tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post1188476643984939565..comments2024-03-19T02:00:34.750-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: Revisiting Ross on the immateriality of thoughtEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger154125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14680795733340667292017-02-11T04:05:40.706-08:002017-02-11T04:05:40.706-08:00Since there's been talk of “algorithms” there ...<br /><br />Since there's been talk of <b>“algorithms”</b> there is this excerpt from http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/09/manzi-on-wright-coyne-dispute.html <br /><br />Quote:<br /><br />".....Manzi is clearer on the issue of final causality. Coyne seems to think that to attribute purposiveness to evolution entails seeing the human species, specifically, as having somehow been the end result toward which natural selection was working; and he trots out the usual ad hominem response to critics of Darwinism to the effect that they just can’t handle evolution’s humbling implications, blah blah blah. But as Manzi notes, this completely misses the point. Let the human race be as cosmically insignificant as you like; neither our existence nor that of any other particular species is at all relevant to the question of evolution’s “purposiveness.” The point is rather that Darwinism claims to identify an <b>“algorithm”</b> by means of which natural processes generate new species. And if this “algorithm” talk is taken seriously, then (to put things more strongly than Manzi does) it necessarily entails, given the nature of algorithms, that there is an end-state towards which the processes in question point – not, to be sure, the generation of some particular species (human or otherwise) at some temporal culmination point, but rather the (in principle non-stop) generation of species after species meeting certain abstract criteria of fitness. (It is an error to think that the existence of final causes in biology would entail some sort of “omega point” a la Teilhard de Chardin. Aristotle, after all, believed that the motion of the heavenly spheres was both teleological – since the spheres were in his view moved by their “desire” to emulate the Unmoved Mover – and also endless. His physics and astronomy were mistaken, but that does not affect the philosophical point about the nature of teleology. Even if evolution proceeds forever, that would not make it non-teleological.)...."<br /><br />End quote.scbrownlhrmnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-6057896249785821842017-02-08T18:15:31.088-08:002017-02-08T18:15:31.088-08:00
Well, it is a series of sorts, with the index he...<br /><br />Well, it is a series of sorts, with the index here: <br /><br />http://www.wall.org/~aron/blog/fundamental-reality-index/<br /><br />It opens with this:<br /><br />“Here is an index for my now complete series on the metaphysical question of what is the most fundamental aspect of reality, giving my own take on the Cosmological Argument, the Argument from Consciousness, and the Argument from Ethics.”<br />scbrownlhrmnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69334099580013916312017-02-08T18:05:31.088-08:002017-02-08T18:05:31.088-08:00
Segue of sorts: http://www.wall.org/~aron/blog/s...<br /><br />Segue of sorts: http://www.wall.org/~aron/blog/sean-carroll-and-the-afterlife/<br /><br />scbrownlhrmnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72091297673672309392017-02-03T14:11:55.977-08:002017-02-03T14:11:55.977-08:00Clarification:
By "nutrients" I mean ca...<br />Clarification:<br /><br />By "nutrients" I mean causal and otherwise. The whole of it.<br /><br />That "....seamless continuum of particle (or whatever) in motion...."<br /><br />scbrownlhrmnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-88215941763577358672017-02-03T10:49:45.332-08:002017-02-03T10:49:45.332-08:00Vincent,
Just two thoughts.
