Wednesday, June 10, 2020

Theology and the analytic a posteriori


Philosophers traditionally distinguish between analytic and synthetic propositions.  An analytic proposition is one that is true or false by virtue of the relations between its constituent concepts.  A stock example is “All bachelors are unmarried,” which is true because the concept of being unmarried is included in the concept of being a bachelor.  A synthetic proposition is true by virtue of something beyond the relations between its constituent concepts.  For example, the proposition “Some bachelors are lonely” is true by virtue of a contingent empirical relation between being a bachelor and being lonely, rather than a necessary conceptual relation between them.

A second traditional distinction is that between propositions knowable a priori and those knowable a posteriori.  A priori propositions are those knowable independently of sensory experience.  A stock example would be an arithmetical proposition like 2 + 2 = 4.  An a posteriori proposition is one that is known through sensory experience.  An example would be “There are two cars in the parking lot.”

Kant noted that combining these notions yields four putative classes of proposition:

1. Analytic a priori

2. Analytic a posteriori

3. Synthetic a priori

4. Synthetic a posteriori

Classes 1 and 4 are relatively unremarkable.  The analytic proposition “All bachelors are unmarried” is knowable a priori precisely because we know that the concept of being unmarried is included in the concept of being a bachelor.  You don’t need to rely on observation in order to determine that it is true, but merely need to understand the concepts.  “Some bachelors are lonely” is known a posteriori precisely because it is only the observable facts that reveal to us its truth.  Understanding the concepts is not enough.

Class 3, the synthetic a priori, is of course the one that Kant was famously concerned about.  Such a proposition would be one which is not true merely by virtue of the relations between its constituent concepts, but nevertheless can be known without relying on experience.  Kant held both that it is difficult to see how there could be such propositions, but also that there must be if knowledge of the natural order is to be possible. 

The reasons had to do with the implications of Hume’s empiricism.  For example, Hume seemed to have shown that necessary causal connections between things could not be known a posteriori, since we have no impression (in Hume’s sense of the term) of any force or power in a cause that necessitates its effect.  But he also seemed to have shown that such causal connections are not analytic either, insofar as causes and effects are “loose and separate” and in principle any effect or none might follow upon any cause.  Hence to be knowable, causal connections would have to synthetic a priori.  Explaining how there could be such knowledge is the starting point of Kant’s system.

Naturally, as a Scholastic Aristotelian I don’t agree with the whole way Hume, Kant, and the other early moderns frame these issues, much less with their conclusions.  But that’s not my topic here.  My topic has to do with something else Kant says, which is that in fact there cannot be such a thing as class 2 or analytic a posteriori propositions.  For analytic propositions are necessary, and what is necessary, Kant thinks, is knowable a priori. 

But knowable to whom?  Consider the proposition “God exists” as understood by classical theists like Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas.  Addressing the question whether this is a self-evident proposition, Aquinas writes:

A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us.  A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as “Man is an animal,” for animal is contained in the essence of man.  If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all… If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition… Therefore I say that this proposition, “God exists,” of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence... Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature – namely, by effects.  (Summa Theologiae I.2.1)

The demonstrations Aquinas refers to in the last sentence are arguments like the proof of a first cause in De Ente et Essentia, which argues that anything the essence of which is distinct from its existence must have a cause the essence of which is identical to its existence.  (This is “the Thomistic proof” that I defend in Five Proofs of the Existence of God.)  The proof shows that the ultimate cause of things cannot be something which merely has being in a derivative way, but must be something which just is subsistent being itself.

Now, because God just is being itself, to know the essence of God would entail knowing that God exists.  In that sense, the proposition “God exists” has in itself the self-evidence of an analytic proposition.  But we know this only because we’ve reasoned from the existence of the things of our experience to an ultimate cause having this essence.  So we’ve arrived at it in an a posteriori way.  And that’s the only way we can arrive at it.  Because of the limitations of our intellects, our conceptualization of God is too imperfect to enable us to “cut to the chase” and get to knowledge of his existence directly, merely from a grasp of the concept of God.  (You might say: The ontological argument works, but not for intellects as limited as ours.)

In the same article from which I just quoted, Aquinas cites the proposition “that incorporeal substances are not in space” as an example of something “self-evident only to the learned.”  You need a certain amount of sophistication to grasp the constituent concepts well enough to know it a priori.  Someone who is not learned could still know it on the basis of the authority of someone who is.  But the unlearned person could also at least in principle come to know it a priori himself, once he acquires sufficient knowledge.  That possibility might make Kant reluctant to concede that an example like this is a genuine case of an analytic a posteriori proposition. 

But the proposition “God exists” differs from this example, in Aquinas’s view, insofar as failing to know it a priori is not merely a consequence of lacking sufficient learning.  No amount of learning would make it knowable a priori for the human intellect left just to its natural capacities.  We human beings can reason a posteriori to the conclusion that God exists and that his essence must be such that to know it perfectly would suffice all by itself to afford us knowledge of his existence.  So we know that the proposition “God exists” must be analytically true and knowable a priori for anyone with a sufficiently penetrating grasp of the constituent concepts.  But we don’t have such a grasp, and so we don’t know the proposition in that manner.  Hence, we have in this case an example of a proposition that is in a clear sense analytic a posteriori, at least for us.

This particular example comes from natural theology, that body of knowledge about God’s existence and nature that is available to us via purely philosophical arguments and apart from special divine revelation.  But other examples would come from revealed theology, which includes propositions about the divine nature that could not in principle have been arrived at through purely philosophical means and are knowable only if specially revealed by God.  The doctrine of the Trinity is an example.  If we had a perfect grasp of the divine essence, we would see that the claim that God is three Persons in one divine nature is as necessary and self-evident as “All bachelors are unmarried.”  But in fact our grasp is so imperfect that we cannot arrive at knowledge of this claim even through indirect natural means, through philosophical arguments, as we can with “God exists.”  We need supernatural assistance.

This assistance comes via a divine revelation backed by miracles, and in particular via the teaching of Christ.  And that is something we know about only a posteriori.  So, once again we have an example of a proposition that is in a clear sense analytic a posteriori.

212 comments:

  1. Terrific as ever.
    Of the five arguments you defend in your most recent book on the existence of God, four of them use analytic a posteriori logic (the cosmological arguments). However, the Augustinian argument is an interesting case, because one can argue that it is both: on the one hand, it is an argument from the nature and existence of abstract objects, which we can know a priori. On the other hand, in order to eliminate the other possible perspectives that you look at that could be alternatives to Scholastic realism (Platonism and Aristotelian realism) you need to have a posteriori knowledge.

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  2. Doesn't Saul Kripke argue for analytic a posteriori truths also?

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  3. Well, as usual, I loved everything in the OP until you folded in the Trinity part:

    If we had a perfect grasp of the divine essence, we would see that the claim that God is three Persons in one divine nature is as necessary and self-evident as “All bachelors are unmarried.”

    But "three persons in one essence" isn't hard to grasp at all. We have 3, 30, 3,000, 3,000,000, etc. persons in one human essence, and depending on the number of persons discussed (let's say 3), we have three humans. And if we're discussing three persons of the divine essence, we have three Gods. Very simple and easy to understand. But wait! Three Gods is an impossibility, and the essence of God cannot be multiplied. There is only one, undivided Godhead devoid of any real composition. And in that case, we're not asserting that "All bachelors are unmarried"; we're asserting that "All bachelors are married." If there is any aspect of the Godhead that is unique to a person, then the Godhead is composed. And if there is no aspect of the Godhead that is unique to a person, then the distinction is outside the Godhead.

    As Aquinas said, whatever is not of the divine essence is a creature, so it appears that the "real" distinction between the persons (the relations) is creaturely. But wait again! Aquinas states that the relations ARE the divine essence, and that the relations are really distinct. Note, they are not nominally distinct (as in love, justice, mercy and judgment); they are really distinct. But that asserts that the very thing which makes them common (principle of commonality (PC), the divine essence) is the very thing that makes them distinct (principle of distinction (PD), the divine essence), which is a straight contradiction because it asserts that each person is really different without differing in any real way. And if there is a REAL difference in the divine essence unique to each person, then per above, the essence is composed. Only by multiplication can we have a common essence and individual instantiations of the essence, but since God cannot be multiplied, there cannot be multiple persons or instantiations of God. So, it appears that we're reaping the benefit of multiplication while denying it in the same argument. To paraphrase Geisler, you cannot ascend the rope of multiplication and thereupon deny that the rope can be so used.

    If against this it is asserted that God is merely relating to Himself in different ways, that He is one undivided being (one person?) who relates to Himself in three different ways, then you're affirming modalism, not the Trinity.

    At bottom, I don't think the very good argument you present here at all applies to the Trinity.

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    1. “ Only by multiplication can we have a common essence and individual instantiations of the essence, but since God cannot be multiplied, there cannot be multiple persons or instantiations of God.”

      I do not think this applies to the infinite. What is one times infinity? What is three times infinity? They are both infinity. It seems that relation as it applies to God is a sui generis category, and that if we truly new the infinite divine essence, we would know that it has this relational, immaterial, non-composite structure.

      That is why there can never be a triune angel or human. You have to be infinite.

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    2. @Scott, you write:

      I do not think this applies to the infinite. What is one times infinity?

      Yes, it does apply according to Thomist metaphysics. Since God's essence is identical with His existence, He is not an instance of a kind like we are. Hence, it is impossible for there to be another existence with the same essence. Multiplication is possible precisely because we are finite (our essence is not to exist, hence, we need a cause).

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    3. Summa contra gentiles book 1 chapter 3

      [3] That there are certain truths about God that totally surpass man’s ability appears with the greatest evidence. Since, indeed, the principle of all knowledge that the reason perceives about some thing is the understanding of the very substance of that being (for according to Aristotle “what a thing is” is the principle of demonstration) [ Posterior Analytics II, 3], it is necessary that the way in which we understand the substance of a thing determines the way in which we know what belongs to it. Hence, if the human intellect comprehends the substance of some thing, for example, that of a stone or of a triangle, no intelligible characteristic belonging to that thing surpasses the grasp of the human reason. But this does not happen to us in the case of God. For the human intellect is not able to reach a comprehension of the divine substance through its natural power. For, according to its manner of knowing in the present life, the intellect depends on the sense for the origin of knowledge; and so those things that do not fall under the senses cannot be grasped by the human intellect except in so far as the knowledge of them is gathered from sensible things. Now, sensible things cannot lead the human intellect to the point of seeing in them the nature of the divine substance; for sensible things are effects that fall short of the power of their cause. Yet, beginning with sensible things, our intellect is led to the point of knowing about God that He exists, and other such characteristics that must be attributed to the First Principle. There are, consequently, some intelligible truths about God that are open to the human reason; but there are others that absolutely surpass its power.

      [4] We may easily see the same point from the gradation of intellects. Consider the case of two persons of whom one has a more penetrating grasp of a thing by his intellect than, does the other. He who has the superior intellect understands many things that the other cannot grasp at all. Such is the case with a very simple person who cannot at all grasp the subtle speculations of philosophy. But the intellect of an angel surpasses the human intellect much more than the intellect of the greatest philosopher surpasses the intellect of the most uncultivated simple person; for the distance between the best philosopher and a simple person is contained within the limits of the human species, which the angelic intellect surpasses. For the angel knows God on the basis of a more noble effect than does man; and this by as much as the substance of an angel, through which the angel in his natural knowledge is led to the knowledge of God, is nobler than sensible things and even than the soul itself, through which the human intellect mounts to the knowledge of God. The divine intellect surpasses the angelic intellect much more than the angelic surpasses the human. For the divine intellect is in its capacity equal to its substance, and therefore it understands fully what it is, including all its intelligible attributes. But by his natural knowledge the angel does not know what God is, since the substance itself of the angel, through which he is led to the knowledge of God, is an effect that is not equal to the power of its cause. Hence, the angel is not able, by means of his natural knowledge, to grasp all the things that God understands in Himself; nor is the human reason sufficient to grasp all the things that the angel understands through his own natural power. Just as, therefore, it would he the height of folly for a simple person to assert that what a philosopher proposes is false on the ground that he himself cannot understand it, so (and even more so) it is the acme of stupidity for a man to suspect as false what is divinely revealed through the ministry of the angels simply because it cannot be investigated by reason.

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    4. I also like this point in chapter 5 of the same book:

      [4] Another benefit that comes from the revelation to men of truths that exceed the reason is the curbing of presumption, which is the mother of error. For there are some who have such a presumptuous opinion of their own ability that they deem themselves able to measure the nature of everything; I mean to say that, in their estimation, everything is true that seems to them so, and everything is false that does not. So that the human mind, therefore, might be freed from this presumption and come to a humble inquiry after truth, it was necessary that some things should be proposed to man by God that would completely surpass his intellect.

      I think its just a matter of humility to accept that there are some things we cannot ever know, in principle, because of our finite human understanding.

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    5. @Daniel

      Nobody argues that we understand everything about God. That's not the issue. The issue is affirming logical contradictions. When our presentation includes PC = PD, we take the wheels off our argument.

      When you tell me that my salvation is dependent on my affirming that there are three fully divine persons in the Godhead, that each person is really distinct from each other, that God is simple, and that there is only one God, I can only reply that you might as well insist that I affirm the existence of square circles. I cannot affirm a contradiction---I don't even know WHAT I'm supposed to affirm! And you cannot know what you're affirming when your affirmations cancel out each other.

      Moreover, if "beyond comprehension" is an out for you, then it's an out for everybody else. Any attempt to refute competing doctrines is undermined because their proponents can also appeal to a realm beyond the reach of finite reason.

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    6. Not every claim that something is beyond comprehension is of equal value. Also, there are reasons that might motivate one to believe in an apparent contradiction. Aquinas lists a few here in chapter 6.

      [1] Those who place their faith in this truth, however, “for which the human reason offers no experimental evidence,” do not believe foolishly, as though “following artificial fables” (2 Peter 2:16). For these “secrets of divine Wisdom” (Job 11:6) the divine Wisdom itself, which knows all things to the full, has deigned to reveal to men. It reveals its own presence, as well as the truth of its teaching and inspiration, by fitting arguments; and in order to confirm those truths that exceed natural knowledge, it gives visible manifestation to works that surpass the ability of all nature. Thus, there are the wonderful cures of illnesses, there is the raising of the dead, and the wonderful immutation in the heavenly bodies; and what is more wonderful, there is the inspiration given to human minds, so that simple and untutored persons, filled with the gift of the Holy Spirit, come to possess instantaneously the highest wisdom and the readiest eloquence. When these arguments were examined, through the efficacy of the abovementioned proof, and not the violent assault of arms or the promise of pleasure, and (what is most wonderful of all) in the midst of the tyranny of the persecutors, an innumerable throng of people, both simple and most learned, flocked to the Christian faith. In this faith there are truths preached that surpass every human intellect; the pleasures of the flesh are curbed; it is taught that the things of the world should be spurned. Now, for the minds of mortal men to assent to these things is the greatest of miracles, just as it is a manifest work of divine inspiration that, spurning visible things, men should seek only what is invisible. Now, that this has happened neither without preparation nor by chance, but as a result of the disposition of God, is clear from the fact that through many pronouncements of the ancient prophets God had foretold that He would do this. The books of these prophets are held in veneration among us Christians, since they give witness to our faith.

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    7. I would read Boethius’ De Trinitate. What you are essentially saying is that humans know all of the ways that the category Relation can be predicated. You are saying that relation MUST be between one part and another part, one individual and another individual, or one species and another species or some combination therein.

      But why is it impossible for a whole substance to be related to itself? Granted this only happens in the reason with regards to finite substances. But it is it a logical contradiction to say that an infinite substance is really related to itself? I think you would have to know what an infinite substance was like to make that claim.

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    8. @Daniel

      Nothing in your citation embraces contradictions. To repeat, something beyond human comprehension isn't the same thing as affirming a direct inversion. And if you concede that inversions are acceptable, you render vacuous any attempt to rebut competing claims.

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    9. @Scott

      I addressed your objection above. If God is merely relating to Himself, then you're affirming something indistinct from modalism.

      Moreover, love, justice, mercy and judgment are "real" attributes of God, but they are ontologically one in His undivided being. If that's your argument, you are again affirming something indistinct from modalism. But the Doctrine of the Trinity (DT) denies that the persons of the Godhead are logical or notional distinctions, and that's where the wheels come off.

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    10. I would say the contradictions are only apparent because we have no direct experience of infinity or what God's substance is like. We only reach our knowledge of the existence of God from his effects, which are not proportional to their cause. I take my queues from revelation on this question.

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    11. @Daniel

      And your opponents can say the same thing. You thus have no basis for claiming that any contrary assertion about the essence of God is false. Everybody can cry, "Mystery!" and keep on truckin'.

      Moreover, diving for the mystery bushes doesn't work because of the already-stated difference between a genuine mystery and a logical inversion. God's essence to exist is mind-boggling but not contradictory. God's attributes being all one in Him is mind-boggling but not contradictory. Defining God as composite while denying that God is composite is both mind-boggling and contradictory. Affirming a contradiction is affirming a falsehood. Big dif.

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    12. And your opponents can say the same thing. You thus have no basis for claiming that any contrary assertion about the essence of God is false. Everybody can cry, "Mystery!" and keep on truckin'.


      I have 2020 years of tradition, implicitly from the time of the bible, explicitly from Nicaea to back me.

      Moreover, diving for the mystery bushes doesn't work because of the already-stated difference between a genuine mystery and a logical inversion. God's essence to exist is mind-boggling but not contradictory. God's attributes being all one in Him is mind-boggling but not contradictory. Defining God as composite while denying that God is composite is both mind-boggling and contradictory. Affirming a contradiction is affirming a falsehood. Big dif.


      Only an apparent contradiction. So no contradiction required. No difference.

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    13. I have 2020 years of tradition, implicitly from the time of the bible, explicitly from Nicaea to back me.

      And the Jews, which deny the Trinity, have an even older tradition. Sorry, but you're firing blanks.

      Only an apparent contradiction. So no contradiction required. No difference.

      Back to square one. You have no basis for refuting any competing view. Now everybody can say "apparent contradiction" and resolve all difficulties. Relativism 101

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    14. And the Jews, which deny the Trinity, have an even older tradition. Sorry, but you're firing blanks.

      I agree in the sense that this is an argument from revelation. But you have provided no argument to reject the Christian revelation. You've just provided version 1.0. and completely ignored version 2.0.

      Back to square one. You have no basis for refuting any competing view. Now everybody can say "apparent contradiction" and resolve all difficulties. Relativism 101

      This is a question of revelation. You have not refuted my argument from revelation at all. In addition, you have not explained why you somehow have insight into what it is like to be the infinite and eternal being. Do you have direct experience of what this is like? If not, then how can you be so certain that you can posit a logical contradiction?

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    15. I agree in the sense that this is an argument from revelation. But you have provided no argument to reject the Christian revelation.

      I am under no obligation whatsoever to refute your hallucinations. Like the Mormon's "burning in the bosom," whatever you feel or see is not an argument; it is merely an experience claim.

      If you, however, tell me that I'll suffer damnation if I don't affirm a particular belief, then its perfectly reasonable for me to ask you what that belief is. And when you tell me that said belief is something on par with square circles and married bachelors, then I'm also correct to say that you're telling me to believe something unintelligible.

      When you attempt to resolve the very clear contradiction by appealing to a zone beyond which reason can reach, I can also rightly reply that any "ism" can claim the same. "Well, those isms are false because our ism is older than their ism." Again, that's not true. The Jewish "ism" is a lot older than yours, and it has the advantage of being at least intelligible. "Well, our revelation is superior..." And I reply that proof by assertion is still fallacious. Bare claims are not persuasive. Go ahead and tell me that you talk to aliens from Mars. I have no way of refuting that, but don't expect any sane person to believe you unless you come up with something more than a personal revelation.

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    16. Fair enough. Aquinas would be the first to admit that the truth of the trinity is beyond our ability to reason to. So if you must take it that way, then I have to respect your decision.

      Still, I point you to the historical claims of the bible - the resurrection, the miracles of Christ, the pretty much the constant tradition in the Catholic and Orthodox churches, and so on. If those have no impact on you, the so be it. I'll pray for your soul and wish you the best.

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    17. Thanks, Daniel. I appreciate the sentiment (really), and I really am a fan of Dr. Feser. I've read many of his books, and he is directly responsible for solidifying my Thomist leanings.

      The conversations here are great, excepting of course the troll posts, but I guess that has to be endured due to the nature of the platform used.

      All the best.

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    18. Certainly we can envision scenarios in which, due to the limitations of the individuals involved, an apparent contradiction may in fact not be real.

      Consider the case of a three dimensional being trying to explain a cube to a two dimensional being. A 3-D being insists that none of the lines intersect except at the vertices and that furthermore, each vertices is connected to three other vertices. A 2-D skeptic scoffs, explaining, correctly, that a 2-D version of the shape would have intersecting lines and thus insists that a contradiction exists.

      We might, however, imagine that we can eventually explain the situation to a 2-dimensional figure, by analogy to the dimensions they already understand. After all, we can achieve a shaky understanding of what four dimensional objects might be like. What if we were trying to explain to a 1-Dimensional being, though?

      Such a being would only know one dimension and therefore probably wouldn't even be able to coherently understand what was meant by "dimension" at all, much less what was meant by "plane" or "cube". Any attempt to explain the line segments composing a cube would doubtless lead to many apparently absurd contradictions, leading many such beings to insist the 3D being is talking nonsense.

      Given this analogy, it seems clear that there may be ways of existing which we simply are incapable of understanding because they do not obtain in our world. If so, there may exist apparent contradictions that are in fact not contradictory from a divine perspective. For Bill's argument to go through, it seems to me he needs to know the unknowable -- that there are no logically possible modes of being of which we are simply ignorant due to our nature.

