tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post1146013348048750053..comments2024-03-28T10:44:57.324-07:00Comments on Edward Feser: The “first world problem” of evilEdward Feserhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13643921537838616224noreply@blogger.comBlogger107125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-18074462914490732712021-11-03T10:58:29.995-07:002021-11-03T10:58:29.995-07:00Apologies, I wrote "parsimonious" in the...Apologies, I wrote "parsimonious" in the prior post, I just meant "harmonious."Stan Pattonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16865980026908644731noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-70007813957305100522021-11-03T10:57:21.193-07:002021-11-03T10:57:21.193-07:00I think it sounds compelling at first, but there i...I think it sounds compelling at first, but there isn't actually a contradiction.<br /><br />This, in particular:<br /><br />"The atheist is likely to respond that suffering people are more likely to believe in God because they hope that he will rescue them from, or at least reward them for, their suffering. But that doesn’t sit well with the atheist’s other claim, i.e. that if God exists we should expect him to be willing and able to eliminate suffering. "<br /><br />On the contrary, it sits perfectly well. These two claims are 100% parsimonious:<br /><br />(A) "If God is abundantly loving we'd expect less suffering."<br /><br />(B) "People who experience pervasive and seemingly inescapable suffering are more likely to desperately hope in supernatural relief, such as an apocalyptic rescue and/or an afterlife reward. People in this desperate condition are more likely to feel no other option than to elevate this hope -- their only hope -- above the otherwise normal expectation that an abundantly loving God wouldn't have put them in that situation to begin with."<br /><br />I.e., A + B are totally compatible.<br /><br />In other words, desperation and starkly limited options compels people to extend hope of rescue and relief, even to people who they know are in some way responsible for those limited options. This effect is so powerful that desperate/limited people will even begin relieve those people of responsibility -- e.g., explaining away their abuse or neglect, or blaming themselves for it.<br /><br />We observe this in Stockholm Syndrome, Battered Woman Syndrome, etc. If the person feels *rooted* and *limited*, and yet wishes to survive, they will psychologically adapt to cope by investing in whatever hope remains, even if it defies reasonability.<br /><br />It is very clever to guilt the unsuffering as having a "privileged" and therefore invalid perspective on such situations. But this is exactly topsy-turvy. It is the person outside the desperate situation, with freedom and options, that has the more objective perspective on the abuse or neglect, and the degree to which it is unacceptable. This is exacerbated with religious investment, where it's not just the source of their last remaining hope, but anchor and cadence of their whole lives.<br /><br />I say all of this as a Christian who extends faith and hope in a God who will be proven righteous, as Isaiah says: No, desperation does not add validity to (nor comfort remove validity from) perspectives on the rationalization of suffering or lack thereof. As the Book of Job teaches us, there is no solution to experiential theodicean problems save for hope in something better, and this hope must be held in spite of what interim suffering suggests, "things too wonderful to know." Finally, any eschatological proposal that poses such a problem, yet doesn't enjoy this form of solution, is a brick wall.Stan Pattonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16865980026908644731noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44248426968153079302021-10-11T22:41:58.755-07:002021-10-11T22:41:58.755-07:00On the sociological issue, the high rate of theism...On the sociological issue, the high rate of theism in some societies with a lot of suffering says nothing about whether the problem of evil succeeds or fails as an argument. This is because we do not consult the consensus of the total population about philosophical issues. Laypeople are generally very bad philosophers.<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-1264173815347150912021-10-08T18:17:23.555-07:002021-10-08T18:17:23.555-07:00Jnezbit i also struggle in this way. Jnezbit i also struggle in this way. maryhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05613163382453563548noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-90406616972206906932021-10-06T20:34:15.263-07:002021-10-06T20:34:15.263-07:00@Alexander
I see, it is true that the conservativ...@Alexander<br /><br />I see, it is true that the conservative darwinist could reply that there is a question being begged on his view being called moraly relativistic, it would need a separate discussion. <br /><br />@Walter<br /><br />I see, that is completely uncontroversial. I have a few worries but this discussion is being quite slow, so maybe it is better to continue it on another day. You get a thumbs up for being a moral realist, though. Talmidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04267925670235640337noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-78286415188216697302021-10-06T09:10:59.926-07:002021-10-06T09:10:59.926-07:00Talmid