First:
See http://...<br />Vincent, <br /><br />Just two thoughts.<br /><br />First:<br /><br />See http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/08/animals-are-conscious-in-other-news-sky.html for animals and consciousness. Here again you come to your claim that you've established internal finality. But you have done so only by denying physics, and, have managed thereby to isolate the physics inside of the Neuron from the physics inside of the Living Blue Planet from the physics of the Ocean/Cosmos in which she swims and from which she receives all of her nutrients. Physics inside isn't causally isolated from physics outside. In fact, such a thing is impossible. If there is internal finality in X, you will need to follow through to the Ocean in which X swims. Anything less seems to sum to an X in want of all the facts. <br /><br />Second:<br /><br />The closed loop you described cannot have internal finality. Well, that is *IF* the Ocean <b>(</b>....which built it and which provides it all of its nano-second by nano-second nutrients...<b>)</b> has anything to say about it.scbrownlhrmnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26053299961177843762017-02-02T10:00:27.515-08:002017-02-02T10:00:27.515-08:00@Don Jindra
"My February 1, 6:57 AM comments ...@Don Jindra<br />"My February 1, 6:57 AM comments were about the true, buried meaning of Ross's argument. They were not necessarily my opinion on the difference between robots and humans."<br /><br />Fair enough. But again: if you were sane and cared to present yourself as such, you'd recognize that that claim would be accepted as even a tiny bit plausible by almost no one other than yourself, and so you'd recognize the necessity of taking the trouble to explain your view and to address some of the obvious objections to it.David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-38128315816262948132017-02-02T06:18:28.844-08:002017-02-02T06:18:28.844-08:00Hi scbrownlhrm,
Just a quick point of clarificati...Hi scbrownlhrm,<br /><br />Just a quick point of clarification. The examples Ed gives in the quote above - namely, waving one's hand in a greeting and drinking beer - are not unique to human beings. Chimpanzees also greet one another, wave their arms and (when given the opportunity) drink beer:<br />http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2167692/Chimp-turns-chain-smoking-beer-swilling-chump-zoo.html<br /><br />Since I know you don't believe chimps have an immaterial soul, it follows that you must believe that their bodily actions are capable of exhibiting genuine intentionality. Exactly how a bodily movement can possess such a property is a secondary question; we already know that some movements do. Ed's critique of Searle makes some telling points, but a neutral monist is not committed to following Searle. For my part, I'm also happy to ascribe intentionality to higher-level brain activities (in a chimp's brain or a human brain) which initiate these voluntary bodily movements. It is their <i>causal</i> role that gives them their "aboutness." And should it be objected that causality would apply equally to wayward causal chains, I would answer that a <a href="http://thebrain.mcgill.ca/flash/d/d_06/d_06_cr/d_06_cr_mou/d_06_cr_mou.html" rel="nofollow">causal loop in the brain</a> for initiating motor activities is not the same as a freak concatenation of events triggering a bodily movement. That's all I wanted to say.Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-2296144754521232162017-02-02T06:08:30.746-08:002017-02-02T06:08:30.746-08:00David McPike,
My February 1, 6:57 AM comments wer...David McPike,<br /><br />My February 1, 6:57 AM comments were about the true, buried meaning of Ross's argument. They were not necessarily my opinion on the difference between robots and humans.Don Jindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05550378223563435764noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-75804448806532534192017-02-01T11:16:43.169-08:002017-02-01T11:16:43.169-08:00@Don Jindra:
"What do you suppose separates u...@Don Jindra:<br />"What do you suppose separates us from robots? I understand very well what Ross means in his paper. It reduces to one thing, and one thing only: We humans desire to be correct and a robot will never have that same desire."<br /><br />So you claim that <i>a desire to be correct</i> is the <i>only</i> thing that distinguishes us from robots? Abstractly speaking, you could be right. But if you were sane and cared to present yourself as such, you'd recognize that that claim would be accepted as even a tiny bit plausible by almost no one other than yourself, and so you'd recognize the necessity of taking the trouble to explain your view and to address some of the obvious objections to it. (That's <i>if</i>.)David McPikehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04997702078077124822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-30960896478972457482017-02-01T06:57:59.337-08:002017-02-01T06:57:59.337-08:00David McPike,
