Tuesday, November 1, 2011

Crickets still chirping... (Updated)

Over a year ago, in the combox of a post on another topic, a reader asked for my opinion of Stephen Law’s “evil-god challenge” to theism.  In the same combox, I dashed off some brief remarks in response.  To my surprise, Law called attention to my off-the-cuff remarks over at his own blog, and offered a testy response in my combox.  He suggested that I read his article on the subject and told his own readers: “I have rattled [Feser’s] cage with a comment… Wonder if he'll respond?”

Well, I did read his article and I did respond both to the article and to his combox remarks, non-polemically and in detail.   Over a year later, I am still waiting for Law’s reply – a reply he said he would write.  Wonder if he’ll ever get to it?

Mind you, I don’t necessarily blame him for not replying.  He said he was busy, and I believe him.  I am extremely busy myself and don’t have time to reply to more than a fraction of the people who comment on my work.  But a reader’s remarks suggest that it may be a good idea for Law to get to it already: 

I also listened to [William Lane Craig’s] first debate with Dr Stephen Law last Friday and found the debate both frustrating and confusing.  Dr Law used the "Evil God Challenge" as his central (I might even say his only) argument of the night… 

I also noticed that Stephen Law (on his website) had said that he would reply to your more considered critique when he was less busy, although he doesn't appear to have done so yet.

Considering that you had replied to him a full year ago, and pretty comprehensively it appeared to me, I was doubly surprised that he had chosen to go with the Evil God Challenge against Dr Craig.  He appears to have been telling everyone how well he did in the debate on his own blog, as well as on other blogs to those who disagree with him, which I find disturbing. 

If Law is going to keep presenting his “evil-god challenge” as if it were some knockout punch to theism generally, he really ought to reply to the points I made in my post.  For as I argued there, Law’s “challenge,” to the extent that it has any force at all, is a threat at most only to the modern, historically idiosyncratic, and anthropomorphic conception of God enshrined in what Brian Davies has labeled “theistic personalism” (and what others have called “neo-theism”).  It is irrelevant to the classical theism of Athanasius, Augustine, Anselm, Maimonides, Averroes, Avicenna, Aquinas, and classical (Neo-Platonic, Aristotelian, and Scholastic) theology more generally.  And thus it is irrelevant to what has historically been regarded as standard (and in some contexts, such as Catholicism, normative) Christian theology (not to mention historically standard Jewish theology, Muslim theology, or purely philosophical theology).  

No doubt Law gets away with presenting his “evil-god challenge” as if it were a threat to theism in general because most of his readers and listeners are as ignorant as he evidently is of the classical theistic tradition.  But while that may be good rhetorical strategy, it is bad philosophy.   

Since posting my more detailed reply to Law, I have written up a couple of other posts relevant to the topic of the relationship between God, goodness, and morality.  Readers interested in understanding what is wrong not only with Law’s argument but also with other common atheist arguments concerning God and morality (e.g. the so-called Euthyphro dilemma) are thus directed to the following:

“Law’s ‘evil-god challenge’”

“God, obligation, and the Euthyphro dilemma”

“Does morality depend on God?” 

Readers who want a more detailed account of the classical theistic conception of God and how it differs from theistic personalism might also look at the following: 

“William Lane Craig on divine simplicity”

“Davies on divine simplicity and freedom” 

“Classical theism”

“God, man, and classical theism” 

“The ‘one god further’ objection”

“A further thought on the ‘one god further’ objection” 

Obviously, what I have to say on the subject in my books Aquinas and The Last Superstition is relevant too.  (For example, anyone who is going to comment on the relationship between God and goodness had better know something about the Scholastic doctrine of the transcendentals, which I discuss in chapter 2 of Aquinas.)

UPDATE: See the combox below for a response by Stephen Law and my reply.

209 comments:

  1. I don't understand some people who attack some argument P against concept Q and maintain P is a failure for not refuting R.

    I think we should recognize that faulting some argument against theistic-personalism for not refuting classical theism is a mistake. We should rather strive for clarity by authors by pressing that they ought to make note that their argument P refutes Q but not R.

    Also, lets scrap the insults, don't use names such as "Funnyatheists". Instead encourage clarity and education on topics by showing that some argument P refutes Q, but Q is different than R so R still stands untouched.

    As an irrelevant side note: Would theists here be fine with an atheist using the name "Funnytheists" to mock young earth creationists such as Ray Comfort? I doubt it.

    ReplyDelete
  2. >Also, lets scrap the insults, don't use names such as "Funnyatheists".