      It's true, of course, that our 1D being will never understand the 3D explanation (unless somehow it were to become 3D itself), but I think it could nevertheless affirm it to be true on the basis of *testimony* from a 2D or 3D being that interacts with it.

      Also, the accusation that people will go to hell for incorrect understandings of the Trinity is mostly a red herring. There are plenty of saved Christians who do not have a classical understanding and who in fact unknowingly affirm heresies. God may also grant grace to those who, while *knowingly* affirming heresies, admit that they were wrong once confronted with the reality of God Himself after death. Obviously, no one who insists on telling God to His face that He is lying about His own nature will get into heaven, but surely that's more a matter of them refusing to see reason and insisting on having reality bow to their own wishes than a matter of a misunderstanding somehow keeping them from heaven. We can't be *confident* in their salvation, since we don't know how they will react, but I don't see any problem with affirming that it is *possible,* assuming, again, a postmortem change in position.

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    19. @Jared

      Your post implicitly acknowledges the "contradictions" but mitigates them by appealing to a possible upper-level dimension beyond our current ability to experience. Interestingly enough, I had a similar conversation on another thread a few months ago, but this appeal is substantively no different than what we've been arguing here. If you can appeal to third or fourth dimension, so can everybody else. You are thus bereft of any warrant to call any ism true or false. On that standard, the DT is no more persuasive than Arianism or modalism. In fact, the latter two are more persuasive because they don't stumble out of the gate over logical inversions.

      You write:

      Also, the accusation that people will go to hell for incorrect understandings of the Trinity is mostly a red herring.

      Well, many Christians make that profession mandatory, including a church council or two way back when. If you disavow those sentiments, then my comments along that line don't apply to you. If you don't expect me to believe it, I sincerely thank you.

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    20. Bill,

      You did not respond to my objection above. You can only claim that my position is indistinguishable from Modalism if you can prove that an infinite substance cannot have real relations with itself while being non-composite.

      The trinity knot (trefoil knot) is the best (albeit very imperfect) mental image for the concept. You have a single string with a structural relationship to itself. Now of course that can be broken up into form matter distinction which is why the analogy is imperfect. A better analogy yet is the universal mathematical concept of a trefoil knot. Being a universal, it is immaterial. It is a single self-relational structural entity.

      Of course even that breaks down because of the essence/existence distinction.

      The point is, God actually IS something. He is not a mere abstraction. So what IS that thing that He is? Whatever He is as it turns out, is a self-relational yet simple entity. The whole self is related to the whole self via the eternal Divine Activity.

      In order to say that is a contradiction, you would have to have a fully worked out definition of being, relation, etc. But considering these are transcendental concepts, that is going to be very difficult to do. Does that clarify my position a bit?

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    21. Bill,

      Also, I would be careful with starting with the Trinity as an anti-Christian apologetic. Your square-circle analogy breaks down because squares and circles are both very easy to understand. Transcendental concepts like being, one, etc. are not so easily understood. And of course, God cannot be comprehended at all. Thomists already accept the doctrine of analogical predication, so immediately out of the gate, we already know our language will fall short. Yes there are real distinctions in the Godhead, but we already know before investigating revelation (from natural theology) that any category that we predicate of God (being, relation, etc.) is going to have no parallel in creation.

      Trying to refute Christianity by refuting the Trinity is kind of like trying to refute modern science by picking holes apart in Quantum Field Theory. Perhaps you can do so, but it is very easy that, being a non-expert, you are making a subtle mistake in your thinking, which seems to be evident.

      I am not saying that to shut down the discussion. You are free to pose your objections, and they are welcome here. However, you do want to be cautious, as I said. My recommendation would be to analyze the veracity of the revelation itself first, then come to the Trinity. At the end of the day, you could always be a Sabellian or an Arian.

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    22. But I would say you should be Catholic. Haha!

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    23. @Scott

      You did not respond to my objection above. You can only claim that my position is indistinguishable from Modalism if you can prove that an infinite substance cannot have real relations with itself while being non-composite.

      ?? I never claimed that an infinite being cannot have real relations with Himself. Modalists claim the same thing, so there's no difference between the two on that score. I claimed that a real distinction in the essence is composition defined. For if there is any aspect of the essence unique to a person, then the whole is dependent on the parts. That of course can be resolved if the difference is merely logical. If you deny a real distinction in the essence, that God is merely having relations with Himself and calls those relations by different names (Father, Son & Holy Spirit), that again is no different from what a modalist claims. How, then, is what you believe different from modalism?

      If you argue for modalism and call it the Trinity, there's nothing to "rebut." God is merely having relations with Himself to fulfill whatever purpose pleases Him. There's nothing contradictory about that, and He doesn't need two additional persons to accomplish that.

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    24. @Scott

      I'm not interested in refuting Christianity, especially since I am one. And "square circles" is merely illustrative of the point that I am making. I've already stated that I'm a Thomist, so I'm quite familiar with "analogical predication."

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    25. Historically speaking, I think the councils were looking at which position most aligned with scripture and tradition. They could have gone Arian or Sabelian, but they choose Catholicism. From what I remember, at one point almost 80% of bishops were for Arianism.

      For me though, the incarnation is sort of emptied of its meaning if either of those alternatives are true. And it sort of makes the whole ministry of Christ seem pointless.

      Again, these are arguments about Mars, but for me, the rational, deductive arguments for the existence of God are merely a preamble to my faith. The revelation as expressed in/by Christ forms the content.

      No need to respond, but just thought I would put that out there. Ed's blog has more to do with Natural Theology then Christian revelation based theology anyway.

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    26. You are a Christian, yet you reject the Trinity?

      I feel like square circles is a poor illustration because it gives the impression that you can easily comprehend the terms and the predicate. But of course, that is not true in the case of the Trinity. In fact they cabbie be comprehended in principle, as you well know.

      Thomas Aquinas believed in real relations of the self to the self. These real relations are the real distinctions of three Persons of the Godhead. However, these are not distinctions of parts because each Person fully possess the one and same Divine Essence. Otherwise, the Persons of the Trinity, being parts of the Divine Essence, would be More fundamental than the Divine Essence itself, but tat is not the case. The distinctions are of the whole self with the whole self. How can a thing be relationally distinct from itself? Well it appears that whatever the infinite and eternal Divine Act is, it is this wholly threefold act of procession. But being infinite, the Essence of each proceeding person is the same as what “came before” (of course the proceeding is eternal, so I am using these temporal words metaphorically). However, since there is indeed a real activity, and not a mere abstract and static being, there is a real relation.

      Again, Aquinas seems to be making Relation into a sui generis category that far outstrips the way it is used in Aristotle’s Categories, even if there is some analogy there. Of course, that is pretty much what you are forced to do if you want to talk about an Infinite God.

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    27. To clarify, Aquinas believed in real relations if the self to the self in God, nor in creatures.

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    28. And the Jews, which deny the Trinity, have an even older tradition. Sorry, but you're firing blanks.

      "And God said: 'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness...' "

      "The Lord appeared to Abraham near the large trees of Mamre. Abraham was sitting at the entrance to his tent. It was the hottest time of the day. Abraham looked up and saw three men standing nearby."

      The fact that the Jews today do not believe in the Trinity does not imply that the revelation made to the Jews did not reveal the Trinity.

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    29. @Tony

      The fact that the Jews today do not believe in the Trinity does not imply that the revelation made to the Jews did not reveal the Trinity.

      If you’ve read the posts above, you should know that your line of reasoning doesn’t work. The verses you cite cannot override the singular personhood of God because the “apparent contradiction” or “inconsistency” is resolved in a higher dimension of existence. As we all know by now, the intricacies of God’s essence are beyond the reach of human reason, so though you see an inconsistency between Jewish teaching and the Bible, it’s only due to your failure to see God’s higher level of existence. It’s a “mystery,” and since Jewish elders have the final say on matters of controversy, you’re not in a position to question them. Their tradition is far older than yours and “mystery” covers every blemish your finite, fallible eyes might see.

      With respect to Ge. 1:26, the next verse says, “So God created man in HIS own image, in the image of God created HE him; male and female created HE them.” Isaiah 44:24 says, “I am the LORD that maketh all things; that stretcheth forth the heavens ALONE; that spreadeth abroad the earth by MYSELF.” In fact, the creation account is given many times in the Old Testament and EVERY time God refers to himself in the first person singular (I, Me, Myself) or is referred to with the masculine singular pronouns He, Him and His. In fact, Jesus Himself stated in Mt. 19:4, “Have ye not read, that HE which made them in the beginning made them male and female.” God is one person, not three. So, no. Ge. 1:26 does NOT teach a Trinity. God was either using the majestic plural or He was speaking to the angels.

      Abraham’s encounter with “three men” (Ge. 18) has nothing to do with the Trinity. Read the whole chapter and the first verse of Chapter 19. The two men with the Lord were the angels that continued to Sodom to bring Lot and his family out prior to said city’s destruction.

      You don’t know me, so there’s no reason for you to take my word for it. Trinitarian scholars reject the notion that the verses you cite are trinitarian prooftexts.

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    30. Unfortunately, it seems to me that I am late for this debate concerning the apparent antinomy between Divine Simplicity and the Trinitarian Relations. And since English is not my native language, I am not sure I can articulate my ideas as I would do in portuguese.

      Anyway, I would like to say a couple of things in response to Bill. First of all, I completely agree with you when you say that a logical contradiction can not be solved with an appeal to mistery. The principle of non-contradiction is universal and transcendent - and even Fr. Garrigou Lagrange, commenting on this issue, says:

      "[...] This is the same as saying that this axiom does not apply to God. But this axiom is directly derived from the principle of contradiction or identity, which patently must be applicable to God analogically because it is the law of being as being, the most universal law therefore, apart from which there is nothing but absurdity, which would be unthinkable."

      However, there is no incoherence in the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity nor is it incompatible with Divine Simplicity. To understand this, we must keep in mind that between Divine essence e the relations there are no real distinctions - there is, however, a virtual distinction, i.e., a logical distinction grounded in reality.

      Paternity and the Divine essence, for example, are really the same, but there is an opposition between Paternity and Sonship - an opposition that does not exist between Sonship and the Divine Essence. Therefore, the trinitarian relations are virtually distinct from the essence of God.

      Finally, this virtual distinction grounds a real distinction between the the three persons in the Godhead.

      Saint Thomas answers this objection twice - in the Summa Theologiae and in De Potentia. Let me transcribe the objection and Aquinas' reply.

      Summa Theologiae:

      "Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relations are not really distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with the same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God is really the same as the divine essence. Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other.

      Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this argument holds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing are identified with each other, if the identity be real and logical; as, for instance, a tunic and a garment; but not if they differ logically. Hence in the same place he says that although action is the same as motion, and likewise passion; still it does not follow that action and passion are the same; because action implies reference as of something "from which" there is motion in the thing moved; whereas passion implies reference as of something "which is from" another. Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as the divine essence; nevertheless these two in their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. Hence they are distinguished from each other."

      De Potentia:

      "10. If two things are the same with each other, where one is there is the other. If then the divine essence is the same thing with Paternity, wheresoever is the divine essence there will be Paternity. But it is in the Son. Therefore Paternity is also: which is clearly false.

      Reply to the Tenth Objection. If two things be the same both really and logically, wherever the one is there must the other be. But this does not necessarily apply when they are the same really but not logically: thus the same instant is the beginning of the future and the end of the past: yet not the beginning of the future but that which is the beginning of the future is said to be in the past. In like manner we do not say that Paternity is in the Son, but that which is Paternity, the essence."

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    31. Scott, thanks for the little lesson on relations, but it was unnecessary because I’m quite familiar with it. You’re simply saying in a more elaborate manner that God can have a relationship with Himself. Neither modalism nor Arianism deny that, so it does nothing to prove multi-persons in God. If a finite human can have relations with himself, surely God is able to as well. Yet, I am not multiple persons or personalities; I am but one person.

      I am a pastor, a husband and a father (among many other things). I can take my wife to the park and hold her hand while we walk. While doing so, I am acting as her husband, but she may also want to discuss some spiritual issues that she’s facing. She sometimes says, “I am asking you as my pastor, not as my husband.” So, though I’m still holding her hand and walking with her, I am also counseling her as her pastor—fulfilling two roles simultaneously. My knowledge of her as her husband relates to the counsel that I give her as her pastor, yet I remain one person.

      When I’m alone and trying to think things through, the chess player in me will relate to the father in me which helps me to solve a developing situation with my children. Of course, God doesn’t need to think anything through, and He doesn’t need “figure out” problems, but in our “analogous predication,” we can say that illustrates in a most imperfect way divine relations. In no case is trinitarianism advanced.

      In fact, I’m not the only one that’s noticed this. None other than William Craig has observed the modalist tendencies of Aquinas’s thought. I know that you will vehemently deny that, but when you say that God has relations with Himself (“him” being a singular personal pronoun), you’re saying that God is one person who relates to Himself. As I’ve told you repeatedly, what you say is what a modalist theologian would say, and you’ve yet to show me what the difference is.

      My two cents: What you say isn’t what you think. The comments on this blog that are clearly trinitarian show a thinking that there are really three centers of consciousness in God that are unique to each person, that there really is some ultra-mysterious committee of three divinities that somehow exist as one divinity. You see a real PERSON of the Son loving and communicating with OTHER PERSONS (Father & Holy Spirit). Putting that on paper yields composition, so you have to deny it, but your official denial doesn’t produce what you think. If you listen closely, you might hear Sabellius clapping his hands.

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    32. Bill,

      Dont evict Scotus from the discussion of Simplicity and trinity. Or Palamas for that matter

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    33. @Unknown

      Thanks for your citations of Aquinas, but they are well-known. Logical or virtual distinctions involve the mental apprehension of two definitions which cannot be realized outside the mind, like concavity and convexity—as any concave line would be a convex line from another perspective. So, it isn’t helpful to appeal to such a distinction in defense of the Trinity.

      I’ve not argued that logical or notional distinctions are unreal. God’s mercy, judgment, love, etc., are REAL. From one perspective, God is love, from another, He is judgment, but all of His attributes are one in Him. He is not one part love, one part mercy, one part judgment, etc.; He just simply IS. So God’s judgment demanded the destruction of Sodom and its inhabitants, but His mercy also acted to save Lot and his family. God’s judgment and mercy “worked together” to save Lot, but there is not one person of judgment and another person of mercy. This is what I mean by borrowing modalist terms to defend simplicity while folding in a real PERSONAL difference between the persons of the Godhead.

      What makes each “person” God? If I understand you correctly, it’s the divine essence. There is thus a principle of commonality (PC) which identifies each person as fully God. How, then, is each person differentiated (PD)? Note, a distinction is a difference, and if A & B are really distinct from each other, as existing beings they would have some things in common and some things uncommon. The “uncommon” features are the divine relations.

      As someone noticed on these boards some time ago, the PC cannot be identical with the PD because it would then follow that what A & B have in common is identical with what they do not have in common, which is a straight contradiction (C = ~C). Moreover, the PC cannot account for the distinction, for if there were only the PC, then A & B would not be distinct, but identical. So, there must be something about A that differs from B in order to be really distinct, and that something is the PD. Rejecting that would mean that it is possible for A to be really distinct from B without differing in any way.

      According to Aquinas, “In whatever multitude of things is to be found something common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of distinction” (ST 1.40.2). Aquinas agrees that because “the persons agree in essence, it only remains to be said that the persons are distinguished from each other by the relations (ST 1.40.2). He elsewhere states that “the relations themselves are not to be distinguished from each other so far as they are identified with the essence” (ST 1.39.1). In other words, the real distinction cannot be accounted for by the essence, because you cannot distinguish them on the basis of what they have in common, but what they have uncommon. So, it seems clear that the PC cannot be identical with the PD.

      But Aquinas goes on to say that “relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility” and “in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same” (ST 1.28.2). This of course yields a straight contradiction: The divine essence cannot be identical with the relations (per above) and the essence is identical with the relations. Moreover, to state that the distinction is only in its mode of intelligibility and that they do not really differ from each other means that the core of trinitarian doctrine is a mental construct. And if it is but a mental construct, then there is no real distinction in God; it’s only as we perceive Him.

      Thank you for affirming the law of non-contradiction. As I’ve been noting, I don’t think that the DT can avoid contradictions. If you appeal to logical distinctions, you affirm something indistinct from modalism; if you insist on a real distinction (difference) in the divine essence, then you cannot avoid composition.

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    35. Bill, the questions you raise are very subtle and complex and I always prefer to talk about such issues in my own language. Nonetheless, I'll try and do my best in english.

      First of all, I think you know that logical distinctions are not merely verbal ones. I mean, a verbal distinction, between Aristotle and The Philosopher, for example, is a kind of logical distinction - but not the only one.

      That´s important, because a thomist - and Aquinas himself - would argue that we have a virtual distinction at one end (Divine essence/ subsistent relations) and a real distinction at the other end (Paternity/Filiation and Spiration/Procession).

      The apparent antinomy that must be solved is the following: the three persons are identical with the Divine essence, but if A=B and B=C, then A=C. And that´s the problem: the Father is not the Son, even though both are identical with the essence of God.

      To answer this objection, I would say that is logically possible and completely coherent the idea according to which two things are really opposed to each other and really identical with a third thing, as long as they hold a virtual distinction.

      It is not easy to demonstrate the aforementioned claim. Let me give an example: the idea of limits in mathematics.

      Take, for example, the function f(x)=3x+1. When f(1)=3.1+1=4. In this case, we say that the limit of f(x) is 4 when x tends to 1. The idea is the following: f(x) will get nearer and nearer to 4 as x gets nearer and nearer to 1.

      However, values near 1 can be greater than or less than 1. That´s what we call right handed limits and left-handed limits.

      When choose values such as 1.9 or 1.999 we evaluate left-handed limits - which means that the values chosen are less than 2. When we choose values such as 2.1 or 2.0001 we evaluate right-handed limits.

      Sometimes, right handed and left handed limits coincide - sometimes they don't. In my example, f(x)=3x+1, both limits are the same.

      Now, I'm afraid that my comment is already too long and I will have to summarize the next steps of the argument.

      In my example, both limits coincide - they are both equal to 4. There is no real distinction between each limit and f(1)=4. However, right-handed and left-handed limits and really distinct: they stand in a relation of opposition to each other.

      Actually, that's the idea Saint Thomas had in mind - centuries before differential calculus. He says that the end of the past and the beggining of the future are really the same instant, i.e., the present. But there is a virtual difference between them: the end of the past is a terminal point and the beggining of the future is a starting point. Past and future, however, stand in a relation of real opposition to each other. And so does the Father and the Son.

      Of course, this reasoning does not prove the existence of subsistent relations in the Godhead. But it shows that the alleged contradiction is not a contradiction at all.

      That's what I had to say. I am sorry for this long text.

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    36. Bill,

      The fact that you think Trinitarians believe God has three consciousnesses shows that you really misunderstand the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity or the Doctrine of the Trinity. Fr. Reginald Garrigou Lagrange explicitly denies a multiplicity of consciousnesses in God because that would imply a multiplicity of intellect and will. I feel like you are reading modernist assumptions into the Trinity.

      All Modalists deny REAL distinctions in the Godhead. They affirm merely logical distinctions. Aquinas (and I) affirms real distinctions in the way described above. These real relations (not merely logical relations) of the one essence to itself are the impetus for the three distinct Persons.

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    37. This is an example of faith seeking understanding. You have to start with the data of faith first, then work your way towards understanding how that data might be explained in a logically coherent way.

      If Bill is not already committed to the doctrine of the Trinity, no amount of discussion will help him resolve his issues. Trinitarian debates raged throughout the church for the first thousand years of church history. The true teaching of Christ and his church was settled during this time and a philosophical vocabulary developed to deal with many of these controversies. But no one will come to believe in the Trinity via these arguments! They will come to believe by first believing in the words of Christ, the authority of the church, and the constant witness of tradition. These are all authority based arguments primarily.

      I wanted to address what Luiz says here:

      First of all, I completely agree with you when you say that a logical contradiction can not be solved with an appeal to mystery. The principle of non-contradiction is universal and transcendent

      I wanted to clarify that I did not agreed with Bill that there was a logical contradiction, only that there was an apparent contradiction. As you are pointing out in your posts, the church has language it uses to cash this out. But as you are seeing, Bill simply can brush this all off, because he has not already accepted the doctrine of the Trinity by faith. And as you say, these are very complex issues that have been dealt with in various ways by different Theologians in the church using different systems. Basic terminology has evolved through time and church councils, but if Bill does not even accept those, then don't expect to make any progress with him on those fronts. If Bill is a protestant, he can simply says, this teaching or that council is not biblical then proclaim his own understanding of the teaching. The edifice that holds the Catholic teaching up is the Bible in combination with magisterial teachings expressed in councils and papal proclamations, and the witness of tradition.

      And even then, Bill may accept all of these and come off unconvinced by the theological vocabulary. He certainly wont go to hell on account of that, but will have to make a commitment to the church's basic teachings on the Trinity, and will need to do so despite his reservations. Is it Bill's fault that the church's grasping at words that express the mystery of the Holy Trinity fall short of expressing the reality? No. He must then somehow make an act of faith based on authority, despite his misgivings. This would be an act of humility and trust on his part that should not be scorned or diminished. In fact, I would see such a submission of his intellect to the data of faith as a movement of grace in his life.

      God bless,
      Daniel

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    38. Having said all of that, I do want to mention that, as a Catholic, I find it jarring when a protestant theologian, like William Craig for example, can so flippantly set himself against two thousand years of church teaching. For example, his comments on divine simplicity are of this sort. From my perspective as a Catholic, this just smacks of .... not sure how to say this politely... pride? Hubris? Arrogance? I know the protestant will turn around and accuse me as a Catholic of being childish or subservient to authority, but I don't think that fits.

      For example, Christ is literally the only conduit we have to knowing his Father. And we would have no knowledge whatsoever of the Holy Spirit without his telling his disciples that he would send the Holy Spirit to them. These aspects of the Trinity depend on trusting the Authority of Scripture, at the very least. So again, to have even the beginning of faith, you have to trust in Christ's words, especially as conveyed by John.

