tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post1546733838714920057..comments2024-03-28T03:20:15.940-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: So, what are you doing after your funeral?Edward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger172125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46406114995377186232022-12-14T05:13:22.784-08:002022-12-14T05:13:22.784-08:00Question, if form is the principle of individuatio...Question, if form is the principle of individuation of the soul, but then we stipulate that the soul persists after its separation, then the soul is no longer individuated? From your post on Averroes. Was wondering how you square this up with continued existence of the soul post death and separation. <br /><br />@everyone Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19060339245844214202018-09-11T02:16:38.628-07:002018-09-11T02:16:38.628-07:00Corruptionism is senseless from the point of view ...Corruptionism is senseless from the point of view of faith. We pray to St. Theresa, we don't pray "to St. Theresa's soul." If St. Theresa performs a post-death miracle, we don't say "St. Theresa's soul worked a miracle," rather we attribute it to St. Theresa herself, the very person. Furthermore, the Church canonises persons, not mere impersonal souls. Corruptionism would have it that the saints are not in heaven, only their souls. This is at least "offensive to pious ears," if not heretical.<br /><br />I think the solution is simple. Death causes a physical separation of body and soul, not a metaphysical separation. That is to say, the human being is only a physically incomplete substance after death, whereas metaphysically he remains a complete whole. This is why at the resurrection the soul can only be united to its own body, not just to any body: because the soul still retains a metaphysical union with, an invincible attraction towards or disposition to receive, that particular body. We can compare this to a house which has had its roof taken off. "Does that house have a roof?" Physically speaking, no. But metaphysically, that is by its essence and definition, that house does have a roof, "it's just missing its roof." Similarly, the human soul which is physically separate from its body still by essence and definition has a body, "it's just put it off for a while." This is why the souls of angels and the souls of men in heaven are still very much distinguishable: the angelic souls are not only physically separate from any body, but even metaphysically, i.e. by definition, they do not have bodies and have no cognition of missing one; the human souls, however, still very much retain their essential union with the body, and it is very obvious that they are missing something. Compare with the case of the demonic possession of an animal: the angelic soul of the demon is physically united to the animal's body, controlling its movements, but they are not metaphysically united such that the demon has become the animal and the animal has become the demon; but in the case of human death, the soul is no longer physically united to the body, but it still belongs to a certain body metaphysically. So a human soul after death is only a physically "incomplete substance," metaphysically it is a complete (rational) substance and therefore still very much a person.Jackhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13858873453982708283noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18162715606669561552017-09-05T21:03:14.916-07:002017-09-05T21:03:14.916-07:00Corruptionism is false because Our Lords soul did ...Corruptionism is false because Our Lords soul did not go out of existence after his death on the cross he descend into hell. I can't imagine how Christ can be present body and soul in the Eucharist in a. corruptionist understanding.Joe Fischerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11427407192469981815noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-29129918965096905092016-08-01T08:55:15.104-07:002016-08-01T08:55:15.104-07:00“But a soul is a substantial form, and a substanti...“But a soul is a substantial form, and a substantial form only exists when informing the substance of which it is the form. So, the substance of which the human soul is the form must exist after death. But that substance is a human being, where a human being is a single substance rather than two substances. So, the human being must exist after death.”<br /><br />Now that I’ve been reading more about this, I remember questions I had years ago. What if the material body and the immaterial soul are bonded through some interaction we are not aware of? Does the soul exist in time only while it has a body or does it interact in time through some exchange between the material and immaterial? Could it be that God creates and maintains the soul from its beginning and the soul maintains the body? So, when the body dies, then the soul still exists just not connected to the material world? What if death is a bonding of a different sort with God?