I would not describe myself as an essentia...Talmid<br /><br />I would not describe myself as an essentialist, unless by that term you mean something quite mundane.<br />I basically think that if there is a sentient physical being, certain things are good for it and certain things are bad for it. That's all there is to it.<br />Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-51852831073392239692021-10-06T06:04:29.700-07:002021-10-06T06:04:29.700-07:00Talmid: "this position is compatible with mor...Talmid: "this position is compatible with moral realism being false"<br /><br />That depends on the conditions of possibility for morality. Or, to put it another way, on one's metaphysics. Darwinian conservatism argues that morality is real, hence argues for moral realism, on the basis of a Darwinian metaphysics. This metaphysics, however, is opposite Scholastic metaphysics, which also argues for moral realism from different principles. Hence, if you consider that only Scholastic arguments for moral realism provide for "true moral realism", then evidently Darwinian arguments for moral realism result in "false moral realism". If you couple it as a minor premise to a major premise such as, let's say, "every false realism is a relativism", and then, sure, a moral arguments based on Darwinian metaphysics cannot but be classified as being "in reality" for moral relativism. But that, I'd say, more begs the question than provides for a valid reasoning.<br /><br />Besides, a similar reasoning can be constructed in reverse. For example, your discussion with Walter on the topic of rape. If we look into the Bible, while in almost every instance rape is condemned in the strongest terms, there however a few instances in which it is not only allowed, but in fact commanded, such as e.g. in Numbers 31, when soldiers in the winning side of a war of genocide are allowed to spare the virgins from the defeated side, enslave them, and from then on force themselves upon them whenever they want. From this one might easily say that it's the the Bible that teaches moral relativism, since a "true moral realism" would make rape immoral in every case, no exceptions or conditionals. But that, evidently, oversimplifies the matter.Alexander Gieghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12282340926229637743noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-54580152140626321572021-10-05T20:54:51.155-07:002021-10-05T20:54:51.155-07:00@Walter
I see. Are you a type of essencialist lik...@Walter<br /><br />I see. Are you a type of essencialist like we aristotelians*? If yes, them i could see it working out on getting a objective morality going. <br /><br />*not that there is only that type of essencialism<br /><br /><br />@Alexander<br /><br />I see, it does seems like a popular position between secular conservatives. Burke itself sounds like he goes that way sometimes. <br /><br />The trouble on this particular case is that, as you admited before, this position is compatible with moral realism being false. Since my questions to Walter aim at understand how moral realism fit on his worldview, there does not seem like darwinian conservatism can help much on this particular case. Talmidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04267925670235640337noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44262185520993781652021-10-05T09:41:30.547-07:002021-10-05T09:41:30.547-07:00@Talmid: "Are you saying (...) we humans have...@Talmid: "Are you saying (...) we humans have there are certain ways of conduct (or moralities) that are necessary to our flourishing (...) and that this means than they are in a way a sort-of objective morality to us?"<br /><br />Yes. Our moral... I won't say "imperatives", as that would give a deontological impression to it, so maybe "potencies" would fit better. So, those moral potencies, if properly followed, give humanity the ability to survive, grow, and thrive, up to and including by opening further potencies, such as that of achieving an Aristotelian good life. Conversely, if someone, using from their volition, actively moves against them, the result is ruin, if not for them personally, then in extreme for their society or even humanity as a whole. And that makes those moral potencies not merely sort-of objective, but in fact strictly objective.<br /><br />"Like, if everyone killed people because they are annoying them society would collapse, so we humans have something like a obligation to not kill by a so silly reason?"<br /><br />That's one possibility, yes. But it also provides an example of how reason interplays with baseline morality, improving upon it in the form of ethics.