      Then you have the first council of Jerusalem, which defines the pattern for Christians on how to settle disputes about the teachings of the faith. The council resolved the issue, adding authority and credibility to Paul, lest he be running in vain. Again, Paul's message was believed partly because he had this authority to back him up.

      In short, authority is an essential part of how the faith was and still is propagated. And especially in this matter, the assent of faith is necessary. First to Christ, then the magisterium he setup, then the evidence from tradition and authoritative councils and the like. Such that, if I had to chose between Craig and the church, my choice is a no brainer. At least on issues like the proper understanding of the Trinity.

      And Bill, you may claim that Trinitarian folks are implicitly acting as though they accept Sabellius, but that is only on account of the weakness of our human understanding. I cannot imagine what it is like to be part of the Trinity. I more often than not, pray to Jesus, sometimes I invoke the Holy Spirit. I also sometimes pray to the Father directly. I always end my prayers by using the sign of the cross, in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. I understand the teaching of the church that there are three distinct persons and one Godhead. But I have no idea how to relate to them as a unity, from the experiential standpoint. But I accept that they are somehow united, based on the authoritative teachings of the church and the words of Christ. I imagine, from a strictly experiential perspective, I am sometimes showing Arian or Sabellian tendencies. I don't think God cares too much, so long as the truth of God's nature as expressed by his Church remains a part of one's understanding.

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    39. @Luiz

      Thanks for your reply and allow me to say that your English is very good indeed. I wish that I could speak a foreign language as good as you do.

      The mathematical construct that you offer doesn’t demonstrate a real distinction in God’s essence; it demonstrates an abstract distinction. God is not an abstract; He is a living being, or Being Itself. I can offer three infinite sets (A, B & C) with each set having an infinite amount of different numbers. Voila! real distinction! Or, what about two infinite bookcases? Bookcase A has alternating rows of white and blue books whereas Bookcase B has nothing but white books. There are just as many blue books in A as there are white books in B, even though there’s only half as many blue books in A. Again, they’re both infinite (PC), but “really” distinct. But Aquinas didn’t say that, did he? He said (again) “relation existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility” and “in God relation and essence DO NOT DIFFER from each other but are one and the same.” Thus, the distinction is precisely in its mode of intelligibility. Is it “real”? Of course, because ideas, abstract concepts, etc. are real, but there is no actual bookcase with an infinite number of books. The distinction exists on paper, but not in the real world.

      Ditto for the divine essence. If all you’re saying is that God really has relations with Himself, your doctrine is indistinct from modalism or Arianism. You’ve offered nothing “trinitarian.”

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    40. @Scott

      The fact that you think Trinitarians believe God has three consciousnesses shows that you really misunderstand the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity or the Doctrine of the Trinity.

      I know that on paper most trinitarians deny that God has three centers of consciousness, but those who embrace divine simplicity (DS) surely speak as if that’s what they believe. On these boards, I read where the Father loves the Son and the Son loves the Father. Now, that either means that God loves Himself or it means that the act of love is a personal relationship between two minds. If you can think of another category, I’m all ears. If it’s the former, nothing “trinitarian” is articulated. If the latter, you have what you say you don’t have.

      All Modalists deny REAL distinctions in the Godhead. They affirm merely logical distinctions. Aquinas (and I) affirms real distinctions in the way described above. These real relations (not merely logical relations) of the one essence to itself are the impetus for the three distinct Persons.

      And as I’ve argued here, the “real” distinctions, when articulated, are either abstract mathematical constructs or amount to nothing more than saying that God relates to Himself, which is not something a modalist would deny. The fact that you can make it work on paper in some mathematical construct doesn’t translate into real-world distinction.

      When modalists deny “real” distinctions, they are denying that there are aspects of the essence that are actually different from each other. Otherwise, composition cannot be avoided. The PC cannot be the PD on pain of contradiction, but that appears to be what you are arguing. But even Aquinas acknowledged that the distinction is in the mode of intelligibility, not that there is any actual difference between the relation and the essence.

      God is real. His mercy and love are real. Those attributes are REALLY distinct in that they have DIFFERENT functions. But ontologically speaking, they are not “parts” of God, for God simply IS mercy and love. If you apply the same language to the persons of the Trinity (F, S & HS), then you have modalism. But trinitarians insist that the distinction in attributes isn’t the same as the distinction in persons. And if it isn’t the same, then I can only conclude that you’re arguing for an ontological difference in the essence, but since you deny that too, it appears, as I noted above, that you’re trying to have it both ways, and that of course doesn’t work.

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    41. “The PC cannot be the PD on pain of contradiction, but that appears to be what you are arguing.”

      Can you spell out what PC and PD stand for in this context? I want to make sure I am not misunderstanding you.

      When modalists deny “real” distinctions, they are denying that there are aspects of the essence that are actually different from each other.

      If by aspects, you mean parts, then yes the Trinitarian would agree. There is not one “part” of the Divine Essence different from the other, because there are no parts. The Persons are not three distinct parts of the One Divine Essence. They are three distinct real relations of the whole essence to the whole essence. Modalists deny that there can be such a real relation between the whole essence and the whole essence. Trinitarians (at least Thomistic ones) do not deny this.

      Again, you are wrong that mercy and love in God are really distinct. They are merely logically distinct. However, it is possible to have distinct ends from the same activity (as the intellect is ordered toward knowledge of God, but the will is ordered toward, in addition to God, the creature). I do not want to get too far into the weeds with arguments from modal collapse, etc. The point is, Thomists do not admit distinctions in the essence, although they do admit distinctions in the Persons/Relations.

      I would be careful not to put too much emphasis on the psychological analogy. Yes the Son is begotten from the Father by something analogous to an idea in the intellect, but again all of these analogies will ultimately be insufficient. Thomists do not believe that the Son is the intellect and the Holy Spirit is the will, for example. All attributes of the Divine Essence can be equally predicated of any of the three Persons.

      Out of curiosity, what kind of Christian are you?

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    42. @Scott

      Can you spell out what PC and PD stand for in this context? I want to make sure I am not misunderstanding you.

      I did so HERE.

      The Persons are not three distinct parts of the One Divine Essence. They are three distinct real relations of the whole essence to the whole essence. Modalists deny that there can be such a real relation between the whole essence and the whole essence.

      I don’t know why you’re insisting that that’s what modalists deny because when you cash it out, as I’ve said numerous times, you’re simply saying that God relates to Himself in distinct ways. That’s NOT something a modalist will deny. God is a HE not an IT. If God relates to Himself, then God is one person fulfilling multiple roles simultaneously.

      If, however, you’re really arguing that God is an IT (a common abstraction from its exemplars), modalists would definitely object because that cannot avoid tritheism. You can make the real distinction work in that instance (God is one essence and the persons are instantiations thereof) but at the expense of monotheism.

      Again, you are wrong that mercy and love in God are really distinct. They are merely logically distinct.

      As to the essence of God, yes, they are logically distinct. I’m NOT saying that the real distinction is in God’s essence. I’m saying that love is real and mercy is real and that they have different definitions and different functions. When you feel the love of God are you simultaneously feeling His wrath? His act of saving you is NOT His act of damning you. There is a real distinction in His acts but He doesn’t “possess” the attributes by participation; He simply IS. God “functions” as Creator, Redeemer and Regenerator and they are all real distinct categories, but at bottom God is one undivided essence acting in myriad ways.

      All attributes of the Divine Essence can be equally predicated of any of the three Persons.

      And if the relations are the essence (per Aquinas), then “Father” can be equally predicated of the Son, and “Son” can be equally predicated of the Holy Spirit. That sounds like modalism to me. If “Father” cannot be predicated of the Son, and if the Son is really different from the Father, how do you avoid genus/species composition?

      By the way, I am a Christian who affirms modalism.

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    43. Good afternoon, all! Hope you don't mind another poster getting into the breach here; this discussion has multiplied a lot since I last looked at it yesterday, and while I certainly lack the credentials to get involved, I think doing so will help me better my understanding of the Holy Trinity, so I'll give it a shot.

      @Bill
      Let me first complement you on your clarity of statement and precision of argument. It has made me reexamine a lot of the arguments and analogies I have heard for the Trinity, and agree that at first blush it certainly seems contradictory.

      My understanding though, is, first, given the nature of abstract forms, God is certainly more similar to an abstract form than he is to human being, given that He is immutable, unchanging, immaterial, etc.

      And if the relations are the essence (per Aquinas), then “Father” can be equally predicated of the Son, and “Son” can be equally predicated of the Holy Spirit. That sounds like modalism to me. If “Father” cannot be predicated of the Son, and if the Son is really different from the Father, how do you avoid genus/species composition?

      So, correct me if I'm misunderstanding this, but the is that given that the three members of the Most Holy Trinity share the same perfectly simple, and totally actualized act of being, then any distinction between them would be impossible. The issue that I see, is that when discussing God, even terms such as "distinction," "same," "act" and even "is" and "real" have to be interpreted analogically rather than univocally. Therefore, (and I believe that Ed argued this in a post a while back), when considering the Trinity a taught by the Dogmas of Classical Christianity, it is necessary, if one has accepted the Christian revelation already, to look at alternate meanings of those terms which might be used in a manner more amenable to the distant reality of God.

      Second though, given that you accept the heart of Christian revelation that God is love, it is necessary to examine what that means as a philosophical category. I would hold with Aquinas that to love is to will the good of the other. This means that, whatever we turn out to think of love as, it is inherently relational and this requires some sort of "other" in some respect, even if not used univocally with the way "other" is normally described; for example, and at the risk of bringing the psychological fallacy back in, I would assert that my self-love has analogous characteristics to my love of others, but is not the same thing.

      What could function as the object of God's love then? Surely, given that I don't think any of the posters here believe that God created out of necessity, we have to conclude that He has sufficiency in Himself to constitute that by which all other loves are measured. This means that part of God's Act is to love and relate to God, hence the idea that the Son is Begotten by the Father and that the Spirit is that love manifest. Before I slide into modalism a question: would not a modal understanding of this relationship require God to exist in different states(modes) of existence compared to Himself at the same time? God's existence and His Divine act are clearly the same, so it seems like Modalism is in the same boat as trinitarianism, in danger of sliding into describing God in terms of distinctions. Unless, that is, we grant that we must speak about the Trinity's relations analogically rather than univocally, at which point we might as well go whole hog for the Trinity. Apologies if I have added nothing new to the discussion, but speaking like this is a good exercise for me in stretching my theological chops, so I figured I'd give it a shot.


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    44. Bill,

      Thank you for the clarification. I will respond to your objection later this evening when I have some time.

      In the meantime, to better understand your views, do you believe in the Divinity of Jesus Christ?

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    45. @Scott

      Yes, I very much believe in the Christ's divinity.

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    46. @Casual Thomist

      Hello! Thank you for your very kind words and for your counterarguments. I’m glad that I at least got you thinking, even if you ultimately disagree with me.

      My understanding though, is, first, given the nature of abstract forms, God is certainly more similar to an abstract form than he is to human being, given that He is immutable, unchanging, immaterial, etc.

      But given the principle of proportionate causality, God must be personal, and along with the special revelation of the Scriptures, man is made in His likeness.

      So, correct me if I'm misunderstanding this, but the is that given that the three members of the Most Holy Trinity share the same perfectly simple, and totally actualized act of being, then any distinction between them would be impossible.

      I would say that notional or logical distinctions are fine. If God is “acting” in a particular manner, that act is real and distinct from other acts that He performs; however, His actual essence just is (simply exists) with no real distinction in His being.

      The issue that I see, is that when discussing God, even terms such as "distinction," "same," "act" and even "is" and "real" have to be interpreted analogically rather than univocally.

      Although that is true, the terms we use cannot assert an inversion else we argue unintelligibly. We cannot argue that God is simple while our definition asserts that He is composite. We cannot argue that there is one numerical God while our definition asserts three Gods. If F and S are fully and completely “the same, perfectly simple, and totally actualized act of being (God),” and if they really differ in some way, then what makes them the same cannot be what makes them different (else we assert that S = ~S, which is of course a contradiction). The principle of commonality (PC) is what makes them the same, and if we only have PC, there can be no real difference between F & S (except a nominal one). Thus F = S. There must, then, be a principle of distinction which enables both sameness and differentiation, and Catholicism affirms that the distinction is in the relations between the persons. Per my argument above, the PC ≠ PD, but if the PC is the divine essence, then the relation must be “outside” God’s essence, hence, creatures. However, Aquinas insists that the relations ARE the essence (they are NO DIFFERENT from the essence), so we’re back to PC = PD. Moreover, the distinction between the relations is only in their mode of intelligibility. So, we have either flat inversions or nothing that sets the DT apart from modalism or Arianism.

      If it is pressed that the essence itself contains real distinctions, so that there is an aspect of the essence unique to each person, then we have composition defined.

      Your comments about love being the object of another appear to be question-begging. Why must love always be directed toward another? We are certainly commanded to love one another as we love ourselves, but if self-love is illegitimate, why are we commanded to love others likewise? I think, therefore, that love does not necessitate an additional person in order to exist or be exercised.

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    47. Bill,

      Interesting. I have always found the Incarnation to be a far more perplexing doctrine than the Trinity. However, I have read less on that. I wonder how you square the apparent contradictions there, but we can stay on topic.

      Regarding the predicates of the Persons of the Trinity, as Bill Clinton famously said, it depends on what “is” means. Obviously, if by “is” you mean that Person and Essence are completely interchangeable, then when you say that there are three Persons in one Essence, you are really just saying that there are three Persons in one Person or three Essences in one Essence. That is obviously contradictory. So whatever Aquinas means, it is probably something a little more subtle than something that a small child could point out as a contradiction.

      I will try to illustrate that subtlety as follows: You say that the Principle of Commonality cannot be the same as the Principle of Distinction. I would agree with that statement, for any finite substance. However, for an infinite substance, if we are able to talk of distinction at all, then the Principle of Distinction must be identical to the Principle of Commonality. However, this identity does not take away the distinctness of the distinctions. I am sure you are familiar with the Athanasian Shield. Let me propose an analogy that makes similar claims.

      Suppose you have a straight line of infinite length going from left to right. The essence of the line is to have infinite length. Let us say that there are two distinct relations in this infinite line. There is the left side of the line (insofar as we can pick any point of the line and consider what is to the left of it), and there is the right side of the line. But, being infinite, the left side of the line has infinite length as well, so it just is the same as the essence of the line. Likewise, the right side of the line is the same as the line itself. However, the left-ness and right-ness of the line are really opposed to each other and stand in a real relation to each other. Finally, although there are two distinct relations (left opposed to right and right opposed to left), there is only one line.

      In the same way the predicates of the Athanasian Creed are formulated, we have the following:

      1. The left-ness of the line is the line.

      2. The right-ness of the line is the line.

      3. The left-ness of the line is not the right-ness of the line.

      4. There are not two lines, but only one line.

      Granted, this is an analogy, so it is not perfectly sufficient, but does it help you understand how the Principle of Commonality can be the Principle of Distinction for an infinite substance?

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    48. @Scott

      I realize that all finite analogies of things infinite will falter at some point, and I've seen plenty of hyper-critics jump on an analogy to sidestep a point, but your analogy fails for very obvious reasons.

      You offer a line running left to right, the essence of which is its infinite length. The point on the line is an arbritrary placement made by an observer. If the observer places a point "here," anything to its right is right of the point (obvious, I know), but if the observor moves the point farther to the right, what was right is now left. Thus, "left" and "right" is a subjective observation---a logical construct, if you will. The point is not the line's essence; its essence is to simply be infinite. What points we place on the line in order to categorize things more effectively fit our pespective, not the line's.

      Moreover, though we affix the labels left and right to arbitrary segments of the line, said labels are not the line's essence. Its only essence is to run infinitely. The principle of distinction in your analogy is the placement of the point (pt), whereas the principle of commonality is the infinite line (IL). It is thus easy to see that IL ≠ pt which of course means that PC ≠ PD.

      The law of non-contradiction clearly applies here. What makes an immaterial essence common with another cannot be the very thing that makes it distinct. That's a metaphysical principle that is inviolable.

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    49. Bill June 12, 2020 at 7:53 AM
      “God is not an abstract; He is a living being, or Being Itself.”
      The term “being itself” is incoherent. Yes, I realize that the OP makes clear that Dr. Feser considers himself among the learned who are able to have “reasoned from the existence of the things of our experience” to “being itself”.

      When I work a long math problem and at the end I arrive at the profound conclusion that 1=0 I do what most reasonable people do, realize that the fact I have reached an incoherent conclusion indicates that I made a mistake in my prior reasoning. From there I do what most reasonable people do, which is to go back and figure out where I went wrong, correct my error in reasoning, and change my answer to one that makes sense.

      The Thomist, on the other hand, performs what he considers to be deep reasoning that is the privy of the learned, arrives at an incoherent answer, and simply claims to have discovered a special something that is allowed to be incoherent. This seems to provide a sort of self satisfaction for the Thomist at having arrived at an answer by virtue of his learned reasoning process that is not generally available to the great many who are so unfortunate as to be unlearned enough to reject incoherent answers as indicators of faulty reasoning.

      The term “being itself” is similar to the statement “I always lie”. There is no immediately obvious grammatical error. The incoherency of each is found by analyzing the meanings of the words.

      “Being” refers to existence, or can be used as a synonym for existence, or in the sense of a state of being, meaning a state of existence, something real, what is, reality, or the antithesis of a philosophical absolutely nothing at all.

      A dichotomy then becomes apparent, that of something versus nothing. What is this “being” in “being itself”? What is the reality of “being” in “being itself”? What sort of existence does the “being” in “being itself” have?

      The choice can be simple, something versus nothing, surely the answer must me one, but not the other.

      If the “being” in “being itself” is nothing, then the term “being itself” is incoherent, because nothing cannot have any being in any sense.

      If the “being” in “being itself” is something, then the term “being itself” is incoherent, because in that case the “being” is not of itself, rather, of that something.

      Therefore, “being itself” is an incoherent term.

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    50. Bill,

      I think you are mistaken. I believe relations in the Godhead are sui generis. Their essence is the same, but they are really opposed by the mode of procession. Similarly left-ness and right-ness are sui generis concepts with regard to length. They are infinite length (that is they are not something different from the line), but they are relationally opposed, and this distinct from each other. It does not matter where the point in the line is because the line is of infinite length, and thus spans the entire length of the line. But that does not mean there is not left and right on the line as you could stand on the line and begin walking to the left. You can similarly stand on the line and start walking to the right. So it is not a subjective distinction but a real distinction of direction.

      Stardust,

      I think you are being incredibly uncharitable. As I have said above, the Trinity is not a simple math problem where you can easily understand all of the terms and predicates and then realize a clear contradiction is being made. If you are treating God like a simple math problem with easily understood finite terms, you are clearly misunderstanding something.

      As for “being itself”, really that means the fullness of being. That means, among other things, infinite intellect, will, and power to bring those things willed about. But being itself is not a mere abstraction. God is something of which all other being is derived. So quite the opposite of an abstraction (which derives its being from existing creatures).

      In fact, that God is a something and not merely an abstraction is what leaves room for the Trinity. It leaves room for the question, “What is that something?” The doctrine of the Trinity is the answer.

      Finally, if you DID perform a math problem and received the answer 1 = 0, is it not possible that you simply wrote down the wrong number in the beginning and made a calculation mistake? What if you had a brilliant math teacher who, among other things, could rise from the dead who told you that you were wrong? Would that do anything to sway your opinion?

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    51. Folks, please don't feed the StardustyPsyche troll.

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    52. Regarding Jewish belief - prior to the fall of Jerusalem most of Jewish theology believed that Wisdom was an attribute of God that was also divine, thereby believing in something analogous to a Binity rather than Trinity.

      The innovation of Christianity is that it made the Spirit of God another person, bringing the number up to 3.

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    53. @Scott, you write:

      Similarly left-ness and right-ness are sui generis concepts with regard to length. They are infinite length (that is they are not something different from the line), but they are relationally opposed, and this distinct from each other.

      I think you're missing the point (no pun intended). You were attempting to address my argument that PC ≠ PD. On your terms, left-ness and right-ness arise from the point on the line. I agree that it matters not where the point is. However, without the point, left-ness and right-ness disappear. Thus, left and right have a relation because of the point. Left and right are alike because of the line. Left and right are different because of the point. What makes them the same is not what makes them different. To argue otherwise is to assert that it is possible for A to differ from B without differing in any way.

      It does not matter where the point in the line is because the line is of infinite length, and thus spans the entire length of the line.

      Ah, but "left" does not span the entire length of the line (nor does "right"). And recall that the DT insists that each person is the "the same, perfectly simple, and totally actualized act of being (God)." The directional labels in your analogy apply to a segment of the line, not the whole. The fact they are of infinite length is irrelevant. Recall my infinite bookcase filled with alternating white and blue books. Though there are an infinite number of blue books, they are not the whole bookcase. If the whole is "God," then the blue (and white) books are only part of God.

      Against this you can object that no temporal analogy will perfectly illustrate divinity, and I readily agree. No analogy will answer the objections that I have made here because we're talking about metaphysical principles. No analogy can undermine the law of non-contradiction because it cannot be undermined. Similarly, I think that no analogy can undermine the principle that what makes things similar cannot be identical with what makes them different.

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    54. Scott,
      “I think you are being incredibly uncharitable.”
      I appreciate your thoughtful response, but skepticism toward ideologies, beliefs, and attempts at logical arguments is, in my view, a very good thing. At the same time I would not wish to be personally uncivil toward you or any of the good folks here.

