tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post1547206857065403742..comments2024-03-29T02:29:03.388-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Descartes’ “preservation” argumentEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger69125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-82700216893462720262017-01-17T10:53:17.558-08:002017-01-17T10:53:17.558-08:00@Daniel: Yes, Roger Ariew's Descartes among th...@<a href="#c4708810293986328330" rel="nofollow">Daniel</a>: Yes, <a href="http://philosophy.usf.edu/faculty/data/rariew_cv.pdf" rel="nofollow">Roger Ariew</a>'s <a href="https://isidore.co/calibre/browse/book/5626" rel="nofollow"><i>Descartes among the Scholastics</i></a> is very good. See <a href="https://isidore.co/forum/index.php?topic=15.msg73#msg73" rel="nofollow">this table from it</a> comparing Thomism and Scotism.<br /><br />I'm surprised Feser hasn't cited Roger Ariew (that I know of). Ariew obtained his PhD from the U. of Illinois in 1976 on Ockham, has a background in the history and philosophy of science (HPS), and is a leading expert on and translator of Descartes and the French Catholic physicist <a href="https://isidore.co/calibre/browse/book/4757" rel="nofollow">Pierre Duhem</a>.Geremiahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11812810552682098086noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-73289837923161901222014-02-28T09:20:50.149-08:002014-02-28T09:20:50.149-08:00@Matt Sheean:
"It seems to me that invoking ...@Matt Sheean:<br /><br />"It seems to me that invoking something like a mind changing itself still falls flat without recourse to the distinction between intellect and will[.]"<br /><br />I agree.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4261563031955490402014-02-27T23:08:24.699-08:002014-02-27T23:08:24.699-08:00This is to do with the discussion over the paper b...This is to do with the discussion over the paper by Yousif.<br /><br />It seems to me that invoking something like a mind changing itself still falls flat without recourse to the distinction between intellect and will (though I agree it is an important one!). Who ever thinks that the 'phrase 'I changed my mind' really has to do with my mind changing itself tout court? The example he gives is of two mental states, which either simply are the mind (just the aggregate of the states) or are states actualized by me. In the first case, the mind is not changing itself, it is simply changing. In the second case, I am numerically distinct from my mental states (or why doesn't he just say that when I eat, I change myself from not fed---> fed?). I might be missing something, but I was miffed that he propped up this really idiosyncratic picture of cognition as if it was a fatal objection to defenses of the first way.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58300373436770576852014-02-27T14:12:45.001-08:002014-02-27T14:12:45.001-08:00I drum; therefore, I percuss.
There were limited ...<i>I drum; therefore, I percuss.</i><br /><br />There were limited repercussions since he wasn't <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AIj-JcoiRnA" rel="nofollow">top secret.</a><br /><br />More relevant to the topic, this from the <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sufficient-reason/" rel="nofollow">SEP</a> article on the PSR:<br />"So there is no possible reason for God making anything less than the best. Everything has a reason. Thus God makes the best possible world. Abelard's opinion was rejected as heresy and mainstream opinion of philosophers during the Middle Ages appears to reject the PSR. God, on the mainstream medieval view, enjoys freedom of indifference with respect to his creation. Thus there is no sufficient reason for why God created what he did and the PSR slips from prominence until its early modern revival at the hands of Spinoza and Leibniz."Step2noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-85705812446991026962014-02-26T08:53:10.074-08:002014-02-26T08:53:10.074-08:00@Scott
Very cool. Thanks.@Scott<br /><br />Very cool. Thanks.Bobnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71641755913438614572014-02-26T08:50:03.012-08:002014-02-26T08:50:03.012-08:00(By "distinct power" I mean a power dist...(By "distinct power" I mean a power distinct from the intellect.)Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-90920099723538066312014-02-26T08:46:50.049-08:002014-02-26T08:46:50.049-08:00@Bob:
According to Aquinas, the intellect is a po...@Bob:<br /><br />According to Aquinas, the intellect is a <a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1079.htm" rel="nofollow">power of the soul</a>. The will is a <a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1082.htm#article3" rel="nofollow">distinct power</a>, inferior to the intellect in an absolute sense although sometimes superior to it in a relative sense. He gives <a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1082.htm#article4" rel="nofollow">this account</a> of their interaction.<br /><br />Relevantly to the present discussion (though not quite to your question), see also <a href="http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2006.htm#article1" rel="nofollow">here</a>.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-59351623103527862352014-02-26T08:08:04.915-08:002014-02-26T08:08:04.915-08:00@Scott
Thanks for the response.