I understand what's being discu...David McPike,<br /><br />I understand what's being discussed here. I seem to be the only one willing to follow through with the ramifications. From my POV it is you folks who are "likely not amenable to rectification by rational argument." Nevertheless, maybe you and a few others do understand that my "diatribes", though usually serious propositions, are generally playful in nature. I doubt these issues are nearly as serious as some people tend to make them.<br /><br /><i>"That there is something rightly called 'desire' isn't controversial, but how it relates, causally and logically, to function-concepts, such as addition, is obviously controversial."</i><br /><br />What do you suppose separates us from robots? I understand very well what Ross means in his paper. It reduces to one thing, and one thing only: We humans desire to be correct and a robot will never have that same desire. In reality, cutting all the fancy jargon, it's this desire that Ross pins his hopes on. This desire must be immaterial. It's the only way Ross makes sense. Yet he would look like a fool if he came out and said simply that. So he leads us on a wild goose chase through an indeterminate wasteland.<br /><br /><br />Anonymous,<br /><br /><i>"Just ask him how he thinks Ross begs the question. He doesn't just mean in one way. There's been a dizzying array of reasons over the years, each more stupid than the last. If Don is correct, Ross must hold some kind of record for the most ways to beg the question in one argument."</i><br /><br />This is false. But I have indeed explained Ross's question-begging using many different examples.Don Jindrahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05550378223563435764noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-57626689812474661362017-01-31T10:07:04.375-08:002017-01-31T10:07:04.375-08:00Vincent,
I pointed to that "one possible out...<br />Vincent,<br /><br />I pointed to that "one possible outcome" and asked if that is "where" the "about" happens. <br /><br />A better word would be is that "why" or "how" the chain of reactions narrows the tunnel to "one meaning" ... as in "about"?<br /><br /><br /><br />scbrownlhrmnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-37779644054764626122017-01-31T09:06:51.157-08:002017-01-31T09:06:51.157-08:00Vincent,
Part 3 of 3:
There is, in short, always...Vincent,<br /><br />Part 3 of 3:<br /><br />There is, in short, always some set of capacities or other that comprises the Background (even if it is not always the same set for different people, or even for the same person at different times), and these capacities serve to ground the Network of intentional mental states. There is much to be said for Searle’s hypothesis of the Background, but it seems that it cannot save the conceptual role theory, for to speak of a “non-intentional capacity for acting” is to speak ambiguously. Consider that when you act without the conscious belief that there is an external world of physical objects, but merely manifest a capacity to interact with the world of physical objects, your capacity isn’t non-intentional in the same sense that an electric fan’s capacity to interact with the world of physical objects is non-intentional. You behave “as if’ you had a conscious, intentional belief in a world of physical objects, but of course you don’t, because it typically never even occurs to you either to believe or doubt that there is such a world: you just interact with the world, period. The fan also behaves “as if” it believed there was a world of external physical objects (that it “wants” to cool down, say); but of course it doesn’t really have this belief (or any wants) at all. In the case of the fan, this is not because it just hasn’t occurred to the fan to think about whether there is such a world, for the fan isn’t capable of such thoughts; it is rather because, strictly speaking, the fan doesn’t really “act” or “behave” at all, as opposed to just making movements. And the reason we don’t regard it as acting or behaving in the same sense we do is precisely because it doesn’t have intentionality — it is a dumb, meaningless, hunk of steel and wires. <br /><br />We on the other hand don’t merely make physical movements: the waving of your hand when your friend enters the room isn’t just a meaningless movement, but an action, the action of greeting your friend. If it were just a meaningless movement — the result of a seizure, say — we wouldn’t count it as an action at all; it wouldn’t in that case be something you do, but rather something that happened to you. The fan, however, is capable of making nothing but meaningless movements. For something genuinely to behave or act as we do requires that it does have intentionality — action and behavior of the sort we exhibit are themselves manifestations of intentionality, and thus presuppose it. But in that case, an appeal to a “capacity for action” cannot provide the ultimate explanation of intentionality. We need to know why our capacities for action are different from the mere capacities for movement that a fan exhibits. Merely noting, à la Searle’s Background hypothesis, that our capacities are non-intentional ways of acting cannot help, for that they are genuinely ways of acting is precisely what needs to be explained. Indeed, since