<br /><br />Related to this, I wondered if reasoning is purely a material function of the brain. I think the soul can use reason, but does the soul need reason? If, after death, you are in an intimate relationship with God would it be necessary? Truth is truth. You don't need reason to get there, so to speak. <br /><br />I figure this must fall into the Ghost in the machine debate, but I’m not sure why. I think it might be that the physics student in me can’t understand substances without bonding forces. There is always that relationship between energy and matter in the physical world, so why couldn’t there be a correlation we don’t know about between the material and the immaterial?Elizabeth Gormleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14233587289334878913noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-10186653401745482512016-04-26T05:32:45.591-07:002016-04-26T05:32:45.591-07:00I doubt you've ever played with pure calcium, ...<i>I doubt you've ever played with pure calcium, but pure calcium is simply not found inside the body (or anywhere in nature). Compounds containing calcium are distinct substances, not calcium. Individual calcium atoms do not act in any particular way. They only act in combination, insofar as they are composed with other atoms. You might say this is true of all things, that all beings are fundamentally relational. That's true, but being is also fundamentally hierarchical, and when atoms are taken up into compounds, it is the compounds that are rightly regarded as primarily operative, and thus as the true substance, in relation to which the 'atomic' (there are no true physical atoms) constituents are material. </i> <br /><br />For the point I was making, it is utterly trivial and irrelevant whether the "correct" level at which to look at the stuff mentioned as an independent substantial reality is at the elemental or compound level. If calcium (elemental) doesn't exist on its own, water certainly does. Water IS a "substance" with behavior characteristic to itself as water. And yet, in the body of a human, it also acts the way "water" acts, in 10,000 different chemical reactions. Hence, the philosophical <i>problem</i> remains: in what sense is it still "water" and not "human"? Fobbing me off on trivialities about calcium just substitutes the trivial for the important. <br /><br />Hence, to return to the point: <br /><br /><i>The fact that we can track some unit or other in no way implies that its accidents are retained. </i> <br /><br />just defies my <i>observational</i> point. Whatever the <i>account</i> is, there is SOME SENSE in which the accidents are "retained." Like, the spatial dimensions of the stuff, the temperature, etc. Qualify "retained" all you want, to make the theory sensible, but don't discard ordinary common sense in doing so. Substitute water for calcium if you like, the following remains a valid point: <br /><br />Whatever the right solution is, we must also account for the fact that the "part" of the body that acts LIKE [water] acts is spatially (and other aspects, like temperature, weight,) determined by the spatial (and other aspects) of the previous substantial reality of the [water]: you can actually TRACK the "location (and other aspects) of the "[water]" in the body as in continuity with the accidents of the [water] in the prior substance. You can put [heavy water] in, and the human body retains THAT "unit" of [water] as to its location, its temperature, weight, and other accidents. <br /><br />You might say this is true of all things, that all beings are fundamentally relational. That's true, but being is also fundamentally hierarchical,<br /><br />I have (and never had) any problem with natural substances being hierarchical, with the fact that it is no longer the SUBSTANCE water, in the body, but "human", and your mistaking my thesis here seems to be blocking your ability to grasp the point. Which is that you seem to be asserting something about the explanatory role of dimensive quantity that doesn't actually explain, but rather confuses things. <br /><br />My point is that there SEEMS to be a kind of confusion in logical priority if we assert, all at the same time, that <br />(1) ALL accidents depend upon the substantial being for their being real, and yet <br />(2) the <i>individuality</i> of the substantial (natural) being depends on dimensive quantity, while also saying that <br />(3) quantity is an accident; and <br />(4) THIS dimensive quantity is due to accidental form, which inheres in a subject logically subsequent to its being (already) a subject. <br /><br />My point is that whatever we say about the matter as persisting from one substantial being to the next one in which it is the matter (i.e. persists through a substantial change), there is <i>some sense</i> in which the dimensive quantity also persists, and thus is not in every sense dependent on the new substantial being to account for its dimension/position. Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86580136975410104342016-04-22T16:00:46.710-07:002016-04-22T16:00:46.710-07:00(I hemmed and hawed over whether to use 'stage...(I hemmed and hawed over whether to use 'stage' or 'phase', finally decided to use 'stage', and wound up using both. Oh well.)Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-5207298247077178512016-04-22T15:48:00.339-07:002016-04-22T15:48:00.339-07:00David M,
Connection??