      “If you are treating God like a simple math problem with easily understood finite terms, you are clearly misunderstanding something.”
      The OP asserts that one can reason from sense experience to the Thomistic assertion of god, including the notion of “being itself” variously stated as “existence itself”, “pure being”, and “pure existence”. The method referenced in the OP is to state premises of sense experience observation and then use learned logical reasoning in deductive arguments to conclude the necessity of god of the sort the Thomist asserts.

      I am not missing something in that I apply sense experience and logical reasoning to refute Thomistic arguments.

      “But being itself is not a mere abstraction. God is something of which all other being is derived.”
      Ok, so “being itself”, in that case refers to something, and therefore cannot be of itself, rather, of that something. Since god, by your words, is something then god is some thing, a thing, an object or a substance, or a thing of some sort. Thus god cannot be “pure existence”, rather, god is simply another sort of material. Hence, the assertion of a god that is some thing solves no logical problem with respect to solving an otherwise infinite regress of things since the same questions about the some things of sense experience must reasonably be applied to the some thing of god.

      “What if you had a brilliant math teacher who, among other things, could rise from the dead who told you that you were wrong? Would that do anything to sway your opinion?”
      No, that would merely be an argument from authority. Any teacher of any sort would need to show me where and why I was wrong and what the correct process of reasoning is and why that process of reasoning is correct. Brilliant people also make mistakes so I do not take the opinion of brilliant people at face value.

      Further, the ability to rise from the dead is not relevant to solving a math problem, in fact, I have seen some movies of people rising from the dead and based on how creepy and ponderously they behave it seems doubtful they are capable of solving math problems at all.

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    55. @Bill
      Although that is true, the terms we use cannot assert an inversion else we argue unintelligibly. We cannot argue that God is simple while our definition asserts that He is composite. We cannot argue that there is one numerical God while our definition asserts three Gods. If F and S are fully and completely “the same, perfectly simple, and totally actualized act of being (God),” and if they really differ in some way, then what makes them the same cannot be what makes them different (else we assert that S = ~S, which is of course a contradiction)… There must, then, be a principle of distinction which enables both sameness and differentiation, and Catholicism affirms that the distinction is in the relations between the persons. Per my argument above, the PC ≠ PD, but if the PC is the divine essence, then the relation must be “outside” God’s essence, hence, creatures…
      Given that we need to speak analogically, I think the very important thing to do is work out what exactly it is in the way we use terms such as “is” and “is not” which lead to the PD/PC contradiction. Obviously, our use of the word “is” to construe a rigid designator poses a problem for the Trinity, as if S=F and F=Q, then S=Q, if we are using the term mathematically. Given that we are talking about perfectly simple Ipsum Esse here, any understanding of the formula which would try and sort the members of the Trinity into distinct categories fails similarly. But, given a traditional Trinitarian understanding, isn’t it possible that there is some possible description of “being” (from which of course, the verb “to be/is”) is derived which, when combined with a proper analogical understanding of “relationship,” isn’t it possible that there is an understanding which would allow for a PD which did in some way (call it kweekwalz or something) PC? It seems like that if we could have a situation where a “PD” is (in some us of the word) a PC, then we would have an out. Determining what it might be is far above my intellectual weight class, but I don’t see anything against it in principle.
      As another aside, upon reexamining my “love question,” I have decided to do something that is rare beyond all measure on an interest forum: I admit that the way I formulated that was, in fact question begging (though I still think there’s something to salvage in there).

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    56. Bill,

      I suppose we can leave the argument there. I feel like we are simply at an impasse. I will say that I believe you interjected the term “point” into the discussion. I suppose I did say left “side” which implies point. Perhaps that was a mistake on my part. A better way of explaining would be left-handed and right-handed. Thus, no matter which point you pick (or if you pick no point at all) you can consider the left-handedness of the line and the right-handedness (so at a point to the right of your “dividing” point you can still consider the line as left handed insofar as it is tending toward the left, etc.).

      Again, I agree with your acceptance of LNC. However, I think in order to apply LNC, you have to have an appropriate definition of the terms, which, when discussing the inner life of an infinite God, you do not. But thank you for your charitable discussion. I will let you have the last word.

      Stardust,

      Thank you for your reply. I am using the word “thing” as a transcendental concept. So I am not implying that God is material. But being a “thing”, He is not a mere abstraction (even if He is not material).

      I am signing off the discussion, so I will let you have the last word as well.

      Finally, to anyone reading, I would urge you to not start with the Trinity or the Incarnation when dealing with the veracity of revelation. Obviously Divine Mysteries, being manifestations of the infinite power of God, are always going to be beyond our comprehension, so while these objections are important to consider, we must always be careful to note the limitations of our own reason. This is not a Kantian cop out for all reasoning, but it is an acknowledgement of the spirit of the Chesterton quote, “The artist tries to get his head in the Heavens. The mathematician tries to get the Heavens in his head, and it is his head that splits”. Ultimately, we should investigate whether or not there are good reasons to accept the Authority if Christ and His Church (based on the historical data) and proceed from there.

      Pace Christi!

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    57. @Scott

      I was content to let you have the last word, but given the little question that arose, you wrote:

      There is the left side of the line (insofar as we can pick any point of the line and consider what is to the left of it), and there is the right side of the line.

      You were using a point (any point) to determine left and right.

      Anyway, thanks as well for the charitable interaction. Posters on other sites have complained about the rudeness of the regulars here, but that has not been my experience. All of my interlocutors on such a fundamental issue have argued intelligently and have been kind and charitable.

      All the best to you.

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    58. Scott"
      "Thank you for your reply. I am using the word “thing” as a transcendental concept. So I am not implying that God is material. But being a “thing”, He is not a mere abstraction (even if He is not material)."
      That paragraph is, as a whole, incoherent. I find that when the incoherence of terms such as "being itself" is clearly demonstrated the Thomist will respond with further incoherent statements, and then bid adieu.

      Previously you had said god is something, which I showed made the statement that god is "being itself" incoherent, because in that case the being is not of itself, rather, of that something.

      Now you say the "thing" of god is a transcendental concept, which is of course an abstraction (that is what a concept is, an abstraction) yet within the space of a single paragraph you contradict yourself by saying god is not an abstraction! Hence, your further statements elaborating on the incoherency of "being itself" are themselves incoherent as well.

      Thus my clear proof that "being itself" is an incoherent term stands unrefuted here.

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    59. @Casual Thomist

      I am simply somebody who is analyzing trinitarian arguments in good faith. I am not a troll who either criticizes something he doesn't understand or deliberately twists an argument in order to more easily knock it down (like the actual trolls here).

      Whether or not an argument can be constructed to adequately rebut the objections of non-trinitarians remains to be seen. Perhaps they've already been made, but so far I've yet to see them. I am not stubbornly refusing to accept the terminology as defined by the DT's apologists. I think that I am taking the terminology at face value and evaluating its implications.

      I realize that any trinitarian worth his salt will say that an airtight, positive argument is not possible due to the nature of the subject, and I can go along with that. But enough must be articulated to enable me to understand what I am affirming, and I definitely cannot understand what I'm affirming if I am uttering a contradiction. And I believe I mentioned that if I'm told that God is simple, but the definition of God is composite, or if I'm told that there is one God, but the definition thereof expresses three Gods, or if I'm told that each person is fully God, but the description tells me that they're only fractionally God, I've got to cry foul.

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    60. @Bill

      Look, i was just watching the discussion because i don't feel like i can help much, but when you say that what makes the members of the Trinity the same(the divine essence) can't be the thing that makes they diferent.

      I get how this can be true on a more literal meaning, but could it not make they equal in a way and diferent in another? Aquinas says something like that several times on his talk about the passions and habits when responding to the objections who use the fact that something can't be at the same time mover and moved.

      How does that work on the Trinity? I dunno. At the end of the day, we don't know much, except that any caracteristic of Our Lord is unlike anything we know anyway.

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    61. @Bill,

      I certainly don't believe that you are a troll! I have been impressed and gratified with the clarity, precision and courtesy you have displayed in the course of this discussion. As a practicing Catholic, who almost gave up the Faith when I lacked good arguments for God's existence, I can honestly say that robust and serious philosophical argumentation is the reason that I'm a Christian. This precise issue is one that I have wrestled with myself, and so I am interested in learning more in order to be more intentional about the nature of Our Lord. At the moment I would say that my belief in the Trinity derives from my belief in the Universal Church through Apostolic Succession and the teaching authority of Peter, which I believe shows through clearly in Sacred Scriptures. Obviously if one disputes this interpretation, then it could be argued that believing there has to be a way in which we can say that God is perfectly simple and yet three persons without contradiction is special pleading. Given that you are not Catholic, I certainly don't think it unreasonable to take that assertion with a grain of salt.

      I certainly agree with you that if the Doctrine required us to assert a contradiction, then we should reject it, full stop and any institution that promulgates it. The thing is, given separate theological teachings, I believe that there must be a way to state the relationship coherently, even if it is beyond my ability.

      Thanks once again for a thought provoking discussion!

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    62. @Casual Thomist

      Thank you as well for the interaction. I very much appreciate the good spirit and interchange of views, even on such a fundamental issue.

      I wish you well on your journey, and perhaps we'll interact again on a more agreeable subject.

      All the best.

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    63. Likewise. Likewise.

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  4. Reading this reminds me of when I read "Thomist Realism and the Critique of Knowledge" by Etienne Gilson. The existence of analytic a posteriori, the existence of knowledge that is empirical and self-evident, completely destroys most of modern epistemology.

    Aquinas wrote about these men when he said "For these sophists desire that demonstrative arguments should be given for all things; for it is obvious that they wanted to take some starting point which would be for them a kind of rule whereby they could distinguish between those who are healthy and those who are ill, and between those who are awake and those who are asleep. And they were not content to know this rule in just any way at all but wanted to acquire it by demonstration." As he goes on to say in that same lecture, wanting a demonstration for everything leads to an infinite regress.

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    1. As a neophyte, I happened by random chance to find a copy of “The Unity of Philosophical Experience” by Gilson in an old bookstore--first philosophy book I ever read. Talk about beginners’ luck! What a lucky find! I could have found Foucault after all . . . (shudder).

      Then I read “Being and Some Philosophers”. That was much harder.

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    2. From that Aquinas quote there can be no doubt about how he would have responded to Descartes' "Discourse on the Method"!

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    3. Indeed, manor rabbit. Gilson's book was actually a response to those Neo-Thomists that were trying to integrate Cartesian epistemology into Thomism (and failing).

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    4. "there can be no doubt..." - indeed, given the quote that is self-evident (but only to God, not to us).

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  5. As Mister Geocon points out, analytic a posteriori doesn’t jive well with modern epistemology. I recently heard E. Michael Jones interviewed on his newest book “Logos Rising”. From the interview I gather that the book is a discussion of philosophy’s historical vacillation between types of irrational fideism (Greek mythology for one example, or Protestant Sola Scriptura for another) and various types of hard physicalism (from the four classical elements to modern materialism)—neither extreme satisfies. Jones proposes “Logos” as the answer (meaning both the Greek concept and the Jewish Messiah as the fulfillment of same).

    Logos, like eudaimonia, is one of those words where if you don’t know what it means, it can’t be explained to you. But however one attempts to define it, it seems to me to be one of those analytic a posteriori problems the moderns thought we could do without . . . maybe that’s our problem.

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    1. From what I read of Gilson's book as well as David S. Oderberg's "Real Essentialism," analytic a posteriori is necessary to come to an understanding of the essence of a thing. Without synthetic a posteriori knowledge, you cannot tell health from sickness, good from evil, reality from illusion.

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  6. My comments are an illusion in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as shitposting, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. He must throw away the ladder, so to speak, after he has climbed up.

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  7. Analytic a posterior exists iff. the conclusion of Fitch’s paradox of knowability (not all truth can be known even in principle) is true. Because analytic statements are those that are true because of their parts but requiring a posteriori reasoning means that this truth is unknowable even in principle.

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    1. Based on my (incredibly limited and subpar) understanding of Fitch's paradox, it seems like you have to assume the nonexistence of God in order for it to work, given that in God you have the Essence of To Be Itself, where existence just IS the same thing as its knowing. Meaning that that paradox is only as strong as the arguments against God's existence and that its weak as the arguments for Him are strong.

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    2. Why is there a connection between Fitch's paradox and atheism/theism?

      It seems that analytic a posteori statement are related to notions about knowability.

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    3. That's the question though: does knowability refer solely to what finite rational actors can know, or what can be known full stop. Unfortunately though, I've reached well past my knowledge in this area it seems...

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  8. Thank you for this, Dr. Feser. Much becomes clearer.

    The modern epistemologist is in the position of that other drunkard looking for his keys; not the one from the famous joke, but his drinking buddy, it would seem. He has looked for his keys all over the place, and not just under the lamppost, but he still can’t find them.

    A passerby asks him if he’s looked in his pockets, because they might have been there all along. The Kantian drunkard says:

    ‘I would, but I have the most elegant proof that there are no such things as pockets.’

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  9. PSA: New paper on PSR and skepticism from Pruss/Koons

    https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11098-020-01482-3

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    1. Yea, thanks Luke. It was a pretty interesting, even if kinda hard, reading. I had a similar idea, that denial of the PSR is a invitation to solipsism, but i could not argue very well to that conclusion.

      But could not the skeptic just agree with the argument and deny that we have any justification in believing that we know any empirical fact? Their answers to that question on the end show that this would be completely irrational, but a complete skeptic would probably insist that it is still possible to doubt.

      Of course, it is probably a waste of time to argue with someone like that, but some people act this way if they see a conclusion they don't like.

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    2. Yes if you put it like that there is no way to convince a Pyrrhic skeptic. On the otger hand, I would never want to argue with them in the first place

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    3. If someone is willing to give up empirical knowledge just to avoid the PSR (and, presumably, theism), I'd take that as an indication that they're not worth taking seriously.

      We can always respond with Thomas Reid, though: why should we trust our rational faculties but not our perceptual faculties? As Reid put it, they "come from the same shop" (whether we think of this in purely naturalistic terms or not), so it seems arbitrary to trust one but not the other.

      Sometimes it's said that our perceptual faculties are fallible, so they're guilty until proven innocent; but our rational faculties are fallible as well, so this won't do. If the skeptic then goes on to refuse to trust any of his cognitive faculties, there's nothing we can say to convince him otherwise; but then it's obvious he's not going to be able to coherently advance any kind of argument for skepticism either.

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  10. What about creaturely knowledge of final causality for things? Does this count as analytic a posteriori?

    Once you've grasped the concept of a tree, you know, say, that its final causes involve, say, sinking deep roots and growing. But this is known (by creatures) only by sense experience. Is this on target?

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  11. I practically shudder any time someone tries to elaborate on "analytic" and "synthetic" along with a priori and a posteriori, because I have always felt the concepts are basically improperly formulated. Nevertheless, I will delve into one question on them, to request a clarification:

    Under the A-T approach to human knowing, the human mind cannot do ANY deductive reasoning until it has material to work with. And the mind does not have any material to work with until it has concepts; and it does not have any concepts until it has abstracted essences from sense input. Hence, it is necessary (at least in the natural order) that sensation precede knowing.

    A priori propositions are those knowable independently of sensory experience. A stock example would be an arithmetical proposition like 2 + 2 = 4.

    According to Thomas, however, the human mind CANNOT know 2+2=4 before having sense input, because it cannot know any essences and cannot formulate the ground-work necessary to know "2" or "+" or "=" or "4" without first having sense input. And not only just ANY sense input, but enough sense input to allow the mind to formulate the concepts of 2, 4, +, and =.

    Does the 4-way breakdown of categories just plain ignore the question of how we get concepts? Does it assume that concepts are known without regard to sense information? Is it possible to reformulate the 4 categories so that sense information is built into the required knowing of concepts?

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    1. But that doesn't alter the distinction; even if all our knowledge begins with sensory experience, there are still things we can know to be true purely a priori. I assume you don't wanna collapse the distinctions between reasoning in mathematics and logic and reasoning in empirical sciences, right? That's sufficient for the distinction. Once your intellect has the concepts and their meanings, it can learn new truths a priori.

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    2. So, does that mean "a prior in a sense" but not "a priori absolutely"? I can't know anything about triangles without sense input, and probably without sense input regarding straight lines and angles. But once I do understand the essence of "triangle", I can go through a proof showing that the base angles of an isosceles triangle are equal, without ever having seen an isosceles triangle. It is true in one sense that my knowledge of the conclusion is "independent of sensing" in that it is independent of sensing isosceles triangles, (and, especially, I can know it of all isosceles triangles without having sensed all isosceles triangles) but it is not independent of sensing altogether.

      I assume you don't wanna collapse the distinctions between reasoning in mathematics and logic and reasoning in empirical sciences, right?

      I am not sure which distinctions you are referring to. Some people in modern universities make distinctions that are less than worthwhile. For instance, some of them say that geometry is "not a science" because it "doesn't deal with empirical knowledge". But from what I just said, such an asserted "doesn't deal with" is, at best, true only in a qualified sense. Certainly the ancients would have laughed at the notion of not calling geometry "a science".

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    3. It is not independent of sensing altogether, but even many strong rationalists would accept that our a priori knowledge also involves (even if indirectly) some sense knowledge. I can see the truth of the principle of non-contradiction a priori, but only insofar as I know the meaning of the words, and I didn't learn the meaning of the words by a priori reasoning or i sight, but by my extended experiences in a community of speakers, etc. But these are all details that don't get in the way of my a priori knowledge, even if they were necessary conditions.

      Once I know the meaning of the words, the concepts, etc., I am able to learn new truths simply by "rational insight". I can know that A = A, that if A is B and B is C, that A must also be C, that A and ~A cannot be true at the same time and in the same respect, etc. The way I come to know these truths is categorically different from how I come to know whether unicorns exist or not. One is a priori, the second is a posteriori.

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    4. Once I know the meaning of the words, the concepts, etc., I am able to learn new truths simply by "rational insight".

      So, some truths are self-evident whereas other truths are evident only by reason of empirical facts which I come to through sense experience. Is that what we are saying? So it's not so much that the so-called "a priori" items are known before sense input, but that they are known because they are evident (i.e. manifestly true) through the meaning of the terms of the proposition.

      So there are truths that are known on account of knowing the meanings of the terms, (and not on account of knowing a specific set of empirical facts); and other truths that are known on account of a specific set of empirical facts. And it really doesn't have anything to do with temporal priority of sense inputs, but the causal relation of the mind's grasp as justifiably resting in the truth as "known".

      Is that what you are saying?

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    5. What do we call a proposition that is known through a combination of "by virtue of the relations between its constituent concepts" and in part through empirical facts gathered through sense. That is, a truth that takes both types of sources in order to be known? If it takes both sorts, a person who only has the empirical data but has not grasped the analytic issue won't be able to know the truth. Is it a "mixed" truth, or do we call it "a posteriori" and ignore the fact that it requires knowing that is not from sense?

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    6. I think the "empirical facts" are not neutral with respect to the concepts by means of which they are understood. Empirical facts are a form/matter compound of concepts and sensory intuitions. Concepts don't come to be (they aren't discovered) apart from activity of the senses, but they do have an independent structure whereby inference from judgment to judgment is possible apart from any need for confirmation from anything "empirical" (the senses). That's the a priori. If the justification for a claim depends also on verifying the particular condition of a thing (on particular (not universal) "empirical facts"), then it's a posteriori.

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    7. Pretty much. The point is that a priori knowledge doesn't stop being a priori (or categorically different from what we usually call a posteriori) just because we needed our senses and memory to gather the concepts involved in it. It's not what is relevant for the distinction.

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  12. Tony,
    A priori propositions are those knowable independently of sensory experience. A stock example would be an arithmetical proposition like 2 + 2 = 4.

    Honestly, this is one of the propositions I would have thought to be analytic. 2 + 2 = 4 is the result of how we define "2" and how we define "4".

    However, I understand that for those who think of quantities as universals, that sort of thinking does not appeal.

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    1. Honestly, this is one of the propositions I would have thought to be analytic.

      The quote I used from Feser, above, was looking at the a priori versus a posteriori distinction. A truth can be a priori and analytic. At least in theory.

      Let me try again to lay out my discomfort, this time with the "synthetic" idea. We can elaborate theorems in geometry about, for example, circles inscribed inside of squares. We can know the conclusions because we know the natures of circles and squares. We don't need to examine any specific circle and square in order to verify the result holds. So the conclusion doesn't need empirical verification in actual material instances in order to be known.

      So now let's switch over to knowing gold. If we knew essences of substances well enough, we would be able to elaborate, on the basis of internal principles of the gold (and laws of physics that make gold to be what it is) a large range of determinations about it: the density of a certain isotope, the electrical conductance, the melting point, etc. But in practice we treat these conclusions as being "synthetic" because we learn them through experimental determination. So, are they synthetic or analytic?

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    2. Tony,

      I would argue synthetic, because the models we would build to describe these essences is still based on synthetic knowledge. What would you consider the argument for analytic?

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    3. Tony,

      What you're getting at is just Spinozism: Knowledge is of what is necessary, perfect knowledge is knowledge of all things (e.g., gold) as necessary, insofar as they are necessary (i.e., relative to perfect (divine) knowledge of them). I think this is rather like Kripke, for whom essences are necessary insofar as they become fixed (analytic) a posteriori, relative to our knowledge of them.

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    4. One Brow,

      "2+2=4" is a priori. But Kant thought it was synthetic, not analytic. It's the prime example of his famous synthetic a priori. Hume thought this kind of thing was an a priori "relation of reason" (i.e., analytic), but Kant thought that was wrong, since the meaning/concept of 2+2 is not actually contained in the meaning of 4 (or vice versa).

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    5. David McPike,

      Mathematically, the concept of "4" contains "2 + 2" under a variety of constructions (for example, 4 would be the second successor of 2 under Peano's axioms). So, I'm curious in what way you would define "4" that is not basically "2 + 2" or "3 + 1".