they are ways of acting, they cannot be literally non-intentional, for if they were, they would no more be true ways of acting than are the capacities of an electrical fan. A capacity for action is, as a matter of conceptual necessity, an intentional capacity. In fairness to Searle, it isn’t clear that he intends his hypothesis of the Background to serve as a complete explanation of intentionality. His aim may be just to draw out some implications of the fact that mental states are logically and conceptually related to one another in a Network. The point, though, is that his way of avoiding the circularity or regress that threaten any conceptual role theory cannot be appealed to in order to vindicate such a theory as a complete theory of meaning — and that it may even be incoherent, if Searle holds that the capacities and ways of acting that form the Background are literally devoid of intentionality.<br /><br />End quote. (...by E. Feser...)<br />scbrownlhrmnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-24375550976585654742017-01-31T09:06:12.205-08:002017-01-31T09:06:12.205-08:00Vincent,
Part 2 of 3:
Either way, no ultimate ex...Vincent,<br /><br />Part 2 of 3:<br /><br />Either way, no ultimate explanation of intentional content will have been given. To provide such an explanation thus inevitably requires an appeal to something outside the network, something which can impart meaning to the whole. John Searle, who endorses something like the conceptual role theory of meaning, acknowledges that logical and conceptual relations between mental states cannot be the whole story if circularity or infinite regress is to be avoided. He therefore postulates that the entire “Network” of intentional mental states (he capitalizes Network to signify its status as a technical term) rests on what he calls a “Background” of non-intentional capacities to interact with the world around us. We have, for example, such intentional mental states as the desire to have a beer and the belief that there is beer in the refrigerator, and these mental states do, in part, get the specific meaning they have via their relations to each other and to other mental states in the broader Network. <br /><br />But ultimately these mental states, and the Network as a whole, function only against a Background of capacities, such as the capacity to move about the world of physical objects, pick them up, manipulate them, and so on. This capacity is not to be identified with the belief that there is a real external world of physical objects; for if it were such an intentional mental state, then it would have to get its meaning from other mental states, and thus couldn’t serve as part of the Background that ends the regress of mental states. The capacity in question is rather something unconscious and without intentionality, a way of acting rather than a way of thinking. One acts as if one had the belief in question, though one in fact does not. While this capacity could in principle become a conscious, intentional mental state — one could come to have the explicit belief that there is a real world of external physical objects that I can manipulate and move about within — this would mean that this particular capacity has moved out of the Background and into the Network, and now rests on some other unconscious, non-Intentional Background capacity or way of acting. <br /><br /><i>See the next comment…..</i><br />scbrownlhrmnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-20909593119306372472017-01-31T09:05:44.314-08:002017-01-31T09:05:44.314-08:00Vincent,
I don't see that you've offered ...<br /><br />Vincent,<br /><br />I don't see that you've offered anything that escapes the following from Feser on Searle and Intentionality:<br /><br />Part 1 of 3:<br /><br />Quote:<br /><br />This sort of theory proposes that the meaning or intentional content of any particular mental state (a belief, desire, or whatever) derives from the role it plays within a system of mental states, all of which, as we’ve seen, seem logically interrelated in the manner briefly discussed in chapters 3 and 6, since to have any one mental state seems to require having a number of others along with it. The idea is that what gives the belief that Socrates is mortal the precise meaning it has is that it is entailed by other beliefs meaning that all men are mortal and that Socrates is a man, that together with a belief meaning that all mortals will eventually die it entails a belief meaning that Socrates will eventually die, and so on. If we think of beliefs, desires, and the like as a vast system of logically interconnected elements, the theory holds that each element in the system gets its meaning from having precisely the place in the system it has, by bearing exactly the logical and conceptual relations it bears to the other elements. (More precisely, it is the objects of beliefs, desires, and the like — sentences of Mentalese according to the CRTT, or, more generically and for those not necessarily committed to the CRTT, “mental representations” of some other, non-sentential sort — that bear meaning or intentional content. But for the sake of simplicity, we