    I disagree at some point you have to use satire against willfully ignorant persons.

    Funnyatheists is an anonymous gadfly who shows up now and the to tweak the noses of the Fundie Class of Atheists who take themselves way too seriously.

    I welcome it.

    That having been said we should strive for clarity but we should throw our pearls before swine either.

    Cheers friend.

    ReplyDelete
  3. BTW FunnyAtheists Blog is hysterical!

    Read his Stephen Law demotivator.

    Beyond funny....

    Follow the link from his name to the blog.

    Too funny. Love that blog.

    FunnyAtheist vs TOF?

    I can't choose.

    ReplyDelete
  4. It's ironic that Stephen Law's "evil god challenge" is itself ruled out by empirical evidence - since he is unable to produce any empirical evidence to back his claim that "most Christians" rule out an evil god based on the good in the world.

    ReplyDelete
  5. BenYachov: Sorry no but as Brian Davies proves if God is not a moral agent then the problem of Evil is a non-problem.

    It's not quite that simple. You make it sound as though God could do horrible things but we just couldn't blame Him. However, theology teaches us that God is rational and loving, so we know there are things God wouldn't do regardless their moral status (or lack thereof). The reason evil isn't a problem is because (as I believe George R. pointed out above), we can't identify any gratuitous evils. The mere existence of suffering isn't enough, because there can be rational reasons to allow it.

    ReplyDelete
  6. >It's not quite that simple. You make it sound as though God could do horrible things but we just couldn't blame Him.

    Well we can't blame him since he has no moral obligations to us. Aquinas said God has no obligations to us.

    >However, theology teaches us that God is rational and loving,

    His "rationality" is analogously
    to ours but completely incomprehensible. His love for us is simply His will for us to receive the ultimate good.

    God doesn't have emotions.

    >so we know there are things God wouldn't do regardless their moral status (or lack thereof).

    Rather "couldn't" do because it would be given His nature incoherent for him to do it.

    For example "Torturing babies to death for fun". A Sadist is the sort of person who feels pleasure inflicting pain on others. Evil is often the pursuit of a good in a disordered fashion. A Sadist wants to feel powerful because he feels helpless. God is already all powerful and God has no emotions thus he doesn't need to feel powerful or feel what He perfectly knows himself to be.

    That is one reason why just because God is not a moral agent he can't do what he wants.

    >The reason evil isn't a problem is because (as I believe George R. pointed out above), we can't identify any gratuitous evils.

    That is a possible response to Rowe if one take the Theistic Skeptical view but I think it is simply better to rather then find a way to get God off the hook show that God isn't the sort of Thing that can coherently be hooked in the first place.

    >The mere existence of suffering isn't enough, because there can be rational reasons to allow it.

    Knock yourself out but I see no reason to try and vindicate the Theistic Personalist God. The True God of the Catholic Church is sufficient. God is not a moral agent. God owes us nothing thus the Problem of Evil is a pseudo-problem according to Davies.

    ReplyDelete
  7. BenYachov: Well we can't blame him since he has no moral obligations to us. Aquinas said God has no obligations to us.

    Yes, of course. But that's not the point (nor anything to do with Theistic Personalism): I'm merely noting that to fix on that point could mislead someone into thinking that it's all right for God to do evil things because He can't be morally culpable for them. But instead the point is that, as you say, it would be incoherent for God to do certain things.



    That is a possible response to Rowe if one take the Theistic Skeptical view but I think it is simply better to rather then find a way to get God off the hook show that God isn't the sort of Thing that can coherently be hooked in the first place.

    I also don't think "skeptical theism" is the right name for it. (I know that's not your term for it, but I think mischaracterises the real answer.) It's like somebody saying, "If I found a right-angled triangle where the square of the hypotenuse didn't equal the sum of the squares of the other two sides, then Pythagoras's Theorem would be wrong." The response isn't to say, "Oh well, we're not dealing with Euclidean triangles here anyway" (although that may also true, just as God is also not a moral agent). If somebody found such a triangle that would indeed be a problem for the Pythagorean Theorem; but the answer is that we know the theorem is true and therefore you will never find such a triangle. There's nothing skeptical about that — far from it. It's not that we are "skeptical" of ever successfully identifying such a triangle. It's that we have proof that there can be no such triangle.

    ReplyDelete
  8. >But instead the point is that, as you say, it would be incoherent for God to do certain things.



    Sadly in a world where people have an attention span of 20 minutes or less confusion is more easy to come by then understanding.

    Like trying to explain the Trinity to persons who insist at all costs of equating it with Tri-Theism.

    ReplyDelete