<br /><br />See, when it comes to our natural moral impulses, no human society has ever been structured so that any member could kill any other member for any reason whatsoever. On the flip side, all of them used to think nothing of the killing, by their members, of those from without. Ethical reasoning thus permits improving upon this baseline, the "no wanton kill of in-groups", by expanding it into "no wanton killing, period". All the while, evidently, delimiting the circumstances in which killing other *is* indeed allowed, such as, for example, by the state in such and such criminal cases duly investigated, by soldiers when defending their own in a just war, or by someone in self-defense or when protecting their family from aggression by 3rd parties.<br /><br />Notice that this bottom-up structure, in which higher levels of morality are built from iterating over lower, biologically-driven moral impulses, that is, via material/efficient causality, does the inverse from what's assumed in a top-down, formal/final moral understanding that begins with "no wanton killing" and flows down into adapted practical needs, eventually breaking up into corrupted forms. But the end result is fundamentally the same, which points to the possibility of both things being real, and just two sides of the same coin.<br /><br />If you're interested a very interesting author to read is Dr. Larry Arnhart. His focus has been on tying together Aristotle, Locke, Darwin and Burke to fully establish what he calls "Darwinian Conservatism". You can find more on his blog:<br /><br />https://darwinianconservatism.blogspot.com/<br />Alexander Gieghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12282340926229637743noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-13149680984182948552021-10-05T07:04:11.421-07:002021-10-05T07:04:11.421-07:00The story of the million dollar gift would describ...The story of the million dollar gift would describe the loss of the preternatural gifts of the state of justice. Because such gifts were, of course, gratuitous, their loss could not be used to argue against divine justice. But the story can't be used to extrapolate man's existence in a state of nature after the loss of the state of justice, at least not from an Aquinian perspective.<br /><br />St. Thomas Aquinas explains (Ia IIae 109): "We may speak of man in two ways: first, in the state of perfect nature [state of nature]; secondly, in the state of corrupted nature. Now in the state of perfect nature, man, without habitual grace, could avoid sinning either mortally or venially; since to sin is nothing else than to stray from what is according to our nature—and in the state of perfect nature man could avoid this... But in the state of corrupt nature man needs grace to heal his nature in order that he may entirely abstain from sin". <br /><br />According to St. Thomas, man in a notional state of nature did not "depreciate" necessarily and did not need grace to avoid sin, whereas he does now. This has nothing to do with social context. <br /><br />The language used above by Leo XIII, St Thomas and thomism after him, and millions of sermons, describing the effects of original sin as a corruption of nature apart from the loss of preternatural gifts, is therefore entirely consistent. Miguel Cervantesnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-19427052962308011842021-10-05T00:23:04.018-07:002021-10-05T00:23:04.018-07:00Talmid
The explanation lies, IMO, in human nature...Talmid<br /><br />The explanation lies, IMO, in human nature.<br />Human nature is such that certain things are good for human beings and certain things are bad.<br />Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-72143851873456606272021-10-04T21:27:35.378-07:002021-10-04T21:27:35.378-07:00So, what does this have to do with the story of th...So, what does this have to do with the story of the rich man and the million dollars?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-13410999165083322062021-10-04T20:17:11.924-07:002021-10-04T20:17:11.924-07:00@Walter
What would the explanation be? Our disagr...@Walter<br /><br />What would the explanation be? Our disagreements here could be why we come to diferent conclusions.Talmidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04267925670235640337noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71323333327243380552021-10-04T00:25:20.157-07:002021-10-04T00:25:20.157-07:00Talmid
No, I am not presupposing that if rape is ...Talmid<br /><br />No, I am not presupposing that if rape is wrong is a necessary truth it does not have an explanation. In fact, I do think there is an explanation for it, but that explanation cannot be God.Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-42417394902062611352021-10-03T20:30:10.083-07:002021-10-03T20:30:10.083-07:00@Walter