can ignore this qualification in what follows.) <br /><br />There seems to be a serious problem with the conceptual role approach, namely that even if it is granted that mental states have the specific meaning or content they do only because of their relations to other mental states, this wouldn’t explain how mental states have any meaning at all in the first place. That a particular belief either implies other beliefs or is implied by them presupposes that it has some meaning or other: nothing that was completely meaningless could imply (or be implied by) anything. The very having of logical and conceptual relations assumes the prior existence of meaning, so that no appeal to logical and conceptual connections can (fully) account for meaning. Moreover, if belief A gets its content from its relations to beliefs B and C, and these get their content from their relations to beliefs D, E, and F, we seem destined to be led either in a circle or to an infinite regress. <br /><br /><i>See the next comment…..</i><br />scbrownlhrmnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72660378793577923392017-01-31T08:56:33.697-08:002017-01-31T08:56:33.697-08:00Vincent,
"...I would say that once a command...<br />Vincent,<br /><br />"...I would say that once a command issues form the frontal cortex and reaches area 6 of the motor cortex, the chain of command is quite determinate and there is only one possible output..."<br /><br />Is that "only one output" where "only one meaning" or "about-ness" in fact "happens" in top-down-chains? <br /><br />scbrownlhrmnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-28685118008180278432017-01-31T08:54:47.901-08:002017-01-31T08:54:47.901-08:00Vincent,
"two atom-for-atom duplicate comput...<br /><br />Vincent,<br /><br />"two atom-for-atom duplicate computers might end up formulating contrary intentions."<br /><br />Okay. So the input and content in the box are all identical. Force for force. Matter for matter. Cause for cause. Acted-upon for Acted-upon. Acts-upon for Acts-upon. <br /><br />Identical. <br /><br />Please explain how the output will be different. It's not obvious that radioactive decay is done intentionally -- that it <i>wants</i> to do so and so <i>does so</i>.<br /><br />scbrownlhrmnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-48131723667001645872017-01-31T07:18:41.524-08:002017-01-31T07:18:41.524-08:00Hi scbrownlhrm,
By the way, the last sentence of ...Hi scbrownlhrm,<br /><br />By the way, the last sentence of my 9:05 AM post above should read: "The intentionality is <b>partially manifested at the micro-level, in the way that the parts support the whole, and fully manifested at the macro-level, where top-down causation is apparent.</b> <b>What you</b> need to show is that no brain process, macro or micro, can possibly be 'about' anything. That's a controversial philosophical position, and it needs to be argued for." I think I accidentally deleted a line or two using the backspace key. Sorry.<br /><br />I'll finish up her, and let you have the last word. Sorry if I sounded a little abrupt earlier. Cheers and all the best.Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-23001476740903860982017-01-31T07:17:43.218-08:002017-01-31T07:17:43.218-08:00Hi scbrownlhrm,
Thank you for your comments. You ...Hi scbrownlhrm,<br /><br />Thank you for your comments. You ask if I would endorse the following:<br /><br />"You (...we...) can in principle using physics/science build the Living-Computer you mentioned, and, also, you (...we...) cannot in principle using physics/science build an Intentional-Computer."<br /><br />I would say (and Feser would not disagree) that we can in principle build a living computer, using science. I'm not sure what you mean by an <i>intentional</i> computer: even the humblest living things possess a kind of intentionality, as their parts are about the whole they comprise. So in the broad sense of the word, we can build an intentional computer, using science. But if you mean "having intentions," then from a neutral monist standpoint, I see no reason <i>in principle</i> why such a computer could not be built. The <i>ability</i> of such a computer to formulate intentions would be a direct consequence of its top-down design, but the <i>content</i> of those intentions would not: two atom-for-atom duplicate computers might end up formulating <i>contrary</i> intentions.<br /><br />You also criticize me for apparently holding [1] that the tools of physics cannot <i>see</i> the Network, and [2] that we can use the tools of physics to <i>build</i> the Network. I'm not sure which Network you are talking about here. If you mean intrinsic finality, I would say that (i) the nested hierarchy of organization plus (ii) embedded functionality, which (taken together) characterize living things can be built from bottom to top, using the tools of physics. But having been built, the nested hierarchy itself can be recognized only at the macro-level. You need a higher-level science to recognize the pattern: not physics but biology. The same goes for embedded functionality. <br /><br />But if by "the Network" you mean the top-down causality found in intelligent