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    6. One Brow,

      Right, mathematically it does that, e.g., under Peano's axioms, but Peano's axioms (or any other further "constructions," i.e., development of further concepts) are also further concepts not actually contained in the concepts of "2" or "2+2" or "4." The further constructions are genuine a priori (not dependent on the senses) elaborations of synthetic propositional knowledge from the simpler concepts.

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    7. What would you consider the argument for analytic?

      The fact that if we REALLY knew the essence of gold, we would not have to rely on experimental data to discern the density, the electrical conductance, etc. These would follow from it as "contained within" the (complete) idea of gold. I take it that "synthetic" propositions, properly, related to propositions that might be true or might be not true, because they are contingent: you can't know whether X or not-X is true except by factual verification, because X could have happened or not-X could have happened. Granted the essence of gold, it is not contingent whether its density is Y and its electrical conductance is Z.

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    8. David, whatever Peano's theory represents, it is a theory about numbers, it is not a proof that elucidates the essence of numbers in a way that makes it impossible to believe are anything but what he proposes. For one thing, it is unclear that when a child grasps the basic numbers, that his mind is going through a process that effectively "does" what the Peano's axioms describe. For another, the axioms require a pre-existent element of "natural numbers" - an existent that must be "given", and it is unclear that this is not a synthetic requirement. It is also unclear that starting with "0" recapitulates the activity of the child's mind in grasping number(s), given how many centuries we humans were doing math before "0" was discovered. There is some reason to think that when a child's mind is undergoing the process by which it comes to the notion of numbers, "1" is more primary than "0".

      Finally, it is less than clear to me that when you understand the essence of the "base" number (especially if it is "1"), that "add" is intrinsic to it rather than an extrinsic thing that we APPLY to the number. Maybe "2" in some sense "contains" the idea of "add", but why would we say it is contained within "1" as it is of its own self? Same question with "=". But if all number is grasped first through sense experience with things that have quantity, in what way is knowledge derived "a priori"?

      To both of you: my underlying point is that the distinctions proposed are less than clear - they have difficulties that are by no means easily solved - and one may well doubt the usefulness of the proposed categories.

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    9. David McPike,

      Again, I'm curious how you define the concept of "4" in a manner that is not basically "2 + 2" or "3 + 1".

      Do you think that "4" is an undefined concept? If not, did you have a definition?

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    10. onyJune 15, 2020 at 7:23 AM
      What would you consider the argument for analytic?

      The fact that if we REALLY knew the essence of gold, we would not have to rely on experimental data to discern the density, the electrical conductance, etc. These would follow from it as "contained within" the (complete) idea of gold. I take it that "synthetic" propositions, properly, related to propositions that might be true or might be not true, because they are contingent: you can't know whether X or not-X is true except by factual verification, because X could have happened or not-X could have happened. Granted the essence of gold, it is not contingent whether its density is Y and its electrical conductance is Z.

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    11. Tony,

      I read you post on numbers, and it was interesting and thought-provoking. Thank you.

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    12. Tony,

      Somehow my reply on the essence of gold was cut off. My apologies for any confusion.

      Even in lumps of pure gold, properties like density and electrical conductance will very very slightly between different lumps, due to how densely packed the molecules are and how they are arranged. So, I would sy we could predict these properties from the essence of gold as a whole.

      On the other hand, if you want to say every lump of gold has a distinct essence, and we could use the essence of each lump to predict the properties of that lump, that's possible.

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    13. Tony,

      I think you misunderstood what I said. The Peano theory is an elaboration from, not a description of, the simpler concepts of numbers. Certainly Peano's theory does not describe a child's (or anyone else's) simple apprehensions of concepts like "2." And "add" is certainly not actually intrinsic to "1." And again, "6+6" is not actually intrinsic to "12"; therefore "6+6=12" is a synthetic proposition. But again: yes, the actualization (in a subject) of the simple concept "1," or of the synthetic proposition "6+6=12," comes about only through sense experience (just as the actualization of the ability to use language and form concepts in general only comes about only through sense experience); but the mind, once actualized, does not depend on sense experience to grasp the form of "1" or the truth of arithmetical operations/propositions. And while coming to understand a particular simple sum may be directly rooted in some particular sense experience, the nature of arithmetic is badly misunderstood if it is understood as being essentially dependent on verification by means of any particular contingent sense experience (past, present, or future) -- as would be the case if such propositions were a posteriori.

      If you still think there are difficulties, well fine, so did Quine (he famously attacked the supposed analytic/synthetic distinction in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism").

      One Brow,

      The principle of all numbers is "1" (as Tony suggested), and I think the concept "4" is most basically "four ones," certainly not "two plus two" or "three plus one." "Four ones" is equal to "2+2" and "3+1" but obviously conceptually distinct from them. Conceiving/understanding one does not entail conceiving/understanding the other, so coming to understand the equality is synthetic knowledge (and its a priori: its justification is essentially grounded in the structure of concepts, not in the data of sense experience).

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    14. David McPike,

      We need to be careful to not confuse vocabulary with the concepts they represent. If you understand "four ones", you also understand "two and another two", even if you don't yet express that under the more abstracted terms of addition.

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    15. One Brow,

      I think not. It's obvious someone can (and we pretty much all do) understand "4" before and independently of understanding adding two and two. You don't express "4" under the latter terms (to begin with, as a child first learning the concepts) because you can't, because you don't yet understand the latter terms.

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    16. David McPike,

      It's not unusual around around here for some to offer a thought like "I think not", and then repeat about 80% of what I said.

      That said, it's also my experience that "obvious" is usually the end of reason in a discussion, to thank you for the interchange.

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  13. Your comments about love being the object of another appear to be question-begging. Why must love always be directed toward another? We are certainly commanded to love one another as we love ourselves, but if self-love is illegitimate, why are we commanded to love others likewise? I think, therefore, that love does not necessitate an additional person in order to exist or be exercised.

    Not trying to be argumentative, but this seems to be a clear contradiction of scripture and what Jesus said about the relationship between the members of the Trinity in the Gospel of John, in my opinion. Modalism makes sock puppets out of them! Arianism has similar problems.

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    1. Sock puppets? So, conversations and love are occurring between whom, Daniel? Is one consciousness loving another consciousness? Is one consciousness communicating with another consciousness? Sounds like composition to me.

      That's what I earlier referred to as saying one thing on paper and thinking something else. Who is the Father loving, Daniel? You have but two options: He either loves Himself or He loves somebody else. What is this "somebody else"? If the Father loves another person who can love him back, then it follows that the other has a unique consciousness. We're back to the three centers of consciousness in God which gives you a composite Godhead.

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    2. From the CCC paragraph 251:

      251 In order to articulate the dogma of the Trinity, the Church had to develop her own terminology with the help of certain notions of philosophical origin: "substance", "person" or "hypostasis", "relation" and so on. In doing this, she did not submit the faith to human wisdom, but gave a new and unprecedented meaning to these terms, which from then on would be used to signify an ineffable mystery, "infinitely beyond all that we can humanly understand".

      This is a mystery - period. It depends on the revelation of Christ. Modalism empties out the content of the faith and the declarations of Christ. You are setting human wisdom over revelation - this is the constant temptation of the philosopher/theologian. As the CCC states in paragraph 42:

      42 God transcends all creatures. We must therefore continually purify our language of everything in it that is limited, image-bound or imperfect, if we are not to confuse our image of God -- "the inexpressible, the incomprehensible, the invisible, the ungraspable" -- with our human representations. Our human words always fall short of the mystery of God.

      So if we must weigh your claims of a contradiction over the clearly revealed word of God, we must go with revelation. And because truth cannot contradict truth, what appears to you as a contradiction, cannot in reality be so. I say this as an article of faith in this matter and I'm not ashamed to do so. As a Catholic, I only need to believe that God's existence is provable via reason.

      God bless,
      Daniel

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    3. Daniel, you must see how inadequate that response is? Why not just say: "You're right. It looks like a contradiction, I don't understand it, I can't explain it, I just believe it because I think God wants me to." Then Bill can say: "Right and I don't think God wants me/you to because he is a God of reason, not arbitrarily demanding we believe in nonsense." I think Bill is wrong, but you need to address the contradiction. You can't 'prove' the Trinity (whether "as a Catholic" or otherwise), but you have to be able to explain how it is not a contradiction.

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    4. Hey David,

      I disagree. He wont accept the very vocabulary in use or at least the conclusions we draw from it. So what is the point? Also, I believe the best method to prove the doctrine of the Trinity is via revelation, which seems beyond the scope of this blog. I think Aquinas would agree with me on this. See the first few chapters of book 1 of the Summa Contra Gentiles. He even warns against trying to logically prove the Trinity as a fools errand which will likely only solidify non believer's view that we are full of it on this. I also think my Catechism quotes back me up on this point.

      Again, many people have attempted to explain to Bill using Thomistic terms how what he sees as a contradiction is in fact not a contradiction, but he simply affirms the contrary. What are we do to now? We are talking about a reality so far above our comprehension that to affirm anything beyond the existence of God from human knowledge seems folly.

      Cheers,
      Daniel

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    5. I found the quote I as looking for to justify my position from the Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1 chapter 9:

      [2] Now, to make the first kind of divine truth known, we must proceed through demonstrative arguments, by which our adversary may become convinced. However, since such arguments are not available for the second kind of divine truth, our intention should not be to convince our adversary by arguments: it should be to answer his arguments against the truth; for, as we have shown, the natural reason cannot be contrary to the truth of faith. The sole way to overcome an adversary of divine truth is from the authority of Scripture—an authority divinely confirmed by miracles. For that which is above the human reason we believe only because God has revealed it. Nevertheless, there are certain likely arguments that should be brought forth in order to make divine truth known. This should be done for the training and consolation of the faithful, and not with any idea of refuting those who are adversaries. For the very inadequacy of the arguments would rather strengthen them in their error, since they would imagine that our acceptance of the truth of faith was based on such weak arguments.

      Cheers,
      Daniel

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    6. Daniel,

      St Thomas is clear that even if we cannot prove doctrines of faith, we must still be able* to refute the arguments that purport to disprove them. (*That is, able in principle. In practise, someone might not be able to, in which case he should practise the virtue of honesty and just admit it and keep working at it until he can. There can be no real conflict between faith and reason.)

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    7. Your ignoring my point on philosophical terms - I think Bill has been answered - he just refuses to admit our position. Do you believe you can eventually argue him to accept the Catholic understanding from philosophy? I'd love to see you do so. I don't have the ability. And I think Aquinas also was against the usefulness of the attempt, as my quote above proves.

      Cheers,
      Daniel

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    8. ...and I see you've provided the exact citation I had in mind: "since such arguments are not available for the second kind of divine truth, our intention should not be to convince our adversary by arguments: it should be to answer his arguments against the truth; for, as we have shown, the natural reason cannot be contrary to the truth of faith."

      St Thomas means you have to be able to show the error in arguments against the faith, such as Bill's. You can't just say, "It's an incomprehensible mystery so I don't need to explain to you why it's not a straight contradiction (i.e., nonsense, from the standpoint of natural reason)."

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    9. Yeah, you missed the second part though:

      This should be done for the training and consolation of the faithful, and not with any idea of refuting those who are adversaries. For the very inadequacy of the arguments would rather strengthen them in their error, since they would imagine that our acceptance of the truth of faith was based on such weak arguments.

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    10. You can't just say, "It's an incomprehensible mystery so I don't need to explain to you why it's not a straight contradiction (i.e., nonsense, from the standpoint of natural reason)."

      Also, I have never held this position.

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    11. Daniel,
      If you think you have answered Bill adequately, then stick to that answer. Don't switch to "It's a mystery -- period." That is not an answer in the Thomistic sense.

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    12. Daniel, I didn't miss the second part. You're not understanding the distinction between positively proving articles of faith (can't be done) and refuting arguments against them (can be done, but not by saying "it's a mystery -- period" -- Bill is quite right to dismiss such a silly rebuttal).

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    13. OK. And to be honest, I'm not in a position to do so. I am still learning. :)

      But I do believe that other's have done an adequate job at trying to explain this to him. I just think that he is in the category of Adversary, not of in the category of the faithful.

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    14. God alone judges the heart. We're all still learning. Bill seems like a smart, sincere, diligent seeker of truth from what I've read. (Who am I to judge?) In any case, my point is that insisting again that "it's a mystery" is clearly not going to be helpful, and will in fact be likely to have the following effect (in the words of St Thomas you quoted above): "the very inadequacy of the arguments would rather strengthen them in their error, since they would imagine that our acceptance of the truth of faith was based on such weak arguments."

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    15. Hey David,

      I think this is the important part from the quote:

      The sole way to overcome an adversary of divine truth is from the authority of Scripture—an authority divinely confirmed by miracles. For that which is above the human reason we believe only because God has revealed it.

      If we can prove from scripture that scripture does in fact hold a trinitarian view, then Bill would have two choices: reject scripture or accept that what he views as a contradiction is only apparent. At this point then, the arguments that have been developed here will take on more force. If we go about it the other way and try to make the argument for the Trinity from Aquinas' vocabulary first, then the arguments lose their force. Because the only way we can even get the ball rolling on this discussion is because we first "believe only because God has revealed it". If Bill still rejects the teaching, then he will have put his own understanding above God's revelation.

      And when I said, "it's a mystery -- period" I only mean that it is a revealed article of faith which must be accepted first before we can develop our understanding of it. In this way, if we believe Aquinas has failed to adequately describe how God can be both three persons in one Godhead, it is only because we have either failed to properly understand Aquinas or there is some better explanation out there still to be discovered which can help us understand. And, to be honest, I think this is the case for 99.99% of folks out there. Very few people (including myself) have an adequate understanding of Aquinas' philosophy and theology to properly understand these issues. Now, you can tell me to hold your beer as you give it a shot with Bill, but I'm concerned that because he appears to have already rejected the Trinitarian article of faith, he will not have the ears to hear it. The better approach will be to argue from scripture first.

      Having said all that, I also believe that you are in the small 0.01% of the population that actually does have an adequate understanding. So I sincerely hope you will prove me wrong. :)

      Cheers,
      Daniel

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    16. Daniel,

      I'm still confident you're misunderstanding St Thomas. Bill accepts the authority of scripture but interprets it differently. If you want to appeal to scripture, okay, but is that going to be an easier argument? At best I think you'll get a probable case, but if you don't address the basic issue of intelligibility, that will still come back to bite you in the ass, and logically you're either left with saying that scripture is unreliable (irrational, nonsensical) and/or that faith and reason are contradictory.

      You write: "And when I said, "it's a mystery -- period" I only mean that it is a revealed article of faith which must be accepted first before we can develop our understanding of it."

      I don't buy that. JPII discusses this in Fides et ratio. You're only getting it half right, namely: "believe that you may understand." Right, but the other half is: "understand that you may believe." There is (should be) a necessary complementary interplay between the two. You may well believe in hopes of understanding, but if understanding fails (or concludes that a belief is irrational) then belief is no longer possible, or at least not reasonable, and so you are left with voluntarism and the will to power.

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  14. Bill wrote:

    According to Aquinas, “In whatever multitude of things is to be found something common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of distinction” (ST 1.40.2). Aquinas agrees that because “the persons agree in essence, it only remains to be said that the persons are distinguished from each other by the relations (ST 1.40.2). He elsewhere states that “the relations themselves are not to be distinguished from each other so far as they are identified with the essence” (ST 1.39.1). In other words, the real distinction cannot be accounted for by the essence, because you cannot distinguish them on the basis of what they have in common, but what they have uncommon. So, it seems clear that the PC cannot be identical with the PD.

    Right. PC and PD are conceptually distinct.

    Bill continues:

    But Aquinas goes on to say that “relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility” and “in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same” (ST 1.28.2). This of course yields a straight contradiction: The divine essence cannot be identical with the relations (per above) and the essence is identical with the relations.

    Wrong. Although the essence and relations (qua relations) are distinct, each relation (qua subsistent (personal) being) is really identical to the essence.

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    1. @David McPike

      Thank you for your posts and for your charitable analysis of my posts. As you note, I am most sincere in my efforts to understand the arguments defending the Trinity, and I am definitely not being obstinate about it. I have honestly tried to consider the arguments of my interlocutors in the best possible light, imperfectly of course, and sincerely do not see how they're connecting the dots.

      You write in reply to my assertion that a contradiction exists:

      Wrong. Although the essence and relations (qua relations) are distinct, each relation (qua subsistent (personal) being) is really identical to the essence.

      But since you agree that the essence itself is not what makes the relations distinct, what then makes them distinct? If the cause is not the essence, then what is the cause? If begetting and procession arise from the essence, then it follows that the essence is the cause of the difference (thus, what makes them common is what makes them distinct). Now, this CAN work in genus/species composites. Human nature can be multiplied in distinct portions of matter (among other things) because it has the capacity to reproduce, but that clearly doesn't work here because God is not composite.

      I can also see how your objection works if the distinctions are notional. If that's all that were alleged, I would lodge no objection. As we know, the DT asserts real relations and it's only the relations that are distinct. But how can something have a relation unless it were already distinct? I've noted more than once that the DT appears to simply assert that God is having relations with Himself. If that is all you're arguing, then no modalist or Arian would disagree. But as my interaction with Daniel demonstrates, the "Gospel of John" clearly refutes that because the Father and Son talk to one another and the Son even prays to the Father. As you can see, that sounds like two very real different centers of consciousness for each person which sounds a lot like composition from my neck of the woods.

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    2. @Bill:

      But since you agree that the essence itself is not what makes the relations distinct, what then makes them distinct?

      If it wasn't the essence/being of God that made the relations distinct, there certainly couldn't be anything else making them distinct, so they wouldn't be distinct. But it isn't the essence considered as essence, that makes the distinctness intelligible to us, it is the essence considered as cause...

      If the cause is not the essence, then what is the cause?

      ...So the cause of the processions of the persons is most certainly the (concrete) essence, considered as real cause, not just as (intrinsic) essence (i.e., considered through the mode of intelligibility we signify by the term 'essence').

      If begetting and procession arise from the essence, then it follows that the essence is the cause of the difference (thus, what makes them common is what makes them distinct).

      Right. What they have in common (the divine essence) is what produces/grounds/gives rise to the real distinction (among the divine persons).

      Now, this CAN work in genus/species composites. Human nature can be multiplied in distinct portions of matter (among other things) because it has the capacity to reproduce, but that clearly doesn't work here because God is not composite.

      I don't see how genus/species (logical) composition is relevant to what you're saying here. Hylemorphic (form/matter) composition is what you seem to be referring to. So indeed, hylemorphic composition is not part of how the divine persons are multiplied. Instead they are multiplied by causal procession.

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    3. @David McPike

      Thanks for your reply. You write:

      But it isn't the essence considered as essence, that makes the distinctness intelligible to us, it is the essence considered as cause......So the cause of the processions of the persons is most certainly the (concrete) essence, considered as real cause, not just as (intrinsic) essence (i.e., considered through the mode of intelligibility we signify by the term 'essence').

      So, the essence causes three somethings (I don't mean that disrespectfully) and these three somethings are actually and completely the essence. So, what then is caused? You say that the relations are caused by the essence but that the relations are the essence, so how can you cause something that already exists unless God is simply manifesting Himself in ways we nominally call Father, Son and Holy Spirit?

      I don't see how genus/species (logical) composition is relevant to what you're saying here. Hylemorphic (form/matter) composition is what you seem to be referring to. So indeed, hylomorphic composition is not part of how the divine persons are multiplied. Instead they are multiplied by causal procession.

      I'm not referring to hylomorphic composition. I am arguing that I can't make heads or tails out of what you are saying unless we consider what many Protestants argue on par with genus/species composition. I've seen God referred to as a metaphysical "Family" with three members (one family, three persons) or a flat "God is one essence with three instantiations" wherein God is the underlying genus and the persons are the essence/existence composites (species). As I noted, that kicks the can down the road, but can lands in tritheism.

      Moreover, if the Son and Spirit are "caused," then how can they be God? Aseity is the sine qua non of theism, so it appears that a caused relation cannot be God by definition. Neither the Son nor the Spirit can truly be God if they were not a se. And if we insist that they are nonetheless "fully God," then there must be something in addition to divine essence to set the Father apart from the other two. That would make the Father a composite of divinity and aseity (D + A). Some have replied to me that a man begetting a child is analogous to the procession in that a man gives his human essence to his child yet retains his personal identity, but since you deny genus/species, essence/existence composites in God, it again appears that you're arguing in defense of a God that has relations with Himself. As I've stated several times now, there's nothing especially "trinitarian" about that.

      I truly don't see how the above avoids the inversion roadblock.

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    4. @Bill:

      Thanks for the reply. You write:

      So, the essence causes three somethings (I don't mean that disrespectfully) and these three somethings are actually and completely the essence. So, what then is caused?

      I never said that the essence causes three somethings. I think you're badly misunderstanding the essence/being distinction. The essence and being of God are one. That's why I used the expression "essence/being of God" to begin with, to emphasize and remind you of that. So the personal essence/being of the Father (IOW, God the Father tout court) causes (generates) the personal essence/being of the Son, etc. That's the doctrine of the Trinity. The essence is not something distinct which causes the three Persons. The essence is just the divine nature, the inner life of which is expressed in the processions and the tripersonal relations of you know who.

      You say that the relations are caused by the essence but that the relations are the essence, so how can you cause something that already exists unless God is simply manifesting Himself in ways we nominally call Father, Son and Holy Spirit?

      You can't cause something that already exists, but something that already exists can be caused (and in this case eternally caused). (BTW, anything caused that already exists (e.g., you and me, the heavens, the earth, etc.) must always continue to be caused for as long as it exists.) You can say that "God" -- i.e., deity, God-ness, the divine nature -- manifests itself as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, but that's (only) because the inner life of the deity exists and subsists in the real being/relations of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. God doesn't manifest (reveal Himself) as Trinity because He is only Unity. We believe He does so because God who is truth is in reality Trinity in Unity.

