The fact that I might choose differently in the same circumstances doesn't mean my choice was random; it simply means my reason for making that choice was not a compelling one.<br /><br />Ian also writes:<br /><br /><i>... *we* determine our own actions. Let me stress I believe in free will in the *full-blooded sense*. That is to say that, in regards to my voluntary behaviour, it is my self -- which I regard as a substantial non-physical self -- that decides my actions. And I can decide whatever I want to do.</i><br /><br />Fine. But if my decisions are proximately determined by me, but ultimately determined by prior physical causes which are beyond my control, then that does indeed make a mockery of freedom. That's why I believe compatibilism is incoherent.<br />Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-45250046524624457562016-09-20T21:13:46.764-07:002016-09-20T21:13:46.764-07:00bulldog,
I don't think the brain needs to be ...bulldog,<br /><br />I don't think the brain needs to be a chaotic system <i>simpliciter</i> for my account to work, and indeed such a supposition would be contrary to the manifest existence of rational and basically predictable thinking, but I do think that such a complicatedly interconnected system will possess modes with chaotic mathematical potentialities. I speculate that, for example, difficult decisions and creativity are most likely to involve such modes.<br /><br />Thanks for the interesting conversation!Fr M. Kirbyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06118708352430779782noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26338200364423925182016-09-20T19:36:58.477-07:002016-09-20T19:36:58.477-07:00Greg:
I did.
Me:
Not so far as I am able to disce...Greg:<br />I did.<br /><br />Me:<br />Not so far as I am able to discern.<br /><br />Greg<br /><br />The libertarian says that, if determinism is true, you can't arbitrarily choose any action you like. Given determinate conditions, there is exactly one action you can perform.<br /><br /><br />Me<br />Then your labelling me as a compatibilist is false.<br /><br />I'm getting the impression you are not particularly inclined to make your points as clearly as possible and certainly, whether my fault or not, I am unable to discern anything substantive in what you say. Hence, I see no further purpose served in further communication with you. I'll reverse this decision should you say something I judge is worthwhile and worthy of a response.Ian Wardellhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05999029760897196102noreply@blogger.com