1. For a created something...David M,<br /><br /><i>Connection??</i><br /><br />1. For a created something which is not immortal, there are, let us say, three (pre-resurrection) stages: 'coming to be', 'continuing to be', and 'ceasing to be'.<br /><br />For a created something which is immortal, there are two stages: 'coming to be', and 'continuing to be'.<br /><br />The soul is a created something which is immortal, so there are two stages for the soul: 'coming to be', and 'continuing to be'.<br /><br />2. I wrote: <i>If the form of man is in (to name those who have weighed in on the matter here) David M, Glenn, Mr. Green and Tony, then, since the form is the same and the individuals are not, it cannot be the form of man which accounts for the numerical distinctness of each of David M, Glenn, Mr. Green and Tony.</i><br /><br />You responded: <i>@Glenn: "since the form is the same and the individuals are not, it cannot be the form of man which accounts for the numerical distinctness of each of David M, Glenn, Mr. Green and Tony." - and yet our souls will remain numerically distinct, even apart from our matter.</i><br /><br />I took your "and yet..." to mean "and yet our souls will remain numerically distinct, even after our death."<br /><br />3. If I took your "and yet..." correctly, then your objection is similar to this of the second objection under the first article of <i>Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima</i> (a link to which was given earlier): "If the soul is individuated by something other than itself, and is the form of the body, it must be individuated by the body (for forms are individuated by their proper matter). And thus it follows that when the body is separated from the soul, the latter loses its individuation."<br /><br />Your objection (assuming it was taken correctly), and the one just quoted, are grounded in an unstated assumption (or, better yet, involve an unspoken premise): that "what is necessary for the 'coming to be' of a something, is likewise necessary for the 'continuing to be' of that something."<br /><br />While the individuation of the soul in, by or through the body ('matter') takes place during the 'coming to be' phase of the soul, and that individuation continues during the soul's 'continuing to be' phase, it (the individuation) is not lost when the soul is separated from the body (which separation takes place during the soul's 'continuing to be' phase). That is, the individuation of the soul continues even when the soul is separated from that which was necessary for its initial individuation. Or, as St. Thomas puts it in his answer to the second objection: "A]lthough the soul receives its act of existing from God as from an active principle, and exists in the body as in matter, nevertheless the soul's act of existing does not cease when the body corrupts, <i>nor does the soul's individuation cease when the body corrupts</i>, even though it has a relationship to the body."<br /><br />- - - - -<br /><br />Anyway, I first chimed in on this subject only for the purpose of countering the claim that <i>matter as "the" principle of individuation...is quite clearly an inadequate and false reading of Aristotle and Aquinas.</i><br /><br />Although it seems clear I've yet to be successful in countering that point (in the eyes of the one who made the claim), I think I've said all I'm going to say here.<br /><br />- - - -<br /><br />In other news... <br /><br />Notwithstanding the fact that I'm an American, I will agree with any Canadian who wants to claim that it ought to be illegal for the NHL to have its playoffs without at least one Canadian team participating.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11442748790552412212016-04-22T06:53:36.343-07:002016-04-22T06:53:36.343-07:00As I said before: ...and this is confusing [and al...As I said before: ...and this is confusing [and always will be] because standardly we speak of just 'calcium' or 'hydrogen,' etc. regardless of whether we are referring to the actual respective substance or to a material constituent of some other substance. [And it is perfectly legitimate to speak this way, even if it causes metaphysical confusion, because both modes of being (or presence) are indeed 'real.' So there is not need to correct scientific usage, just a need for caution about drawing metaphysical conclusions from scientific usage.]David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52005702715811872632016-04-22T06:49:48.140-07:002016-04-22T06:49:48.140-07:00Tony, it seems to me that by 'really present&#...Tony, it seems to me that by 'really present' you mean 'substantially present' as in 'present qua substance'; whereas I don't think it makes good sense to say that 'virtual presence' or 'material presence' or 'potential presence' are kinds of 'not-real presence.' They are 'real,' they're just not 'substantial.' Does that help?<br /><br />Re. calcium: you're not understanding my position (or, I think, the truth of the matter). You write: "Inside the body, that atom operates just the way calcium acts in the presence of that other chemical, bonding to it, as occurs outside the body." I doubt you've ever played with pure calcium, but pure calcium is simply not found inside the body (or anywhere in nature). Compounds containing calcium are distinct substances, not calcium. Individual calcium atoms do not act in any particular way. They only act in combination, insofar as they are composed with other atoms. You might say this is true of all things, that all beings are fundamentally relational. That's true, but being is also fundamentally hierarchical, and when atoms are taken up into compounds, it is the compounds that are rightly regarded as primarily operative, and thus as the true substance, in relation to which the 'atomic' (there are no true physical atoms) constituents are material.