At Catholic World
Report, Prof. Christopher Morrissey kindly
reviews my book Scholastic
Metaphysics. From the review:
The great strength of
Feser’s book is how well it exposes the shortcomings of the speculations of
contemporary analytic philosophy about the fundamental structures of reality.
The most recent efforts of such modern philosophical research, shows Feser, are
remarkably inadequate for explaining many metaphysical puzzles raised by modern
science. In order to properly understand the meaning of humanity’s latest and
greatest discoveries, such as quantum field theory in modern physics, an
adequate metaphysics is urgently required, now more than ever…
Feser has a notable
flair for being both witty and engaging and for using entertaining and vivid
examples. The book demands much from the reader’s intellectual abilities, but
like reading St. Thomas Aquinas himself it is always rewarding and
exhilarating. Page after page, insight after insight piles up—so many that if
you have any philosophical curiosity at all, you simply cannot stop reading.
End quote. By the
way, if you are not familiar with Prof. Morrissey’s
various web pages devoted to topics of interest to regular readers of this blog
(such as this one, this one, this one, and this one), you should be. I have found them a very useful resource over
the years.
and this, "I agree with Santi to the following extent: when it comes to assertions about objective reality, the epistemological significance of the assertion varies with the possibility of empirical verification."
ReplyDeletethat doesn't sound very pluralistic to me. I'd wager your pluralism extends so far as empirically equivalent models and that's about it.
That's an interesting assertion there, dude. So, is this something we could study empirically? Could we, say, get a sample group and see whether or not more folks in that group had their interest piqued by questions that are resolvable via empirical verification? Like, you know, because most people find maths and stuff like that boring, right?
ReplyDeleteSorry, Matt, but snark fail. :)
I made it perfectly clear that I was talking about assertions about objective reality. Saying, 'we should index epistemological significance to empirical verifiability' is itself not an assertion about objective reality, but recommendation about what stance to take towards objective reality.
Here's where the pluralism kicks in:
ReplyDeleteFirstly, that there are many dimensions of discourse and practice that are oriented by cognitive ideals other than correctly modeling objective reality;
Secondly, that even with regard to correctly modeling objective reality, different kinds of explanation will work well (or poorly) under different conditions;
Thirdly, this might convey the spirit of what I mean by pluralism:
"it might be impossible for beings with minds like our own to have an understanding of the world that is at once comprehensive and self-consistent. If a world view is a comprehensive and internally consistent understanding or set of beliefs, it is possible that no one has ever had, or ever could have, a world view." -- Steven Horst.
"I made it perfectly clear that I was talking about assertions about objective reality. Saying, 'we should index epistemological significance to empirical verifiability' is itself not an assertion about objective reality, but recommendation about what stance to take towards objective reality."
ReplyDeleteok, so you admit you weren't saying anything interesting, then.
Also, what is 'objective reality', where'd that come in? Is it model independent?
This is not an argument, but an intuition. Since according to you intuitions are not evidence, this in particular is not evidence of anything, much less that metaphysical questions cannot be resolved.
ReplyDeleteWhat a metaphysician calls her "intuitions" are not evidence of what is objectively real, because one's intuitions are simply the classifications and inferences that one has as result of the conceptual framework that one has acquired. The feeling of intuitiveness has no justificatory weight, nor does the counter-intuitiveness of a hypothesis or theory count as a reason against it.
More to the point, Metaphysicians in general *argue* for their position. And while it is true, that all demonstrative knowledge must come to self-evident principles which do not admit of demonstration, not only not all "self-evident" principles have the same status, but the fact that there is no demonstrative proof of them, in the traditional sense, precludes the giving of dialectical justifications, say retorsion arguments, aporias, etc.
I didn't deny that metaphysicians give arguments -- of course they do! But I will return to a point I raised a few weeks ago when I started commenting here: any metaphysical system, if it's going to be worth its salt, is going to have to have some explanation about why it is anything more than an explication of the conceptual framework of the metaphysician.
In other words, it's going to have to have some explanation about where the rubber hits the road -- exactly where the conceptual framework meets up with reality. One very good reason for keeping metaphysics closely tied to science is because that way, metaphysics can 'inherit' the tie to reality than science has.
I do recognize, of course, that one needs some metaphysics to get any science off the ground in the first place. But that's a very 'thin' metaphysics that can be established by transcendental argument, distinct from the 'thick' metaphysics that we are usually more interested in.
ok, so you admit you weren't saying anything interesting, then.