      Moreover, if the Son and Spirit are "caused," then how can they be God? Aseity is the sine qua non of theism, so it appears that a caused relation cannot be God by definition. Neither the Son nor the Spirit can truly be God if they were not a se.

      The Son and Spirit are God because they eternally possess the fullness of the divine nature/essence/being. The Son receives the fullness of the divine nature as proceeding from the Father, and this receiving is what distinguishes him from the Father. But the Father generates the Son necessarily and eternally from the nature of his own being/essence and the Son necessarily receives fully and eternally the divine nature as his own being/essence. So just as the nature of God is a se, so the whole inner life of the Trinity is a se (and this is said truly, as contrasting with the (not a se) inner/outer life of creatures/creation), although of course within that Trinitarian life there is "ab-alio"-ty as well as "a-se"-ity.

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    5. @David McPike

      I appreciate the dialog, but I don't think much progress is being made. You write:

      I never said that the essence causes three somethings. I think you're badly misunderstanding the essence/being distinction. The essence and being of God are one. That's why I used the expression "essence/being of God" to begin with, to emphasize and remind you of that.

      I think you're badly misunderstanding my "three somethings." You are telling me that PD = PC in a sense, so the origin of the relations must be from the essence. The "relations" are the "somethings" I'm referring to.

      So the personal essence/being of the Father (IOW, God the Father tout court) causes (generates) the personal essence/being of the Son, etc. That's the doctrine of the Trinity.

      But the "personal essence/being of the Son" is NO DIFFERENT (to use Aquinas' words) from the divine essence/being! Relation and divine essence are one and the same. As I've been told above, everything that can be predicated of God (the divine essence) can be predicated of the relations, and if the relations are NO DIFFERENT than the divine essence, then we can predicate "Father" to the "Son" and vice verse.

      The essence is not something distinct which causes the three Persons. The essence is just the divine nature, the inner life of which is expressed in the processions and the tripersonal relations of you know who.

      Yes, I understand that. I guess I should have left "somethings" out of my reply because you didn't take it as I meant it. My apologies. Nonetheless, the divine nature causes processions to take place, and the processions are the relations, but the relations are the divine essence of which everything in the divine essence can be predicated. As I've stated numerous times, this appears to be nothing more than God having relations with Himself.

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    6. The Son and Spirit are God because they eternally possess the fullness of the divine nature/essence/being. The Son receives the fullness of the divine nature as proceeding from the Father, and this receiving is what distinguishes him from the Father. But the Father generates the Son necessarily and eternally from the nature of his own being/essence and the Son necessarily receives fully and eternally the divine nature as his own being/essence.

      If the Son "receives" the divine nature by something other than Himself, then He is not God by definition. God is not given His nature, and God's existence is not dependent on a cause. The essence of God is uncaused, and the instant you affirm a cause of being, then whatever is caused cannot be God by definition. To make it work, you either have to adopt some form of composition (which you vehemently deny) or you must equivocate terms like cause and aseity, which renders your argument unintelligible.

      Nothing begotten is a se. That's an automatic contradictio in terminis. Nothing caused is a se. If the sun were eternal, then the rays emanating from the sun would be eternal as well, but that doesn't change the ontological dependence of the rays on the sustaining power of the sun. Can the Father be caused? Can the Father proceed from the divine essence? If so, then the Father isn't God either. If not, then the Father has something the Son and Spirit do not have. In your construct, the existence of the Son is dependent on the eternal begetting of the Father, and as stated, no dependent being is God, unless you equivocate God as well.

      Everything you argue can, however, work logically (as I've noted repeatedly), but either at the expense of the Trinity or monotheism. If everything can be predicated of the Son that can be predicated of the divine essence, then F, S & HS are but functional distinctions of the one Person of God (modalism). God has relations with Himself, which neither modalists nor Arians deny, but trinitarians cannot accept that. There has to be some triple personal real distinction in the essence/being of God, but the explanations you offer don't achieve that. For if there is an aspect of the essence unique to each person, where the Father "ends" and the Son "begins," then you must affirm composition. If there is an impersonal essence that is distributed among three personal relations, they may each be fully God in a sense, but you'll have to affirm essence/existence composition and tritheism.

      The essence of God cannot be multiplied. There cannot be something analogous to a metaphysical Xeroxing of personal relations, each having "everything predicated of the divine being." Yes, you can make it work logically, but at the expense of the DT.

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    7. @Bill:

      I think you're badly misunderstanding my "three somethings." You are telling me that PD = PC in a sense, so the origin of the relations must be from the essence. The "relations" are the "somethings" I'm referring to.

      (Didn't I already explain this?) I took your "three somethings" to refer to the three persons or subsistent relations of the Trinity. I'm curious why you think I badly misunderstood that. I think I'm understanding quite well that you said I said something that I didn't say. Instead you've replaced it with something that shows, as I said before, that you don't understand the essence/being distinction. You seem to grasp it abstractly at times in your argument. Then at others you forget about it, as when you talk about the essence as if it were (according to anything that I've said or anything contained in DT) an entity in itself, which apart from/prior to the being of any of the persons could from itself (from its own being) cause the being of the three persons. I think your continuing to advert to that absurd thought is just muddying the waters. So again, what I said was that the essence qua essence does not explain the relations, but only the concrete essence/being qua cause, i.e., qua divine person; e.g., the Father's divine essence/being generates the Son's divine essence/being.

      So you can't say: "the divine nature causes processions to take place," unless you understand it concretely to mean "the divine nature fully possessed by the Father generates the divine nature fully possessed by the Son," etc. (i.e., the actual DT). Maybe you understand that too, abstractly, sometimes; but if so, I think it might help if you stopped putting the doctrine in an obviously obfuscated way.

      ...if the relations are NO DIFFERENT than the divine essence...

      But obviously they are different, qua relations and qua essence, because they refer to different aspects/modes of intelligibility of the being of the Godhead (personal vs. essential).

      If the Son "receives" the divine nature by something other than Himself, then He is not God by definition.

      If the Son fully receives and thus fully possesses the divine nature, then He is indeed God, by definition! To assert the contrary is not just question begging but absurd.

      So obviously the Father does not proceed from the divine essence. That's nonsense, not an intelligible option. Obviously the Father is God and He obviously has something the Son doesn't have (Fatherhood, Paternity), just has the Son has Sonhood, but these are relational distinctions of the persons fully possessing the divine essence, not distinct aspects of the divine essence considered in itself as essence.

      And no, the Father is not the Son, so if anybody told you principles that lead to that conclusion, those principles were wrong.

      "everything that can be predicated of God (the divine essence) can be predicated of the relations, and if the relations are NO DIFFERENT than the divine essence, then we can predicate "Father" to the "Son" and vice verse."

      Each of the subsistent relations/divine persons is identical to the divine essence, but it doesn't follow that the terms referring to the persons have the same sense and are interchangeable in predication. If someone told you that, he told you wrong. The Evening Star may be really identical to the Morning Star, but you can't say: "ES rises in the evening, ES is MS, therefore MS rises in the evening." Similarly you can't say: "F is G, S is G, therefore F is S and S is F." (Unless you want to just insist on begging the question against DT; but what would be the point of that?)

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  15. @David McPike, you write:

    ...when you talk about the essence as if it were (according to anything that I've said or anything contained in DT) an entity in itself, which apart from/prior to the being of any of the persons could from itself (from its own being) cause the being of the three persons.

    I've always understood the essence of God to be the being of God, and I've argued from the first that the PC is the essence. Each person cannot be different from that which they are common on pain of contradiction. And I've clearly stated that Aquinas argues that the difference is in the relations. And if the distinction is in the relations, there is no "Father" without a "Son." Are you identifying the entire "being" of God with the Father, or does the being of God become Father, logically speaking, when He begets the Son? From what I gather, it's the latter. And if it's the latter, the Son is ontologically dependent on the Father for His existence and identity. Moreover, your language about the Father proceeding the being of the Son sounds like two beings to me. Moreover, God's "being" is not an IT. God is HE.

    So you can't say: "the divine nature causes processions to take place," unless you understand it concretely to mean "the divine nature fully possessed by the Father generates the divine nature fully possessed by the Son," etc. (i.e., the actual DT). Maybe you understand that too, abstractly, sometimes; but if so, I think it might help if you stopped putting the doctrine in an obviously obfuscated way.

    I put a lot of options on the table in order to avoid putting words in your mouth, so I'll dispense with all of that and stop the "obfuscation." I apologize and will try to be sharper. Your statements are directly and clearly logical inversions and cannot be true under any rational standard. I hope that's clearer.

    If the Son fully receives and thus fully possesses the divine nature, then He is indeed God, by definition! To assert the contrary is not just question begging but absurd.

    You can only legitimately say that if you directly addressed my rebuttal, which you told Scott is something that's required of somebody defending your version of the Trinity. If you stepped outside the box for just a second, you would see how patently absurd your statement is. Or, if you simply paused to consider my rebuttal, you would see the silliness of your retort.

    ...continued...

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  16. God is uncaused by definition! God is a se! His aseity is what sets God apart from creation. When you argue that the Son has an "origin" or is "caused" or "begotten" by the Father, you deny His divinity. You are thus forced to equivocate the terms "caused, origin, begotten, and God" in order to sustain your procession theory. "Receiving" divinity would be laughable if you weren't so serious. If the Son needs a cause, then the Son isn't a se BY DEFINITION. This is not simply the observation of an unknown modalist proponent on Feser's blog. Trinitarian scholars who deny this "eternal procession" have noticed the same thing. Neither the Son nor the Spirit are a se, and that makes it impossible for them to be God. Your, "If the Son fully receive and thus fully possesses the divine nature, then He is indeed God, by definition" is akin to saying, "If God creates another God, then the other being is God by definition!" See how silly that is? The "other" being cannot be God because God cannot be created. Ditto for the Son. If the Son has a cause, the Son is not God.

    Each of the subsistent relations/divine persons is identical to the divine essence, but it doesn't follow that the terms referring to the persons have the same sense and are interchangeable in predication.

    I never said that they "have the same sense." And if you bothered to follow my arguments as closely as you want me to follow yours, you would have understood that. The ES IS the MS considered from a different perspective. I CAN say, "That which is the ES rises in the morning, and we call it the MS." Similarly, we can say that the one who is the Father is also the Son, considered from a different perspective. Welcome to modalism.

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    1. Hey David,

      I got my learner's hat on hear, so not addressing Bill in particular, but I thought I would give a stab at clarifying the concepts at least - can you confirm if I'm on the right track?

      So we have a few concepts we are working with:

      *Essence: Shared in common.
      *Nature: Shared in common. The interior principle of action of a being and of its development. It signifies the specific essence of a being, what the thing is, that by which the thing is what it is.
      *Power: Shared in common.
      *Existence: Shared in common.
      *Person/hypostatsis: Principle of distinction based on subsistent relation such that we can distinguish different properties for each person, even though they all share the same powers and essence. A Person is a singular being existing distinctly from others.


      Christ, as an example, has both a divine nature and a human nature united in the second person of the Trinity. So personhood in the trinity is treated as a kind of integration point of some sort.

      We don't have a univocal understanding of person here, such that person as described in human beings is the same as person understood in God. So analogy is required, right? Bill can only be certain of his declarations of contradictions if he is treating the notion of person univocally.

      What do you think?

      Cheers,
      Daniel

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    2. But I don't want to appear to be taking the easy route out, so I was hoping to delve a little bit further:

      When we speak of a human person, the word person does not signify only the human nature, but the singular, concrete, and distinct individual who exists. Thus person includes nature and signifies something more than nature. First, the nature as principle or as essence does not include the concrete act of being. The essence of creatures is not identical to their existence. The person adds to the nature the very act of existing. Second, the person adds to the nature the features that give it its singularity, its individuality. In us, human persons, this individuation comes from matter. In the human person, this flesh is substantially united to this soul. To sum up: The human person adds two things to human nature: the proper act of existing, which the nature does not include in itself; and what individualizes this human nature, what gives it its irreducible singularity.

      When we speak of angels, the word person does not signify only the angelic nature, but the singular, concrete, and distinct individual who exists. Thus the person includes the nature and signifies something more than the nature. The nature as principle or essence does not include the concrete act of being. The essence of angels are not identical to their existence. The person adds to this nature the very act of existing, such that the person would not exist without the combination of the two.

      When we speak of the trinity, the divine person is an individual substance of a rational nature, but in a manner profoundly different from human persons and angels. There is, however, an analogy. In God, this spiritual nature (an intellectual nature) is the transcendent divine nature identical to the very existence of God, indeed identical in the three persons such that even the three persons are their identical divine nature, and there is no real difference, but only a conceptual distinction. The sole real distinction that is found in God is the distinction between the persons themselves (and not between the persons and the divine nature). And in so far as our minds can understand it, that distinction rests in the concept of relations or relative properties. They are relations that subsist.

      Real relations possess two aspects: It exists, not just conceptually, but in reality of things. In in this case, in the reality of the relations between the persons of the trinity. Paternity, filliation, and procession. This is not another existence added on top of the nature, but exists in the nature. These relations of distinction, though, not only define the differences between the persons of the holy trinity, they are the persons of the holy trinity.

      Thus the analogy moves as such: Humans generate persons, Angels generate persons, and God generates persons. This is the result of the combination of essence and existence.

      Bill would appear to be happier maybe with only one person being generated by God's essence and existence? Or perhaps no person at all? But wouldn't even one person being generated constitute a problem for bill? And how does he know that only one person is sufficient to express the divine essences' existence?

      Anyway I know you don't have infinite time, so I understand if you can't respond. But if you can, let me know if I've gone off the rails anywhere.

      Cheers,
      Daniel

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    3. @Daniel, you write:

      The sole real distinction that is found in God is the distinction between the persons themselves (and not between the persons and the divine nature).

      But if the Persons are no different from the divine nature, and are one and the same with the divine nature (per Aquinas), then the "persons" can only relate to each other in a manner that God relates to Himself. Your description reduces to God relating to God. "Son" is not God + Son, but Son = the one, simple undivided divine essence (God). That's the only way I can make sense of your appeal to relations. How can a relation exist unless the persons having the relationship are already distinct? And if there isn't a difference to begin with, then the relations indicate self-interaction. And as I've been saying many times now, that's nothing "trinitarian."

      Bill would appear to be happier maybe with only one person being generated by God's essence and existence? Or perhaps no person at all? But wouldn't even one person being generated constitute a problem for bill? And how does he know that only one person is sufficient to express the divine essences' existence?

      If you want to know what I think, why don't you ask me? Lots of persons are "generated" by God's existence; they're called creatures. You and I can be happy about that because we now exist.

      But if you insist that the being of God generated a "relation," and by virtue of that generation a "real" relationship exists between the generator and the generated, and you also say that what is generated is one and the same with the generator (Father=divine essence, Son=divine essence), then again, all you are saying is that God relates to Himself.

      On the other hand, if you insist that the generated has a personal identity akin to an alter ego (something I think you'll vehemently deny), then all you're saying is that God has multiple modes of revelation which again is modalism.

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    4. And so we come round to my original argument. The PC is what makes each person God. The PD is the relation of each person to each other. However, each relation (person) is wholly and completely God. It isn't relation + God = person; it is person = God. The relation is one and the same, no different than God Himself. So, the relational distinctions are in the divine essence. That means you are saying that the PC = PD, what makes the persons identical with what makes them non-identical, and that is a straight contradiction (I = ~I).

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    5. But if the Persons are no different from the divine nature, and are one and the same with the divine nature (per Aquinas), then the "persons" can only relate to each other in a manner that God relates to Himself. Your description reduces to God relating to God. "Son" is not God + Son, but Son = the one, simple undivided divine essence (God). That's the only way I can make sense of your appeal to relations. How can a relation exist unless the persons having the relationship are already distinct? And if there isn't a difference to begin with, then the relations indicate self-interaction. And as I've been saying many times now, that's nothing "trinitarian."

      No, God is three selves, not just Himself. I as a human have one nature and one self. I see no reason why there could not be a being with three selves.

      Lots of persons are "generated" by God's existence; they're called creatures. You and I can be happy about that because we now exist.

      You didn't actually answer my question though. Are there any persons in God? Do you pick out the father, as the unitarians do and demote the son and the holy spirit to creatures? Do you think there can be no personhood in good at all, only essence and nature?

      But if you insist that the being of God generated a "relation," and by virtue of that generation a "real" relationship exists between the generator and the generated, and you also say that what is generated is one and the same with the generator (Father=divine essence, Son=divine essence), then again, all you are saying is that God relates to Himself.

      You are assuming Himself here. You are begging the question.

      On the other hand, if you insist that the generated has a personal identity akin to an alter ego (something I think you'll vehemently deny), then all you're saying is that God has multiple modes of revelation which again is modalism.

      Only if you begin by assuming that in the Trinity there is only one controlling person. Your assuming the very point in question (something I think you'll vehemently deny).

      Thanks,
      Daniel

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    6. And so we come round to my original argument. The PC is what makes each person God.The PD is the relation of each person to each other. However, each relation (person) is wholly and completely God. It isn't relation + God = person; it is person = God. The relation is one and the same, no different than God Himself. So, the relational distinctions are in the divine essence. That means you are saying that the PC = PD, what makes the persons identical with what makes them non-identical, and that is a straight contradiction (I = ~I).

      I get lost in your abbreviations. Can you expand them please? I'll be able to give a better response that way. :)

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    7. @Daniel, you write:

      No, God is three selves, not just Himself. I as a human have one nature and one self. I see no reason why there could not be a being with three selves.

      A being with three selves is a composite being, assuming of course that these "selves" are real (which must be what you're getting at). If there is an aspect of the essence that unique to each person, then the essence is composed by definition. Since the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) abjures divine composition (for very good reasons), a composite Godhead is impossible.

      You are assuming Himself here. You are begging the question.

      The Bible calls God He, Him, His, and Himself, whereas God is quoted referring to Himself as Me, Myself and I literally thousands of times. "The LORD, he is God, and there is none else." So, no. I'm not assuming anything.

      Only if you begin by assuming that in the Trinity there is only one controlling person. Your assuming the very point in question (something I think you'll vehemently deny).

      What I believe is not specifically the point in question. I am examining the logical implications of the Trinity and merely saying that some logical extensions are indistinct from modalism, whether or not you accept it. I would only be "begging the question" in that regard if I were articulating a defense of modalism.

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    8. @Daniel, you write:

      I get lost in your abbreviations. Can you expand them please? I'll be able to give a better response that way. :)

      My apologies. I thought you were following my interaction with others here. I spell it out a couple of times above, but I won't make you hunt for them.

      For A and B to be similar but distinct, there must be a principle of commonality (PC) and a principle of distinction (PD). If we have nothing but PC, then A = B, the labels 'A' and 'B' are then nominal, not actual (real) distinctions. Something, then, must account for their being dissimilar, and that is the PD. The PC cannot be the PD (PC ≠ PD), for that forces us to assert that the thing which makes A & B common is the very thing that makes them different (C = ~C), which of course is a straight contradiction. This gives us the following principle (P): A is really distinct from B if and only if (1) there is a PC & a PD between A & B, and (2) PD between A & B cannot really be identical with PC (PC ≠ PD).

      With respect to the Father (F), Son (S) and Holy Spirit (HS), each are asserted by the Doctrine of the Trinity (DT) to be fully God, really distinct from one another, and one, simple, indivisible God. So, the PC for each person is the divine essence (per Aquinas) and the relations are the PD. However, Aquinas also tells us that the relations are "no different" from the essence, that they are "one and the same" as the essence, and that the only distinction between the relations and the essence is their "mode of intelligibility" which of course means that each person is one and the same with the full Godhead. And per above, that's a clear logical inversion. The very thing that makes them alike cannot be the thing that makes them different. That amounts to saying that it's really possible for F, S & HS to be distinct without differing in any way.

      Though trinitarians deny a real distinction between the persons and the essence, they insist by revelation that there is a real distinction between each person as an "opposing" relation. But since each person is fully and completely the undivided divine essence, the simple essence is merely relating to itself (Himself). Nothing trinitarian is advanced.

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    9. @Daniel:

      Seems fine to me, except you lost me at the end with: "Thus the analogy moves as such: Humans generate persons, Angels generate persons, and God generates persons. This is the result of the combination of essence and existence."

      @Bill:

      FYI, here's what Aquinas says (ST I.28.2):

      Et sic manifestum est quod relatio realiter existens in Deo, est idem essentiae secundum rem [And thus it is manifest that the relation really existing in God is the same as the essence according to the thing]; et non differt nisi secundum intelligentiae rationem, prout in relatione importatur respectus ad suum oppositum, qui non importatur in nomine essentiae. [And it does not differ except as following/according to/in consideration of (secundum) the reason(ing)/account/concept (rationem) of the understanding, so far as in 'relation' is implied a relation to its opposite, which is not implied in the name 'essence.'] Patet ergo quod in Deo non est aliud esse relationis et esse essentiae, sed unum et idem. [Therefore it is clear that in God the being/existence of the relation and the being/existence of the essence are not other (they don't differ from one another), but are one and the same (being/existence).]

      Your argument is: Aquinas says PC and PD are different. But Aquinas says PC and PD are the same. So this is a clear "logical inversion" (i.e., you mean contradiction?).

      In reality Aquinas just says that PC (divine essence) and PD (the divine relations) are different notions (as he explains in part above, and as is obvious), but that considered concretely (i.e., not as logical principles, principles of understanding, principles of conceptual unification and differentiation) they (essence and person) are identical, the being of the essence and the being of the relation are one and the same.

      And so you write: "The very thing that makes them alike cannot be the thing that makes them different."

      I think it might allay your confusion if you amended this to say: "The very thing that 'makes' (in the same respect (ITSR)) them 'alike' (ITSR) cannot be the thing that 'makes' (ITSR) them 'different' (ITSR)."

      And then you can see that instead of saying:
      "That amounts to saying that it's really possible for F, S & HS to be distinct without differing in any way."

      you should say:
      "That amounts to saying that it's really possible for F, S & HS to be distinct (in one respect) without differing (in another respect)."