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-8407769757600102452016-04-22T06:26:14.294-07:002016-04-22T06:26:14.294-07:00Glenn: "what is necessary for the 'coming...Glenn: "what is necessary for the 'coming to be' of a something, is likewise necessary for the 'continuing to be' of that something"<br /><br />Thomas: "The act of existing (esse) and individuation (individuatio) of a thing are always found together. For universals do not exist in reality inasmuch as they are universals, but only inasmuch as they are individuated. Therefore, although the soul receives its act of existing from God as from an active principle, and exists in the body as in matter, nevertheless the soul’s act of existing does not cease when the body corrupts, nor does the soul’s individuation cease when the body corrupts, even though it has a relationship to the body."<br /><br />Connection?? All I see here is a clear statement that the soul separated from matter is individuated. (Therefore matter is not the principle of the soul's individuation, even though the soul remains - by nature though not in actuality - the principle of some matter's individuation.)David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-43123157751592104812016-04-21T17:19:52.300-07:002016-04-21T17:19:52.300-07:00So I would say that calcium is really and virtuall...<i>So I would say that calcium is really and virtually present (through the ways in which its matter and powers are (literally) incorporated) in the body (as well as potentially, since pure calcium can be extracted from the body).</i> <br /><br /><i>Similarly, if you have a flask full of water, you would be flatly wrong if you claimed to have a flask full of hydrogen and oxygen. Calcium is in the body, but only in the way in which H2 and O2 are in H2O.</i> <br /><br />And I cannot make these statements cohere in my mind. If calcium is "really" present in the body, the H and O are "really" present in the flask. But I would be flat wrong to say so. <br /><br />In the usage developed to answer the problem I outlined in my 7:57am comment, "virtually present" was crafted to designate a meaning like "not really present, but present in some other manner so that the POWERS it usually exhibits are present." To be really present would imply that the substantial form "calcium" was informing the matter, and if so then the substantial form "human" is NOT. So, it is (according to the versions of A-T that I have seen) flat wrong to say the calcium is really present in the human body, without qualifying "really" to mean something other than what it normally means. Which is what "virtually" was crafted to do. <br /><br />To suggest that calcium is "really present" through the ways that its matter is present, incorporated into the body, is to deny <i>substantial change</i> altogether, and like Democritus say that "the body" is just the accumulation of bits of calcium and dog and hair and water... To say that calcium is "potentially present" because you can "extract" it is, perhaps, slightly enlightening, but hardly very much given that ALL matter is in potency to form, (that's what matter is), <i>of course</i> you can "get" something else like calcium when it isn't "human" anymore. <br /><br />So, you have danced all around the problem and basically seem to have said "yes, it's that" to the options available, when they are mutually incompatible, and I have no clue what you actually intend. <br /><br />It isn't "really" calcium and human at the same time. It isn't "really" and "virtually" and "potentially" calcium at the same time in the same sense. So, which is it? Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-82912752278445849302016-04-21T16:57:22.718-07:002016-04-21T16:57:22.718-07:00I also don't think it's plausible to say t...<i>I also don't think it's plausible to say that any part of the body acts like calcium acts. Calcium per se has no role in blood-clotting, or the constitution of bones and teeth, or neuro-transmission, etc. </i> <br /><br /><i>"Calcium per se has no role in blood-clotting, or the constitution of bones and teeth, or neuro-transmission, etc." - That sounds odd, I suppose, but the point is just that the substance calcium (calcium by itself, just calcium) is obviously insufficient for any of these biological functions (even if the matter and natural properties of calcium (or calcium derivatives) are necessary parts of such functions).