ReplyDeleteI never claimed to be saying anything interesting about objective reality. There are more kinds of interesting statements than those. I was saying about interesting about the attitude we ought to adopt towards objective reality, which is clearly different than an assertion about objective reality itself.
And could you cut it out with the snark? I didn't start it and haven't said anything to deserve it. I'm trying to hold up my end of a civil, intellectual discourse. Doing the same is the least you can do.
Or if you're only interested in snark, let me know now so I can do something more valuable with my time than endure your passive-aggressive jibes.
Also, what is 'objective reality', where'd that come in? Is it model independent?
I think that objective reality can be characterized (indeed, must be characterized) in a model-independent way -- which is why I call myself a pluralist rather than an internal realist a la Putnam.
The problem is that a model-independent characterization is going to be very sparse or 'thin' -- something like what Dennett calls 'real patterns' or what Deleuze calls 'multiplicity' would work here.
KN,
ReplyDeleteok. I am still waiting for your response to this bit I posted earlier, prior to the snark:
"That doesn't strike me as being a response to what I said. The distinction between the two as such holds no matter what. We might, as Aquinas thought Anselm was, be mistaken about the soundness of an a priori judgement, but not whether or not it is an a priori judgement if we are to be correct about our assessment of it. More to the point, this distinction must hold across the gamut of conceptual frameworks if it is to be intelligible at all (for example, the distinction is the same in Newton and Einstein, they differ on whether or not a particular judgement is one or the other)."
"That doesn't strike me as being a response to what I said. The distinction between the two as such holds no matter what. We might, as Aquinas thought Anselm was, be mistaken about the soundness of an a priori judgement, but not whether or not it is an a priori judgement if we are to be correct about our assessment of it. More to the point, this distinction must hold across the gamut of conceptual frameworks if it is to be intelligible at all (for example, the distinction is the same in Newton and Einstein, they differ on whether or not a particular judgement is one or the other)."
ReplyDeleteI accept that the distinction between a priori and a posteriori statements will hold of all conceptual frameworks, but I don't see how we can get any grip on it antecedent to adopting some conceptual framework or other. Nor do I think that the same statements will be a priori in all conceptual frameworks -- as discussed above, Buddhist logic rejects the law of the excluded middle!
This might be of some interest: "A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori", C. I. Lewis 1922.
@Kantian Naturalist:
ReplyDelete"I was saying [something] interesting about the attitude we ought to adopt towards objective reality, which is clearly different than an assertion about objective reality itself."
I'm not seeing the distinction you have in mind here. Surely any assertion is about "objective reality"; what else is there for it to be about? Even the most "subjective" fact you care to consider—my seeing the color red, your experiencing hunger, Smith's hating Jones for no reason that Jones can see—is an "objective reality."
Are you saying that you weren't making an assertion at all (or perhaps that "ought"-statements in general aren't assertions because they're not "about objective reality"), even "about" your own subjective tastes or preferences?
If so, then why is your non-assertion "interesting"? And if not, then how does your assertion "about the attitude we ought to adopt towards objective reality" differ from "an assertion about objective reality"?
Just to be absolutely clear, the (possibly non-)assertion at issue here is The less empirical verification makes any sense in resolving a question, the less interesting the question.
ReplyDeleteKN,
ReplyDeleteperhaps we are talking past each other. Here is an argument I took you to have made:
1. The distinction between a priori and a posteriori would only be absolute if there were an absolute conceptual framework.
2. The distinction is not absolute, as shown by the different approaches to inertial frames in Einstein and Newton
3. There is not absolute conceptual framework
This is very difficult to parse out as it is, important terms like "absolute" and "conceptual framework" are not very determinate (in fact, the argument seems to depend on their indeterminacy, their stretchiness).
I took umbrage with the second premise, though, since it seems clear enough and clearly false. The distinction between a priori and a posteriori statements does not change simply because a judgement that we thought was a priori turns out to be such that it can only be arrived at a posteriori.
The significance of this is that if for any model such and such is true then we have an item of knowledge about models in general.
KN,
ReplyDeleteI should amend the conclusion above to be weakened to something more like what you actually said:
3. the a priori/posteriori distinction does not provide a good reason to think there is an absolute conceptual framework.
correction
ReplyDeleteJung praised the Pope for the latter's emphasis on the *Assumption*, not the Immaculate Conception.
http://jungcurrents.com/importance-assumption-virgin-mary/
@Matt Sheean:
ReplyDelete"I took umbrage with the second premise, though, since it seems clear enough and clearly false. The distinction between a priori and a posteriori statements does not change simply because a judgement that we thought was a priori turns out to be such that it can only be arrived at a posteriori."