Right, the thing here is that you are pre...@Walter<br /><br />Right, the thing here is that you are pressuposing that if "rape is wrong" is a necessary truth them it does not have a explanation, my "1 + 1 = 2" example is here exactly to show that a necessary truth can have a explanation(on this case, the nature of the numbers). <br /><br />I remember Dr. Graham Oppy commiting the same mistake on a discussion of his. The thing is that i would say that instead of being a brute fact a necessary truth is either explained by itself(like the addition example) or by another(like "Walter existence is possible" being explained by a necessary being existence). The idea of a truth that by itself could be false but just happen to be a necessary truth just is not inteligible to me. <br /><br />@Alexander<br /><br />Thanks, that would help. I tried to read again now that it is sooner that last time and my mind is working better and i think that i understood you mostly.<br /><br />My dificult would be in your first comment were you comment this:<br /><br />"Therefore, us having a set of determined emergent moral values resulting from the lower-level psychological, biological, and physical processes that gave rise to humanity, values that are absolutely necessary *for us* given they're embedded in our very (also emergent) nature, and therefore true for our species, wouldn't be contradictory with there being no moral truths in an absolute sense, as all other moral sets also have so many 'a%', 'b%', 'c%' probabilities of emerging in a given volume 'V', and thus, in an infinitely large Universe, an almost 100% chance of actually emerging "somewheretime", each also absolutely necessary for the species in which it emerged."<br /><br />This i take to be the origin of morality on a atheist universe. Are you saying on the quote that thanks to the particular physical constitution we humans have there are certain ways of conduct(or moralities) that are necessary to our flourishing, in the sense that most of us not acting acordingly would mean that society would not work and that this means than they are in a way a sort-of objective morality to us? <br /><br />Like, if everyone killed people because they are annoying them society would collapse, so we humans have something like a obligation to not kill by a so silly reason? Did i get you right?Talmidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04267925670235640337noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-44937575397422053262021-10-03T08:17:53.680-07:002021-10-03T08:17:53.680-07:00The POE is based on God being seen as a moral agen...The POE is based on God being seen as a moral agent in the univocal way a virtuous rational creature is a moral agent. Theodicies are employed to try to morally justify God's inaction in the face of evil given His omnipotence and obvious ability to stop any evil in its tracks.<br /><br />But if God is not a moral agent like us given His Classic Theist Nature then moral evaluation of the Deity is incoherent. Like trying to judge wither or not Beckum is a good footballer based on his batting average. The later being a meaningful measure for a baseball player but not to a footballer.<br /><br />Given these facts the POE is a non-problem. Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-37005629784465483222021-10-03T06:35:55.305-07:002021-10-03T06:35:55.305-07:00@Talmid: I can explain the parts you didn't un...@Talmid: I can explain the parts you didn't understand in more details if you'd like, as years ago I wouldn't have understood what I just wrote either. :)<br /><br />Point out the parts that weren't clear, one at a time, and I'll do my best to unpack them.Alexander Gieghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12282340926229637743noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-26077195166808904532021-10-03T00:23:47.330-07:002021-10-03T00:23:47.330-07:00Talmid
"Rape is bad " is either a neces...Talmid<br /><br />"Rape is bad " is either a necessary truth or it is a contingent truth.<br />If it is a contingent truth, invoking God doesn't solve anything because in that case there is a possible world in which God condones rape.Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-35733998064888368802021-10-02T20:39:14.861-07:002021-10-02T20:39:14.861-07:00@Walter
I would say that 1 + 1 = 2 is true thanks...@Walter<br /><br />I would say that 1 + 1 = 2 is true thanks to what 1, 2 etc are, so it is kinda self-explanatory. It would be a logical contradiction to it to not be what it is.<br /><br />On morality, there are a lot of worldviews were things are diferent. Rape being wrong can look self-evident to us and most humans that ever lived but i don't see why it being moraly indiferent would be logically contradictory. It would be if you assume certain worldviews but only because on these worldviews there are facts about humans and other things that would entail it being wrong, though. <br /><br />"Rape is bad" does not seems what Kant call analytic a priori, it seems that you need facts about the world to know that it is right. <br /><br />@Alexander<br /><br />Being honest with you, what you said mostly got over my head, so i can't comment much. I'am being serious, btw.<br /><br /> Sorry, that happens with me a lot here, being still a talmid and all that :(<br />If Mister Geocon or Walter or another want to comment, i think it would be better, for i doubt that everybody also failed to get what you said. Talmidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04267925670235640337noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69895020229245328552021-10-02T11:47:26.990-07:002021-10-02T11:47:26.990-07:00Well I think really think there is one so there yo...Well I think really think there is one so there you have it and if ye cani articulate it to me then ah well then.