</i> <br /><br />Oh come on. That doesn't even look like you are trying to understand me. When a radioactive atom of calcium is taken up into the body (as part of food), and it enters into a location where blood-clotting occurs, and it is IN VIRTUE OF calcium's particular manner of reacting chemically to something that blood clotting successfully occurs at that location, it is just silly to say that it's not "plausible to say that any part of the body acts like calcium acts". Inside the body, that atom operates just the way calcium acts in the presence of that other chemical, bonding to it, as occurs outside the body. To focus on "blood-clotting and neurotransmitting" is just to set your microscope too large, look down at the finer level: calcium bonding with X, is, also, part of "what happens" as life functioning in the body. It is just as much part of the human body operating as is the neurotransmitting. <br /><br /><i>That doesn't sound right. The fact that we can track some unit or other in no way implies that its accidents are retained. </i> <br /><br />I have no idea what you mean to suggest by the ripe banana. But you whatever mean by suggesting that its accidents are not retained is just off. I am not claiming any STANCE about why the accidents are found the way they are, I am just making a point about what we observe. Go back to the radioactive calcium atom: inside the body that atom is just part of the body. And if it was cold before it was taken up into the body, the moment it enters into the bloodstream it remains cold - for a short time. It <i>was</i> radioactive before, it remains radioactive in the body. The accidents of the atom SEEM to be present before and after the change, whatever you want to say about what really occurs. Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54983087430644098792016-04-21T12:36:42.358-07:002016-04-21T12:36:42.358-07:00David M,
and yet our souls will remain numericall...David M,<br /><br /><i>and yet our souls will remain numerically distinct, even apart from our matter.</i><br /><br />I'm not sure what you mean by this. Do you mean to say, "...and yet our souls will remain numerically distinct, even after our death"? <br /><br />If so, then it must be realized that an unstated assumption grounding that objection is that what is necessary for the 'coming to be' of a something, is likewise necessary for the 'continuing to be' of that something. <br /><br />However, St. Thomas clearly indicates that that isn't so in the case of the soul. (See his answer to the second objection <a href="http://dhspriory.org/thomas/english/QDdeAnima.htm#1" rel="nofollow">here</a>.)Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23668389000657111462016-04-21T11:49:33.903-07:002016-04-21T11:49:33.903-07:00...and this is confusing because standardly we spe......and this is confusing because standardly we speak of just 'calcium' or 'hydrogen,' etc. regardless of whether we are referring to the actual respective substance or to a material constituent of some <i>other</i> substance.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-11902452272263349662016-04-21T11:36:46.487-07:002016-04-21T11:36:46.487-07:00"Calcium per se has no role in blood-clotting..."Calcium per se has no role in blood-clotting, or the constitution of bones and teeth, or neuro-transmission, etc." - That sounds odd, I suppose, but the point is just that the substance calcium (calcium by itself, just calcium) is obviously insufficient for any of these biological functions (even if the matter and natural properties of calcium (or calcium derivatives) are necessary parts of such functions). Similarly, if you have a flask full of water, you would be flatly wrong if you claimed to have a flask full of hydrogen and oxygen. Calcium is in the body, but only in the way in which H2 and O2 are in H2O.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-53703658447225365642016-04-21T11:15:21.753-07:002016-04-21T11:15:21.753-07:00Tony: " You can put radioactive calcium in, a...Tony: " You can put radioactive calcium in, and the human body retains THAT "unit" of calcium as to its location, its temperature, and other accidents." <br /><br />That doesn't sound right. The fact that we can track some unit or other in no way implies that its accidents are retained. (Suppose I send you a ripe banana in a paper bag by pony express and have some way of tracking it...)<br /><br />I also don't think it's plausible to say that any part of the body acts like calcium acts. <i>Calcium per se</i> has no role in blood-clotting, or the constitution of bones and teeth, or neuro-transmission, etc. <br /><br />So I would say that calcium is <i>really and virtually</i> present (through the ways in which its <i>matter and powers</i> are (literally) incorporated) in the body (as well as <i>potentially</i>, since pure calcium can be extracted from the body).David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-86102192765213907942016-04-21T10:51:48.904-07:002016-04-21T10:51:48.904-07:00@Glenn: "since the form is the same and the i...@Glenn: "since the form is the same and the individuals are not, it cannot be the form of man which accounts for the numerical distinctness of each of David M, Glenn, Mr. Green and Tony." - and yet our souls will remain numerically distinct, even apart from our matter. And the accidents of this bread remain numerically distinct from the accidents of that bread, even apart from the existence of their prime matter.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71931503258188651592016-04-21T10:42:13.824-07:002016-04-21T10:42:13.824-07:00STh III.77.2:
since the subject is the principle ...STh III.77.2: <br />since the subject is the principle of individuation of the accidents, it is necessary for what is admitted as the subject of some accidents to be somehow the principle of individuation: for it is of the very notion of an individual that it cannot be in several; and this happens in two ways. <br /><br /><b>First, because it is not natural to it to be in anything</b>; and in this way immaterial separate forms, <i>subsisting per se</i>, are also <i>individuals per se</i>. <br /><br /><b>Secondly, because a form, be it substantial or accidental, is indeed naturally in some thing, not however in several</b>; just as this whiteness, which is in this body. <br /><br />As to the first, <b>matter is the principle of individuation of all inhering forms</b>, because, since these forms, considered in themselves, are naturally in something as in a subject, from the very fact that one of them is received in matter, which is not in another, it follows that neither can the form itself thus existing be in another. <br /><br />As to the second, it must be maintained that <b>the principle of individuation is dimensive quantity</b>. For that something is naturally in one thing only, is due to the fact that that other is undivided in itself, and divided from all others. But division occurs in substance on account of quantity, as is said in Phys. i. And therefore dimensive quantity itself is a particular principle of individuation in forms of this kind, namely, inasmuch as forms numerically diverse are in diverse parts of the matter. Hence also dimensive quantity has of itself a kind of individuation, so that we can imagine several lines of the same species, differing in position, which is included in the notion of this [dimensive] quantity; for it belongs to dimension for it to be quantity having position. And therefore dimensive quantity can be the subject of the other accidents, rather than the other way about.<br /><br />Jeffrey Brower writes in <i>The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas</i>: "What accounts for the distinction of material objects, Aquinas thinks, is their prime matter, which can only exist under some determinate dimensions or other. But what accounts for the individuality of material objects is the particular determinate dimensions under which their prime matter exists For unlike prime matter, Aquinas says, such dimensions are not only individual, but individual in and of themselves."<br /><br />That gets at part of what I'm getting at, but I would add: Prime matter clearly does <i>not</i> account for the <i>actual</i> distinction of material objects, but rather <i>grounds the general possibility of materially distinct objects</i>. The <i>actual</i> distinction of material objects clearly requires matter <i>and</i> form.<br /><br />Thomas' use of the dictum "materia est principium individuationis" is very much a shorthand formula, and not untrue, but apt to mislead if not properly explicated.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-37993956568840030842016-04-21T07:57:22.518-07:002016-04-21T07:57:22.518-07:00Okay. I'm convinced that designated matter mea...<i>Okay. I'm convinced that designated matter means spatio-temporally determinate(-in-virtue-of-form) matter.</i> <br /><br />David, I am going to try to step back to a slightly different tack, one which I am not at the moment sure is relevant or not. I am exploring to see what comes of it, not simply contesting your thesis. <br /><br />One of the typical difficulties that you have to maneuver in coming to the A-T theory of form and matter is the stance of metaphysical "parts" or "elements" in a substantial being. One of the things that makes a good human sound and healthy is having good bones, and one of the necessities of sound bones is sufficient calcium in the bones. But what we mean by "calcium" by and large we know when we study calcium when it is on its own, not simply when it is "in" a human being. It reacts to certain chemicals, it has a certain density, it has a certain atomic weight, etc. We attribute its behavior to its form. It <i>continues</i> to do these things in the bones: it continues to behave this way. Yet, under the A-T theory, there is ONE substantial form of a human being, and that form is the form of the whole being. There is no "calcium" <i>properly speaking</i> in the body, there is "human" in the body, which operates the way calcium operates when calcium is independent of a body. <br /><br />One way to address this is to say that a physical part of the body retains the powers of (i.e. the virtues of) "calcium", while being wholly (in)formed by the human form. This is the "virtual" presence of calcium approach. <br /><br />Another is to say that calcium is "really" present in some imperfect way, so that the calcium becomes subservient to the organic whole "human". This way is perhaps not much loved by run-of-the-mill A-Ters, because it smacks of multiple substances in the apparent whole. <br /><br />Whatever the right solution is, we must also account for the fact that the "part" of the body that acts LIKE calcium acts is spatially (and other aspects, like temperature, color, weight,) determined by the spatial (and other aspects) of the previous substantial reality of the calcium: you can actually TRACK the "location (and other aspects) of the calcium" in the body as in continuity with the accidents of the calcium in the prior substance. You can put radioactive calcium in, and the human body retains THAT "unit" of calcium as to its location, its temperature, and other accidents. The continuity of the <i>accidents</i> of the previous calcium with the accidents of the (virtual or sub) calcium in the human body is not, as such, explained merely by the substantial form of humanness. Nor is it explained by the logical priority of substantial form over accidental form. It must be explained, rather, in the face of these truths. <br /><br />David, I am not sure what, precisely, you mean by "spatio-temporally determinate(-in-virtue-of-form) matter." Are you relying on the "virtual" approach, and suggesting that the calcium retains the _virtues_ of the accidental form by which the calcium was spatially determinate in the prior substance, when it becomes part of the human - without any ACTUAL continuity of the accidental form? Or suggesting that the actual form is present in continuity through the change? (Since this discussion is not part of the "block theory" debate, I think we are safe to erase "-temporal" from the "spatio-temporal" aspect of the matter.) Tonynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28236221736008166282016-04-20T10:30:03.476-07:002016-04-20T10:30:03.476-07:00David M,