For my own edif...@Scott<br /><br />Thanks for the response. <br /><br />For my own edification and if you don't mind, did Aquinas consider intellect and will distinct parts of the mind, that a mind is composed of parts, for instance?Bobnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-58401328150320905992014-02-26T08:05:58.830-08:002014-02-26T08:05:58.830-08:00@Glenn:
"Is it really a sign of anality to t...@Glenn:<br /><br />"Is it really a sign of anality to think that it is a simple matter of courtesy, more accurate, and, perhaps, also a protective hedge, to say, 'Given what So-and-So says here, I think he would agree that...', or some variation thereof?"<br /><br />I don't think so, but if it is, then I'm anal too.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-70512911205266011462014-02-26T08:03:24.974-08:002014-02-26T08:03:24.974-08:00@Bob:
"He is saying that a mind can change i...@Bob:<br /><br />"He is saying that a mind can change itself[.]"<br /><br />Sure, but even for that specific example he doesn't consider Aquinas's account of the relationship between intellect and will or even acknowledge that he provides one.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6138573877103200082014-02-26T06:47:59.936-08:002014-02-26T06:47:59.936-08:00@Glenn:
"Wink."
Ah. Yes, I see it. Tha...@Glenn:<br /><br />"Wink."<br /><br />Ah. Yes, I see it. Thanks.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-21248928268598852472014-02-26T05:09:44.347-08:002014-02-26T05:09:44.347-08:00I had been racking my brains trying to remember th...I had been racking my brains trying to remember the famous statement made by that guy in the picture in the OP, and -- <i>finally!</i> -- I remembered: <br /><br />"I drum; therefore, I percuss."Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-22192921778828422492014-02-26T04:47:28.764-08:002014-02-26T04:47:28.764-08:00Some while ago one contributor wrote, "I have...Some while ago one contributor wrote, "I have cited in one of our previous discussions on this subject a number of prominent contemporary Thomists who agree with my characterization, such as Joseph Owens, W. Norris Clarke (whose work Hart recommends in his latest book), Gregory Rocca, John Wippel, and so on." <br /><br />This brought me up short, and I wanted to ask, "Do Owens, Clarke, Rocca, and Wippel know you? Have you made them aware of your characterization? Have they, or someone on their behalf, conveyed to you their agreement with your characterization?"<br /><br />I don't doubt that this might be seen as a sign of anality, and I'm not entirely sure that I would disagree.<br /><br />Still, it was something which snagged my mind, and when something snags my mind, I tend to wonder about that something, even if only for short while. <br /><br />Of course, it was back in December that my mind was snagged by the statement above, and that I'm now mentioning it indicates that I may have been wondering about it, even if only off and on, for two months. As best I can tell, two months does not exactly qualify as a "short while", at least not when wondering about such a minor statement as the one above, and so the sign of anality may be a bit more ominous than might at first be thought.<br /><br />In my defense, however, or perhaps from my defensiveness, I will say that I had mostly forgotten about it, so that I really haven't been wondering about it for two months -- not even off and on. In fact, I can say that I've been getting along fairly well for the better part of a whole month without a recollection of having been snagged tumbling about in the back of my mind, never mind actually wondering about that by which I had been snagged.<br /><br />As I was reading through Yousif's paper, however, I came across, "Wippel agrees with me[.]"<br /><br />Uh-oh. <br /><br />Hadn't I read something like that somewhere before? <br /><br />I think so. <br /><br />But now it is this that I wonder:<br /><br />Is there an unwritten rule I'm not privy to? "If you think I agree with you (or with your characterization of what I had said), then you may say that I do. You don't need to check with me first. For it is not important that you verify that you haven't overlooked some nuance in what I was saying, and it isn't important that I have a chance to see if some nuance in what you're saying might be at variance with what I was getting. If you think I agree with you, then you may say that I do. In fact, I would very much appreciate not being burdened with having to say, 'Yes, I agree with you (or with your characterization of what I had said).'"<br /><br />Is it really a sign of anality to think that it is a simple matter of courtesy, more accurate, and, perhaps, also a protective hedge, to say, "Given what So-and-So says here, I think he would agree that...", or some variation thereof?<br /><br />And doesn't the time-line of events -- the very fact that So-and-So said it first -- indicate that, actually, it is the current writer who agrees with So-and-So, rather than the other way about?Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81914133634995258902014-02-26T01:23:03.879-08:002014-02-26T01:23:03.879-08:00@Scott