<br /><br />Go in peace.Son of Ya'Kovhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05645132954231868592noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-42351060576365868632021-10-02T06:23:48.242-07:002021-10-02T06:23:48.242-07:00@Daniel: That's Saint Augustine's point, p...@Daniel: That's Saint Augustine's point, precisely. If I remember right, he argues against skeptics by stating that if one believes only their own senses and nothing more, then one lives in an extremely limited way, that one must take on faith assertions they cannot personally experience, such as that this man is their father and that woman their mother, this first leap of faith expanding their world in a way that adds to it, not subtracts from it. Further leaps of faith do similarly, until one reaches the limits of what can be achieved by natural faith alone. And that to expand beyond that requires a final leap of faith towards information that cannot be obtained through natural means as it's strictly inaccessible, and thus can only be attained through supernatural revelation.Alexander Gieghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12282340926229637743noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-69143857065368286922021-10-02T05:58:34.036-07:002021-10-02T05:58:34.036-07:00@Talmid: That's the point. I'm also a mora...@Talmid: That's the point. I'm also a moral realist, but I take contextualization into account in a much stronger way than Christian realism does.<br /><br />Contextualization is present in the Bible with these distinct moral codes it details:<br /><br />a) For God Himself towards creation;<br /><br />b) For virtuous pagans (the Noahide code);<br /><br />c) For Hebrews towards Hebrews;<br /><br />d) For Hebrews towards non-Hebrews;<br /><br />e) For Christians towards Christians;<br /><br />f) For before-death Christians towards non-Christians;<br /><br />g) For after-death Christians towards the damned.<br /><br />As well as for how angels act towards; h) other angels; i) demons; j) pre-fall humans; k) pagans; l) Hebrews; m) Christians; n) the damned.<br /><br />There are intersections of varying sizes between these, but also broad divergences, which are rationalized away on the basis of higher level meta-ethical principles, which then filter down into these 14 specific moralities.<br /><br />The take I presented is similarly structured, but coming from the other direction. In there's a lower level, reductive but still strictly real and objective meta-ethical fundamental that gives rise to so many also real, also objective, contextual moralities, none of which is arbitrarily chosen, or willy-nilly changeable.<br /><br />And if we presume a single Creator in this scenario, be Him encompassingly hylomorphic or merely causally effective, then it follows these contextually objective real moralities are also, by definition, so many contingent instantiations of higher level meta-ethical principles. Which may well include, as a subset, the 14 moral codes I referred above.Alexander Gieghttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12282340926229637743noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-30765630935620755592021-10-02T00:59:33.328-07:002021-10-02T00:59:33.328-07:00Talmid
I don't really understand your questio...Talmid<br /><br />I don't really understand your question. <br />I don't see the contradiction in oral truths are necessary truths that are just there.<br />having no basis on anything else.<br />Asking why they couldn't be different is assuming they are contingent, but I think they are necessary.<br />I guess you don't think that 1 + 1 could be 3, so in the same way rape e.g. could not be good.<br /><br />of course, this has to do with human nature. If human nature were such that little girls enjoyed being raped and in fact would benefit from being raped, then rape would be good.Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-71774394558668969882021-10-02T00:50:04.859-07:002021-10-02T00:50:04.859-07:00"I don't see the problem?"
That'..."I don't see the problem?"<br /><br />That's a pity.Walter Van den Ackerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16101735542155226072noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8954608646904080796.post-46094714683177878712021-10-01T20:34:30.724-07:002021-10-01T20:34:30.724-07:00@Alexander
My question was to Walter, really. He ...@Alexander<br /><br />My question was to Walter, really. He has a particular morality in mind while saying that a good person does not do x and i wanted to understand his view so we could contrast it with the catholic one. <br /><br />And Walter and i are both moral realists, so we are pressuposing that only one morality is true. Talmidhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04267925670235640337noreply@blogger.com