I took KN to mean that because the very same proposition/judgment/statement may be regarded as known a priori in one "conceptual framework" and a posteriori in another, therefore the distinction between a priori and a posteriori statements is not absolute unless there is an absolute "conceptual framework," which KN doesn't think there is.
But if so, I still don't think that response addresses your claim that the two forms of justification are distinct. That, e.g., an object may appear blue under one kind of ambient lighting conditions and red under another doesn't in and of itself mean that blue and red aren't distinct, whether or not there are any such things as "absolute ambient lighting conditions."
For any given proposition, we can distinguish between the two forms of justification—and if KN insists, we can make the distinction relative to any given "conceptual framework," so that (say) proposition p is justified a priori in conceptual framework A and a posteriori in conceptual framework B.
Which, come to think of it, is exactly what KN himself does.
Indeed, for anything KN has said, we may well be able, at least sometimes, to determine on an a priori basis whether, in a given "conceptual framework," a given proposition is justified a priori or a posteriori.
ReplyDeleteScott,
ReplyDeleteThanks, I do think you put it more clearly.
"Indeed, for anything KN has said, we may well be able, at least sometimes, to determine on an a priori basis whether, in a given "conceptual framework," a given proposition is justified a priori or a posteriori."
These seems important when it comes to determining the difference between conceptual frameworks. There must be some relation the framework has to its own first principles that distinguishes it from another, or something like that. We can judge "from the armchair" that the Buddhist logic is not Classical since it denies the excluded middle. I suppose this is just a difference between ways of thinking, but if ultimately we are saying that thinking takes this pluralistic character it seems that this is a judgement about the character of thought per se (and round and round we go).
Since Peirce has been mentioned, I was just reading this and it seemed applicable (especially as it sounds like Scott's illustration of the mistaken sight of blue):
ReplyDelete"I may think a thing is black, and on close examination it may turn out to be bottle-green. But I cannot think a thing is black if there is no such thing to be seen as black... It is the nominalists, and the nominalists alone who indulge in such scepticism, which the scientific method utterly condemns."
@Kantian Naturalist:
ReplyDelete"The feeling of intuitiveness has no justificatory weight, nor does the counter-intuitiveness of a hypothesis or theory count as a reason against it."
I never said that a "feeling of intuitiveness" has any "justificatory weight", so I am not sure what you are responding to.
What I did say (or at any rate intended to) is that to believe that the bulk of the justificatory weight of any significant metaphysical view (since we are where we are, take AT metaphysics as the representative example to bear in mind) is a "feeling of intuitiveness" is just ludicrous.
Furthermore you did say that "At some point everything comes down to the "intuitions" of the metaphysician"; so by your own criteria, and since you implicitly admit that at some point "everything comes down to the "intuitions"", whatever justifications you give have no justificatory weight.
"In other words, it's going to have to have some explanation about where the rubber hits the road -- exactly where the conceptual framework meets up with reality."
I do not know what you mean by the first sentence, since what else could a metaphysician be doing other than giving an account of reality? The first of the 24 Thomistic theses reads as:
"Potency and Act divide being in such a way that whatever is, is either pure act, or of necessity it is composed of potency and act as primary and intrinsic principles."
Why being, potency, act, pure act, etc. are not simply items in some ad hoc conceptual framework but an actual description of reality just *is* philosophical dialectics at work, starting with the Parmenidean aporias, the Aristotelean distinction between potency and act, etc. and all the arguments that surround, support and justify them.
"One very good reason for keeping metaphysics closely tied to science is because that way, metaphysics can 'inherit' the tie to reality than science has."
That science has some kind of privileged tie with reality is itself a metaphysically qualified statement. After all, not only it is possible, many philosophers do adopt an operational, instrumentalist view of science.
And underneath this lies a very naive view of how Science develops. But since at the moment it is just a suspicion, I will leave it unverbalized.
"I do recognize, of course, that one needs some metaphysics to get any science off the ground in the first place. But that's a very 'thin' metaphysics that can be established by transcendental argument, distinct from the 'thick' metaphysics that we are usually more interested in."
Until you explain the difference between "thick" and "thin" the distinction is vacuous. And since I suspect you would qualify something like the standard Aristotelean metaphysical apparatus of act and potency, substance and essence, etc. as "thick", it is false.