As far as I can tell from a quick skim, he...@Scott<br /><br /><i>As far as I can tell from a quick skim, he hasn't considered the well-known A-T account of how something (say an animal) moves itself: namely, by some of its parts moving others of its parts. That point alone destroys his objection to the Oderberg/Feder reading of Aquinas's First Way.</i><br /><br />It seems to me that the author may have considered this counter argument. <br /><br />He is arguing that:<br /><br /><b>Something can be changed by something actual whilst not be changed by something numerically distinct from itself.</b><br /><br /><br />Take another look at the example he uses to support this argument:<br /><br /><b>For example, I can, through sheer volition, change myself from the state of potentially thinking about a math problem, to the state of actually thinking about a math problem. In this case, I—qua thing—am changed; however I changed my self—nothing numerically distinct from me changed me.</b><br /><br />It seems to me that he is not referring to something like a shoulder moves the arm that moves the hand. <br /><br />He is saying that a mind can change itself which, in the end he says, contradicts the premise:<br /><br /><b>Whatever is being changed is being changed by something actual and distinct from that which is being changed.</b><br /><br />At least that is how I read it.Bobnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-8079610107935102542014-02-26T01:15:56.402-08:002014-02-26T01:15:56.402-08:00Have a look at fourth item from the bottom under &...Have a look at fourth item from the bottom under "Aristotelico-Thomism and Neo-Scholasticism: Online resources" on the right side of this page. Wink.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-4905613608875931352014-02-25T19:38:56.868-08:002014-02-25T19:38:56.868-08:00In searching further I do find books (e.g. one by ...In searching further I do find books (e.g. one by Rudi te Velde) that refer to it as <i>Summa Theologiae</i>.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-64198879113339353992014-02-25T16:20:39.683-08:002014-02-25T16:20:39.683-08:00Thank you, Anonymous Latin Scholar.Thank you, Anonymous Latin Scholar.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-42041663468843170642014-02-25T15:30:21.106-08:002014-02-25T15:30:21.106-08:00@ Scott and any other interested parties:
"S...@ Scott and any other interested parties:<br /><br />"Summa" is a Latin noun, having any of these meanings (non-exhaustive):<br /><br />1.top, summit, highest point or place<br />2.the principal or main thing<br />3. sum, summary, total<br /><br />theologia is where the English word theology is derived from. <br /><br />Hence "Summa Theologiae" seems the most appropriate rendering, since the latter word is in the genitive, ie "of theology". <br /><br />therefore Summa Theologiae means "the summit of theology", or variations on that.<br /><br />Cheers,<br /><br />a Latin scholar.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-24471919723582964092014-02-25T15:19:19.484-08:002014-02-25T15:19:19.484-08:00@ Scott
If it weren't for the fact that most ...@ Scott<br /><br />If it weren't for the fact that most modern philosophers only have to give knee jerk reactions to the first way, I'd imagine that this would be a very common objection to the first way, especially by analytic philosophers. The reason I think this is because of their tendency to collapse the distinction between being a substance and being a mere being, one that is absolutely crucial and plagues their debates over Universals.Timotheoshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09848027239405239382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51975913819105663642014-02-25T15:08:51.237-08:002014-02-25T15:08:51.237-08:00@ Anon
That's true too; Yousif made it sound ...@ Anon<br /><br />That's true too; Yousif made it sound like Feser never thought of the self-mover objection but he actually very clearly discussed it in his book, although it was in a different place than when he discussed the Principle of Proportional Causality.Timotheoshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09848027239405239382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6482903836769777872014-02-25T15:04:55.209-08:002014-02-25T15:04:55.209-08:00@Timotheos:
"And that's why this paper m...@Timotheos:<br /><br />"And that's why this paper makes me so sad; Yousif was so careful to look into all of the so called 'fatal' objections to the first way and found adequate responses for all of them; right up until he gives one that Aquinas himself answered in numerous places and was in fact what Aquinas was trying to prove impossible in the first way."<br /><br />That's it exactly. His dropping that ball at the end was what jumped out at me first, even on just a quick perusal. It's too bad, because if he'd responded to that last objection as he did the others, he'd have provided a <i>defense</i> of Aquinas's First Way and the title (and aim) of his essay would have been different.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-37475554270273716512014-02-25T15:00:40.671-08:002014-02-25T15:00:40.671-08:00@Scott
If heat is "virtually" present in...@Scott<br /><i>If heat is "virtually" present in (say) a match head, then, I would want to say, the causal power (or, in more current terms, the "disposition") to produce heat is actually present in it even if it's not being exercised right now and needs something else to put it into motion. In that case, heat is actually present in the match head as the end of a causal power (that is, virtually), and it's the exercise of the power itself, not the "heat," that wants actualizing. Or so it seems to me.</i><br /><br />Thanks, that is helpful.<br /><br />@Scott<br /><i>As far as I can tell from a quick skim, he hasn't considered the well-known A-T account of how something (say an animal) moves itself: namely, by some of its parts moving others of its parts. That point alone destroys his objection to the Oderberg/Feder reading of Aquinas's First Way.</i><br />@Timotheos<br /><i>That essay was painful; it was so carefully written, taking in all the subtle distinctions and answering all of the standard objections, and then he swoops in with a basic objection that has a classic Aquinas 101 answer at the very end, spending only about a paragraph on the issue compared to all of the pages he spent on other objections.</i><br /><br />I was surprised by that as well. Since Feser and Oderberg both consider self-movers pretty thoroughly, it was surprising that he used his free motion as a counterexample.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-39151360758769217412014-02-25T14:58:47.736-08:002014-02-25T14:58:47.736-08:00@Timotheos:
"And Scott, I'm pretty sure ...@Timotheos:<br /><br />"And Scott, I'm pretty sure that Summa Theologiae is the old-school way of spelling it, but I'm not 100% about that."<br /><br />Thanks. Just wondering. It appears with the <i>ica</i> spelling in the heading on the page.Scotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11979532520761760862noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-34140479668941823722014-02-25T14:57:51.678-08:002014-02-25T14:57:51.678-08:00@ Scott
If I had to take a guess, Yousif was draw...@ Scott<br /><br />If I had to take a guess, Yousif was drawing this account from MacDonald, who in turn was not defending it, but was merely trying to outline how Aquinas might have understood virtual presence. So Yousif was probably just repeating what he read in MacDonald who in turn was probably being a little too fast and loose with those terms.<br /><br />I actually don't fault Yousif too much for this, since he goes on to acknowledge that Oderberg both says that this principle is not techincally required of the first way and that Oderberg is at least probably right in this.<br /><br />And that's why this paper makes me so sad; Yousif was so careful to look into all of the so called "fatal" objections to the first way and found adequate responses for all of them; right up until he gives one that Aquinas himself answered in numerous places and was in fact what Aquinas was trying to prove impossible in the first way.Timotheoshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09848027239405239382noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-31635574060310342502014-02-25T14:40:27.607-08:002014-02-25T14:40:27.607-08:00That essay was painful; it was so carefully writte...That essay was painful; it was so carefully written, taking in all the subtle distinctions and answering all of the standard objections, and then he swoops in with a basic objection that has a classic Aquinas 101 answer at the very end, spending only about a paragraph on the issue compared to all of the pages he spent on other objections.<br /><br />It's actually easy to see how he made the mistake, and if there is anyplace where Aquinas thought his Principle of Causality needed the most defense, that would be it, since he usually defended his principle just by proving that wrong. Nevertheless, it's an objection that Aquinas has an easy answer for, as Scott has canvassed above. <br /><br />And Scott, I'm pretty sure that Summa Theologiae is the old-school way of spelling it, but I'm not 100% about that.Timotheoshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09848027239405239382noreply@blogger.com