      And there's nothing logically "inverse" (or perverse or contradictory, etc.) about that.

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    10. A being with three selves is a composite being....

      The essence is not composed. It is identical to its existence. But is that the only thing we can know about God's essence? Clearly not - God's essence is packed full of omniscience, power, omnipresences, and so on. And, because God is of a rational substance, he also has personhood in a very unique way that we can only come to by analogy to our own way of experiencing personhood. It would seem to me that you would have no problem with the concept of personhood being contained in the essence of God, so long as it was one - is that correct? And we don't even have a full understanding of how person hood exists in human beings. So how can you so confidently affirm that one, two, or three persons in God constitutes composition in the essence? If God is self conscious and knows himself, how can you, as a finite human being, know what that is like?

      The Bible calls God He, Him, His, and Himself, whereas God is quoted referring to Himself as Me, Myself and I literally thousands of times. "The LORD, he is God, and there is none else." So, no. I'm not assuming anything.

      Well, except for all the times that God asserts the same for Christ and the Holy Spirit as well. In addition, you are also ignoring all the councils of the church. And this comes back to my point I was debating with David - there is a sense in which all of this discussion is profoundly based on Revelation, and we must approach this truth in the spirit of faith and trust in the revealer more so than we trust our own powers of understanding. God, in his infinite wisdom, did not provide a Thomistic chapter of the bible. He revealed what was true about himself through Jesus Christ, such that our faith in Christ Jesus is the primary reason why we believe in the Holy Trinity. That is not to say that God is proposing something contrary to reason. You and David might call this approach silly, but from my perspective, you are letting your human pride get into the way of the truth. This is what we Catholics call the obedience of faith.

      I point you back to the words of Saint Thomas

      [4] Another benefit that comes from the revelation to men of truths that exceed the reason is the curbing of presumption, which is the mother of error. For there are some who have such a presumptuous opinion of their own ability that they deem themselves able to measure the nature of everything; I mean to say that, in their estimation, everything is true that seems to them so, and everything is false that does not. So that the human mind, therefore, might be freed from this presumption and come to a humble inquiry after truth, it was necessary that some things should be proposed to man by God that would completely surpass his intellect.

      And I think, without diminishing the value of Saint Thomas' works, there was a profound message he gave to all his followers in the end of his life that corresponds with this initial statement above:

      The end of my labors has come. All that I have written appears to be as so much straw after the things that have been revealed to me.

      and

      I can write no more. I have seen things that make my writings like straw.

      I don't think these statements necessarily lead to voluntarism and the will to power, because I don't believe that the human intellect has within it that capacity to be the measure of all things. As Hamlet said to Horatio:

      There are more things in heaven and Earth, Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.

      I'll end my side of this discussion on this note. I hope you don't take it in the spirit of a personal attack. It is not meant that way. As David said in one of his posts, I also admire your zeal for truth.

      God bless,
      Daniel

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    11. @Daniel, you write:

      Your argument is: Aquinas says PC and PD are different. But Aquinas says PC and PD are the same. So this is a clear "logical inversion" (i.e., you mean contradiction?).

      I have a lot of respect for Aquinas, but I obviously don't buy everything that he argued. I'm using inversion in the sense of opposite, meaning that the logical extension of some of his arguments are the opposite of what he intended.


      ...the being of the essence and the being of the relation are one and the same.

      Of course.

      I think it might allay your confusion if you amended this to say: "The very thing that 'makes' (in the same respect (ITSR)) them 'alike' (ITSR) cannot be the thing that 'makes' (ITSR) them 'different' (ITSR)."

      I'm not confused, so there's nothing to "allay." God is love, God is judgment, and God is wrath. These attributes are "alike" in one respect in that they are wholly identified with God, but they are "different" in another respect due to their "operation," but there is no REAL difference in God's essence with respect to those attributes. So, as I've stated many times now, if that is all you're saying with respect to the persons of the Trinity, that there is a logical or conceptual distinction, then there's nothing particularly "trinitarian" about it. I have even used the term "real" in that God's attributes are real and their effects are really different. That is not, however, what you are saying. You are saying that there is a REAL distinction in God's essence (because the relations ARE God's essence). So, unless there is composition in the essence (which you deny), then there cannot be a different respect of sameness and difference.

      If there is any aspect of the essence unique to each person, then the essence is composed by definition. The essence is not composed, so there is no unique multiple personhood in God. There is no real distinction between the essence and the relations because the relation, per what you just said, ARE the essence, "the being of the essence and the being of the relation are one and the same." The relations' function may be distinct (as the "function" of mercy and wrath), but not really distinct.

      And, yes, that is the "opposite" of what you intend to argue (perverse and contradictory).

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    12. @Daniel, you write:

      It would seem to me that you would have no problem with the concept of personhood being contained in the essence of God, so long as it was one - is that correct?

      Correct.

      And we don't even have a full understanding of how person hood exists in human beings. So how can you so confidently affirm that one, two, or three persons in God constitutes composition in the essence?

      We all agree that analogous predication is necessary when speaking about God. As I said above, when you argue that God is simple and your definition tells me that He is composite, I object. And it doesn't help matters when the attempt is made to pat things into place by appealing to God's ineffable essence. By definition, an aspect of the essence unique to a person tells me that there is a zone where the Father ends and the Son begins, and there is a zone where the Son ends and the Holy Spirit begins. And that extends to each person being but a fraction of the whole, which is the opposite of what you elsewhere affirm (that each person is NOT a fraction of the whole).

      Well, except for all the times that God asserts the same for Christ and the Holy Spirit as well.

      Yes, and modalists would reply that since "Christ" is the human manifestation of God (1 Tim. 3:16) and "Holy Spirit" is God's indwelling presence in a believer (Eph. 4:6), "He" is the most appropriate term. Regardless the counterpoints you may make in response to those verses (and many others), I've made no assumptions about the literally thousands of times the Bible refers to God with singular personal pronouns. God is a living being, not an "it."

      I'll end my side of this discussion on this note. I hope you don't take it in the spirit of a personal attack. It is not meant that way. As David said in one of his posts, I also admire your zeal for truth.

      And I sincerely appreciate your taking the time to interact with me. I've seen many of these discussions disintegrate into knock-down, drag-out brawls. Thanks for your congeniality and efforts.

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    13. @Bill:
      "The relations' function may be distinct (as the "function" of mercy and wrath), but not really distinct."

      And yet the because the processions are real, the relations are real, and they are really relationally distinct. You've given no argument against this, you're just begging the question.

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    14. @Daniel:
      Let's think about but St Thomas says:

      Another benefit that comes from the revelation to men of truths that exceed the reason is the curbing of presumption, which is the mother of error. For there are some who have such a presumptuous opinion of their own ability that they deem themselves able to measure the nature of everything; I mean to say that, in their estimation, everything is true that seems to them so, and everything is false that does not.

      So in your estimation, does your interpretation of St Thomas seem true, and so you assume it is true? It seems you are assuming that what Thomas says should rather serve as a warning to your interlocutors; but why not rather as a warning to yourself?

      So that the human mind, therefore, might be freed from this presumption and come to a humble inquiry after truth, it was necessary that some things should be proposed to man by God that would completely surpass his intellect.

      So does Thomas mean (a) completely surpass his understanding altogether (so that Augustine's/JPII's dictum "understand that you may believe" should be rejected); or (b) completely surpass the ability of his unaided reason to positively ascertain apart from the assistance of grace and revelation? (Or something else?)

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    15. @Daniel:

      To be clear, Thomas holds the following (as do I): Truth has one source in God, so that truths known by reason and truths known by faith cannot contradict one another. It follows that no rational argument purporting to disprove an article of faith can be sound and all such arguments are rationally refutable, i.e., they can be shown to be unsound; and this is true notwithstanding that articles of faith are not rationally provable (i.e., through the use of reason alone, apart from revelation).

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    16. Hey David,

      So in your estimation, does your interpretation of St Thomas seem true, and so you assume it is true?

      I'm not saying we have no grasp of reason, but I do believe there are limits.

      It seems you are assuming that what Thomas says should rather serve as a warning to your interlocutors; but why not rather as a warning to yourself?

      I do. Maybe I come off sounding arrogant. If yes, then I apologize. He's still right though. :)

      So does Thomas mean (a) completely surpass his understanding altogether (so that Augustine's/JPII's dictum "understand that you may believe" should be rejected);

      No. Not completely. I agree that we can come to some conclusions about God through analogy and through a posteriori means (the five ways). This provides the preambles to faith, so to speak.

      or (b) completely surpass the ability of his unaided reason to positively ascertain apart from the assistance of grace and revelation? (Or something else?)

      This one I think I can agree with, at least with regard to the content of revelation. Having said that, as you have pointed out before, we need to respond to arguments against revealed truth. That is our job as Christians. I believe Aquinas thinks the best way to do this is via the authority of scripture (and I would add the authoritative teaching of his church and its councils) when it comes to doctrines that fall in this category.

      By saying this, I'm not trying to set up a dichotomy, such that only authority and appeals to revelation will work. I don't believe that and I think Aquinas did not either. Understand so that you may believe has a place in the order of grace. But when Aquinas says "completely surpass his intellect." I don't think he simply had in mind dolts like me. I think he meant everyone - and especially those who think highly of their own abilities. Our current condition is as Paul expressed it in 1 Corinthians 13:12

      12 For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known.

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    17. To be clear, Thomas holds the following (as do I): Truth has one source in God, so that truths known by reason and truths known by faith cannot contradict one another.

      Yes. I believe this to be true as well.

      It follows that no rational argument purporting to disprove an article of faith can be sound and all such arguments are rationally refutable, i.e., they can be shown to be unsound; and this is true notwithstanding that articles of faith are not rationally provable (i.e., through the use of reason alone, apart from revelation).

      Yes, but.... some means are better than others. Aquinas gave his advice on which route best serves in discussions such as these. I tend to agree with him. His advice was not a command though, and maybe this discussion with Bill will prove to be fruitful, God willing.

      God bless!
      Daniel

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    18. @Daniel:

      I pretty much agree with all that. I'm certainly confident it's (b), not (a). The important thing to remember in our present context is that while we may see as through a glass, darkly, it's not so dark that we can't (in principle) see the difference between good and bad arguments for, and correct and incorrect formulations of, the revealed doctrines. But of course this seeing may take a great deal of effort (i.e., faith acting in love). Indeed it is for us even now a first fruits of grace, a joy and consolation, to be able to see, even darkly, as we await the fulness of the revelation of His coming in glory. (That's why we're both Feser-fans, I assume. He's extraordinarily helpful in helping us to see things more clearly and distinctly.)

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    19. 100% agreed! I'm also a fan of your work! Your thesis on the Eucharist was amazing. And I really liked your talk on Rawls. :)

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    20. @David McPike, you write:

      And yet the because the processions are real, the relations are real, and they are really relationally distinct. You've given no argument against this, you're just begging the question.

      The relation is the divine essence, so of course it's real. That's called a tautology. That's no different than saying the essence is real, so the essence is real. And if the essence is real, it can relate to itself, which is all your word shell verbiage accomplishes.

      And proof by assertion is still fallacious. Your selective "rebuttals" don't entitle you to accuse me of begging the question. I explained in detail why your "defense" of the Trinity is something no modalist or Arian would object to. Since the essence is simple and indivisible, and since the relations are "one and the same" and "no different" than the essence, then their reality is the fact that they are the essence. In God, there is no real distinction between substance and accident, between existence and essence. God does not have a relation but is the relation. Relations do not exist in God's substance but are identical with the divine substance (just like His attributes---God does not have justice, He is justice). Since relation is the divine essence, there is nothing to relate to other than the simple, undivided essence of God. Thus, God is simply relating to Himself. Calling those "relations" "real" is nothing more than saying that God's essence is real. And that's not "begging the question" because that's the logical extension of your terminology.

      On the other hand, if you insist that there is an aspect of the divine essence unique to each person, then it follows (not begging the question), that the essence is composed (as I've argued above).

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    21. @Bill:

      The relation is the divine essence, so of course it's real. That's called a tautology. That's no different than saying the essence is real, so the essence is real.

      Do you honestly believe that?

      (Earlier it seemed to me you were engaged in an honest effort to understand; now I'm beginning to wonder.)

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    22. Do you honestly believe that?

      Aquinas has written that “relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility” and “in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same” (ST 1.28.2). So, yes, the relation is real because the essence is real. Of course I believe that.

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    23. But you believe its tautological? Please do explain.

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    24. If we have a relation, don't we them have a sort of oposition on the essence? Don't this means we do have some diference between "parts"(not metaphysical parts, of course) that could them be Father, Son and Holy Spirit? I do not mean that this shows there are three Gods, of course.

      The trinitarian is not saying that there are three totally diferent selfs or a Cerberus on the Godhead like, say, William Lane Craig believes, he is saying that there is some sort of relation on God(not that they are diferent) that separates the three persons in a way that is not a numerical one(because them we would have three Gods) neither a mere logical one(because the opositions actually are the essence). What does this means? Dunno, but the modalist also believes that he can't actually explain God nature, so...

      I mean, what do we mean by "God is relating to Himself" and how exactly this is diferent from the trinitarian belief? If we can't define the two beliefs in a way that shows exactly how they contradict each other, this discussion won't end.


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    25. @Talmid

      Hello again! I explained a bit of how a modalist views relation elsewhere in this thread. Here's a snippet:

      I’ve not argued that logical or notional distinctions are unreal. God’s mercy, judgment, love, etc., are REAL. From one perspective, God is love, from another, He is judgment, but all of His attributes are one in Him. He is not one part love, one part mercy, one part judgment, etc.; He just simply IS. So God’s judgment demanded the destruction of Sodom and its inhabitants, but His mercy also acted to save Lot and his family. God’s judgment and mercy “worked together” to save Lot, but there is not one person of judgment and another person of mercy.

      So, in the example I provided, judgment and mercy had what we would say is analogous to a relationship. The wrathful aspect of God "determined" to destroy Sodom, but God's mercy "stepped in" and said, "Let me save Lot." Since God is simple, this scenario didn't play out like I described. It is simply how it "works" from our perspective.

      Aquinas makes it clear that a relation IS the divine essence, and since the essence is not and cannot be divided, the distinction is only in "our mode of intelligibility" or as it is sensible to man. It is all one in God.

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    26. @Bill

      So, what do you believe is the diference between this view and the trinitarian one Aquinas used? When you say that God is one what you actually says is "God is non-composite", and Aquinas agree on that.

      My worry is that our concepts of unity, relations, composition etc are taken from the material world, who can't even dream of holding a candle to God, so our language when we talk about The Lord turns into a bunch of analogies that are actually easier to follow apophaticism, so our language of analogy can trick us if we get distracted.

      To give you a example, a poster here tried to argue several times that God(as thomism understand) is impossible because the idea of a omnipotent mind(or even any mind) that is absolutely simple is a incoherent idea. As a thomistic theist, you agree with me that this is not true and only works if you read "mind" or "simplicity" as what these worlds means when they describe things on this material world. But can't we do the same mistake when talking about the Trinity? Maybe it looks like there is a contradiction because our language is not apophatic enough and we think we do know how God is.

      This looks like a excuse, i know, but i think the problem is that both sabelianists and trinitarians don't know what the idea of the Trinity actually means, so this debate won't get anywhere. This is diferent that, say, when a vedantist say both that:

      1. Everything is Brahman

      and

      2. Brahman has no atributes

      These entail

      3. Nothing has atributes

      This conclusion do talks about what we actually know(creation), so we don't have the same dificult and can just point out that this don't make any sense.

      In the end, i believe we should just believe in what is revealed to us, even if we can't actually understand what is revealed, and never try to "prove" the Trinity by arguments. I mean, do you actually understand what the Incarnation means? I don't, but i believe that Jesus is divine because He said that and proved He had the authority.

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    27. @Talmid

      Thanks for your post. You raise interesting points, and I agree that God's existence is such that finite terms can never adequately describe.

      That said, I believe I mentioned previously that whatever terms we use cannot be contradictory if for no other reason that we'd be uttering gibberish if we do.

      The crux of the matter for me is the implication that there is a real difference in God's essence. Metaphysical or physical, a real difference in the essence is composition which is the very thing that Thomist trinitarians adamantly deny. Well, deny it or not, that's what it is.

      They cleverly argue that the persons' identity as God is one and the same; it is the relation that's different. But Aquinas clearly states that the relation IS the essence, so how does that help matters? As I've stated multiple times now, either God is relating to Himself or there is a zone unique to each person. If the former, you have modalism or Arianism; if the latter, you have a straight contradiction.

      For me, modalism is clearly superior because it affirms strict monotheism and the full deity of Jesus without any contradiction. It at least has the luxury of being free from the logical impossibilities of three really different persons who are not really different.

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    28. Talmid,
      "...God(as thomism understand) is impossible because the idea of a omnipotent mind(or even any mind) that is absolutely simple is a incoherent idea. As a thomistic theist, you agree with me that this is not true and only works if you read "mind" or "simplicity" as what these worlds means when they describe things on this material world."

      Yet the OP states
      " But we know this only because we’ve reasoned from the existence of the things of our experience to an ultimate cause having this essence."

      So which is it? God cannot be reasoned from sense experience or god can be reasoned from sense experience?

      Thomism only concludes that by reasoning from sense experience there must be a real existence of some sort that is impossible for us to understand. Thus, Thomism solves nothing.

      We start out realizing that the nobody understands the ultimate explanation for all that exists in our sense experience, then we apply Thomism, only to arrive at the conclusion that nobody understands the ultimate explanation for all that exists.

      Why do Thomists seem to think they have solved a problem when all they have done is stated that the "solution" to the unknown is unknowable?

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    29. Guys, please don't feed the StardustyPsyche troll.

      Delete
  17. @Bill,

    You're definitely into a lot of straight question-begging here. I think you have a healthy kind of Jewish-Muslim dogmatic monotheist revulsion to the scandal of the Trinity, which is in part admirable compared to the lazy, insouciant belief of many Christians. In any case, to your arguments:

    Are you identifying the entire "being" of God with the Father, or does the being of God become Father, logically speaking, when He begets the Son?

    I find your question here odd. You must know the answer already, surely? Obviously Fatherhood logically implies being a Father, i.e., to the Son (within DT). (That's a priori analytic, to get back to Feser's OP.)

    Your statements are directly and clearly logical inversions and cannot be true under any rational standard. I hope that's clearer.

    That's a gratuitous assertion. It certainly is not clearer.

    If you stepped outside the box for just a second, you would see how patently absurd your statement is. Or, if you simply paused to consider my rebuttal, you would see the silliness of your retort.

    Tu quoque!

    God is a se by definition. Right, but what exactly does that mean? A priori that might seem to exclude the Trinity of persons. But a posteriori (after revelation takes us out of the box of our natural presuppositions) we come to know more about God's aseity. We come to know that it can/should/must be understood in a sense which includes the internal processions and relations of the persons of the Trinity, without prejudice to and in clear distinction from (despite your gratuitous assertions to the contrary) the non-aseity characterizing the being of and God's ("non-real") relations to creatures/creation. Your argument rests on gratuitously asserting that your a priori sense of aseity is necessarily the only one that can apply to God; in other words, that God necessarily has nothing to teach you, via revelation, about the correct understanding of His own aseity; in other words, you are making an idol of your own a priori concepts instead of allowing them to be shaped by divine revelation. And in order to cling to your a priori conception of God's asseity you are prepared to assert that even if the Son fully possesses the divine nature, He is not God. Now the mystery is, why do you think that your specific a priori understanding of the aseity of God is so clear and distinct and necessary that it would justify saying that even if a person fully receives and possesses the divine nature, He wouldn't be God?

    You say: "Receiving" divinity would be laughable if you weren't so serious.

    I say: Your claim that "receiving" divinity would be laughable if you weren't so serious would be laughable if you weren't so serious.

    Now what do you say?

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    Replies
    1. @David McPike

      But a posteriori (after revelation takes us out of the box of our natural presuppositions) we come to know more about God's aseity.

      Aseity is not a "presupposition." It is logically deduced from a posteriori arguments for God's existence. It is a metaphysical principle that all things caused are actualized by something that cannot be caused. The uncaused cause's essence is to exist. He doesn't have existence; He is existence. It is therefore impossible for Him to be caused. If a metaphysical being of essence/existence composition exists (e.g. an angel), then its existence is caused and sustained by something that cannot be caused. Arguing that an uncaused cause can be caused is turning language on its head, and no amount of "revelation" can undo that obvious contradiction. What you're doing is what you chastised Daniel for doing. You utter a logical contradiction and you defend it by appealing to revelation, that somehow aseity doesn't mean within the essence what it means outside the essence. That doesn't work.

      And in order to cling to your a priori conception of God's asseity you are prepared to assert that even if the Son fully possesses the divine nature, He is not God.

      You're again misreading me. I never said, "Even if the Son fully possesses the divine nature, He is not God." I said that "receiving" the divine nature or causing the divine nature is a contradictio in terminis because God cannot be caused. I said that your statement is akin to saying that, "If God creates another God, then the other being is God by definition." That's patently false because God cannot be created. What about that revelation? What about our a priori assumption that there can be but one God? What if the unknowable intrinsic essence of God can produce other Gods? That means God can create as many Gods as He likes. But if multiple Gods is a metaphysical impossibility, as shown by natural theology, it is equally impossible for aseity to be caused. That's not a presupposition; that's the logical consequence of natural theology. Your attempt to avoid that implication by appealing to revelation renders you bereft of rebutting competing doctrines. If you can appeal to revelation, so can they. If "it's a revelation" is an out for you, it's an out for everybody.

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    2. @Bill:

      Aseity is not a "presupposition." It is logically deduced from a posteriori arguments for God's existence.