As an aside, I always wondered what is it with the self-deprecating view of the relation between Philosophy and Science adopted by some philosophers, mainly of a naturalist bent? Is it just the bare recognition that they lack the ability to compute a scattering cross section or grasp what the principle of stationary action is? If you cannot do it, and you cannot teach it, and you cannot teach gym, you preach endlessly about its ineffable, mystical qualities? Is it the secret hope that some of the social prestige and power wielded by the ministering priests of Science will befall on them?
Well, where are we here? There are several issues on the table. Taking them in no particular order . . . .
ReplyDelete(1) foundationalism and anti-foundationalism in philosophical methodology. As I see it, this is the big issue that we're dancing around. I'm deeply suspicious of the very idea of "foundations" for our knowledge of reality, whether third-person foundations (as in Aristotle or Aquinas) or first-person foundations (as in Descartes or Kant).
(2) the relation between science and metaphysics: since we all here agree that science needs metaphysics, I won't bother adding my voice to that choir. Nor do I suspect much disagreement that metaphysics needs science. The question is, in what way does metaphysics need science? As I see it, metaphysics needs science in order to be constrained by a source of information more demanding than logical alone. Logic alone can tell us what cannot be the case in any possible world, but we need science to tell us what is the case in the actual world.
(2) the a priori/a posteriori distinction: clearly this distinction will hold of any conceptual framework. But I see the distinction in terms of the difference between the basic rules of the framework and the moves that are permitted by that framework. "A bishop can only move diagonally" is an a priori statement of chess; "adding X to Y yields a successor to Y" is an a priori statement of arithmetic; "Sherlock Holmes was a detective" is an a priori statement of the fictional world of the Holmes stories, and "movement is defined relative to an inertial framework" is an a priori statement of special relativity.
(3) pluralism and realism: this is where my idea of "thin metaphysics" and "thick metaphysics" comes into play. "Thick metaphysics" tell us what we are committed to on the basis of having adopted a conceptual framework (numbers, bishops, Sherlock Holmes, physical movement, etc.). "Thin metaphysics" tells us what we must be committed to in order to use any conceptual framework at all. That does yield a very minimal realism, so the pluralism is not entirely unconstrained.
I had a very long response that was consumed by the demons that live inside the Internet. Here we go again -- shorter this time --
ReplyDelete(1) science and metaphysics: like everyone here, I accept that science needs metaphysics. And I also think that metaphysics needs science (is this more controversial?). Logic alone won't tell us which metaphysical system is right, if any of them are, because the constraints are too loose. Logic can tell you what cannot be the case in any possible world -- though it's also true that which logic you use to yield this result isn't entirely free of metaphysical commitments of its own. What logic cannot tell us is what's going on in the actual world. To get information about the actual world to bear on the metaphysics, you need experience -- and to make sure that one's experience is not just the explication of one's own parochial conceptual framework, you need that particular kind of experience called science, in which intuitions are exposed to testing and thereby generate counter-intuitive results. So I don't see metaphysics as a foundation to science, but rather metaphysics and science reciprocally constrain each other (in different dimensions of constraint -- conceptual and empirical).
(2) a priori and a posteriori. I see this distinction as basically the distinction between the constitutive rules of a conceptual framework and the moves allowed by those rules. "Adding X to Y yields a successor to Y" is an a priori truth of arithmetic; "Sherlock Holmes was a detective" is an a priori truth of the Holmes stories; "a bishop can only move diagonally is an a priori truth of chess; and "motion is measured relative to an inertial framework" is an a priori truth of special relativity. (I also think that "organisms are teleologically structured" is an a priori truth of biology and "subjective awareness is intentionally structured" is an a priori truth of phenomenology.)
(3) Pluralism and realism. I want to distinguish between "thick metaphysics", which tells us what we are committed to in having adopted some particular conceptual framework (numbers, bishops, Sherlock Holmes, physical measurements), and "thin metaphysics," which tells us what we must be committed to in order to use any conceptual framework at all. So my pluralism is constrained by realism -- but only by the thinnest or weakest kind of realism.
KN,
ReplyDeleteYou said before,
"The distinction between a priori and a posteriori would be absolute only if there were an absolute conceptual framework, and I don't think there are any good reasons to think that there is one. "
but, I have argued that the distinction between the two kinds of judgement, if it is intelligible, must hold across conceptual frameworks, and I think your most recent definition is just fine: "the distinction between the constitutive rules of a conceptual framework and the moves allowed by those rules." But, this is a definition that holds across the range of conceptual frameworks. To quote Peirce again, "I cannot think a thing is black if there is no such thing to be seen as black."