>> "On the contrary, it is to...David M,<br /><br />>> "On the contrary, it is to correctly assign "blame". That is, and in a manner of speaking, it is the higher ('form') which is splintered, and it is the lower ('matter') which does the splintering."<br /><br />> I don't think that is a Thomistic way of putting things. <br /><br />Since it was put that way <i>by me</i> -- in an attempt to clarify that asserting matter as the principle of individuation is not at all about usurping the role or importance of form -- it may be said to be a 'Glenn' way of putting a Thomistic principle (which principle, as you no doubt are well aware of by now, is that of matter with respect to individuation).<br /><br /><i>Perhaps I should clarify that I am intending to discuss metaphysics, not physics.</i><br /><br />Okay, let's do that (with the understanding that it is not verboten to mention something with physical existence for the purpose of illustration).<br /><br />Here is St. Thomas in <i>De Ente et Essentia</i>:<br /><br />"[T]he designation of the species with respect to the genus is through forms, whereas the designation of the individual with respect to the species is through matter." 46<br /><br />I say three things (the last of which is for the purpose of illustration):<br /><br />1. When it is said that matter is the principle of individuation, it is not being said that matter is the principle of existence, but that matter is the principle of <i>individuation <b>amongst existing things</b></i>.<br /><br />2. St. Thomas, even if it should turn out that he is wrong, is at least consistent. Witness the following (which was quoted earlier): "[S]uch things as agree in species but differ in number, agree in form, but are distinguished materially."<br /><br />3. If the form of man is in (to name those who have weighed in on the matter here) David M, Glenn, Mr. Green and Tony, then, since the form is the same and the individuals are not, it cannot be the form of man which accounts for the numerical distinctness of each of David M, Glenn, Mr. Green and Tony.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-81067231290863518592016-04-20T08:06:24.908-07:002016-04-20T08:06:24.908-07:00Glenn:
"Before the act of existence can be re...Glenn:<br />"Before the act of existence can be received by a composite of form and matter, it is necessary that there be a composite of form and matter. A composite of form and matter, however, results not from form receiving matter, but from matter receiving form."<br /><br />Is that so? I don't see it. Perhaps I should clarify that I am intending to discuss metaphysics, not physics. In the general metaphysical case, then, surely the resurrection of the soul is a clear counter-example to your assertion here.<br /><br />"To hold that matter is the principle of individuation is not to hold that matter is more important or pre-eminent than form." <br /><br />But it is to hold that, at least <i>in regard to individuation</i>.<br /><br />"On the contrary, it is to correctly assign "blame". That is, and in a manner of speaking, it is the higher ('form') which is splintered, and it is the lower ('matter') which does the splintering."<br /><br />I don't think that is a Thomistic way of putting things. It is too Platonic. In comparison to more powerful intellects there is a glimmer of sense in it. But in consideration of the being proper to the human intellect Thomas would reject this way of looking at things. For Thomas, matter (the body) exists for the good of the human (intellectual) soul. It is not to be blamed.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46878654743284791282016-04-20T07:56:44.100-07:002016-04-20T07:56:44.100-07:00Tony, I'm afraid that much of your argument I ...Tony, I'm afraid that much of your argument I simply can't follow. <br /><br />"It seems to me that if what you say is true, and if there is NO SENSE in which the dimensive quantity of the matter as in the worm persists through the change..." -- I'm confused as to where this is coming from. Matter is the principle of unity in change, and it is surely false to say that there is no sense in which its primary property persists through the change, but its formal (sensible and intelligible) manifestation obviously changes.<br /><br />"We would be led, also, to concluding that there is no sense in which the matter of the worm became the matter of the bird: since there is no persistence of form across the change, there could be no continuity of the MATTER ITSELF across the substantial change." -- I don't understand your argument here. Perhaps you are conflating the essence of matter (pure potency for material form) with the properties of matter (having (temporally) dimensive quantity)?<br /><br />"I am not sure I know exactly what Thomas means by designated matter, but I don't think he means, simply, matter as determined by the accidents of size and shape and extension which all inhere in the substance logically already determined by the substantial form. I don't think that's it." -- Okay. I'm convinced that designated matter means spatio-temporally determinate(-in-virtue-of-form) matter.