      Excellent observation. If follows that God's aseity (as deduced from a posteriori arguments) is a relational concept (distinguishing God from creatures), not a properly essential concept, since it is deduced precisely in an argument starting from creatures and reasoning to the existence (not the essence) of a being that differs from creatures in its being a se. To say that God is a se is to deny of God an imperfection that pertains to all creatures. It is fundamentally about what God is not, not what God is (God's essence). The specific sense to be assigned to 'aseity,' then, follows from the mode of argument from which it is derived. Thus you have no grounds for asserting that it also applies to circumscribing and delimiting the intelligibility of God in His own essential being.

      Arguing that an uncaused cause can be caused is turning language on its head, and no amount of "revelation" can undo that obvious contradiction.

      Again, Bill, as with reading Aquinas, you have to remember that words have multiple significations. 'Cause' is obviously a word with multiple significations, so when you use the word 'cause' to derive supposed contradictions you better check yourself and see if you aren't equivocating. Here you clearly are. A thing's essence is a kind of cause, its intrinsic cause. An uncaused cause still has an essence, so an uncaused cause is still caused. It just isn't caused by anything extrinsic to itself. So, e.g., the Son is essentially caused by the uncaused causality of the inner processions of the Trinity. The Father generates the Son, but this generation is intrinsic to the uncaused causality of the divine essence.

      (Last note: I hope I didn't 'chastise' Daniel, I just tried to point out some problems with his argument. And hopefully, Bill, you can see now that my argument is not at all along the same line as Daniel's.)

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    3. @David McPike

      To say that God is a se is to deny of God an imperfection that pertains to all creatures. It is fundamentally about what God is not, not what God is (God's essence)..

      Any creature is a created being, physical or metaphysical because every creature is a composite of act and potency. We deduce that the ground of all composition is Pure Act whose essence is to exist. There is thus no cause whatsoever in Pure Act. It is impossible. We can say, however, that Pure Act is the sufficient explanation of itself, but we cannot say that it is the cause of itself. I most certainly disagree with you here.

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    4. @Bill:

      And the Trinity is Pure Act (no potency). To say that there is no cause whatsoever in Pure Act, including no intrinsic cause, is to say that there is no essence/being whatsoever in Pure Act; and so the truth is that God is nothing. (Hurray for apophaticism-gone-wild!) In any case, I think your objections have been clearly answered and it seems you are now reduced to what are clearly merely verbal quibbles. If you have nothing else to object, thanks for the discussion.

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    5. @David McPike

      To say that there is no cause whatsoever in Pure Act, including no intrinsic cause, is to say that there is no essence/being whatsoever in Pure Act...

      Did somebody say something about begging the question? You know enough about the divine essence to "confidently" assert that an uncaused cause actually needs an intrinsic cause in order to exist? Does that require a revelatory memo too? It would have to because that's nothing but self-causation in drag. And to say that Pure Act needs to be actualized is to deny the existence of Pure Act. Verbal quibbles anybody?

      Pure Act has no cause of being precisely because He is Pure Act. Creatures need a cause of being; that's why God is the uncaused cause. To argue that God needs some internal mechanism to sustain His essence undermines the entire argument for His existence.

      But perhaps this can be resolved if we're using different senses of "cause." To cause is to produce an effect which requires the actualization of a potential, even if the effect were eternal (as light from an eternal sun). This is impossible in God since God has no potency to actualize. So cause may mean "reason" or "explanation" for an act. And if God is revealing Himself as Son, the reason is God's eternal redemptive plan. Since the redemptive plan requires the Son, and since the plan is eternal, it follows that the "Son" is eternal in that sense. Thus, the explanation or reason (since it is "in" God) is real, but not really distinct from God (no real difference in His essence). And again, there's nothing trinitarian about that, but that's not how you appear to be defining "cause." There is some intrinsic principle that props God up and that somehow justifies your saying that the "being" of the Son is "caused" by an eternal procession, which is absurd.

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    6. @David McPike

      I think your objections have been clearly answered and it seems you are now reduced to what are clearly merely verbal quibbles.

      Answered, yes, so in that sense it is "clear" but not sufficient. Logical contradictions don't clear anything up.

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    7. @David McPike, you write:

      A thing's essence is a kind of cause, its intrinsic cause. An uncaused cause still has an essence, so an uncaused cause is still caused.

      Essence in creatures is something we abstract from beings in identifying them in particular categories. It is the what-ness of a thing, but it has no causal efficacy. It can only be actualized by something other than itself, and that is God (all perfections being eminently in Him). I suppose one can call it a "cause" of sorts because it is the "blueprint" that particularizes the act of existence conjoined to it.

      Since the essence of God is to exist, there being no difference between the two (essence and existence), there is no cause, full stop. You agree that God needs no external cause but He nonetheless "needs" and internal one. But if essence is a "kind" of cause in creation, it does not follow that it is any kind of cause in Pure Act (begging the question?). Created essence is a kind of cause due to potency actualization and multiplication. But Pure Act is devoid of potency and multiplication, so "kind of cause" doesn't apply to its essence. God simply is. We can all agree that Pure Act is far higher than our human minds can comprehend, but that's a far cry from Pure Act needing a cause.

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    8. @Bill:

      Within the Aristotelian tradition, 'cause' means 'what is required to understand/explain a thing.' Traditionally there are taken to be four causes needed to full explain a thing. The formal cause is what actualizes the matter. Pure act is pure (unactualized) form. It has no material cause. But to say that Pure Act has no formal cause is to say it is not Pure Act, but Pure Unintelligibility, or Pure Nothingness. But if God is Pure Act then He is Pure Intelligibility and Pure Form. Formal causality is clearly a 'cause' in one of the classical senses of 'cause.' Why do you think its being identical to existence would change this? It seems you have nothing but gratuitous assertion here.

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    9. @Bill:

      Sorry, I just noticed your 11:22PM post.

      "You know enough about the divine essence to "confidently" assert that an uncaused cause actually needs an intrinsic cause in order to exist?"

      You're quite confused, I dare say. I know enough about the meaning of the terms 'cause' and 'essence' to know that nothing exists without an intrinsic cause.

      Therefore yes, I also know enough to apply the meaning of these terms to the case of God: If God exists, he has an essential/formal/intrinsic cause (which of course can also be shown to be identical to his existence). FYI, the logical inverse is also true: If God does not exist, he does not... And the contrapositive is also true: If God has no essential/intrinsic/formal cause, then God does not exist.

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    10. @David McPike

      Within the Aristotelian tradition, 'cause' means 'what is required to understand/explain a thing.' Traditionally there are taken to be four causes needed to full explain a thing. The formal cause is what actualizes the matter. Pure act is pure (unactualized) form. It has no material cause. But to say that Pure Act has no formal cause is to say it is not Pure Act, but Pure Unintelligibility, or Pure Nothingness. But if God is Pure Act then He is Pure Intelligibility and Pure Form. Formal causality is clearly a 'cause' in one of the classical senses of 'cause.' Why do you think its being identical to existence would change this? It seems you have nothing but gratuitous assertion here.

      The "gratuitous assertion" here is "Pure act is pure (unactualized) form. It has no material cause." If it is unactualized, it is because it is already act; there is no potency to actualize. Your "it has no material cause" is gratuitously appended to make room for some immaterial cause and it contradicts your first statement. Pure form needs NO cause whatsoever; only "impure" form does. In material things, form must be conjoined with matter in order to exist. In immaterial composites (angels) you have subsistent form whose potency is actualized by God. Because the form is potential, it needs actualization, but Pure Form needs NO actualization, hence, it needs no cause. To say that it needs a cause else it doesn't exist is to confuse the finite with the infinite, the contingent with the non-contingent.

      The whole enterprise of the four causes is to demonstrate that every act/potency composite of necessity is caused because its essence, by virtue of its composition, stands in need of a cause. And that cause is is that which needs no cause whatsoever because its essence is eternal Act. Thus, "formal cause" does not apply to Pure Act, physically or metaphysically. Pure Act is explained by the fact that it is Pure Act. There is no potency whatsoever in its essence, therefore there is nothing to actualize. And if there's nothing to actualize, there is nothing to cause.

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    11. @Bill:

      And if God is revealing Himself as Son, the reason is God's eternal redemptive plan. Since the redemptive plan requires the Son, and since the plan is eternal, it follows that the "Son" is eternal in that sense.

      I think this gets rather interesting. So you're saying the "Son" is eternal in the sense in which God's plan of redemption is eternal, and thus in the sense in which God's plan of creation is eternal, i.e., in the sense in which God's knowledge of creation is eternal; i.e., the "Son" is eternal in the sense in which God's knowing/relating to that which is contingent and not-eternal and not-God is eternal. Thus, the "Son" is contingently eternal, and not eternal in the sense in which God's knowledge of Himself is eternal (i.e., by the necessity of His own nature), and thus not in the sense in which God Himself is eternal. Therefore God does not know the "Son" as God, but as a mode of his (non-real) relating to creation. Therefore the "Son" is not God. So you're right: that's definitely not Trinitarianism.

      But then the "Son" is also not God relating to Himself, as you want to maintain. The "Son," by your account, is God relating to creation, or perhaps better, God's means of relating creation to Himself. But then the existence of the "Son" is extrinsic to and not identical with the divine essence (unless you're also a pantheist? -- but that would require a lot of retractions on your part).

      Another way of putting this: if the "Son" is eternal in the sense in which the redemptive plan is eternal since the eternal plan requires the "Son," then creation is eternal in the same sense as the "Son," since the eternal plan of redemption requires creation no less than it requires the "Son." Therefore the "Son" is not eternal in the sense in which God is eternal. Therefore the "Son" is not God.

      Wow, fun!

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    12. @David McPike

      Traditionally there are taken to be four causes needed to full explain a thing.

      And I already acknowledged more than once that "explanation" of God is His essence to exist. As Pure Act, He exists essentially, and that's all the explanation that is needed. However, you're pursuing this to justify God the Son's eternal generation, that the Son's being is dependent on the intrinsic causal activity of the one, simple and undivided essence of God, and that's a different kind of causality. Conceding arguendo what you say about causality, the intrinsic principle that makes God God is different than the cause that generates the being of the Son, else the divine essence too would need a similar generation.

      But if God the Son's being is dependent on eternal generation, then what generates is either the same thing or something else. For you, that "something else" is the Father, but the Father is the one, undivided, simple essence of God. And since the Son is also the one, undivided, simple essence of God and, per Aquinas, the relations are also one and the same and no different than the one, undivided, simple essence of God, we're back to saying that God is really having a relationship with Himself (Sabellius is still clapping). Otherwise, God is really and actually generating another God with the "exact" essence as the generator (a metaphysical Xeroxing). And that is not at all the same kind of causality that you're trying to defend because that is polytheism. Moreover, a being's dependence on another for its existence means that it DOES NOT have in itself this "intrinsic causality" which suffices to explain itself. If it (the Son) has that intrinsic quality, He would not need generation from another. He would be the sufficient explanation of Himself.

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    13. @Bill:

      The whole enterprise of the four causes is to demonstrate that every act/potency composite of necessity is caused because its essence, by virtue of its composition, stands in need of a cause.

      Really, "the whole enterprise"? You're going to sum it all up just like that? That strikes me as an absurdly ignorant claim. Daniel mentioned hubris before; I'll mention it again now.

      Because the form is potential, it needs actualization, but Pure Form needs NO actualization, hence, it needs no cause.

      Of course it needs no extrinsic cause, but to call it 'Pure Form' means it has a 'formal cause' (which is just its own form/nature/essence). This is purely a matter of understanding the meaning of terms as they are standardly used. You are pretending to make a substantive argument out an idiosyncratic stipulative definition. It's not convincing or interesting.

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    14. Well, no again. Pure Form is different from "impure" form in that it needs no cause. You're begging the question that what is Pure needs a cause, and you're the one gratuitously folding in "external cause" which is discordant with the whole argument.

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    15. Oy, Bill. Pure Form needs no cause but it is a cause. You pretend to "acknowledge" this "already," then you qualify your acknowledgement, saying you'll "concede it arguendo." So again: sure, Pure Form needs no cause, but so what? That doesn't contradict the the fact that Pure Form is a cause (an intrinsic formal essential one, not an extrinsic one). So why do you keep acknowledging, and then waffling and coming back with this irrelevant non-response/non-argument?

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    16. What I am conceding for sake of discussion is YOUR allegation that the being of the Son is caused, and I did so to make a point. Please pay attention if you're going to reply to me.

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    17. Pure Act is a cause of other being, but there is no cause of something uncaused, by definition.

      You're insisting that Pure Form is caused because contingent form is caused. Question begging.

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    18. @Bill:

      So your 9:43AM post is more interesting. Let's try to sort through your claims. I hope it's not all just a rehash.

      But if God the Son's being is dependent on eternal generation, then what generates is either the same thing or something else.

      Right: "same thing" in one respect; "something else" in another respect.

      For you, that "something else" is the Father, but the Father is the one, undivided, simple essence of God. And since the Son is also the one, undivided, simple essence of God and, per Aquinas, the relations are also one and the same and no different than the one, undivided, simple essence of God, we're back to saying that God is really having a relationship with Himself (Sabellius is still clapping).

      Close, but not quite. God the Father has a relationship with Himself; he knows and loves himself as God and as principle of generation within the Godhead. This entails that He likewise has a relationship with the Son, as God like unto himself and as His only begotten Son. (Why is Sabellius clapping? Is he at a hoedown?)

      Otherwise, God is really and actually generating another God with the "exact" essence as the generator (a metaphysical Xeroxing).

      If you like; except that that generated essence is the divine essence, which is identical to the divine being, so that the one generated fully shares the being/essence of the one generating and is only differentiated relationally, through the truly, divinely eternal act of generation intrinsic to the divine life.

      And that is not at all the same kind of causality that you're trying to defend because that is polytheism.

      No, actually that's Christianity, a form of monotheism.

      Moreover, a being's dependence on another for its existence means that it DOES NOT have in itself this "intrinsic causality" which suffices to explain itself.

      That is true insofar as the dependent being's existence is really distinct from its essence (i.e., in the case of creatures); but not in the case of the natural generation of a divine person. Every created effect receives, and thus has, within itself intrinsic causality sufficient to explain what it is (i.e., every creature receives and has an essence); but its intrinsic causality is not sufficient to explain that it is (since it receives existence contingently, in dependence on the free will of God). The Son receives and has sufficient causality to explain both what he is and that he is, because he receives the fullness of the very being/essence of the Father. He thus exists necessarily, like the Father, and not in dependence on the free will of the Father (which he naturally fully shares with the Father).

      If it (the Son) has that intrinsic quality, He would not need generation from another. He would be the sufficient explanation of Himself.

      But the Son has that intrinsic causality because he has it from another; and remember that he (necessarily! - but by a necessity known to us a posteriori, on the basis of revelation) has it necessarily, not contingently as in the case of creatures. His intrinsic causality (his divine essence/being) is thus sufficient to explain itself, notwithstanding its relationally differentiated position within the divine life of the Trinity. (Is Sabellius still clapping? What's he listening to?)

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    19. "Pure Act is a cause of other being, but there is no cause of something uncaused, by definition."

      Bill, I know you're not this stupid. I am confident that you are perfectly capable of recognizing and fully and consistently acknowledging (not merely "conceding arguendo") that 'cause' is said in many ways and that I've been clear and consistent in my explanations of the standard distinct usages on this point, such that your claim here is otiose and moot. You're just being stubborn and silly at this point.

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    20. @David McPike

      Right: "same thing" in one respect; "something else" in another respect.

      And this "same thing" and "something else" is the simple, undivided essence of God.

      God the Father has a relationship with Himself; he knows and loves himself as God and as principle of generation within the Godhead.

      But since "God the Father" is the simple, undivided essence of God, the "principle of generation" applies to the entire Godhead.

      This entails that He likewise has a relationship with the Son, as God like unto himself and as His only begotten Son.

      But since "God the Son" is the simple, undivided essence of God, and since, per Aquinas, the relation is the simple, undivided essence of God, then God is still having the relationship with Himself.

      Why is Sabellius clapping?

      Because modalists and Arians won't object to the fact that the undivided essence of God knows Himself and loves Himself and relates to Himself. All your verbiage serves to accomplish is not that there is a real difference in the essence of God; it merely shows on Aquinas's terms the single personhood of God.

      If you like [God generating another God]; except that that generated essence is the divine essence, which is identical to the divine being, so that the one generated fully shares the being/essence of the one generating and is only differentiated relationally, through the truly, divinely eternal act of generation intrinsic to the divine life.

      So the one generated isn't the being/essence; he merely shares it, correct? And since this sharing is occurring as an "intrinsic" act, then there is an aspect of the essence unique to the person, for the person is either the whole undivided essence or He is a part. If the former, then again the essence is relating to itself. If the latter, you have composition. You appear to reject both in favor of intrinsic Xeroxing, that within God there can be the generation of another God, but this "another" cannot really be another else there is clear composition in the Godhead. So, as Aquinas notes, the difference is only in their mode of intelligibility because they are all one in the simple, undivided essence of God. Pass the popcorn.

      The Son receives and has sufficient causality to explain both what he is and that he is, because he receives the fullness of the very being/essence of the Father. He thus exists necessarily, like the Father, and not in dependence on the free will of the Father (which he naturally fully shares with the Father).

      But the Son receives it through a process of eternal generation. It's not as if he was generated and He now exists a se. His being is continually being generated, thus His existence is dependent on this eternal begetting else He would not exist.

      But the Son has that intrinsic causality because he has it from another; and remember that he (necessarily! - but by a necessity known to us a posteriori, on the basis of revelation) has it necessarily, not contingently as in the case of creatures.

      This "intrinsic causality" is not the Son's precisely because He is eternally receiving it from the Father. If he had that causality, He would not need the Father's begetting. The Father doesn't need begetting nor does He receive His personhood from another. That can only mean that there is something in the essence of the Father that is not in the essence of the Son, which equivocates on what it is to be God or it affirms composition.

      (Is Sabellius still clapping? What's he listening to?)

      Yep. He's listening to you. Standing-O.

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    21. David McPike,
      "Pure Form"
      ...is an incoherent term.

      What is the form in "pure form of? Absolutely nothing at all? Then in that case "pure form" is incoherent because nothing cannot be coherently said to have any form at all.

      If the form in "pure form" is of something, then "pure form" is incoherent because then the form is not pure, rather, of that something.

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    22. Guys, please don't feed the StardustyPsyche troll.

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    23. Hi (blank), thanks for stopping by.

      Can you explain how the term "pure form" is in any sense coherent?

      Or at least, can you employ a logical, rational argument to refute my argument on the merits?

      I mean, it should be pretty simple, after all, I provided a very specific argument as to why "pure form" is incoherent.

      It should be pretty simple for you to point out specifically on the logical rational merits where exactly my argument is mistaken, shouldn't it?

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    24. Folks, please don't feed the StardustyPsyche troll.

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  18. And this:

    I never said that they "have the same sense."

    You never said, but you (evidently unwittingly) implied.

    And if you bothered to follow my arguments as closely as you want me to follow yours, you would have understood that. The ES IS the MS considered from a different perspective. I CAN say, "That which is the ES rises in the morning, and we call it the MS." Similarly, we can say that the one who is the Father is also the Son, considered from a different perspective. Welcome to modalism.

    If you wish, you can indeed say to the Trinitarian: "the one who is the Father is also the son; therefore modalism." Welcome to begging the question!

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  19. If you wish, you can indeed say to the Trinitarian: "the one who is the Father is also the son; therefore modalism." Welcome to begging the question!

    And this again shows that you're not paying attention. I originally made those comments in the context of saying that your defense is indistinct from what a modalist would say. And to rebut what you misunderstood, you appealed to the very analogy modalists use to illustrate God's m ode of revelation.

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  20. @Bill:
    A quick note on "logical inversion": Given "If P then Q," the logical inversion is "If not P then not Q." There is nothing unintelligible about logical inversions and I'm confused about the way you keep using this term.

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    1. @David McPike

      The primary definition of invert is of course "to turn upside down." I see several strands of your argument to extend to the opposite of what you intend.

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    2. But of course within the domain of logic, the term is a term of art with a more specific meaning, so it is misleading/confusing if you ignore that specific meaning when (apparently) using the term within that specific domain. (And this advice should of course be taken to have general application.)

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    3. I will take that under advisement. Thank you.

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  21. Also Bill, with respect to what I said before about your a priori conception of aseity, the problem is that 'assets' is indeed an a posteriori concept (and potentially doubly a posteriori, derived from knowledge of creatures and of revelation), but you're effectively forgetting that and treating it as if it was a priori.

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    1. I see 'aseity' autocorrected to 'assets' above. I hope that didn't cause any (more) confusion.

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  22. @Feser: A synthetic proposition is true by virtue of something beyond the relations between its constituent concepts.

    This is not quite right. It would be better to say that a synthetic proposition is true by virtue of something other than a relation of containment between its constituent concepts.

    The point is that, for Kant, a synthetic proposition does assert a relation between constituent concepts. It's just that that relation isn't the relation of containment. Instead, the relation is a different one. Explaining this relation is what Kant considers to be the general problem of transcendental philosophy.

    For example, as you point out, Kant considers 2 + 2 = 4 to be synthetic. But Kant wouldn't deny that this is a relation between the concepts of "2+2" and "4". In particular, if you read "2+2" as a sequence of operations to execute in intuition (such as by visualizing two dots placed adjacent to two other dots), then the result will necessarily fall under the concept "4" (there will be 4 dots). In this way, the concept of "2+2" is connected inseparably to the concept "4". So there is a relation between the concepts.

    What there isn't is a relation of containment. The concept "4" appears nowhere in the concept "2+2". The detour through intuition is necessary to see the relationship between "2+2" and "4". You have to visualize the dots or otherwise invoke the faculty of intuition, perhaps by counting on fingers or by manipulating formal symbols according to certain rules.

    Nonetheless, "2 + 2 = 4" is true just in virtue of the meanings of these concepts, as descriptions of possible experience.

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