moral agents, then a neutral monist would respond that while a human brain [in a human body] could (in principle) be built from the bottom up, it is nevertheless a "brute fact" that when it is configured in a certain way, top-down causation suddenly emerges. And once again, physics would not be an appropriate tool for detecting this kind of causation, but biology would. <br /><br />You ask:<br /><br />"You use 'about' to mean that there is at some (...distal perhaps..,) point in the cascade of particles - a 'tunnel' - which, once it is 'entered,' there is only one possible output and not two - hence only one true 'meaning'. All the photon fluxes start a bit wide and then eventually the tunnel narrows enough to force, say, just one enantiomer where just a few firings/discharges earlier there were two possible 'tunnels'."<br /><br />I'm not sure what you're getting at here. If you're talking about volition, then I suggest you have a look at this Webpage from McGill University. It's very accessible:<br /><br />http://thebrain.mcgill.ca/flash/d/d_06/d_06_cr/d_06_cr_mou/d_06_cr_mou.html<br /><br />I would say that once a command issues form the frontal cortex and reaches area 6 of the motor cortex, the chain of command is quite determinate and there is only one possible output. But before signals reach the frontal cortex, multiple outputs (some conflicting with each other) are perfectly possible. A neutral monist would say that choices are made in the frontal cortex.<br /><br />As for meanings: if you're talking about <i>propositional</i> meanings (as opposed to the meaning of this or that word), these are the one thing that neutral monism can't really explain. Choices are not a problem for such an account, but propositions are. It seems absurd to say that propositions are encoded in the brain. Body movements, yes; propositional meanings, no. (To be continued)<br /><br />Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-10212567422257976962017-01-30T20:08:30.960-08:002017-01-30T20:08:30.960-08:00Vincent Torley,
Last two items:
You use "ab...<br /><br />Vincent Torley,<br /><br />Last two items:<br /><br />You use "about" to mean that there is at some (...distal perhaps..,) point in the cascade of particles a "tunnel" which once it is "entered" there is only one possible output and not two -- hence only one true "meaning". All the photon flux-es start a bit wide and then eventually the tunnel narrows enough to force, say, just one enantiomer where just a few firings/discharges earlier there were two possible "tunnels". <br /><br />Is that accurate? <br /><br />I ask b/c it has to do with building Networks and what sort of work is being done.<br /><br />Lastly:<br /><br />You have not established intrinsic finality for you have only by arbitration managed to isolate the the physics inside of the Living Blue Planet from the Ocean in which she swims and from which she receives all of her nutrients. Physics inside isn't causally isolated from physics outside. In fact, such a thing is impossible.scbrownlhrmnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-61833245485703580302017-01-30T19:44:56.862-08:002017-01-30T19:44:56.862-08:00
Vincent Torley,
The reason those questions matt...<br /><br />Vincent Torley,<br /><br />The reason those questions matter is that you seem to assert [1] that the tools of physics cannot see the Network. <br /><br />But you also seem to say [2] we can use the tools of physics to build the Network.<br /><br />However:<br /><br />Given the first, we cannot build a Network that can see Networks. <br /><br />Given the second we can build a Network that can see Networks. <br /><br />Hence the question on building that Living-Computer? That Intentional-Computer? <br /><br />On the bench-top will physics/science in principle get us there?<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />scbrownlhrmnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-14194026055539727072017-01-30T19:32:31.308-08:002017-01-30T19:32:31.308-08:00Vincent Torley,
Based on your last few comments, ...<br />Vincent Torley,<br /><br />Based on your last few comments, you seem to land here:<br /><br />You (...we...) <i><b>can</b></i> in principle using physics/science build the Living-Computer you mentioned, and, also, you (...we...) <i><b>cannot</b></i> in principle using physics/science build an Intentional-Computer.<br /><br />Is that correct?scbrownlhrmnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35637190050334691392017-01-30T09:05:14.760-08:002017-01-30T09:05:14.760-08:00Hi scbrownlhrm,
Finally, you write:
"What i...Hi scbrownlhrm,<br /><br />Finally, you write:<br /><br />"What is the fundamental nature of the [neuronal] network, of the stacked-up-layers-of-unintentional-work? Well, you say physics is not the pattern, just the cascades which constitute the pattern, hence physics cannot measure the pattern. It’s the *pattern* of the network which is beyond 'nothing-but' physics. <br /><br />"Which of course cannot be true – otherwise you’d have no scientific means to say that there’s even a pattern in-play. But we *can* measure the pattern – and we use nanometers and weak nuclear forces and what-not to measure all the sodium pumps and the patterns of discharges and so on. John Searle’s silicon (brain) chip gets us there as well. *IF* physics could not measure the pattern *THEN* you’d have no way to build that alive-computer you mentioned earlier. Nor Searle his silicon chip. But you state that you *can* build that alive-computer. But you also say that your tools by which you build it (physics) cannot see what it is you’re building. <br /><br />"You can’t have it both ways."<br /><br />END<br /><br />There seems to be some confusion here. The notion of dedicated functionality which I use to analyze intrinsic finality (the hallmark of living things) isn't the same as the pattern of top-down causation I propose occurs when we make a free choice. The latter involves macro-level <i>constraints</i> on combinations of micro-level neuronal firings, which do not interfere with the quantum randomness of the micro-level processes. The non-randomness is detectable only at the macro-level, which is why a physicist, looking at the individual molecules in the brain, would never pick it up. <br /><br />You argue that "stacked-up-layers-of-unintentional-work" can never add up to intentional agency, but I'm not saying that they do. The intentionality is at need to show is that no brain process, macro or micro, can possibly be "about" anything. That's a controversial philosophical position, and it needs to be argued for.Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-91254948984194309822017-01-30T08:50:56.399-08:002017-01-30T08:50:56.399-08:00(Continued)
(1) Ed's analysis is just as vuln...(Continued)<br /><br />(1) Ed's analysis is just as vulnerable to the Living Computer objection as mine is. In a 2010 post titled, "ID theory, Aquinas, and the origin of life: A reply to Torley" at http://edwardfeser.blogspot.jp/2010/04/id-theory-aquinas-and-origin-of-life.html , Feser granted the possibility that scientists could one day "generate life in a laboratory using purely inorganic materials" (I think he meant non-living materials), IF "the scientists did something to the raw materials that could not have happened in the absence of an intelligence like their own" (e.g. God or an angel). If Feser acknowledges that, then he cannot deny the possibility that scientists could one day make a living thing, by building a computer from organic materials and putting its parts together in such a way that some of the causal processes occurring in them proved beneficial for the whole.<br /><br />The only thing that divides Ed and me is how we define intrinsic finality. He takes the notion of "benefiting the whole" to be basic and unanalyzable, whereas I attempt to analyze it in terms of the parts working together, from the bottom up, to protect the stability and continued functioning of the whole.<br /><br />(2) I disagree with your claim that subatomic particles in a state of constant flux cannot possibly be dedicated to the functioning of the whole they comprise. Why ever not? While they are part of a living system, they contribute to its functioning, by helping to bind together the molecules they comprise - e.g. DNA, RNA, proteins, carbohydrates and fats. Their intrinsic finality may be short-lived, but it is nonetheless real. They are doing a job, and they do it well. What's the problem?<br /><br />(To be continued)<br />Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-16384686280545159952017-01-30T08:49:58.156-08:002017-01-30T08:49:58.156-08:00Hi scbrownlhrm,
I wrote a reply several hours ago...Hi scbrownlhrm,<br /><br />I wrote a reply several hours ago, but it seems to have vanished into the ether. I'll try again. In response to my suggestion that intrinsic finality can be defined clearly and simply, as the parts of a system "acting in such a way as to preserve the structure and/or function of the whole," you wrote: <br /><br />"Yes your arbitrary definition is quite clear. However, the seamless continuum of particles (…or whatever…) in motion that reality is not *only* going to ultimately contradict you with its own non-arbitrary nature/essence but *also* in doing so it shall affirm its eternally open ended drift. No Closure, so no End. No End, so no The-Good. No The-Good, so no (…shall we say….) 'ontic-metric'...<br /><br />"Our cul-de-sac is fine – but that you want us to believe you when you tell us it defines the whole show just won’t do – not without some sort of metaphysical wellspring of all ontological possibility which in fact gives closure on your radical claim with respect to the irreducible substratum of reality... <br /><br />"The rest of your comment makes good sense, and I’ll refer you back to the problem of the Living-Computer and the two contradicting premises which you have there."