In two
recent posts, we looked at philosopher Alex Byrne’s criticisms of claims made
by some transgender activists to the effect that
sex is not binary and that
it is socially constructed. Byrne
is by no means the only philosopher alarmed at the increasingly bizarre claims
being made by such activists – and the shrillness with which they are making
them. Kathleen Stock worries that such
ideas will
cause harm to women. Daniel
A. Kaufman warns that they threaten nothing less than the
end of civil rights. Nor are
these philosophers conservatives who are hostile to the sexual revolution. They are progressives concerned about
extremism and anti-intellectualism in their own ranks. And as if to prove the critics’ point, some of
the activists have in response tried to get the
critics fired and otherwise to silence them.
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Thursday, December 27, 2018
Sunday, December 23, 2018
Christmas every day
A Protestant
friend once asked me what the point is of the Catholic doctrine of
transubstantiation. Why is it so
important to think that Christ is really present under the accidents of bread
and wine? What is the cash value of this
idea? The answer I gave him is best
understood in light of the meaning of Christmas.
Tuesday, December 18, 2018
Immateriality in Rome
Earlier this
month I gave a talk on “The Immateriality of the Intellect” at a conference
on neuroscience and the soul held at the Angelicum
in Rome. Video of the talk has now been posted at
YouTube.
Links to other recent talks of mine can be found at my main website.
Links to other recent talks of mine can be found at my main website.
Thursday, December 13, 2018
Byrne on why sex is not a social construct
Recently
we looked at
philosopher Alex Byrne’s defense of the commonsense view that there are only
two sexes. In a new
article at Arc Digital,
Byrne defends another aspect of sexual common sense – the thesis that the
distinction between male and female is natural, and not a mere social construct. Let’s take a look.
As is
typically done these days by writers on this topic, Byrne begins by
distinguishing between sex and gender.
Sex has to do with the biological distinction between male and female,
whereas gender has to do with the way the difference between male and female is
shaped by culture. In the article in
question, Byrne does not challenge the claim that gender is socially
constructed. He is concerned only to
rebut the more radical claim that sex is socially constructed. We’ll return to the gender question later,
though, because the claim that sex differences are natural is relevant to it.
Tuesday, December 4, 2018
COMING SOON: Aristotle’s Revenge (Updated)
My new book Aristotle’s
Revenge: The Metaphysical Foundations of Physical and Biological Science
will be out early next year from Editiones Scholasticae. More information forthcoming, but to whet
your appetite, here are the cover copy and the detailed table of contents:
Actuality
and potentiality, substantial form and prime matter, efficient causality and
teleology are among the fundamental concepts of Aristotelian philosophy of
nature. Aristotle’s Revenge argues that these concepts are not only
compatible with modern science, but are implicitly presupposed by modern
science. Among the many topics covered
are the metaphysical presuppositions of scientific method; the status of
scientific realism; the metaphysics of space and time; the metaphysics of
quantum mechanics; reductionism in chemistry and biology; the metaphysics of
evolution; and neuroscientific reductionism. The book interacts heavily with the literature
on these issues in contemporary analytic metaphysics and philosophy of science,
so as to bring contemporary philosophy and science into dialogue with the
Aristotelian tradition.