Even with your "thin realism" you do not avoid the specter of the absolute. Thomism, it seems, cannot be true at the same time as your pluralism.
Why being, potency, act, pure act, etc. are not simply items in some ad hoc conceptual framework but an actual description of reality just *is* philosophical dialectics at work, starting with the Parmenidean aporias, the Aristotelean distinction between potency and act, etc. and all the arguments that surround, support and justify them.
ReplyDelete"Being, potency, act, pure act" are products of human imagination having a power of explanation with regard to reality of approximately zero.
How do you like Scholastic Metaphysics so far, Alan?
ReplyDeleteMatt Sheean asks:
ReplyDeleteHow do you like "Scholastic Metaphysics" so far, Alan?
Hasn't arrived yet. It's allegedly been despatched but could take three weeks. Rest assured I'll post an Amazon review when I've read it.
On the other hand, I have now managed to listen through Feser's presentation of his version of "First Way" several times while driving. I'll put a blog post up at TSZ when I have time.
@Alan Fox:
ReplyDelete""Being, potency, act, pure act" are products of human imagination having a power of explanation with regard to reality of approximately zero"
What a devastating critique. I hardly know how I am going to recover from this blow.
I have argued that the distinction between the two kinds of judgement, if it is intelligible, must hold across conceptual frameworks, and I think your most recent definition is just fine: "the distinction between the constitutive rules of a conceptual framework and the moves allowed by those rules." But, this is a definition that holds across the range of conceptual frameworks.
ReplyDeleteThe distinction between a priori and a posteriori judgments, as I've suggested we draw it, cannot hold across all conceptual frameworks in the way you seem to want it to. So there is a real issue at stake here.
Put it this way: there is a difference between
(1) for any conceptual framework, there are constitutive rules which take the form of a priori judgments when made explicit;
and
(2) there are a priori judgments that are valid for all conceptual frameworks.
(1) and (2) are quite different, and I am defending (1), not (2).
To quote Peirce again, "I cannot think a thing is black if there is no such thing to be seen as black."
That seems right; as I understand Peirce's point, our perceptions and thoughts, when they are working correctly, are tracking the modal structure of reality that grounds counter-factual statements. But since that does not mean that there is only one correct way of tracking that structure, it does not count as a criticism of pluralism. However, I can appreciate your point that my "thin" realism may have to be slightly thicker than I'd realized -- at least thick enough to accommodate modal properties.
"However, I can appreciate your point that my "thin" realism may have to be slightly thicker than I'd realized -- at least thick enough to accommodate modal properties."
ReplyDeleteThis pleases me. A very civil gesture, by which I am humbled.
Thank you for making your point much more clear as well, I think I have a bit more to sink my teeth into. I fear that perhaps I am not being clear enough myself, though. I DO realize that you are defending (1), I believe that was what I took you to be saying. What I am saying is that in order to know that such and such takes the form of an a priori judgement in this framework or that involves knowing something about a priori judgements as such. To quote Scott,
"For any given proposition, we can distinguish between the two forms of justification—and if KN insists, we can make the distinction relative to any given 'conceptual framework,' so that (say) proposition p is justified a priori in conceptual framework A and a posteriori in conceptual framework B."
@Kantian Naturalist:
ReplyDelete"(1) and (2) are quite different, and I am defending (1), not (2)."
Sure, but even on (1), the definitions of a priori and a posteriori (and therefore the distinction between them) are universal across all conceptual frameworks. All that varies with the framework is which specific propositions meet those definitions.
Neither Matt nor I, that is, is/am understanding you to say that there are judgments that are justified a priori in all conceptual frameworks. We're just taking you to say that what makes a judgment a priori is the same in all such frameworks.
Moreover, the following proposition seems to be true even on your own account of things: if it's true that proposition p is justified a priori in framework A, then it's true in all conceptual frameworks that "proposition p is justified a priori in conceptual framework A."
In order to arrive at the relevant sort of pluralism, I think, you need to deny that proposition. Do you deny it, and if so, what are your grounds for doing so?
@Kantian Naturalist:
ReplyDelete"To get information about the actual world to bear on the metaphysics, you need experience -- and to make sure that one's experience is not just the explication of one's own parochial conceptual framework, you need that particular kind of experience called science, in which intuitions are exposed to testing and thereby generate counter-intuitive results."
If by the first sentence you mean nothing more than the peripatetic axiom, then I am not far from the truth in saying that no one here would dispute that. If by it you mean that both Science (just like that, hypostatized and capitalized) and metaphysics are needed and that there is a certain relation of continuity between them, then who will quibble with that? Although it really depends on what one wants to stuff in the putative relation of continuity.