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-50853801829778798252016-04-20T07:39:23.775-07:002016-04-20T07:39:23.775-07:00"Repression is thus one of the central defens..."Repression is thus one of the central defense mechanisms by which the ego [the conscious soul] seeks to avoid internal conflict and pain, and to reconcile reality with the demands of both id [organically grounded instincts] and super-ego [reason]. As such it is completely normal and an integral part of the developmental process through which every child must pass on the way to adulthood. However, the repressed instinctual drive, as an energy-form, is not and cannot be destroyed when it is repressed – it continues to exist intact in the unconscious, from where it exerts a determining force upon the conscious mind, and can give rise to the dysfunctional behavior characteristic of neuroses. This is one reason why dreams and slips of the tongue possess such a strong symbolic significance for Freud, and why their analysis became such a key part of his treatment – they represent instances in which the vigilance of the super-ego [i.e., reason] is relaxed, and when the repressed drives are accordingly able to present themselves to the conscious mind in a transmuted form." (From IEP article on Freud)<br /><br />So from a Freudian-ish perspective, sleep does not involve a cessation of organic functioning, contributing to cognitive impairment (as Aquinas seems to hold); rather it involves the suspension of <i>reason</i>, resulting in dis-ordered, organically-grounded cognitive manifestations. It seems like a question that might well be taken seriously here is: Does Aquinas have the resources to provide a plausible explanation of the status of the immaterial intellect during sleep?David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-52759703470623216512016-04-20T05:42:39.306-07:002016-04-20T05:42:39.306-07:00David M,
This receiver (myself) is not receptive ...David M,<br /><br /><i>This receiver (myself) is not receptive to this argument. I'm sure I don't want to dispute that the received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver. But the act of existence (of a material thing) is not received by matter, but by the composite of form and matter, both of which are fundamentally contingent 'things'.</i><br /><br />Before the act of existence can be received by a composite of form and matter, it is necessary that there be a composite of form and matter. A composite of form and matter, however, results not from form receiving matter, but from matter receiving form.<br /><br />To hold that matter is the principle of individuation is not to hold that matter is more important or pre-eminent than form. On the contrary, it is to correctly assign "blame". That is, and in a manner of speaking, it is the higher ('form') which is splintered, and it is the lower ('matter') which does the splintering.Glennnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18816908792177426152016-04-19T14:42:44.923-07:002016-04-19T14:42:44.923-07:00St Thomas holds that dimensive quantity is the fir...<i>St Thomas holds that dimensive quantity is the first property of matter, but only dimensive quantity is self-individuating or individuated per se </i> <br /><br />David, I am not sure you've got that quite right. The "first property" of matter is the first property <i>logically</i>, following after substantial (material) being, right? If I recall correctly, all accidental forms rely on the substantial form prior. You can only talk of accidental forms as <i>inhering</i> in a substance, the substance is logically prior to the accidents. <br /><br />But for a natural substance, the natural parts, the intrinsic causes, co-incide logically, neither cause is logically prior to the other. The form does not _precede_ the matter, and the matter does not precede the form <i>in this substance</i>. Yet temporally with a natural change, the matter is, prior to the coming to be of the bird, the matter of a worm; the matter precedes the substantial form of the bird. Before the substantial form of the bird has existence, the matter which WILL be the matter of the bird is designated matter in the worm, and will also be designated matter in respect of the the substance of the bird. <br /><br />It seems to me that if what you say is true, and if there is NO SENSE in which the dimensive quantity of the matter as in the worm persists through the change, then there are two problems: (1) we would not find conservation of mass in natural changes. We would find the matter of the worm becoming the (entire) matter of the elephant, or the bacterium. (2) We would be led, also, to concluding that there is no sense in which the <i>matter of</i> the worm became the <i>matter of</i> the bird: since there is no persistence of form across the change, there could be no continuity of the MATTER ITSELF across the substantial change. There would then cease to be any rationale for the notion of a "substrate" subsisting through natural substantial changes, which is one half of the whole basis for the Aristotelian matter / form distinction. <br /><br />I am not sure I know exactly what Thomas means by designated matter, but I don't think he means, <i>simply</i>, matter as determined by the accidents of size and shape and extension which all inhere in the substance logically already determined by the substantial form. I don't think that's it. Tonynoreply@blogger.com