<br /><br />I have to say that you have a rather florid way of expressing your ideas, that makes it almost impossible for me to understand what you're saying. I prefer spare, simple and jargon-free prose. I also like short sentences. I have no idea what a "metaphysical wellspring of all ontological possibility" is, and I don't know what my "radical claim with respect to the irreducible substratum of reality" is supposed to be. That's the way Continental philosophers love to write, which is why nobody reads them. I come from the "Anglo" tradition: to me, writers like Sartre and "Das Nicht nichts" Husserl sound like they're waffling. Allow me to translate what you wrote into standard English (at least, I think this is what you meant):<br /><br />"Your definition of intrinsic finality is clear, but arbitrary. Machines (e.g. computers) could be built that would satisfy that definition. Would they be alive? What's more, the ultimate components of a living organism are the subatomic particles that make up the atoms and molecules in its body. But these particles are in a state of continual flux: they're coming and going all the time. In such an open system, it's simply absurd to say that these particles are in any way dedicated to the functioning of the whole they comprise. At the bottom level of reality, then, finality is absent, on your account."<br /><br />Two quick points in reply. (To be continued) <br /><br />Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18541020215095940222017-01-30T01:10:49.983-08:002017-01-30T01:10:49.983-08:00Hi scbrownlhrm,
Before I respond to your posts, I...Hi scbrownlhrm,<br /><br />Before I respond to your posts, I'd like to comment about your writing style. In response to my suggestion that we can identify systems possessing intrinsic finality by the fact that their parts act in such a way as to preserve the stability and continued functioning of the whole, you wrote:<br /><br />"Yes your arbitrary definition is quite clear. However, the seamless continuum of particle (…or whatever…) in motion that reality is not *only* going to ultimately contradict you with its own non-arbitrary nature/essence but *also* in doing so it shall affirm its eternally open ended drift. No Closure, so no End. No End, so no The-Good. No The-Good, so no (…shall we say….) 'ontic-metric'."<br /><br />I have no idea what you're trying to say, here. I simply can't understand your English. Since I'm an educated native speaker (B.Sc., B.A., B.Ec., M.A., Ph.D., Grad.Dip.Ed.), I think the problem is not my stupidity, but your convoluted and overly florid way of expressing yourself. Maybe your English teacher told you to write like that at school. She was wrong. Please <i>don't</i>: it hurts my head to read sentences like that, and it impedes clear communication. Please write in clear, simple prose, as George Orwell recommended in his online essay, "Politics and the English Language" (see http://www.orwell.ru/library/essays/politics/english/e_polit/ ). Here's what I <i>think</i> you meant to say:<br /><br />"I understand your definition of life, but I think it's arbitrary. And anyway, it won't work. Living things are composed of particles in a state of perpetual flux. They're open systems, whose bottom-level components [subatomic particles] are drifting in and out all the time. There's simply no way that these particles, which are always coming and going, could be dedicated to the good of the whole that they comprise. And if they're not, then there's no intrinsic finality, after all."<br /><br />And here's my reply: yes, it's true that the particles in living things come and go. But it's also true to say that <i>while they're there</i>, in the bodies of living things, they do a useful job. We can point to individual bio-molecules (e.g. proteins, carbohydrates and fats), which are made up of these particles, and talk about their role in supporting the functioning of a living organism. So yes, there is <i>measurable, observable</i> finality. No problem here.<br /><br />You raise the problem of a living computer. But Ed's account of intrinsic finality is vulnerable to the same criticism. In his 2010 post, "Id theory, Aquinas and the Origin of Life," he allows for the possibility that scientists in a laboratory could generate life. Sure, he says the things would have to be brought together in a certain way. But there's nothing in his analysis that precludes the possibility of building a living computer. Go and check it out.<br /><br />If neutral monism is correct, then one could (in theory) build an intelligent living thing, able to make libertarian choices, in this way. You propose a dilemma, relating to whether physics can measure the pattern of top-down causation that occurs in free choices or not. I should point out that this pattern is much more sophisticated than the pattern that defines a living thing, and quite distinct from it. Intrinsic finality has to do with the way the parts support the whole. This pattern can be described in chemical terms. The kind of pattern found in top-down causation, which occurs when we make a free choice, is different. It is built upon, but is not reducible to, biochemistry. As I wrote above, it consists of macro-level restrictions on combinations of micro-states which are incompatible with the free choice made by the individual. All that a chemist could observe is that certain combinations of micro-states never occur while the individual is in that frame of mind (i.e. while he/she has that intention). More later.Vincent Torleyhttp://www.angelfire.com/linux/vjtorley/index.htmlnoreply@blogger.com