On the other hand.
Metaphysicians typically do not dispute over the scientific facts; if they do not dispute over the scientific facts, and yet they do dispute, it is because Science, understood in the modern sense, is silent on these matters. They typically do disagree on how to *interpret* the scientific facts.
Science has no more power to decide metaphysical matters then it has to decide mathematical ones; it has a different object (e.g. the metrical, quantitative properties of mobile being) and its own methodology. There is not a single substantial metaphysical disagreement that is decided in say, Reviews of Modern Physics. So to say that one needs "that particular kind of experience called science" is vacuous. After all, what exactly in the the comments with which you have graced the combox is in any way, shape or form, supported by Science? So it is what? The "explication of your own parochial conceptual framework"? Even more (as if more needs to be said), it is precisely the kind of moves you want to make that *generate* intractable problems, rather than solve them, as the host of this blog as argued ad nauseam.
For Aristotle, Metaphysics was the First philosophy, not in the sense that its study preceded that of other subjects, but in the sense that it is fundamental, fundamental in a way the empirical Sciences are not. In short, Metaphysics neither is reducible to conceptual analysis, neither needs to be naturalized, neither is it secondary to empirical enquiry. And if you do disagree with this... well, by now you should know how it goes.
Daniel,
ReplyDeleteI'm familiar with Voeglin, but not his comparative religion. Sounds interesting.
I tend to agree that man, culturally and individually, tends to orientate himself towards the divine. But I'd also say that the process is two way - the divine (and indeed the ideal, imaginal, and psychic) reach towards man, culturally and individually, as he reaches towards them.
One area where I do differ from the Perennialists is they tend to focus on the great faiths (plus a few others, like the Plains Indians). They tend to almost imply that these are the few set forms, in our historical epoch, divine revelation and inspiration has taken. Following on from Henry Corbin, I would allow more of a space for other revelations than the great faiths in their central forms alone. For example, Perennialists say little of Sikhism or Jainism. And there is little space for other smaller inspired figures (of course many of these, like Joseph Smith, seem dubious, but not all), like Swedenborg or the founders of sects like the Druze. But that said, I can see the importance of spiritual discipline and the great benefits, generally, of staying within the doctrinal, sacramental, and imaginative world of one great, living tradition. And the great world religions are usually the best at giving spiritual succour today.
When it comes to reason and intellectual intuition, it must be remembered that, in Platonism at least, Nous is intellectual. Discursive reason reflects Nous and which is its summit. So, in that sense reason is not necessary, and I think that when mankind was closer to God, he had little need for discursive reason in his spiritually, just as the gods or angels do not. But that doesn't mean, of course, all forms of spiritual experience are formed out of the same level of intellection. Much that goes under the heading of mystical experience, even when more or less genuine, isn't pure Intellection. And, yes, in our day and age religion does need to wield discursive reasons extensively. But my idea of the better use of reason in spirituality would be Plato, the Church Fathers, or Shankara. The systematic and exhaustive use of reason in modern philosophy is quite different.
@ Scott
ReplyDeleteNeither Matt nor I, that is, is/am understanding you to say that there are judgments that are justified a priori in all conceptual frameworks. We're just taking you to say that what makes a judgment a priori is the same in all such frameworks.
Moreover, the following proposition seems to be true even on your own account of things: if it's true that proposition p is justified a priori in framework A, then it's true in all conceptual frameworks that "proposition p is justified a priori in conceptual framework A."
In order to arrive at the relevant sort of pluralism, I think, you need to deny that proposition. Do you deny it, and if so, what are your grounds for doing so?
I like the point being raised here, but I'm somewhat troubled by it as well.
The point is that the a priori is still absolute, even if relativized, in the following sense.
Suppose we say,
(1) "motion is measured relative to an inertial framework" is a priori with respect to special relativity;
we would still have to say
(2) it is absolutely true that "motion is measured relative to an inertial framework" is a priori with respect to special relativity.
In other words, if p is only a priori relative to some conceptual framework, it is still an absolute truth about that conceptual framework that p is a priori in that framework.
There are some pluralists who are willing to bite this bullet and accept the point. C. I. Lewis makes this point in his Mind and the World Order in his discussion of pragmatism-cum-pluralism.
I would say that this claim -- that it is absolute true about conceptual framework C that p is a priori in C -- is itself a claim within a particular conceptual framework, namely, the framework of the history of philosophy of science.
In other words, though it's quite true that a statement about the framework of some scientific theory is not itself part of that theory, it is still part of some other framework -- namely, a framework in which other frameworks are discussed and assessed.
The idea that philosophy is a metavocabulary for first-order vocabularies (including, but not limited to, scientific theories) doesn't seem like a problem for my version of pluralism, since my pluralism only commits me to the thought that there's no single correct metavocabulary that unifies all the other first-order vocabularies that we use in navigating our experience of the world.
KN,
ReplyDeleteYou have described your view. Is there a good reason to adopt it? That is, do you have an argument for the truth of it?
I ask this with a bit of a rhetorical edge, since I believe that it puts you on the spot, so to speak. To argue for the truth of pluralism, I take it, is to tacitly put forward a normative claim that in virtue of its normativity reduces the scope of inclusivity that the mere description of pluralism implies.
I ask this with a bit of a rhetorical edge, since I believe that it puts you on the spot, so to speak. To argue for the truth of pluralism, I take it, is to tacitly put forward a normative claim that in virtue of its normativity reduces the scope of inclusivity that the mere description of pluralism implies.
ReplyDeleteI don't mind being put on the spot!
The best argument I can think of for pluralism is that it makes good sense of what we know from cognitive science: we know that humans (and other animals) have domain-specific mental representations that are generally reliable at tracking structures and processes in that domain.
It's been suggested that humans differ from other animals (e.g. chimps) by virtue of being able to form "metarepresentations" -- mapping from one cognitive domain to another -- and clearly language plays some role in our ability to do this. In particular I would stress the crucial role that metaphor plays in combining cognitive domains.
I take it a strength of pluralism that it takes cognitive science seriously. Of course that won't convince someone who thinks that epistemology must be wholly a priori!
KN,
ReplyDeleteWhat you've said does not, to my eyes anyways, rise to the full heights of rational argument.
Cognitive science shows that certain structures, processes, etc are domain specific and that human beings in particular are able to relate these domains to each other by relating the representations therein through the construction of meta-representations. I gather that you want to argue further that there are many ways, equally as useful for mapping reality, of forming these meta-representations. (These meta-representations, I take it, also are what you have been calling "conceptual frameworks"). That there are a number of meta-representations does not get us all the way to 'capital-P' Pluralism, though, since, if this is all pluralism is, it is simply the observation that there are a number of meta-representations (Ken Ham, after all, knows that there are evolutionists!)
How is there not a sneaky sort of essentialism going on here, as well? e.g. it is just in the nature of brains to facilitate this activity.
I said, "it is simply the observation that there are a number of meta-representations"
ReplyDeletethe Ken Ham comment is unclear after this, I think. What I mean is that unless "useful" becomes so constrained so as to exclude meta-representations that are false (and thus making our pluralism less pluralistic after all), we have to let young earth creationism in with the rest since it seems to be useful, given the general meaning of the term "useful." I say this out of the suspicion that you would be loathe to attribute usefulness to the beliefs of a Ken Ham type.
Cognitive science shows that certain structures, processes, etc are domain specific and that human beings in particular are able to relate these domains to each other by relating the representations therein through the construction of meta-representations. I gather that you want to argue further that there are many ways, equally as useful for mapping reality, of forming these meta-representations. (These meta-representations, I take it, also are what you have been calling "conceptual frameworks"). That there are a number of meta-representations does not get us all the way to 'capital-P' Pluralism, though, since, if this is all pluralism is, it is simply the observation that there are a number of meta-representations (Ken Ham, after all, knows that there are evolutionists!)
ReplyDeleteI've been reading some recent work by Steven Horst, who has been working up a theory of cognitive pluralism, and now that I see a bit better what he's doing, I realize that I've made a few mistakes.
One mistake is the conflation of cognitive models and conceptual frameworks. Horst thinks these are importantly different. I think I see some of the differences but not all of them. One important difference is that cognitive models are non-linguistic and sub-personal -- they're just how brains 'chunk' information. Whereas conceptual frameworks are, presumably, linguistic (though not obviously or necessarily so), if a concept is just a node in an inferential nexus. (Not all concepts are like that, but clearly an important class of concepts are like that.)
Another important point that Horst makes is that different cognitive models can represent the world more or less well -- in his terms, they are "apt". (He puts it this way because he wants to say that only sentences are true or false, and cognitive models aren't sentential.) So mere pragmatic utility isn't the only criterion we can appeal to in assessing cognitive models.
What I'm not entirely clear on is how Horst thinks he avoid a relapse into transcendental idealism. He's aware of the danger, and wants to avoid, but I don't yet see how.
Clearly, all cognitive models are constrained by reality, just as our knowledge of reality is constrained by the parameters of our cognitive models (some of which are acquired and transformed, and others of which are hard-wired into us). The question is, how to accommodate both of those thoughts at the same time.
One point that Horst makes with which I fully agree is that thinking about minds as systems of cognitive models (though there are other dimensions of mindedness as well!) should instill some epistemic humility. We should be deeply skeptical of any meta-theory which purports to tell us What Reality Is Really Like.
More precisely, we should be skeptical of any metaphysics which assumes that we can transcend both evolutionary and cultural constraints on our capacity to represent reality and thereby represent Reality In Itself.
"Clearly, all cognitive models are constrained by reality"
ReplyDeleteThis is actually not all that clear. I think we'd need something like an account of 'proper function' added to that. Cognitive models within properly functioning brains are constrained by reality, or accurately map reality. A depressive brain, for instance, does not operate according to models that are beneficial for the organism (presumably for the clinically depressed individual, the depression deeply informs those pre-linguistic, subpersonal aspects of cognition).
I also don't see why transcendental idealism is a "danger." Go where the argument leads, I say, and then see if it sticks.
Also, I'm not so sure you are not purporting to argue for a picture that tells us what reality is really like. I find moralizing about epistemic humility is little more than a tactic to paint one's own view as virtuous. In your case, this is done without any substantive account of virtue. "Humility" in this case is what Nietzsche refers to as a mere "virtue-word" (see "equality"), something that merely excites the sentiment of the reader to desire the moral comfort that might be granted by taking on the view of the author. Only believe this, and you will be humble.
I hope you'll forgive my rant, though.
This is actually not all that clear. I think we'd need something like an account of 'proper function' added to that. Cognitive models within properly functioning brains are constrained by reality, or accurately map reality. A depressive brain, for instance, does not operate according to models that are beneficial for the organism (presumably for the clinically depressed individual, the depression deeply informs those pre-linguistic, subpersonal aspects of cognition).
ReplyDeleteI accept the general point being made here -- that something like the "proper function" of the cognitive model needs to be added to the account.
I'm less enthusiastic about the particular example, because I tend to think of depression as an affective state rather than a cognitive one, although it does impact cognition, e.g. a depressed person is more likely to ignore evidence that conflicts with his or her depressed self-assessment.
More generally, not everything mental is cognitive -- there's also got to be something said about feelings, moods, and sensations in a comprehensive account of mindedness. Those do play an important role in the psychic life of the organism or person, but they tend to not generate epistemological problems. (But maybe that's a problem?)
I also don't see why transcendental idealism is a "danger." Go where the argument leads, I say, and then see if it sticks.
There is something to this, but I want to avoid having a view that is phenomenologically indefensible. A good account of mindedness and the relation between experience and nature should tell us why we experience the world as we do.
But I don't think that transcendental idealism does that. I don't see how transcendental idealism can explain the phenomenological fact that a central part of human experience consists of how reality impinges on our conceptual schemes in unexpected and unpredicted ways -- sometimes delightfully surprising, sometimes anxiety-inducing, and sometimes downright horrifying.
If everything that we could experience was already cut down to fit our conceptual schemes, there would be no way of explaining the experience of ontological surprise.
There's the further fact that Kant's specific version of transcendental idealism has been empirically falsified by special relativity, because we can not only conceive of non-Euclidean geometries (which Kant might perhaps have allowed for) but also empirically determine that the physical world is better modeled in terms of non-Euclidean geometries than in terms of Euclidean geometries. I don't think that Kant's system can accommodate that fact.
Also, I'm not so sure you are not purporting to argue for a picture that tells us what reality is really like.
Fair enough. At this point I'm still working through this question to a considerable extent.
I do think that pretty much any "inventory ontology" -- a specification of what objects, kinds, and relations there are -- is indexed to a particular way of modeling reality.
But that does not mean that we can not (or should not) say anything at all about what reality is like independently of model-indexed specifications. After all, I do need to say something about what model-independent reality is like such that it can be modeled at all!
I find moralizing about epistemic humility is little more than a tactic to paint one's own view as virtuous. In your case, this is done without any substantive account of virtue. "Humility" in this case is what Nietzsche refers to as a mere "virtue-word" (see "equality"), something that merely excites the sentiment of the reader to desire the moral comfort that might be granted by taking on the view of the author. Only believe this, and you will be humble.
I'll accept that I deserve that. :)